Turkish and Azerbaijani Public Opinion on Armenia and Armenians

Azerbaijani and Turkish hostility towards Armenia and Armenians is deeply rooted in historical, territorial, and ethnic conflicts that have shaped the relations between these nations. It is a complex phenomenon rooted in a history of violence, territorial claims, and nationalist narratives. In both Azerbaijan and Turkey, official rhetoric often portrays Armenians as historical enemies. This narrative is reinforced through education, media, and political discourse, creating a climate of hostility. Historical violence and modern conflicts have led to mutual distrust and fear among the populations, reinforcing ethnic divides. Turkey’s unwavering support for Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict strengthens the alignment between the two countries against Armenia. This alliance is seen as part of a broader strategy of regional influence and solidarity among Turkic peoples. Armenia’s lack of diplomatic relations with Turkey and its closed borders with both Turkey and Azerbaijan contribute to its geopolitical isolation. 

The Armenian Genocide, carried out by the Ottoman Empire during World War I, is a central issue in Turkish-Armenian relations. The systematic mass killing and forced deportation of Armenians from their ancestral lands remain a source of profound animosity. Turkey’s denial of the genocide further exacerbates tensions. During the Soviet era, tensions simmered between the Armenian and Azerbaijani SSR’s, especially over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The primary source of hostility between Azerbaijan and Armenia is the dispute over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, a predominantly Armenian-populated area within Azerbaijan’s borders. The war in the early 1990s, which resulted in Armenian forces took control over Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding territories, fueled deep-seated animosity. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war reignited hostilities, with Azerbaijan, supported by Turkey. The conflict brought widespread destruction, displacement, and suffering for Armenian people, further deepening enmity.

The historical relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey is characterized by deep cultural, linguistic, and political ties, often summarized by the phrase “one nation, two states.” This connection is rooted in their shared Turkic heritage, language similarities, and cultural traditions. The relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey is a blend of deep historical ties, cultural similarities, and strategic geopolitical interests. Both countries trace their roots to Turkic ancestry and have based their notion of citizenship on this ancestry, thereby excluding other ethnic groups. This leads to a constant suspicion towards communities other than Turks and results in discrimination against non-Turks. The Turkic language family and similar customs have fostered a strong sense of kinship. Both Azerbaijan and Turkey are predominantly Muslim countries, although in Turkey majority of population adhering to Sunni Islam, and in Azerbaijan the percentage of Shia Muslim community reaches 85 percent. This sectarian difference, which can lead to problems between other states even resulting in war, is overlooked because the two countries align their interests and prioritize ethnic identity over religious identity in their relationship.

Throughout the 20th century and into the present day, Azerbaijan and Turkey have maintained a close political alliance. Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Azerbaijan’s independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since then, the two countries have collaborated on various political, economic, and military fronts. Both Azerbaijani and Turkish public opinion are significantly shaped by historical conflicts and grievances with Armenia and Armenians. The public opinion in Turkey often aligns with Azerbaijan in regional disputes. There is a sense of solidarity with Azerbaijan’s stance, and Turkish media frequently highlight this unity. Turkey’s support during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war was a significant demonstration of their common enmity against Armenians and Armenia.

Public opinion in both countries is often characterized by a negative perception of Armenia, and this shared perception further strengthens Turkish-Azerbaijani solidarity. The public in Azerbaijan supports the strategic partnership with Turkey, valuing Turkish support in political, military, and economic spheres. This cooperation is seen as vital for Azerbaijan’s national interests and security. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a central issue in both countries’ perception of Armenia. The Azerbaijani public sees Armenia as an occupier of its territory, and Turkish public opinion is largely supportive of Azerbaijan’s stance. The recent conflicts reinforced these views, with Turkey openly supporting Azerbaijan. Both publics often frame their national identity in opposition to Armenia. The narrative of a common enemy helps to reinforce the “Two states, one nation” slogan, emphasizing solidarity against a perceived threat. Media in both countries frequently portray Armenians and Armenia in a negative light, focusing on conflicts and tensions rather than potential cooperation or reconciliation. This consistent narrative reinforces negative perceptions among the public. 

In Turkey, there is a somewhat broader spectrum of public debate regarding Armenia and Armenians. While the dominant narrative is negative, there are also voices advocating for reconciliation and historical recognition. In Azerbaijan, public opinion is more uniformly negative, with less public space for alternative narratives due to the direct impact of the conflict.

Many Turks view Azerbaijan as a brotherly nation, sharing a common ethnic, linguistic, and cultural heritage. There is strong public support for cooperation in various fields such as economy, education, culture, and military. Turkish people generally view collaborative efforts with Azerbaijan positively, seeing them as mutually beneficial. Economic cooperation, particularly in the energy sector, is seen as crucial. Projects like the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) are viewed positively, as they enhance Turkey’s strategic importance and energy security.

Azerbaijanis generally regard Turkey as a fraternal ally, with a shared history and cultural ties. This cooperation is seen as vital for Azerbaijan’s national interests and security. There is enthusiasm for educational and cultural exchanges with Turkey. Many Azerbaijani students study in Turkey. Azerbaijani public opinion generally supports military collaboration with Turkey, especially in light of hostility towards Armenia and Armenians. The joint military exercises and Turkey’s support during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have reinforced this sentiment. Economic ties, including trade and investment, are viewed positively. The public sees Turkey as a key economic partner that can help boost Azerbaijan’s development.

Turkish public opinion about Armenia and Armenians has evolved over time, influenced by historical events, political developments, and changes in societal attitudes. The relationship has been marked by deep-seated tensions, largely stemming from the legacy of the Armenian Genocide and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 

Following the Armenian Genocide of 1915-1917, during which 1.5 million Armenians were killed or forcibly displaced by the Ottoman Empire, relations between Turks and Armenians were marked by silence and denial. The Turkish state adopted a policy of denial regarding the genocide, which deeply influenced public opinion. For decades, the events were either not discussed publicly or were presented through a state-sanctioned narrative that denied responsibility. Armenians who remained in Turkey became a marginalized minority, with their history largely erased from public discourse. Negative stereotypes and distrust towards Armenians persisted, fueled by nationalist rhetoric. Throughout the mid-20th century, the Turkish government continued its policy of denying the Armenian Genocide, which was reflected in public opinion. Armenians were often viewed with suspicion, and any claims of genocide were dismissed as foreign propaganda aimed at weakening Turkey.

During the Cold War, Turkey’s strategic alliance with the West and its geopolitical concerns, particularly regarding the Soviet Union (which included Armenia as a Soviet republic), contributed to a sense of distrust towards Armenians. This period also saw the rise of Armenian diaspora activism, particularly the push for genocide recognition, which further strained relations. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) carried out attacks on Turkish diplomats and institutions around the world, demanding recognition of the genocide. These attacks led to increased hostility towards Armenians in Turkey, with public opinion hardening against Armenian demands for recognition and justice.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the late 1980s and early 1990s had a profound impact on Turkish public opinion. The conflict led to a surge in pro-Azerbaijani sentiment in Turkey and a corresponding rise in hostility towards Armenia. The perception of Armenians as aggressors in this conflict further deepened negative attitudes. During this period, media broadcasts, films, and songs that supported Azerbaijan in the Karabakh issue, depicting Azerbaijanis as victims and Armenians as ruthless aggressors played an important role in shaping public opinion. The early 2000s saw a rise in nationalist sentiment in Turkey, partly as a reaction to increasing international pressure to recognize the Armenian Genocide. Public opinion remained largely aligned with the state’s denialist stance, with many Turks viewing Armenian calls for recognition as unjustified attacks on their national identity.

Despite this, the early 2000s also witnessed the beginning of more open debates within Turkish society about the Armenian Genocide. Intellectuals, journalists, and some politicians started to challenge the official narrative, leading to increased awareness and, in some cases, empathy towards Armenians. However, these debates often led to polarized opinions, with strong backlash from nationalist segments of society. As more countries around the world recognized the Armenian Genocide, Turkish public opinion became increasingly polarized. On one hand, there was growing acknowledgment of the genocide among certain segments of the population, especially among younger generations and liberal intellectuals. On the other hand, nationalist groups and much of the general public continued to resist these acknowledgments, often viewing them as foreign interference in Turkish affairs.

The Turkish government today, under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, maintained a firm stance against genocide recognition, which influenced public opinion. Statements by government officials and media often framed Armenian demands as part of a broader conspiracy against Turkey, reinforcing negative perceptions. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in which Turkey provided strong support to Azerbaijan, had a significant impact on public opinion. The Turkish public largely supported Azerbaijan’s military actions, viewing the conflict through a nationalist and religious lens. This period saw a resurgence of anti-Armenian sentiment, with many Turks celebrating Azerbaijan’s victories as a triumph for the Turkic world.

Today, Turkish public opinion remains deeply divided. While there is a growing segment of the population that acknowledges the Armenian Genocide and seeks reconciliation, the majority of the public, influenced by nationalist rhetoric and state policies, continues to deny the genocide and harbors negative views towards Armenians. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has further solidified these attitudes, with public opinion often equating Armenians with historical enmity and territorial disputes.

In summary, Turkish public opinion about Armenia and Armenians has evolved from a post-genocide atmosphere of denial and marginalization, through periods of heightened nationalism and conflict, to a present-day context marked by deep polarization. While there are signs of change and growing awareness, particularly among younger and more liberal Turks, hostility and denialism remain strong, particularly in the wake of the recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Turkish public opinion regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has evolved significantly from the 1990s to the present, shaped by historical ties, political developments, and regional dynamics. In the early 1990s, as the Soviet Union collapsed, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict erupted into full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkish public opinion quickly aligned with Azerbaijan due to shared ethnic and cultural ties, as well as the perception of Armenia as an aggressor occupying Azerbaijani territory. Turkish media extensively covered the conflict, often highlighting the suffering of Azerbaijani civilians and framing Armenia as the antagonist. This coverage reinforced a narrative of solidarity with Azerbaijan. The Turkish government, led by various administrations throughout the decade, consistently supported Azerbaijan, including closing its border with Armenia in 1993 in response to Armenian advances in Nagorno-Karabakh. Public opinion mirrored this official stance, with widespread support for Azerbaijan’s territorial claims.

Throughout the 2000s, Turkish public opinion on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remained firmly pro-Azerbaijan. The Turkish public viewed the conflict as part of a broader struggle between Turkic nations and Armenia, bolstered by nationalist rhetoric. During this period, Turkey and Azerbaijan further strengthened cultural and economic ties. Public opinion was shaped by frequent references to the concept of “one nation, two states,” emphasizing the deep bond between the two countries. The Turkish government continued its policy of non-recognition of Armenia’s control over Nagorno-Karabakh, and any attempts at rapprochement with Armenia, such as the 2009 Zurich Protocols, were met with skepticism or outright opposition by much of the Turkish public. In this and similar processes of rapprochement with Armenia, some media and political institutions in Turkey, which are extensions of the Azerbaijani political power, influenced public opinion to ensure that Azerbaijan’s positions were accepted by public, thereby preventing Turkey from developing an independent stance on Armenia.

The 2010s saw heightened tensions in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, with sporadic clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces. Turkish public opinion remained steadfastly supportive of Azerbaijan, with little sympathy for Armenia’s position. Nationalism in Turkey gained strength during this period, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue was often framed as part of Turkey’s broader national interests, with the Turkish public increasingly viewing the conflict through a nationalist lens. During this period, the rapid weakening of Turkey’s fragile democracy, the increasing establishment of one-man rule under Erdoğan, and the regime’s portrayal of its partnership with Azerbaijan in Caucasus politics as a major success made Turkey’s foreign policy in this area completely shallow and one-dimensional. As a result, any potential for peaceful initiatives with Armenia was indefinitely frozen. Moreover, the rise of social media also played a role in mobilizing public opinion. Pro-Azerbaijan sentiment, nationalist rhetoric, and anti-Armenian messages spread widely, further entrenching public support for Azerbaijan.

The most significant shift in Turkish public opinion occurred during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. Turkey’s active political, military, and diplomatic support for Azerbaijan during the conflict was met with overwhelming public approval. Many in Turkey viewed Azerbaijan’s military successes as a victory not just for Azerbaijan but for Turkey as well. This perspective was the result of decades of propaganda imposed by the Turkish government. Public celebrations in Turkey following Azerbaijan’s recapture of territories were widespread, with the Turkish flag often flown alongside the Azerbaijani flag. The Turkish public’s perception of the conflict solidified around a narrative of victory and justice, with little room for empathy towards Armenia. The successful outcome for Azerbaijan further cemented the view that Turkey’s unwavering support was both justified and effective.

Today, Turkish public opinion remains firmly pro-Azerbaijan, with little change in the perception of Armenia. The public generally sees the Nagorno-Karabakh issue as resolved in Azerbaijan’s favor, and there is widespread pride in Turkey’s role in the conflict. Nationalist sentiment continues to influence public opinion, with any discussions about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict often invoking broader themes of Turkish and Turkic unity against perceived external threats.

Liberal-minded Turkish intellectuals have played a crucial role in Armenian-Turkish reconciliation efforts, challenging the official narratives, advocating for historical truth, and fostering dialogue between the two nations. Their contributions, though often met with significant resistance, have been instrumental in pushing the boundaries of public discourse and promoting a more nuanced understanding of the complex history between Turkey and Armenia. Liberal-minded Turkish intellectuals have played a vital role in advocating for Armenian-Turkish reconciliation, often at great personal and professional risk. Their work has helped to challenge official narratives, promote dialogue, and slowly shift public opinion towards a more open and honest discussion of the past. While significant challenges remain, their contributions have laid important foundations for future reconciliation efforts between Turkey and Armenia.

However, during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, liberal-minded Turkish intellectuals played a more limited role compared to their broader efforts in advocating for Armenian-Turkish reconciliation. The nationalist fervor in Turkey during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war made it difficult for liberal intellectuals to voice opposition to the war or express sympathy for the Armenian side. The overwhelming public and governmental support for Azerbaijan in Turkey created a challenging environment for dissent. Some liberal intellectuals focused on the humanitarian aspect of the conflict, expressing concern for the displacement of civilians, including Armenians, as a result of the war. They highlighted the human cost of the conflict and called for the protection of civilians and the need for peace. However, these voices were often marginalized or criticized within the broader public discourse.

A few intellectuals attempted to link the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to the broader historical context of Armenian-Turkish relations, including the legacy of the Armenian Genocide. They argued that unresolved historical grievances contributed to the ongoing tensions and that genuine reconciliation would require addressing these historical issues. However, these arguments were often overshadowed by the immediate focus on the war itself. Some intellectuals criticized the militaristic approach to the conflict, arguing that it would only perpetuate cycles of violence and suffering. They advocated for a more balanced perspective that recognized the suffering on both sides, although these views were not widely accepted in the dominant public narrative.

After the war ended, some intellectuals began to engage in more critical analysis of the conflict’s causes and consequences, including the displacement of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. These reflections often focused on the need for long-term peacebuilding efforts and the importance of addressing historical grievances to prevent future conflicts. Intellectuals who spoke out against the war or expressed concern for Armenians often faced significant backlash, including accusations of being unpatriotic or betraying Turkish and Azerbaijani interests. Despite their efforts, these intellectuals had little direct influence on Turkish policy during the war, as the government and the broader public were largely united in their support for Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijani public opinion about Armenia and Armenians has evolved over time, heavily influenced by the historical, political, and military conflicts between the two nations, particularly the ongoing dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh. During the Soviet era, Armenia and Azerbaijan were both part of the Soviet Union, and while ethnic tensions existed, they were largely suppressed by the central government’s policies of promoting socialist unity and brotherhood among the various nationalities. The late 1980s saw the rise of ethnic nationalism in Azerbaijan as the Soviet Union began to weaken. The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, a predominantly Armenian-populated region within Azerbaijan SSR, became the flashpoint for escalating tensions. The conflict quickly escalated into violence, with pogroms against Armenians in Azerbaijani cities like Sumgait and Baku. As the Soviet Union collapsed, Armenia and Azerbaijan declared independence, and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict erupted into full-scale war. The war, which lasted from 1991 to 1994, resulted in significant Azerbaijani territorial losses, including Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions. This period cemented a deep animosity towards Armenians in Azerbaijani public opinion, as Armenians were seen as occupiers of Azerbaijani land.

After the 1994 ceasefire, Azerbaijani public opinion remained deeply hostile towards Armenians, fueled by the loss of territory and the plight of the displaced. The Nagorno-Karabakh issue became central to Azerbaijani national identity, with the government promoting a narrative of Armenian aggression and occupation. The economic difficulties faced by Azerbaijan in the post-war period further intensified nationalist sentiments. The unresolved conflict and the presence of a large displaced population kept the issue at the forefront of public consciousness.Hostility towards Armenians and Armenia, along with the promise of victory in Karabakh, was used as a tool by President Heydar Aliyev and his son Ilham Aliyev, who succeeded him, to maintain their hold on power in Azerbaijan. For this purpose, generations of Azerbaijanis were raised with animosity towards Armenians. Azerbaijani media and education systems reinforced negative perceptions of Armenians, often portraying them as enemies of the Azerbaijani state and people. 

Throughout the 2010s, Azerbaijan’s economy, bolstered by oil revenues, allowed for significant military buildup. Public opinion became increasingly focused on the possibility of a military solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, with government rhetoric often emphasizing the need to restore territorial integrity. Nationalism continued to be a powerful force, with public opinion consistently reflecting strong support for reclaiming Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding areas by force if necessary. The government’s hardline stance on the conflict was mirrored by widespread public support. Sporadic clashes along the line of contact between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces kept tensions high. These incidents, often widely reported in Azerbaijani media, reinforced negative views of Armenians and the belief that military action was necessary. The reception and rewarding of Ramil Safarov as a hero in Azerbaijan after his darkly controversial extradition from Hungary, following his attack and murder of his Armenian colleague Gurgen Margaryan with an axe during a NATO meeting serves as a significant symbol for understanding the prevailing social psychology in Azerbaijan during this period.

The 2020 conflict marked a turning point in Azerbaijani public opinion. Azerbaijan’s military successes during the war, which resulted in the recapture of significant territories, were met with widespread public euphoria. After the war, Azerbaijani public opinion remained deeply hostile towards Armenians. The war also reinforced the narrative that military strength and determination were key to resolving the conflict. Nationalist sentiments remain strong, with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict still central to national identity. Public opinion continues to view Armenians with distrust and hostility, but there is also a sense of finality, as many believe the conflict has been resolved in Azerbaijan’s favor.

Today, Azerbaijani public opinion towards Armenians remains marked by deep-rooted hostility, shaped by decades of conflict and nationalist rhetoric. The memory of the war and the displacement of Azerbaijani communities continues to fuel negative perceptions. Although public discourse remains largely hostile, there are some voices within Azerbaijani society calling for reconciliation and peace, particularly among younger generations and intellectuals. However, these voices are currently in the minority, and public opinion remains largely aligned with the government’s hardline stance.

The public perceptions of Azerbaijan and Turkey about each other are positive, whereas their perceptions of Armenia and Armenians are negative. This plays a significant role in determining the policies of both countries towards Armenia. However, it would be naive to say that public perception is a neutral domain. Certainly, just as public opinion is influential in shaping politics, political power and relationships also shape public opinion. Both in Turkey and Azerbaijan, political powers create, direct, and construct public perception. As a result of these activities, the “Two states, one nation” perception not only signifies the friendship between the two countries and their peoples but, perhaps even more so, indicates a joint stance against Armenia and Armenians. Deconstructing the perception that Turkish and Azerbaijani peoples are friends and brothers while Armenians are enemies is crucial for developing peaceful and rational policies in the Caucasus in the future. Because when examined more closely, regardless of the type of ethnic bond between Turks and Azerbaijanis, a more realistic assessment of the Armenians’ relationships with Azerbaijanis, Turks, and other peoples of the region—whether in the Caucasus or in Historical Armenia, which today lies within Turkey’s borders—will reveal much more clearly that Armenians, who have had a much older presence and have built a rich civilization in this region, are an inseparable part of this geography.