Kenneth EaswaranAssociate Professor of Philosophy
Phone: (213) 740-3072
Office: STO 227
- B.A. Music and Philosophy, Stanford University, 6/2002
- B.S. Mathematics, Stanford University, 6/2002
- Ph.D. Logic and the Methodology of Science, UC Berkeley, 5/2008
- Research Fellow, Australian National University, Fall 2008
- Easwaran, K. (2011). Varieties of Conditional Probability. (Vol. Philosophy of Statistics). pp. 137-152.
- Easwaran, K. (2008). Review of Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence, and Truth, by Jody Azzouni. The Philosophical Review.
- Easwaran, K. (2013). Regularity and Hyperreal Credences. The Philosophical Review. Vol. 123
- Easwaran, K. (2013). Why Countable Additivity?. Thought. Vol. 2, pp. 53-61.
- Easwaran, K. (2013). Expected Accuracy Supports Conditionalization - and Conglomerability and Reflection. Philosophy of Science.
- Easwaran, K. (2012). Why Physics Uses Second Derivatives. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
- Easwaran, K., Fitelson, B. (2012). An 'Evidentialist' Worry about Joyce's Argument for Probabilism. Dialectica. Vol. 66 (3), pp. 425-433.
- Easwaran, K., Monton, B. (2012). Mixed Strategies, Uncountable Times, and Pascal's Wager: a Reply to Robertson. Analysis. Vol. 72 (4)
- Easwaran, K. (2011). Bayesianism I: Introduction and Arguments in Favor. Philosophy Compass.
- Easwaran, K. (2011). Bayesianism II: Criticisms and Applications. Philosophy Compass.
- Easwaran, K. (2010). Logic and Probability. Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research. Vol. 27 (2), pp. 229-253.
- Easwaran, K. (2009). Probabilistic Proofs and Transferability. Philosophia Mathematica. Vol. 17 (3), pp. 341-362.
- Colyvan, M., Easwaran, K. (2008). Mathematical and Physical Continuity. Australasian Journal of Logic. Vol. 6, pp. 87-93.
- Easwaran, K. (2008). Strong and Weak Expectations. Mind. Vol. 117, pp. 633-641.
- Easwaran, K. (2008). The Role of Axioms in Mathematics. Erkenntnis. Vol. 68 (3)
Description of Research
Summary Statement of Research Interests
Kenny Easwaran works in the areas of epistemology and the philosophy of mathematics. His work in epistemology focuses on the mathematical notions of probability theory, and how they can help clarify the pre-theoretic notions of belief, justification, knowledge, and the like. In particular, his research has focused on cases involving probability zero, and what they can show about the notions of conditional and unconditional probability in other cases. In the philosophy of mathematics he is particularly interested in set theory and its foundations. In particular, he has worked on the question of what role axioms play in mathematical reasoning, and how they can serve a useful epistemological role despite the ongoing debates about the ontological questions of mathematics (whether abstract objects exist, and whether they are the right sort of thing for us to be able to come to have knowledge about). Additionally, he is interested in the role that the social practices of mathematics play in the development of mathematical knowledge, and the constraints they put on the notions of proof that are acceptable to mathematicians.
Philosophy of Mathematics, Mathematical Logic, Formal Epistemology
- School of Philosophy
- 3709 Trousdale Parkway
- Mudd Hall of Philosophy, MHP 113
- Phone: (213) 740 - 4084
- Email: firstname.lastname@example.org