Faithful Action: Working with Religious Groups in Disaster Planning, Response and Recovery

This report details the need for increased involvement of the faith community, a discussion of barriers that both public agencies and faith groups face as they attempt to work together, and the benefits of bringing public agencies and faith communities together to address important social needs, in particular for emergencies and disasters in California.

Download a PDF of this report

Executive Summary
Faith-based organizations provide services before, during, and after disasters. Studies of catastrophes—from 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina to local wildfires—describe the important role of the faith community as a source of physical, social, and spiritual care. The role of congregations and FBOs has not been regarded as a significant part of disaster preparedness, response and recovery plans by public agencies, outside of the work done by some VOADs (Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster). This report details the need for increased involvement of the faith community, a discussion of barriers that both public agencies and faith groups face as they attempt to work together, and the benefits of bringing public agencies and faith communities together to address important social needs, in particular for this report, to be strategic partners with emergency managers and public health emergency agencies in building and sustaining disaster resilient communities in California. This partnership must encompass all phases of the disaster lifecycle: mitigation education, preparedness training/planning, as well as short and long-term recovery. Intermediary organizations could also play a role in enhancing the ability of faith groups of all kinds to participate with public agencies.

In order to facilitate the process of mutual learning between public agencies and faith communities, this report outlines a method of identifying the most likely candidates that could be successfully included in such a partnership. The report details four tiers of faith communities, based on their resources, capacity, and capability to engage publicly on issues like disaster preparedness and response.

Finally, the report provides several recommendations for public agencies generally, and Cal EMA in particular, as they seek to competently engage with faith communities in their disaster efforts. The following bullet points summarize the recommendations.

Strengthen Existing and Enable Emergent Networks
Create and/or enable strong, well-organized, self-governed and sustainable intermediary organizations to act as a bridge between government offices, and judicatory bodies, FBOs and congregations

Build Knowledge Within Public Agencies

• Create faith-based liaisons for each county
• Establishing a statewide faith-based steering committee
• Harness the network of faith-based liaisons within each government agency
• Create a manual for those working with faith communities
• Create and implement religious competency training programs and materials
• Create a more formal training regimen focused on the faith-based landscape for each area of operation

Assist and partner with Faith Groups

• Reduce building code and other legal barriers
• Link congregations to other community disaster infrastructure
• Use congregations as liaisons to special needs and at-risk populations
• Educate faith communities and their congregations about existing programs
• Capitalize on key opportunities to educate using congregations as information depots

Download the PDF of the report

Faith-based organizations (FBOs) and faith leaders serve as focal points for people seeking physical, social, emotional, and spiritual care when disasters strike, as evidenced by responses to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Hurricane Katrina, the 2009 California wildfires, the 2010 earthquake in Imperial County, California, and other events such as heat waves and blackouts. In fact, FBOs represented around two-thirds of the social service agencies involved in recovery efforts following the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina. A recent study determined that over 60 percent of Americans turn first to their religious leaders for advice and direction in times of crisis; this percentage has been found to be even higher in low-income and immigrant communities. Studies of 9/11 and Katrina also indicate that low-income populations—especially low-income immigrants—are less likely to have property or health insurance, be highly skilled, or work in well-paying industries. Consequently, they are the most vulnerable in the case of disasters, and face greater levels of economic, psychological, familial, and health-related hardship compared to non-immigrant or middle-class populations. As a result, their recovery challenges can also impede the long-term sustainable recovery of the broader community, with these groups looking to congregations and FBOs at higher rates than the general population. Thus, it is of the utmost importance to understand the potential (and limits) of faith communities and how they might be more of an integral part of the disaster planning, response, and recovery process.

Hurricane Katrina provides an excellent example of both the strengths and weaknesses of faith-based organizations operating in disaster response and recovery. Katrina, at its height a category five hurricane, caused catastrophic regional damage.¹  Breached levees flooded 80 percent of New Orleans and resulted in $75 billion in damages.² Katrina was responsible for at least 1,417 deaths, countless missing and over 1.5 million internally displaced persons.³

As sections of the New Orleans levee system collapsed, the natural disaster of Katrina deteriorated into a social debacle.⁴  Thousands of people—mostly African American, poor, and elderly—were trapped in the New Orleans Superdome and the city’s convention center, or on rooftops, without electricity or food.5  The consequences of this disaster were grave: 1.5 million people had to meet the challenge of where they would live or work, and pondered if they would ever return to their homes after such massive, widespread suffering, while also facing the shock of losing loved ones and dealing with confusion over federal policies regarding disaster relief.⁶

Many regard Hurricane Katrina as a moment when the system failed. Government incompetence—exemplified by a failure to prepare, to respond, and to adequately communicate risks—was fueled by perceived bigotry, hesitancy, and an impotent bureaucracy. In the midst of this failure, some faith-based and community actors rose spontaneously to fill the gaps and meet the needs of the many affected by this tremendous storm and its aftermath. Thus, the story of Katrina is also a story of awakening and realization. It has long been recognized that faith communities, their houses of worship and social service agencies offer relief programs, but Katrina set a new standard by shining the light anew on the domestic work done by faith-based organizations in response to local problems, both catastrophic and minor. The successful provision of services by FBOs and NGOs contrasts with the many chronicled deficiencies and failures of government during the catastrophic 2005 hurricane season.⁷

Worden (2006) has argued that the faith community provided the initial response because of its immediate proximity to the disaster:

From tiny storefront congregations to deep-pocketed denominations, the communities of faith arrived first. In the harrowing hours and days after Hurricane Katrina, when survivors roamed the desolate streets in search of water, food and medicine, (religious) groups—not FEMA, not the Red Cross, not the National Guard—provided dazed residents with their first hot meal, their first clean water, their first aspirin.

Researchers at the Institute for Southern Studies found that faith communities were among the first groups to respond to the overwhelming needs left behind in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.⁸  Similarly, Cain and Barthelemy (2008) found that Louisiana residents rated the effectiveness of the efforts of faith communities higher than other responding groups and agencies, even higher than large nonprofit groups (e.g., American Red Cross) and local and state government. Although officials say it is difficult to know the exact number of people who have volunteered in the Hurricane Katrina recovery, they estimate that more than one million volunteers have served in Louisiana and Mississippi since the storm. Many faith-based groups have helped residents return to their homes.⁹

Pete Hull’s report, “Heralding Unheard Voices,” (2006) includes hundreds of examples of the roles that faith-based organizations and congregations played in the wake of a disaster. For example, Temple Baptist Church, in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, opened its doors as a shelter for over 300 workers from the local power utility. Church volunteers operated the facility around the clock for three weeks so linemen and technicians could rest between their arduous shifts returning power to the battered community.¹⁰  In East Baton Rouge, Louisiana, University Methodist Church operated a distribution center that provided critical supplies to other shelters.¹¹  Elsewhere in Baton Rouge, Lifting Up This Temple Unto God Full Gospel Church used its bus to shuttle evacuees to medical clinics and bathing facilities.¹²  In Opelousas, Louisiana, Pastor Nathaniel Carter opened the New Life Church of God in Christ as a shelter on the night Hurricane Katrina made landfall.¹³  He did so without direction from any government authority.¹⁴  Over the next five months, the shelter provided refuge for 200 to 300 evacuees each evening.¹⁵

One year after the storm, many of those same groups continued to work across the Gulf Coast, from New Orleans to Alabama, adapting to the needs of the community and recruiting thousands of additional volunteers.¹⁶  Many congregations and groups committed themselves to the long-term tasks of recovery. Religious groups became the primary donors of free muscle power for displaced homeowners, repairing and rebuilding, once concrete block at a time.¹⁷  While the system fumbled, many different organizations—whether already existing, emergent because of the emergency, or extending their efforts into new areas—coupled with the spontaneous action of many individuals, did whatever was necessary to assist their communities. These groups and individuals exhibited cooperation and used their networks, innovative response tactics, and fundraising abilities to assist others, often without direction or assistance.

As the social safety net of the United States erodes, faith-communities often work to fill many of the unmet needs of their congregations and their surrounding communities on a day-to-day basis. They respond to public safety problems of gang violence by providing intervention programs. They bring hope and healing communities in times of distress, and operate food banks, shelters, clothing distribution. Congregations often see the effects of emerging societal trends, like the mortgage crisis, among their members and in their communities before they become public policy challenges. During natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes and earthquakes, congregations can marshal or have the potential to marshal additional resources, human capital, and other support to meet the pressing challenges of their communities in these emergency situations. They respond because caring for people in need is intrinsic to all religious traditions. Yet, they typically work outside of any government agency and without public funding or preexisting coordinated efforts. Congregations may undertake these efforts on their own, through denominational associations, or through network ties that leaders have formed with other congregations and FBOs. Others operate with little formal connection to other congregations or community-based efforts and are not able to contribute to larger efforts beyond their own walls.

Over the past decade, there has been increasing interest among public officials to engage the faith-based sector. This increase in both desire and mandate to work with faith-communities has not been adequately supported with the requisite knowledge, cultural competencies, and religious literacy to deal with the complexities of the many different faith-communities and the resulting myriad of organizational expressions in the United States. In fact, many government efforts see congregations solely as locations from which to execute government initiatives, source individual volunteers, or perhaps provide shelter during an emergency. Congregations are not understood as a system with unique institutional attributes, substantial underutilized assets, and organizational partners that can be more fully harnessed in times of crisis.

Similarly, congregations across the religious and political spectrum are simultaneously interested in, and cautious about, engagement with public officials. While they work to meet the needs of their congregants and their surrounding communities, and in some cases may have a more global perspective, many remain wary of partnerships with public agencies because of legitimate concerns about government intrusion into the lives of their congregations, or historic experiences of partnerships gone awry.

However, if the sustainable involvement of congregations can be systematized, there is great potential to increase their engagement and effectiveness in disaster preparedness and response. Understanding the capacity and capabilities of congregations and envisioning what they might be able to do with more training and sustained support represents an important step. Addressing mutual concerns and closing the knowledge gap that exists between faith communities and government will also enhance partnerships. Addressing this critical link in the emergency management and public health emergency chain will enable congregations, FBOs, and government efforts to more effectively and efficiently work together during times of crisis.

As Peter Gudaitis, president of the National Disaster Interfaiths Network, said of
congregational disaster response:

Most [congregations] thought it was a vocational imperative. There was a crisis, people were suffering, and they wanted to respond…typically, faith communities, their houses of worship and their social service agencies perceive their roles as primary. They’re not necessarily first responders, but they certainly perceive themselves as tertiary responders. Also, they often see themselves as being able to advocate best for the unmet needs in the community, because they typically know the most disadvantaged, and they tend to have a high level of understanding of culture and language and theological competency, so they often are the appropriate liaison between government and community or between faith communities or between neighbors and faith communities…The challenge lies in the fact that most congregations do not take appropriate steps to get preparedness training or familiarize themselves with the structures that exist post-crisis.

U.S. congregations number in excess of 345,000 making them the most ubiquitous institutions in all neighborhoods across the United States. In the five-county greater Los Angeles area, for example, there are more than 12,000 congregations.³⁵  In many urban neighborhoods, there can be more congregations per square mile than liquor stores, gas stations, and banks combined. For example, the MacArthur Park neighborhood of Los Angeles registers 67 congregations in one square mile. Congregations range in size from small storefronts to large megachurches the size of small college campuses, with the overall average size of congregations in the U.S. being about 200 individual members.

In order to adequately understand the potential role that faith communities can play in the disaster response system, it is necessary to understand first that each faith community has a unique form of organizational and cultural life, and particular demographic dynamics. These unique forms provide a reservoir of resources that can be leveraged in emergencies, assuming they can be pre-identified, integrated into a risk communication system, trained, sustained, and then activated in appropriate ways. Congregations represent access to different language and cultural competencies, including the ability to reach different immigrant groups and generational groupings, from young to old. Congregations also include communication networks, whether phone trees or e-mail lists, within the communities where they are located, across the broader geographic region, and even across the nation and internationally. Not only do congregations have these competencies, they provide these services on a regular basis by serving as destinations for information and various social and community services. Finally, congregations often have relationships with media representatives and outlets, and many have proven to be adept at working with the ethnic, religious, and mainstream media in their different efforts.³⁶

Furthermore, local congregations and FBOs are often integrated into the community. This identification imbues congregations with a dedication to serve their communities in times of need. Juliet Choi, former senior director of partner services for the American Red Cross says, “Churches can often get deeper into a community faster than secular rescue teams. There’s always a sense of comfort when you see someone who looks similar to you.”³⁷  For example, in the Deep South, volunteers from the National Baptist Convention—one of the largest African-American Christian denominations in the country, with over five million members—are an essential link between victims of disaster and government disaster services.³⁸

Governmental policies and procedures often exacerbate this need for community partners with local knowledge. During Katrina, both the Red Cross and FEMA used rotating teams consisting largely of outside volunteers, and the longer the emergency endured, a lack of knowledge about the local area became a problem.³⁹  Familiarity with local areas and perceived legitimacy were keys to overcoming the distrust of severely traumatized individuals.⁴⁰   Traditional responders, however, were typically unacquainted with local conditions, facilities, and services. Moreover, knowledge gained on the ground was lost as new teams rotated into the area.⁴¹  In addition, according to many responders, the rules seemed to change with each changing shift, creating confusion and frustration, and increasing a sense of insecurity when reassurance was critical. Even under the worst circumstances, when many human service agencies are damaged and inoperable, and therefore unavailable as referral sources, knowledge of the local topography and knowledge about how to navigate the local terrain is a critical advantage.⁴²

In addition to being centers of these broader cultural, demographic and network resources, congregations and their members also include an exhaustive variety of human, material, and spatial resources. For example, while it may seem fairly obvious, congregations include many different sorts of individuals. These individuals represent many different competencies, from medical professionals to tradespeople, such as carpenters and plumbers, to caregivers whose life work is to provide for the daily needs of the physically or mentally challenged. Congregations also have specialized ministries that target unique issues, needs, or populations, which can be utilized as points of response in times of disasters, if they are adequately prepared beforehand. Congregations also maintain detailed membership lists that include addresses and contact information. This information, and the congregation’s ability to communicate with its members, can be leveraged to increase the response from congregation members. Finally, congregations have many transportation competencies, represented not only in the many buses, vans and car pools that they organize to get their members to services, but also the public transportation routes on which their members live. Thus, not only do they often have the means to transport people around their communities, they also have an intimate knowledge of the infrastructure in their communities.

The physical space that congregations occupy represents another form of congregational resources that can be utilized during emergencies. Congregations have buildings that can serve a variety of functions in disaster response, from local command centers to shelters for people who may need medical care and/or are displaced from their homes. Similarly, parking lots provide open space
for organizing resources, staging operations, or even to erect temporary housing for people. And, of course, congregations have kitchens that can be utilized to feed the people who may be temporarily housed there, for people in the neighborhood, and for disaster relief workers. Congregations also represent a potential pool of financial resources, not only as a source of donations, but as a trusted and trustworthy place through which funds might be raised for and/or distributed to the community.

Finally, congregations represent a significant and respected form of moral capital in times of crisis. Religious leaders are generally recognized as having the sort of moral authority that can be used to calm communities and provide a vision of hope when otherwise panic or unrest may be lurking, or to advocate for overlooked or ignored populations in need in the wake of an emergency or disaster. This is evidenced by the role that Rev. Cecil Murray played in the civil unrest that followed the verdict in the Rodney King trial in 1992. Rev. Murray was a regular presence in the news media during those several days, and his efforts, along with other faith community leaders he had organized, served to calm many in the city during the violence and looting. His efforts following the unrest went a long way towards healing the breach in the social contract in the days and months following the events of 1992.⁴³  Further, this type of engagement with the community by religious leaders can help address issues related to “meaning making” and can serve as a buffer against long-term psychological consequences.

In order to mitigate, prepare, respond and recover from a disaster, those being served must have a level of trust in those communicating with them, providing relief for them, and directing them. As Eisenman, et al. (2007) argue, effective communication depends on whether the message recipient perceives the message source as trustworthy and believable.⁴⁴  Thus, Philbin and Urban argue that faith-based community leaders can play an important role in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters, because they are trusted leaders in the community. Trust plays a significant role in individual responses to crises and is critical to facilitating appropriate responses and insuring the safety of citizens during catastrophic situations.⁴⁵

Silver and Wicke (2009) show that the power of local institutions, including FBOs, to mobilize, to calm, and to direct their own communities, may provide “a model and cause for reevaluation of the role of outside rescue agencies and current procedures during public health emergencies, disasters and extreme events.” Primary proximate social institutions pre-date the crisis, share a vested interest in the community, understand important cultural elements of the area, and will remain with the affected population long after the crisis has passed.⁴⁶  Outside entities, including voluntary and care-giving organizations, on the other hand, are transient, unknown, and may be unable to appreciate the cultural intricacies of the community.⁴⁷  This proves most true among the elderly population, minority populations, and rural, close-knit, and spatially isolated zones.

Faith communities and their leaders carry the ability to garner trust, and in crisis situations, people often look for figures they can rely on for information, communicate with, and follow. Further, faith community leaders often function in a “gatekeeper” capacity, particularly among more conservative groups and/or in rural areas. Philbin and Urban’s work suggests that vulnerable groups, with higher levels of distrust of authority figures, will turn to multiple sources for information, suggesting a multipronged approach to risk communication, preparation and recovery involving a variety of means for dissemination (print, electronic, broadcast, personal interaction) will be needed to insure that the information is consistent across sources. Religious leaders, because they are trusted, can serve an integral role in delivering critical information during times of crisis. When combined with the decline in public confidence in institutions such as the government and industry, Philbin and Urban recommend that public information officers (PIOs) consider more formally integrating risk communication principles and faith-based leaders into their strategic communication plans.

One model that takes this idea into account emerged from the aftermath of 9/11 and comes from the New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH).⁴⁸  In its efforts to better prepare for emergency situations, NYSDOH invested in free risk communication workshops to establish and enhance relationships among faith communities throughout the state.⁴⁹  Through these workshops, NYSDOH hoped to take advantage of fundamental attributes that facilitate the delivery of emergency information to significant portions of communities.⁵⁰   NYSDOH, with the Consortium for Risk and Crisis Communication, offered workshops with the following purposes: (1) Train faith community and health department representatives in risk communication practices and principles; (2) Offer an opportunity for the two groups to discuss ways to collaborate on public health emergency preparedness and response; and (3) Provide an opportunity to network together. This is but one model of how governmental bodies can consider leveraging the trust inherent in faith communities and their capacity to communicate.

Another tool that could be replicated and used to harness available resources are congregational assessment management databases, including the HOWCALM® system (House of Worship Communitywide Asset and Logistics Management). (Please see Appendix VI for an assessment survey based on HOWCALM.⁵¹) Developed in 2006 by New York Disaster Interfaith Services (NYDIS) in New York City, the HOWCALM system is a secure, user-friendly, web-based management tool that identifies and inventories the location, judicatory affiliation, physical assets and programmatic resources—as well as risk communication data for over 7,000 New York City houses of worship, religious schools, and faith-based service providers which can potentially activate and deploy in case of disaster. Since 2006, participating congregations have partnered with NYDIS to assist faith communities and disaster impacted families throughout the city to better respond and deploy their assets during disasters. The HOWCALM system includes three types of users:

1. Congregations:  HOWCALM empowers congregations to enhance their level of preparedness and access to risk communication. Being a user and connecting to NYDIS allows congregation leaders to connect with emergency managers, public health initiatives, and other faith communities and build relationships to promote the levels of understanding and cooperation needed for resilience and effective responses to all-hazards.
2. Faith Communities:  HOWCALM equips faith communities to enhance the level of preparedness for their houses of worship, schools, and service providers and conduct emergency planning for their community. Participation in HOWCALM also helps faith community and judicatory leaders connect with NYDIS, its partners, and their peers from other religious traditions and build relationships to promote the whole community understanding and cooperation needed for effective responses to all types of disaster.
3. Emergency Management Agencies:  HOWCALM via NYDIS, equips emergency management and public health agencies with the information to communicate, coordinate, and cooperate, with NYC faith communities and houses of worship to accomplish their mission. By building those relationships, government can ensure that their resources and expertise are mobilized in ways that leverage the moral authority and cultural competency and religious literacy of local religious leaders.

Other Assets

Speed of response.⁵²  During Katrina, government and national voluntary agencies organizations did not reach many areas for some time due to flood waters, damaged infrastructure, and overwhelming demand. In contrast, local organizations were already on the scene or close by. The combination of local presence, independence from bureaucratic constraints, and smaller size enabled these organizations to act quickly, saving lives and property.
Beyond the speed of their initial response, they are often among the last left in the recovery process following a disaster.

Independence.⁵³  Many organizations, particularly smaller local ones, can successfully operate without government support or direction. The combination of independence from government direction and small size enables organizations to be agile and immediately responsive to human need.

Standing capability.⁵⁴  Many organizations provide day-to-day care for those in need before any disaster strikes. They are already involved in community services of some type and are able to adapt to crisis conditions and increase their capacity to meet the increased demand. Social service case managers can transition into disaster case managers. Food banks for the homeless and needy are able to supply pop-up shelters with food. Counselors can address the needs of disaster victims.

Small scale.⁵⁵  Smaller organizations, particularly shelters, are often responsive to evacuees, volunteers, and relief workers. Despite an emphasis on large facilities and service providers in government planning, small-scale efforts have been proven to be highly successful. During Katrina, smaller shelters located or quickly established in houses of worship (of all sizes and denominations), in Boys and Girls Clubs, in recreation halls, and in schools run by local community volunteers were able to address various issues, including personal hygiene, quality feeding, mental health and spiritual care, and family needs, more effectively than many larger shelters. These shelters enabled evacuees to get back on their feet, become more self-sufficient earlier, and leave the shelter better equipped. Shelter operators noted that smaller facilities and the community atmosphere they promoted contributed to psychological well-being.

Specialization.⁵⁶  Many FBOs specialize in one or a few relief or recovery services. Specialization optimizes the contributions of organizations during a disaster. The major faith traditions (i.e., Buddhist, Christian, Jewish and Muslim) have chosen to specialize in certain aspects of disaster response and recovery, and there are different ways of categorizing these specializations. Hull (2006) notes specialization as a best practice in four functional areas: food, medical services, mental health and spiritual care, and physical reconstruction. The National VOAD (Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster) lists six specializations: case management, donations management, emotional and spiritual care, long-term recovery, mass care, and housing. To successfully engage congregations and other FBOs in the disaster preparation and response process, they should be typed by specialization. Identifying the groups that are willing and capable of contributing is an important component of emergency planning, particularly with the new FEMA emphasis on “whole community.”

Hunt (2006) describes how specialization works and looks in action on the ground. After Hurricane Katrina, many FBOs took on tasks that tapped into their long-standing expertise. The Salvation Army focused on getting water and ice to a devastated area within twelve hours.⁵⁷  The Islamic Society of Central Florida opened its school as a shelter and feeding site, but also become a key financial contributor with money raised solely for charitable purposes.⁵⁸  “We can’t do everything, but we are able to contribute,” said Bassem Chaaban, the society’s outreach director. “We looked at the things we could do and did them.”⁵⁹  The Seventh-day Adventists used a similar process when they took on warehousing duties based on their more than decade-long experience of organizing and sorting through the overwhelming amount of donated clothes.⁶⁰  Specialization requires a level of coordination amongst groups that is often difficult to meet without advance training, regular communication, and umbrella organizations. For example, the head of the Seventh-day Adventist program started a nonprofit agency (Apopka Agency) to focus on coordinating distribution points and direct needs to groups in the network.⁶¹

Partnering. Partnerships between organizations to meet complementary needs prove to be highly effective. For example, an FBO serves as a shelter, while a secular community-based organization (CBO) prepares meals and delivers them to the shelter. Partnering was a best practice noted in four functional areas: food, logistics management and services, children’s services, and case management.⁶²

For agencies looking to partner with and enhance the ability for FBOs to prepare, respond and provide support in recovery, the above assets are a reliable indicator of effectiveness. Thus, agencies should identify and establish relationships with FBOs that have strong programs in the community, large worship spaces, kitchens or parking lots, and/or leaders with involvement in community activities. Agencies could also contact and interface with ministerial alliances, clergy councils, and interfaith boards/associations. This research also points to the fact that size is not a reliable indicator of success during times of crisis. Indicators that display community involvement are more important measures of disaster response capacity and capability, including such basic activities as officiating at funerals, participation in local government meetings, and attendance in religious study programs. These types of activities are all important factors for agencies looking to work with FBOs.

Yet, while congregations certainly provide a wealth of capabilities and assets, there are certain caveats to their ability to function effectively during a crisis. NDIN’s Peter Gudaitis says that the most frequent roles that congregations assume early in a crisis are offering hospitality (shelter, food, and clothing) or social services. Citing what happened in aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Gudaitis states the following:

[C]ongregations just started looking at what people’s unmet needs were and they didn’t consider how much money they were wasting because people could get those things for free, or that they were available through government disaster entitlement programs. So we heard stories of congregations buying people plane tickets or putting people in hotels or paying their rent, and all of those things the government provides for free after a disaster.

Thus, even though these types of contributions seemed like the right thing to do, congregations wasted their own limited resources by providing services that the clients would have otherwise received through the federal government. The challenge then is to engage and educate congregations and FBOs about their proper and most effective roles without jeopardizing their ability to continue on as organizations after the disaster has passed.

Spiritual Care. Another significant asset of congregations is their unique ability to provide social and moral support in the wake of a disaster. While congregations and FBOs are widely recognized for providing spiritual care, there are many lessons to learn about how to better equip them to play this role effectively and in collaboration with mental health providers.

Disasters may impact an individual’s religious and spiritual beliefs.⁶³  Individuals and communities also have a well-documented tendency to turn to faith and religious leaders after a disaster.⁶⁴  Even in an urban environment, such as New York City in the aftermath of 9/11, where many religions and cultures converge, affected persons still exhibit the desire to be comforted by religion. According to a national survey conducted after the 9/11 attacks, 90 percent of Americans turned to religion as a coping response to the trauma experienced.⁶⁵   Similarly, 59 percent of New Yorkers surveyed following 9/11 said they preferred to receive support from a clergy or religious counselor, compared with 45 percent who sought out a physician, and 40 percent who sought a mental health professional for emotional support.⁶⁶

Not only do affected populations turn to faith and religious leaders in times of crisis, spiritual care has been shown to have positive recovery aspects. Emerging research suggests that religious and spiritual responses, as well as clergy-mental health provider collaboration, may be beneficial in helping to buffer negative psychological reactions. Ai and colleagues (2005) surveyed 453 graduate and undergraduate students three months after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.⁶⁷   They found that participants, who believed in diverse spiritual entities used various types of prayer for coping. Researchers found that spiritual support and positive attitudes mediated the effect of post-September 11.
Similarly, Lawson (2007) found that “unceasing communication with a Higher Power” assisted the respondents in gaining control over threatening events allowing them to exhibit courage and determination to cope with the dislocation of Katrina. Research with almost 600 Mississippi residents following Hurricane Katrina—primarily from Jewish and Christian backgrounds—found that positive religious and spiritual beliefs such as having a coherent religious coping strategies, religious support, and a meaning-making community, reduced the effects of resource loss—both material and relationship losses—and hurricane exposure (e.g., did they evacuate or not, personal injuries sustained, reported stress of hurricane experience) on post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms, depression, and alcohol use.⁶⁸  Similar findings have also been verified across numerous other disasters among people from diverse faith backgrounds, including the Oklahoma City bombing, and Midwest flood.⁶⁹  Several additional studies suggest that what was important (e.g., what mediated negative mental and physical health outcomes following resource loss) was not how religious or spiritual a person was, rather, how one utilized their religion or spirituality.

Recipients of spiritual care include:⁷⁰

• First responders and recovery workers
•  Law enforcement mortuary professionals, pathologists, body identification workers, etc.
• Families of victims
• Affected persons and communities

Spiritual care points of contact include:⁷¹

• Disaster Scene: Trained chaplains offer quality appropriate spiritual care to both workers and families. Trained spiritual care workers can help control spontaneous volunteers who wish to offer inappropriate religious coercion.
• Mortuary:  Chaplains can help work with the religious needs of medical and forensic personnel and provide appropriate rituals and local clergy when requested by families.
• Ante-mortem Victim Information Collection:  Spiritual Caregivers can help both family members and information gatherers deal with the strain of working with grieving family members.
• Family Assistance Center
• Burial/Final Disposition:  Chaplains and local clergy can assist with culturally appropriate burial arrangements to the extent possible allowed by the circumstances of the disaster
• Faith Community Liaison:  Chaplains offer one means of connecting FM officials and personnel with the broader religious institutions of the affected community.

The role of spiritual care providers often includes:⁷²

• Securing basic needs
• Providing counseling⁷³
• Conducting needs assessments
• Monitoring the rescue and recovery environment
• Providing outreach and information
• Delivering technical assistance, consultation, and training
• Fostering resilience and recovery
• Conducting triage and referral
• Providing treatment
• Providing a sense of safety and calm
• Providing a sense of self and community efficacy and connectedness
• Providing a sense of hope.

Many organizations and collaborations between clergy and mental health professionals have sought to develop best practices and programs that would strengthen response and recovery in disaster-prone areas, specifically regarding spiritual care. This area is important enough for  the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD) to develop their “Spiritual Care Points of Consensus,” a document that established basic standards for addressing the spiritual needs of those who are directly impacted by a disaster, as well as for relief workers.⁷⁴  The statement resulted from work by NVOAD personnel and representatives from more than twenty faith-based organizations, including Scientologists, Buddhists, Catholics, and other traditions.⁷⁵   The document sets out ten points that outline the fundamentals of ethical emotional and spiritual care when dealing with survivors of catastrophes, including warning against inappropriate proselytizing or evangelizing in disaster zones, and against discrimination based on “culture, gender, age, sexual orientation, spiritual/religious practices and disability.”⁷⁶

Congregations and FBOs often experience barriers to working with government. These barriers may be due to the characteristics of a particular faith group, or due to the lack of religious literacy or other limitations of public agencies. At times, FBOs and public agencies exhibit suspicion regarding any formalized relationship with each other because of issues related to the separation of church and state. This may be the result of a two-way lack of contact between the groups or a mutual lack of knowledge. Potential partners could also be wary due to previous experience, or because of theological or political ideas. In some cases, congregations and FBOs are wary of creating relationships with public agencies because this would mean exposing themselves to increased scrutiny on various local and statewide zoning and access laws. More specifically to disaster work, however, the work of congregations and FBOs is often limited by different governmental shortcomings. These issues fall within the generally accepted role of government and government agencies following a disaster.⁷⁷  For example, Hull (2006) found that his interview subjects believed that the impact of FBOs and NGOs during a disaster would be heightened that if the government could address the following limitations and challenges.

Problems with access and credentialing.⁷⁸  Faith-based organizations, particularly local ones, often have difficulty with physical access to disaster areas and associated activities. Without government-issued credentials identifying them as serving in some official capacity, they find themselves blocked from delivering resources and services in mass care settings. This is an issue for smaller FBOs that are not recognized at law enforcement and military checkpoints. In addition, spiritual care providers are often not allowed access to some shelters because of credentialing issues. While this rightly restricts access to appropriately credentialed personnel, this presents a primary limitation and challenge in three functional areas for FBOs: mental health and spiritual support, logistics management and services, and transportation management and services.

Inadequate training and experience.⁷⁹  The great geographic scale of destruction and the intensity of Hurricane Katrina, combined with the perception that government and organizations like the Red Cross could not take care of all of the resulting problems, prompted action by many local organizations that had never served in a disaster relief capacity. Despite their lack of experience, these FBOs became, among other things, shelter operators, builders, case managers, caregivers, and providers of shelter, food, and medicine. Although their effectiveness improved quickly, their lack of initial training and experience proved to be a challenge. Those organizations with prior training initially fared much better than those who had none. Training and experience are limitations and challenges in three functional areas: shelter, medical services, and physical reconstruction services that need to be addressed if public agencies expect greater and more skilled participation from congregations and FBOs in disasters and other emergencies.

Unanticipated needs for long-term routine services.⁸⁰  Government agencies and other responders did not anticipate the needs of evacuees following the initial disaster response, particularly in an event as large and sustained as Hurricane Katrina. For example, although FEMA now mandates transportation services for evacuees, at the time of Hurricane Katrina, transportation was not provided. Long-term routine needs are overlooked or are inadequately addressed in six functional areas: shelter, mental health and spiritual support, physical reconstruction of infrastructure and housing, transportation, waste management and sanitation, children’s services, and case management of those who have been affected by the disaster.

Lack of Trust. Because congregations tap particular populations and language groups, and they each have their own historic relationship with public agencies, they may tend to avoid outreach by government agencies. Issues such as those noted above, e.g., revealing too much information about themselves and their buildings and programs, may work against efforts to get congregations into relationships with city, county or state agencies. If trust underlies most of these relationships, then it may be unrealistic for government agencies to assume that they are regarded as a trusted entity when working with different faith groups. Researchers from CRCC have found that there is a significant amount of distrust on the part of religious groups, especially when asked specific questions about their buildings, programs and capabilities.⁸¹

Confused by Government Agencies. Beyond the trust factor, there are often more practical issues that keep congregations from approaching government entities. For example, Jamie Aten, co-director of the Humanitarian Disaster Institute at Wheaton College in Wheaton, Illinois, describes responses to interviews he conducted with churches in Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina:

Within a number of different churches that we surveyed, the attendees reported seeking out help from clergy and their faith community overall before seeking government help. One of the reasons that we hypothesize is that some were coming from lower socioeconomic status or maybe areas that were marginalized, and therefore it made it harder to get to government help and vice versa.

Peter Gudaitis suggests that it is often confusing for congregations and FBOs to work with government agencies:

When we’re talking about [government and disaster response], we’re talking about emergency managers, first responders, law enforcement, public health, we’re talking about this gamut of government leaders, not just emergency managers or public health emergency officials. There’s this huge swath of government agencies that you end up working with in a disaster. For instance, the Small Business Administration is who manages housing loans after a disaster. Then you have FEMA, HUD, the CDC, Health and Human Services. You have all these unknown federal agencies, and it’s not just your local emergency managers, which I think is one of the challenges on the faith community side.

Lack of Religious Literacy. Government agencies often lack adequate and accurate knowledge of faith community groups, how they operate, and how best to approach them. Gudaitis describes the following situation:

A lot of the people in government are religious, but in general, government agencies don’t tend to have a lot of competency in working with faith communities that are not mainstream, mainline, and represent the majority of the population…. You have government leaders that understand politics, but they don’t understand the people, their religious structures, their theology, their culture.

In addition to the general lack of understanding faith communities, what they believe, and how that may impact their willingness and ability to act in a disaster, are other, more practical issues related to what congregations and FBOs can actually do in disaster situations. Gudaitis, for example, says that government organizations typically lack the basic operational knowledge of the faith community such as whether they, by virtue of their internal organizational authority structures, can act without specific permission from key religious authorities. The government, in general, regards the faith community as a self-sustaining resource that can be tapped at will in a disaster. Thus, government agencies must gather and institutionalize in their own organizational structures basic competencies such as understanding religious groups, including their lines of authority and the types of resources that might be mobilized in a disaster.

Working With Faith Communities

Barriers to public agencies working with groups within the faith community are, in many ways, similar to the barriers that faith groups experience with public agencies. For example, there may be a general suspicion of faith groups and their motives, and an uncertainty about what their abilities to act in disaster situations. Further, as noted above, a lack of contact and/or knowledge of faith groups makes it easier to avoid working with them. Finally, public agencies and officials may have inaccurate assumptions about the capacity of congregations and FBOs. For example, officials may assume that a congregation’s pastoral leadership can be approached in a fairly easy manner so as to access their resources. However, it is important to note that large numbers of congregational leaders are bi-vocational; their role is only one job that they maintain, and it may not actually pay them much, if any, salary. This bi-vocational role is a particularly prominent characteristic of congregational leaders in communities that are typically most at risk in a disaster. On a practical level, bi-vocational religious leaders find it difficult to attend important informational meetings and trainings related to disaster preparedness and response that are more often than not, held on weekdays during work hours. Peter Gudaitis observes, “over and over, emergency management, the Red Cross, even VOADs offer most … conferences and meetings during the middle of the week during the middle of the work day.”

Proselytizing and Preferential Treatment. One fear that contributes to the hesitancy to financially support faith-based groups involves both perceived, or actual, hidden religious agendas. The fear of proselytizing, as well as preferential service for fellow believers, runs deep in secular communities and organizations. For example, one denominational disaster relief website listed “Professions of Faith” and four other evangelism categories prior to reporting other direct services on its annual activity report.

2012 Activity Reported to Date⁸²
Professions of Faith    34
Gospel Presentations    346
Chaplaincy Contacts    753
Ministry Contacts    2,261
Other Decisions    10
Volunteer Days    3,348
Meals Prepared    42,729
Chainsaw Jobs    485
Mudout Jobs    1
Fire Cleanup/Debris Removal    141
Repair/Roofing Jobs    33
Showers    803
Laundry Loads    291
Children Cared For    203

This agency is a signatory of the National VOAD “Points of Consensus on Emotional and Spiritual Care,” which prohibits member organizations from such activity:

People impacted by disaster and trauma are vulnerable. There is an imbalance of power between disaster responders and those receiving care. To avoid exploiting that imbalance, spiritual care providers refrain from using their position, influence, knowledge or professional affiliation for unfair advantage or for personal, organizational or agency gain.

Disaster response will not be used to further a particular political or religious perspective or cause—response will be carried out according to the need of individuals, families and communities. The promise, delivery, or distribution of assistance will not be tied to the embracing or acceptance of a particular political or religious creed.⁸³

Thus, despite the prohibition by the National VOAD agreements, the agency openly includes religious conversions as one of their measures of success, suggesting efforts at proselytizing can even be a problem with organizations that have signed agreements to refrain from such activities.

At times, houses of worship are accused of providing their own members with preferential treatment. De Vita and Kramer (2008) noted one church-based group that attempted to serve its members first by creating a tracking system to identify members and prioritize their service. With regard to the same issue, a public agency that became a conduit for donations routed significant private donations to a local faith-based organization because the director believed that pastors were best suited to identify where services were needed.⁸⁴

Another organization alleged that no one was given religious services unless requested, but a staff member in the same organization reported praying with everyone receiving assistance.⁸⁵  Some fear that certain populations, such as the LGBTQ community, may not be assisted or may receive biased treatment. Some have highlighted how after Hurricane Katrina, homophobia blew in.⁸⁶  LGBTQ
evacuees and their families faced discrimination at the hands of more conservative faith-based relief organizations based on their sexual orientation, gender identity, and/or HIV status.⁸⁷  “Tragedy does not discriminate and neither should relief agencies,” stated Kevin Cathcart, executive director of Lambda Legal, in a news release in 2005.⁸⁸

Unfortunately, some faith-based groups do combine proselytizing with relief work, resulting in ethical dilemmas that are rarely discussed in the literature.⁸⁹  Jessica Powers, a Red Cross volunteer from New York who managed the feeding operation in conjunction with the Southern Baptist group in New Orleans, recalls that  a volunteer riding along with the Red Cross on a disaster mission in Louisiana was proselytizing victims.⁹⁰  “I had to say to him that the Red Cross is a humanitarian organization, and one of our positions is neutrality,” she said. Severson (2011) profiled a couple that views spreading the word about Jesus Christ as an essential reason that they repeatedly volunteer in disaster zones.⁹¹

In a disaster setting, people are more open—perhaps vulnerable is a better word—to such a message. “You have an opportunity to tell people that the Lord loves you,” the husband said. “When you hand someone food when they’re hungry, the door’s open.”⁹²

These practices are problematic for several reasons. Deciding needs or allocating aid based on potential of proselytizing is discriminatory, unjust, and a misuse of funds. While some argue that proselytizing (such as prayer) combined with relief and assistance improves spiritual wellbeing and overall benefit, it often has the opposite effect of creating doubt and mistrust among vulnerable groups.⁹³  The process of proselytizing begins by creating doubt or dissonance in existing beliefs or faiths.⁹⁴  During this phase, the spiritual wellbeing (and therefore the health) of the recipient population may decline.⁹⁵  Therefore, as Jayasinghe (2007) has shown, proselytizing work in the aftermath of a disaster could worsen wellbeing in an individual or of a community already undergoing immense hardships. In response to these kinds of experiences, in 2009, National VOAD adopted the “Emotional and Spiritual Care Points of Consensus”  to guide for all FBOs involved in disaster preparation and relief efforts.⁹⁶

Misplaced Faith. If the determination to spread faith is one limitation of religion during a crisis, another is the determination of faith to stay the course. Media reports have profiled families and communities that refuse to evacuate, despite orders, based on a belief that a higher power will save them. In Texas, during Hurricane Ike, roughly 90,000 persons in three counties ignored calls to leave, citing faith and fate.⁹⁷  The choice to stay—always questionable and sometimes fatal—was an especially curious one to make so close to Galveston, site of a 1900 storm that killed at least 6,000 people, more than any other natural disaster in U.S. history.⁹⁸  Clarence Romas, a 55-year-old handyman, said he would ride out the storm in his downstairs apartment with friends.⁹⁹  Ignoring a “certain death” warning “puts a little fear in my heart, but what’s gonna happen is gonna happen,” he said.¹⁰⁰

Jamie Aten of Wheaton College gave an example of the potentially negative side of strong faith commitments within a religious community. Aten described a visit to one Mississippi faith community: “The religious leader got up and one of the final things he said was, ‘If you leave or you evacuate, it’s because you do not have enough faith in God.’” At the same time, Aten says that this particular community was very connected to the broader community and they had programs that could contribute to the disaster response process. Thus, deficits in one area should not exclude groups from other outreach efforts. Aten says that not all faith communities can be approached in the same way and should not be expected to respond in the same way. Aten describes the most fruitful approach:

Identify what it is they do well and leverage the skill sets that they already have. If you can bring multiple groups to the table and one is very strong in working with children and others with elderly, they’re going to be able to contribute differently. And if you can leverage that, capture that, by engaging them, like you’re saying, on other civic issues, when a disaster comes, you can begin filtering it through the mechanisms that are already in place…this also helps with sustainability of the intervention being carried out.

Similar to the assumptions noted previously, most discussions of the potential role of the faith community to act in various public capacities assume that there is a singular entity made up of religious congregations, judicatory bodies and other FBOs. This assumption also takes as the normative model those faith organizations—whether congregations, judicatories or FBOs—that are able to act successfully in different ways that benefit the public good, despite the fact that there are relatively few of these groups compared to the larger landscape of the faith community. For example, there are approximately 345,000 religious congregations¹⁰¹  in the United States, over 23,000¹⁰²  in California alone, but the number of congregations that have responded to disasters such as Katrina is quite small in comparison to entire population of religious congregations.

Further, there is tremendous variation in how congregations are organized, with as much as half of U.S. congregations being independent entities, while others are organized under the authority of a judicatory (denomination, association, or some other governing body). These can be as varied as formal bodies at the national level that also has regional authorities, or local or national networks of congregations, and even ministerial alliances and interfaith groups, which are all voluntary organizations. Thus, the faith-based world can be quite complicated to understand and to navigate due to numerous denominational structures and qualities. Each faith community has its own organizational structures and nomenclature. Furthermore, some non-hierarchal organizations lack a single comprehensive authority to interact with government. Based on his interaction with DHS and FEMA officials, Hull (2006) argues that the faith-based world, with all of its varieties and dimensions, is difficult for government personnel to fully understand. Some within DHS and FEMA may have personal knowledge of one aspect of the faith-based world given their own affiliation and practices, but the range of organizations is immense. The differences are not well understood by a faith community’s own members, let alone those on the outside attempting to get a good understanding of how these organizations work.¹⁰³

This can lead to confusion about how an agency might interact with these groups, and also to a general lack of understanding of what religious groups believe and how they are perceived by the broader public and government officials. Matthew Ball, director of public affairs, North America West, for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS), says that much of his work is spent helping people realize that there is more to the church than missionary activity. He says,

There is such confusion about who we are and what we really believe, the way in which we can dispel misunderstanding and eliminate fear is to help people know who we are. When I meet with foreign diplomats that are here stationed in California, one of the things I like to do is take with me a written report that shows how much humanitarian aid and assistance has been given to their country over the last five years. It’s oftentimes in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, and it itemizes detail work, from the delivering of wheelchairs to the digging of wells in foreign villages to the delivery and air drop shipment of hygiene kits, so many different things…when I take that report, it helps the diplomats understand that I am not there to proselytize and I’m not interested in proselytizing, I’m only there to help them to see the Mormon church as more than just a missionary effort.

The large number of congregations and faith-based organizations creates the challenge of including them all in risk communication efforts and determining which group(s) might be able to contribute in a significant way to disaster preparedness, response and/or recovery, and community resilience. There could be any number of ways to organize thinking about what segments of the faith community might be most capable of participating in the disaster response process. Thus, the authors of this report have developed a four-part typology, comprised of tiers of groups, each tier indicating a different level of capacity and willingness to be a part of the disaster response process. This typology provides a way for public agencies to think about how best to focus their attention when seeking out participants from the faith community in disasters. The result is a template through which public entities can categorize congregations and FBOs in terms of their potential contributions, and manage their relationships with different types of organizations and congregations. This template can also help public entities identify the most fruitful FBOs to work, how to work with them, and how to assist different types of organizations as they show interest and ability to participate in the disaster process. Finally, the template can establish the groundwork for networking groups so that they can complement each other’s strengths and weaknesses.¹⁰⁴

Four Tiers

The first tier of congregations and FBOs are what we call “have it all” organizations that are Fully Capable of inclusion in the disaster response, mitigation, and recovery process. These organizations have physical assets (including a kitchen, parking lot, and indoor space) and they also have active congregations and a pool of volunteers, organizational capacity, sufficient staff, and niche leadership capable of managing various types of programming. They already have a range of social programming, community programs in place, an ethic of civic engagement, and a supportive board and general operations capability. These organizations, while valuable in many ways, will still view disaster related activities as secondary or tertiary activities until a disaster occurs. Thus, relief groups should work to have structures in place at these congregations, which can then be activated when needed.

The second tier consists of congregations that want to “do something” in emergencies and disasters. We classify these as Interested with Potential. These congregations and organizations have an interest and passion to be involved, but may have limitations in space, resources, capability, and programming.

Congregations in the third tier tend to be Internally Focused. Their primary interest is “doing our own thing for own people.” These congregations and FBOs may have capacity, space, and resources, but they lack an active ethic of civic engagement. They seldom move beyond caring for their own congregation or a specific small community.

The fourth tier includes congregations that are either Unprepared (limited capability and little initial interest but potentially helpful congregations) or Uninterested in any sort of disaster preparation or response. Unprepared congregations may be storefronts, temporary, or small groups, but they have some value to disaster relief. These small congregations may serve as a place to access harder to reach communities and serve as a place to distribute important material and information. Uninterested congregations would be difficult, if not impossible, to mobilize in effective ways,
but they can still be utilized to effect some level of individual preparedness among their members.

Using Imperial County as an example, the authors divided congregations into tiers. The following chart provides an overview of the county.

Imperial County

Total Population    174,528
Population Density    2499
Number of Congregations    123
Number of Adherents    67,372
Religious Adherents as Percent of Total Population    38.6
Unemployment Rate    13.9
Percent Male    51.9
Percent Female    48.1
Median Household Income    $40,976
Percent Population Below Poverty    21.5
Percent Employed    53.4
Percent of Homeowners    58.1
Percent White     70.7
Percent Black or African American    12.5
Percent American Indian
and Alaska Native     3.7
Percent Asian    8.5
Percent Native Hawaiian
and Other Pacific Islander    2.8
Percent Other Races    9.5
Percent Hispanic or Latino    12.5

The map on page 28 demonstrates what this tier system would look like, using the congregations in Imperial County as an example. Fully Capable Congregations are identified by red dots.

Interested With Potential Congregations are identified with yellow dots. We placed congregations in this category if we found information indicating disaster related interest or programming but they do not have a website or other public information about ministries and facilities.

Internally Focused Congregations are identified with green dots, and were placed in this category if they have a website or if we were able to find information about them publically, such as the name of the pastor or a listing of ministries and programs, but with no indication of interest or involvement in any emergency or disaster efforts.

Unprepared Congregations and Uninterested Congregations are identified by blue dots. These two categories are difficult to disaggregate and include congregations do not have a website or if we found no information about them publicly, other than a listing on the internet or in the telephone book.

In each of these tiers, it is important to note that not only are there congregations of varying sizes and religious traditions, but also that are representative of different social classes, racial/ethnic makeup, relative isolation of a group or community, and many other considerations. Given the range of theological, political, social and asset based differences between and among congregations, how should outreach to these congregations be organized? Should government agencies focus resources on the most equipped congregations or should they attempt to reach as many as possible? Focusing on each and every congregation, even focusing on only one or two of the tiers identified above, is the wrong approach. Rather, the best way to access and leverage the potential contribution of the faith community to the disaster response process is through representative or intermediary organizations that stand between congregations and public agencies, and serve to organize and manage the multitude of congregations and their pertinent information. In this regard, Peter Gudaitis argues that,

I don’t think it’s important to get everybody with deployable assets at the table, but I think it’s important to get everybody at the table with a sense that they all have an equal voice within an effective partnership…. New York Disaster Interfaith Services is not a coalition of congregations. It’s a coalition of judicatory bodies. So the congregations are represented by their judicatory bodies… ministerial associations and federations.

The point here is not to duplicate NYDIS for California, especially since denominational relationships to congregations are quite different in the Northeast compared to the Pacific region. Rather, it is to emphasize the value and importance of inclusive, competent and functional coordinative organizations whose sole purpose is to work with all faith traditions and their partners in developing their disaster mitigation, preparation, response and recovery roles. These types of agencies would sidestep issues of trust between public agencies and the faith community, and also reduce the number of entities that public agencies, such as Cal EMA, must interface with in a disaster or emergency.

Thus, agencies must value each tier and type of congregation differently and approach and partner with them in specific ways based on an understanding of their strengths and limitations. Yet the best organizational strategy for both the faith community and public agencies is not to have the 23,000 California congregations interfacing directly with government agencies. Rather, congregations should be classified first in terms of the four tiers described above, and then brought into existing intermediary faith-based or community organizations oriented toward sustainable disaster work in all phases of the disaster lifecycle—whether the Citizen Corps Council, local VOADs, national VOAD, or another group. These intermediaries can manage the information on resources, abilities and interest, and then serve as the points of contact for public agencies during a disaster. It is also important, when using a community-based or whole community approach, to assess the field in order to recognize the entities that are already working. Once players are identified, groups can be networked to avoid unnecessary duplication.

Finally, given the wide range of congregations and FBOs, approaches to outreach should vary based on the tier in which particular groups can be categorized, and the geographic (and political) landscape of the territory, whether city, county, or state. Peter Gudaitis offers the following recommendation:

One of the things that we advocate through NDIN is that every community in the U.S., at least every state, and preferably every locality, either a county or a city, should have some sort of a “disaster interfaith” group. These coordinative groups could be an interfaith disaster council like San Diego, or a fully functional nonprofit disaster human service agency like New York Disaster Interfaith Services (NYDIS). Or it could be a group of volunteer long-term recovery committees like Florida has, called—Florida Interfaith Networking in a Disaster, which supports and trainings the efforts of every county-based Long-term Recovery Committee to have a faith-based caucus. But every community should have some FBO coalition that congregations connect with.

Brandy Welch, partner services manager for the American Red Cross in Los Angeles, says that the Red Cross recognizes the importance of understanding and working with faith groups, and has recently hired a faith-based coordinator for Los Angeles County, whose sole responsibility is to take over outreach activities to faith communities. NDIN’s Peter Gudaitis adds,

Most FBOs involved in National VOAD are trying, and I think in a lot of ways they offer some interesting tools. But at the end of the day, the disconnect is that National VOAD agencies are temporary partners establishing relief and recovery projects as long as their resources for any particular event last. They’re not long-term providers, and they don’t do long-term recovery—that get the process started. Local congregations and FBO/CBO do long-term recovery. So resiliency—that is, mitigation, education, and preparedness training—really needs to come from the ground up, not from the top down, because mitigation, education, and preparedness training at its root is about local resiliency, partnerships and building sustainable local recovery capacity.

Based on the foregoing, the authors recommend that Cal EMA consider the following points as it formulates a strategy to build competent sustainable relationships with and include faith communities of all “types” in the emergency management and public health emergency system(s).

1.    Networks: Strengthen Existing and Enable Emergent

Congregations that have the potential to work within local disaster plans will be increasingly likely to do so if they are networked and equipped in advance of an event. To ensure that this happens, intermediary coordinating bodies sometimes called “disaster interfaiths” must be established in each county, or county cluster (in rural areas). The current faith-based emergency management landscape dictates the need for strong, well-organized, self-governed and sustainable intermediary organizations to act as a bridge between government offices, and judicatory bodies, FBOs, and congregations. Research strongly indicates that congregations that receive messages about individual and congregational preparedness will be more willing to participate in a formal emergency management or public health emergency structure. It is incumbent on Cal EMA to fund, and also to create funding opportunities, for intermediary organizations that can reach congregations. Currently, there are many people from different government agencies engaging faith-based organizations about many issues, including disaster preparedness. A more effective approach would be to establish an overarching body that can coordinate disaster preparation activities and include widest range of religious groups possible in its membership base. This body must maintain a level playing field for all faith communities, and not allow the large and economically advantaged faith communities to govern or dictate the process. Nor would any government body dictate the process but rather, help build and sustain the capacity of a structure that is inclusive of all faiths on equal basis.
In rural or low-population counties, existing ministerial and interfaith alliances might be tapped in order to fill this function. Minority faith groups, however, are less likely to participate in a process that is perceived to be managed by a dominant faith group or one that appears to support a particular political agenda or person. For example, perhaps the police chief is Mennonite, so the Mennonites will convene the disaster interfaith meetings. In large population centers, many freestanding non-sectarian organizations are already dedicated to these activities. Among these groups, however, what is their level of expertise in disaster response? How effective are they in convening a faith-based initiative that sets its own agenda and is not subject to the secular effort? A lack of sustainable funding in both instances hampers the ability of these organizations to be effective and sustainable partners. Therefore, multi-year state and local funding should be made available for each county’s disaster interfaith network.

Intermdiary organizations should have several mandates:

1. Identify all congregations and FBOs in their jurisdiction
2. Build sustainable operational capacity and community resilience through regular communication, training, volunteer management, exercises/tabletops, etc.
3. Provide resources and information to congregations not in their membership to increase individual and organizational preparedness.
4. Increase their core membership of congregations in the network that are
   capable and willing to participate in preparedness or disaster human services
5. Provide organizational capacity building and networking opportunities for network members, the faith community, emergency managers and public health emergency leaders
6. Asset map the resources of those congregations and service providers
7. Have a risk communication plan that communicates directly with local religious leaders in times of crisis
8. Maintain a website and social media presence
9. Work with emergency managers to integrate the faith community’s needs and capacities within local disaster plans and regional catastrophic planning
10. Activate their membership, in coordination with emergency managers during a disaster
11. Participate in long-term recovery efforts
12. Train government agencies in religious literacy and competency
13. Engage researchers and educational institutions in the endeavor as well as evaluation of the effectiveness of trainings, planning, and recovery initiatives.

One example of such an intermediary organization is the San Diego Interfaith
Disaster Council (IDC). Incorporated in 2007, the IDC has approximately forty active representatives from the faith community, one part-time staff member, and several volunteers from member organizations.¹⁰⁵

The organization meets monthly and has several informational booklets available online. Their mission is to “increase the resiliency of the San Diego County community by establishing and maintaining a coordinated faith-based effort to prepare for and respond to disasters.”¹⁰⁶  In the last few years, the IDC has completed 41 projects using 274 volunteers who contributed 2,220 volunteer hours.¹⁰⁷

The IDC was formalized during the Southern California wildfires of October 2007 when faith communities and disaster professionals realized that a coordinated faith-based effort could improve preparedness and mobilize faith community resources and provide practical assistance in times of disasters.¹⁰⁸  The regional leadership of the United Methodist Church and the Episcopal Diocese joined together to conduct recovery operations and to explore preparing congregations for future disasters.¹⁰⁹  The two denominations formed an ad hoc group: Recover San Diego.¹¹⁰  Initially, the two groups provided case management services, but the necessity to understand the pressing issues within communities inspired a gap analysis.¹¹¹  The results of the two month study showed a need for improved coordinating and communication with the County of San Diego and among faith groups.¹¹²

Over the next two years Recover San Diego expanded its membership and focus to include preparedness and disaster response in San Diego County.¹¹³  From the initial foundation of Recover San Diego, the San Diego Interfaith Disaster Council (IDC) was formed with Metro United Methodist Urban Ministry as the fiscal agent.¹¹⁴  The IDC has taken on the challenge of bringing together the diverse faith communities of San Diego with local government—an unprecedented move in that county. Recently, San Diego IDC has struggled with the loss of long-term recovery funding, as it is dependent on private foundation and corporate contributions to maintain its operations.¹¹⁵  Establishing a sustainable stream of funding could increase the IDC’s capacity immeasurably.

The Emergency Network of Los Angeles (ENLA), the Los Angeles County VOAD (Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters), represents another example of an existing intermediary body. ENLA is a coalition of nonprofit organizations, including secular and faith-based organizations, along with government and private-sector partners, with some disaster function.¹¹⁶  ENLA serves as the forum where organizations share knowledge and resources throughout the disaster cycle—preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation—to help survivors and their communities.¹¹⁷  Similar to San Diego IDC, ENLA has suffered from inadequate funding and has lacked stability overall. ENLA is an excellent example of an intermediary organization that would benefit from a reduction of barriers to funding from governmental sources. It may also be beneficial to consider using a subgranting agency that can assist ENLA with capacity building. If ENLA were to be properly staffed and its capacity developed to handle public money,  it could serve as a point of contact for emergency managers in Los Angeles County. ENLA could then increase its membership and tap congregations within its membership base to be deployed by emergency managers during a disaster. ENLA could also conduct congregation-based preparedness activities more broadly, extending beyond its members. ENLA would further be able to target congregations at the individual level.

In summary, the authors recommend the following actions:

• Increase the capacity in existing networks, and support the development of new networks in areas where they do not currently exist. This would include supporting and funding disaster interfaith organizations that can organize key FBOs and congregations in each county. Each county should have an operating disaster faith-based umbrella group that can work with congregations. Depending on the county, some will be operated completely by volunteers while others may need permanent staff and robust communications, program and training budgets.
• Use those regional networks to inventory and maintain databases on congregational capacity and assets, and develop skills-based training with their members.
• Enable an environment for emergent networks: create risk communication plans and strategies that help direct FBO and congregational involvement toward appropriate roles in disaster planning and programming.
• Create infrastructure to help extending networks: put out calls for potential support services needed during a disaster not currently being filled.
• Enhance long-term recovery engagement with congregations.
• Connect those networks to existing initiatives to build capacity, such as AmeriCorps, VISTA, Citizen Corps Councils, and Medical Reserve Corps.

2.    Build Knowledge Within Public Agencies

It is often true that public agencies lack sufficient knowledge about faith communities and collaborating with them in an effective manner. Public agencies usually do not understand how faith communities are structured and what the broader faith community landscape looks like. In addition, they consider faith-based work as a set of activities, rather than as a distinct discipline. Often those activities are regarded with a checkbox mentality resulting in one-and-done events that lead to unrealistic outcomes and ineffective outreach.

If public agencies are expected to be responsible for faith-based engagement, whether disaster-focused or otherwise, they need a more formal training regimen focused on the faith-based landscape in their particular areas. Public agencies and their staff cannot be expected to operate effectively without formal training in religious literacy, on working with faith communities, and in understanding faith community demographics and cultural sensitivity issues. Without a baseline of “religious competency,” public agencies could waste resources and frustrate partners.

Initially, religious competency training programs and materials must be created and implemented. After this, a faith-based liaison—if one were to be identified—must go through a mandatory training, preferably in partnership with other groups, that would include a landscape analysis of the territory
for which they are responsible. Curriculum development would be an important
consideration when developing training courses. One suggestion is to create a manual on risk communication and faith-based engagement best practices, one that includes a primer on faith communities, their practices and engagement/mass care needs.

The creation of a manual for those working with faith communities in the context of disaster is important. Such a manual could serve as an overview of how to operate and how to work within such communities for those doing public-private engagement.

A neutral, multi-faith third party that understands the issues and potential problems, and action-oriented resources should create the manual, rather than the groups themselves. Faith communities could evaluate the manual, but academic and editorial control must come from an impartial institution in order for it to be trusted and reliable. After the creation of the manual, courses can be developed to deliver the information to staff.

Training materials should include a smart phone application based on the primer. This “app” would essentially serve as a religious competency field guide for emergency responders and public health emergency personnel that are engaging or attempting to serve the needs of faith communities. A smart phone app is a unique way of getting information quickly into the hands of someone who will be interfacing with faith communities. For example, if an ambulance were to drive up a mosque with a person in need of services inside, first responders may not know of the proper etiquette required when entering such a house of worship. Their lack of information may lead to confrontation that could hinder their ability to respond. If they were to have access to an app that could tell them the ten most important things to know when entering a mosque (for example, avoiding shoes on prayer surfaces, specifics of gender segregation, and physical contact), they would be able to assist the distressed person(s) more quickly.

Another important way to build knowledge about faith communities within public agencies is to harness the network of faith-based liaisons within each agency. One approach would be to develop a roundtable that includes faith-based liaisons from all government agencies. This roundtable could serve as a place where discussions can occur around faith-based geographies and outreach techniques. A professional interagency faith-based initiatives roundtable should be created by both geography and discipline. For example, emergency organizations working on disaster response should have a roundtable, those working specifically with faith-based actors should have a separate forum, and those involved in disaster work in Los Angeles should also have a forum. The frequency of these meetings would need to be determined, but interagency roundtables that are focused on knowledge-sharing, relationship building and identifying best practices would help in alleviating congregational stress caused by overwhelming information as well as fine tune outreach by public agencies.

Further, the report authors recommend that Cal EMA take the lead in establishing a statewide faith-based steering committee to provide strategic planning, communication, training and operational support for multi-jurisdictional emergency response. This steering committee would consist of the leadership of each county disaster interfaith and would function as an advisory panel that would assist in coordinating the county disaster interfaith organizations. Among other responsibilities, the steering committee would assist in communicating between Cal EMA and other state agencies and each county interfaith, reducing the costs related to communication and planning. The steering committee would also work on strategic planning for the disaster interfaiths, communicate about opportunities related to disaster training and response, such as disaster training drills. The state faith-based liaison officer would be advised by the steering committee, assisting them with planning and outreach to the county disaster interfaith organizations.

During an emergency, not every congregation or FBO will respond, thus a successful engagement strategy may not need to include every FBO or congregation in a particular area. Cal EMA, local emergency managers, and VOADs need to assess local emergency plans and set targets for potential faith-based engagement that will augment existing plans related to disaster human services capacities and gaps. Further, faith-based engagement must have specific goals. Public agencies need to identify and define and transparently share their goals for engagement. What specifically do public agencies hope to gain from working with
the faith community: increased sheltering capacity, better preparation, other resources, or something else? What are the goals in each location in which they are involved? What is the target number of congregations or FBOs to be reached in each region and for each zip code? Are congregations viewed as a way to access and hard to reach populations? These types of questions are important to determine at the outset of any faith-community engagement plan, thus we recommend the development of a process to define goals for what the faith community could contribute, by county if possible. Such a process will aid public agencies in targeting their efforts so that faith liaisons can have measurable goals toward which they can tailor their work plans and efforts.

A related step in the process of identifying goals would be for public agencies to clearly articulate and define a specific set of activities for engagement with faith communities. It would also be beneficial to attach funding to these defined activities. If intermediary organizations could access funds that could then be passed on to congregations or FBOs who have met the defined requirements but do not have the capacity or capability to handle public money, then their ability to respond and prepare for a disaster would be improved.

In addition, Cal EMA should designate a faith-based liaison officer in each county, similar to the terrorism liaison that is required to be identified on each Cal EMA grant application. This individual would be responsible for engaging and coordinating with faith communities and the county-wide disaster faith-based intermediary organization. This person would also be the point of contact for the state level steering committee. The authors recommended that public agencies such as Cal EMA hire faith-based officers whose responsibilities are to coordinate with intermediary organizations. This officer would not be responsible for supporting and coordinating with individual congregations, rather their focus would be to convene the statewide steering committee and to support all county based intermediary organizations within a manageable territory. This position would be responsible to be a liaison to enhance communication and knowledge transfer between the statewide faith-based steering committee, intermediary organizations and Cal EMA. Such a position will enhance productivity, networking, and effectiveness, especially when these activities are combined with their participation in a faith-based liaison roundtable that includes all the local and county agencies that are pursuing faith-based outreach. If public agencies such as Cal EMA can coordinate with intermediary organizations as well as with all other governmental staff doing outreach to faith communities through monthly or bi-monthly roundtables, information sharing across departments and efficiency will be enhanced as a result.

In summary, the authors recommend that Cal EMA pursue the following actions.

• Develop an increased religious literacy.
• Develop a process to insure there are religious needs competency within its programs and mass care plans.
• Build faith based roundtables with both a statewide steering committee and one Cal EMA-based, fusion point of contact, that is within and across all state agencies that are conducting outreach to or have MOUs with faith-based organizations to share information and best practices, or provide direct services.
• Increase and institutionalize knowledge of and about the faith community (including congregations and the broader range of faith-based nonprofits).
• Develop a manual with religious literacy primer for how to work with FBOs.
• Create a smart phone app for first responders and others with quick tips on cultural competencies for different faith groups.
• Create an FBO engagement officer in each county tasked with bridging between local efforts, the county OEM and statewide agencies.
• Create an FBO steering committee to support the engagement officer and all local disaster interfaiths.
• Host regular meetings with the steering committee and the local disaster interfaiths to identify gaps and opportunities in current planning, response and recovery efforts by county where faith communities could play a role. Use those gaps/opportunities as road-maps for outreach and partnership.
• Bring together countywide FBO engagement officers within and across each of Cal EMA’s three regions to share best practices and learning.
• Bring FBOs and senior judicatory and congregation leaders/volunteers together regionally and at the state level, on a regular basis to network, train and build sustainable capacity.
• Secure strategic and sustainable funding systems for these efforts (e.g. a percentage of annual HMGP, CNCS, CDC, and Citizen Corps grants) with limited or no impact on state revenue/budget.

3.    Assisting  and Partnering with Faith Groups

Often, congregations are under-resourced in terms of their leadership capacity and programmatic ability—especially pertaining to emergencies. While congregations generally have a wealth of social and cultural capital, they often lack the ability to steward and manage their resources in the most effective way. On a daily basis, congregations work to meet the unmet needs of their members and the local community, and manage to meet those needs with fewer resources than they need to fill them. Given this reality, congregations, much like most individuals, have a hard time engaging with the concept of a future disaster. Disaster is a far-off thought considering the individual human tragedies that exist before them on a regular basis. Thus, congregations need to be taught about their hazard vulnerabilities and the roles that exist for faith communities within the disaster life cycle. Religious leaders must recognize that this is a necessary part of their organizational mission and responsibility as religious and community leaders.

Building Standing Capacity and Resilient Congregations. The first and most important predictor for congregations and FBOs to do disaster life cycle work is to create a standing capacity and stronger and more resilient congregations and FBOs. Any programmatic endeavor that enables an organization to be stronger, and thus able to sustain stress and demands on its resources, will enhance its ability to prepare and respond to disaster. Moreover, engaging congregations and FBOs in their larger social world and helping them to develop programs and services, creates the necessary foundation that can be activated during a disaster. Congregations and FBOs that are socially engaged and participate in civic engagement activities, tend to view themselves as part of a larger geographic community, which helps to establish an organizational cultural and sense of vocation among members that can sustain the stresses that are caused by disasters and public health emergencies.

One initiative that could be the model for such inclusive involvement with congregations is the concept behind the Faithful Readiness conferences held by the Center for Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships at FEMA. Conferences should move beyond information sharing, to identifying, creating, and sustaining local faith based engagement using conferences as the beginning point for identifying potential participants and stakeholders. Creating stakeholder conferences or forums that engage congregations on their social based-programs, and then help them to pursue disaster readiness, can be an effective entre into congregational participation. Understanding the programs that congregations already have in place and then finding a space within such work to connect them to disaster preparedness and response may help congregations use the resources and current skill sets available to them in multiple ways. Rather than asking congregations, “How can you participate in a broader engagement in society during this disaster?” the question needs to be reframed in familiar language. For example, the questions could be rephrased to ask how they would continue to care for their members or keep their community programs going in the event of a disaster.

Distributing Inter-Religious Disaster Related Materials. Every congregation should receive materials with information about how to increase the individual preparedness of their members and how to create disaster plans for the organization. Unfortunately, a FEMA-approved faith-based curricula for congregations and FBOs does not exist. In addition, most existing material has been created by individual faith communities for their own congregations. Most non-religious curricula are designed for secular nonprofits, and are inadequate for congregations and FBOs.

FEMA curricula tend to be generically geared to nonprofits, lumping CBOs and FBOs together and expecting a one size fits all response. This approach is insufficient and demonstrates a disconnect when it comes to religious competence. While faith-based training materials and print resources specific to particular faith communities and disaster exist, they are primarily Christian and have not been adequately introduced into the public disaster sphere. In addition, appropriate translations of such material are difficult to find. Recently FEMA has been exploring the co-branding of inter-religious resources in partnership with NDIN. For example, Episcopal Relief and Development partnered with New York Disaster Interfaiths Services to create the “Spiritual Care Curricula for Disaster Chaplains and Spiritual Care Workers.” The curricula trains and certifies faith-based volunteers in disaster spiritual care, clergy and religious leaders as disaster chaplains, and includes a module to train instructors. Another example of an interfaith curriculum is the “Community Arise” program created by Church World Service. This curriculum encompasses eight trainings for community-based and faith-based organizations. Unfortunately, the course struggles to attract the participation of non-Christian organizations.

It is clear that U.S. congregations, FBOs and religious leaders think of themselves as different, indeed separate, from the larger nonprofit sector. While FBOs are nonprofits and community-based organizations, they tend to see themselves first as religious organizations and therefore function differently from other, non-religious organizations. Thus, they expect material that is tailored to their specific vocabulary and faith-based culture. Many congregations will not identify with material used for other community based organizations and nonprofits, and as such, it is important to craft material specifically for faith-based organizations, with a plural or inter-religious perspective.

Reducing Building Code and other Legal Barriers. Barriers to congregational involvement also need to be addressed. Ordinances and zoning restrictions are examples of these barriers. Local congregations can find themselves in violation of local building and safety codes, and the costs of complying with local code ordinances are prohibitive. The ability of congregations to be active in a disaster is sometimes predicated on their ability to have thriving social ministries before the disaster, yet many of them cannot adequately develop such programs because of code restrictions related to costly facility upgrades. For example, researchers interacted with a church that hoped to remodel a kitchen and expand its feeding program capacity. The church planned to spend $100,000, but code requirements for unrelated upgrades in other parts of the building would have resulted in a total cost of $2 million. As a result, the church decided against the upgrade, which in turn, has limited its capacity to the provision of canteening services in a disaster.

Following a 2007 tornado in New York City’s boroughs of Brooklyn and Queens, Mennnonite Disaster Services was unable to provide free roof tarping and repairs to low-income families because the city building code required that only licensed NYC contractors who completed an engineering study of each structure could perform these tasks. Needless to say, many families did not have the insurance or funding to meet that standard and the good will and free labor of a long-standing nationally recognized expert in home repair was thwarted.

These are some of the reasons why faith communities are wary of sharing information about their assets, including their physical plants. Public agencies must be aware of such barriers to involvement so that they can change their target demographic, adjust their expectations of congregational involvement, or focus outreach to the largest and most well-funded congregations. Otherwise, public agencies will need to find some way to ease the burdens on congregations of creating and maintaining their social ministries at a capacity or skill level that can be mobilized in a disaster. In the end, the fact that a congregation has a good kitchen means that they can be much more easily incorporated into a local disaster response plan.

Linking Congregations to Other Community Disaster Infrastructure. Another innovative way to involve congregations in disaster planning is to create formal coordination and outreach mechanisms between congregations and critical infrastructure such as hospital and schools. Creating such connections within neighborhoods, congregations and local FBOs can work to fill holes needed during a disaster in their immediate vicinity, and also benefit from relationships that have been created with other organizations outside of the region. Hospitals and schools are, in general, trusted institutions, and religious leaders understand their role when it comes to illness and education. Caring for the sick and providing educational opportunities for their young are both traditional functions across faith traditions, and thus represent trusted public institutions.

In this model, hospitals and schools could partner with congregations and FBOs to share space and planning for the potential use of houses of worship and their facilities in times of disaster or for public health emergencies. For example, congregational buildings could be used for setting up an overflow clinic staffed by local hospital personnel, or, if a hospital is damaged and cannot be used, local congregations could be utilized as an alternate location for meeting medical needs or disaster mortuaries.

Creating these kinds of neighborhood-by-neighborhood connections would cover a large portion of the population in dense geographies like Los Angeles or San Francisco. That is, if there are existing neighborhood-based planning efforts that include existing institutions mandated to have a disaster plan, nearby congregations or FBOs could be an important asset in that plan. While it would take much time and effort to build trust, and then form and sustain those relationships, it is less so as compared to creating a stand-alone faith-based engagement program.

Congregations as Liaisons to Special Needs and At-risk Populations. Another area where congregations and FBOs excel is in identifying and accessing vulnerable, special needs or other at-risk, low visibility populations. In California, like many states, there are language access issues and immigration issues. Some groups are suspicious of government engagement, especially minority religious communities and their institutions, as well as ethnic, racial and refugee enclaves. One way to reach these populations is to develop partnerships with religious and ethnic minorities, like Buddhists, Hindus, Jains, Native Americans, Sikhs or Hmong and Somali refugees. Congregational engagement could be established by outreach by language groups, to groups such as Salvadoran or Guatemalan churches, Gurdwaras, or Vietnamese Cao Dai. This engagement with underrepresented communities must be done with cultural and religious competency and sensitivity, which often requires significant training and capacity building as well as the involvement of intermediary organizations.

Educating Faith Communities and their Congregations about Existing Programs. Public agencies have many strong and successful programs that would benefit from more exposure to faith communities. Many of the programs that exist are unknown by the very populations and communities that could use them. Cal EMA, FEMA and other public agencies should expend the resources necessary to educate and inform the public of existing programs that could be of benefit to them, with the goal to build sustained engagement relationships. Educating congregations about existing programs in and after disasters, builds resiliency and benefits both the recipients of such programs (with congregations as the crucial channel of information). This would also keep congregations from unnecessarily duplicating existing programs and allow them to put their resources into other areas of need. Further, it is important to point out that online training and traditional English-only curricula are not adequate educational sourcing for reaching out to different faith communities. For example, many faith groups serve immigrant communities with their leaders being both foreign born and trained, suggesting that significant communication and literacy barriers exist at both the leadership and membership levels. Further, a significant number of religious leaders and congregations do not have Internet connections, may not use e-mail or computers, and may not be Internet savvy.

In addition to existing programs, groups that are expected to have a role during a disaster require funding mechanisms to assist in their building and expending additional capacity without overly taxing their existing resources. There could be creative ways to do this, for example making regular training, course delivery, and technology tools available at the state or county disaster interfaith level. Or, there could be a federal, state or local matching program for volunteer activity or donations centered in particular congregations. This funding could be a standing percentage of annual funding for existing programs, for example the FEMA HMGP (Hazard Mitigation Grant Program), so as not to require new budget lines or tap state coffers. Also, if a congregation raised a certain amount of money for disaster related program, there could be a federal or state or local match to the amount raised by the congregation for themselves or for their local disaster interfaith. In short, there must be creative ways that disaster interfaith networks can support congregations by being a conduit for funding or other resources without being overly reliant on public funds or tapping their already strained resources in order for them to fill the needs that emerge in a disaster.

Capitalize on Key Opportunities to Educate. Finally, capitalizing on pivotal moments is a key to successful engagement. Cal EMA should consider mailer campaigns that would be timed specifically to a recent or upcoming preparedness event that makes people more aware of disasters. For example, the population of an area affected by a blackout, has firsthand experience about how unprepared they are to live without electricity. This presents a window of opportunity for agencies to inform the population about disaster preparation. Informational mailers, targeted by languages spoken, could then be disseminated through the membership of each congregation and their community and religious networks. Such cognitive windows are important in creating connections and enhancing action. Other approaches for such engagement include creating shopping lists for disaster preparation kits, that could also be distributed through congregations and concomitantly creating programs with supermarkets so that they could create displays organized around the preparedness lists. The larger point is that congregations should be considered as informational depots that can assist in getting disaster preparedness information distributed across a wide swath of the population.

Risk Communication. Researchers have found that disasters often devastate key community infrastructures leading to obstructions in communication.¹¹⁸  Communication is vital to successful disaster preparedness and response, yet communication prior to, during, and after times of disaster is extremely difficult.¹¹⁹  The inability to communicate readily creates major challenges to locating staff, congregants, volunteers, and partners.¹²⁰  Religious leaders frequently report that that one of biggest obstacles they have encountered before and after a storm is the break in social networks (e.g., not knowing how to get into contact with congregation members) that emerged from lack of communication capabilities.¹²¹

Disaster communication may be enhanced through novel uses of new and existing technology resources.¹²²  Many FBOs have developed creative ways to use the Internet, including their own web sites, e-mail networks, and official government sites, to generate large responses from social and professional networks and the general public, and to match organizational needs with volunteer skills and interest.¹²³  Along these lines, Aten and Topping (2010) have introduced an online social networking disaster preparedness tool that psychologists can help faith communities use to assist in developing preparedness and response plans. They hope this tool can be used to strengthen social networks within and between faith communities in disaster circumstances through improved information sharing and gathering, communication, and support. This tool may be used to allow psychologists to facilitate and assist clergy feeling stretched by responsibilities, defusing responsibility and ensuring that greater input and more diverse perspectives will be shared and incorporated in response and recovery efforts directed at spiritual care.

In summary, the authors recommend that Cal EMA:

• Translate existing materials for both language and cultural/institutional/religious competency and mandate that all materials generated at the community level, with state or federal monies, be measured for religious competence
• Work with religious bodies (such as denominational, ministerial alliances, interfaith groups, and clergy councils) to distribute information to all congregations
• Engage congregations and FBOs in preparing their own continuity of “ministry” plans to activate their self-interest
• Distribute pre-packed materials for congregational newsletters/communications
• Reduce barriers to developing standing capacity- local ordinances, building codes
• Encourage faith based organization engagement in all community issues to develop trust, social capital and local knowledge needed for disaster work
• Target hazard specific outreach after disasters in particular areas for both long-term recovery and also for future preparedness
•  Offer faith-based specific training and workshops to build capacity specifically for FBOs: offer them on nights and weekends to ensure that congregations with limited professional paid staff can participate and ensure that organizations can join a local disaster interfaith network after these events. Further, using an interfaith “holy day” calendar to select event dates will insure a larger cross section of attendees.
• Use congregations via judicatories as a partner in enhancing individual preparedness. It is vital to respect religious protocols and authority when approaching their congregations.
• Encourage faith-based participation in neighborhood planning efforts (among schools, hospitals and law enforcement/first responders)
• Conduct outreach to religious minorities to reach hard to reach populations
• Develop disaster preparedness and training curricula across all faith groups
• Develop disaster interfaiths that are intentionally inclusive, self-governing and sustainable
• Develop formal faith-based risk communication capacity in every county
• Equip disaster interfaiths to asset map all congregations and FBOs and use that data to increase the capacity of disaster interfaith, and religious judicatories and teach them how to use the data to enhance the planning and response capacity of emergency managers without compromising confidential data.

Faith-based organizations represent an important ally for public agencies as they seek to strengthen and enhance disaster preparedness and response in California. Because of their diversity and ubiquity, faith-based organizations serve as bedrock institutions of many neighborhoods, especially in low-income and predominantly immigrant communities. Moreover, they are often trusted sources of information, counseling, and social services of all kinds. Many faith-based organizations have the capacity to respond to disasters and have physical resources that can be utilized to serve in times of need. Other faith-based organizations must be encouraged to expand their vision to include the world beyond their limited definition of community.

For public agencies, faith-based organizations represent a challenge. Not only are they numerous, but they often have cultural, linguistic, and religious barriers that must be overcome. Intermediary organizations could play a significant role in overcoming barriers by assisting both agencies and FBOs and providing the appropriate toolkits to enhance understanding. The authors of this report contend that strengthening networks through intermediaries, building knowledge in public agencies and FBOs, and facilitating the ability of FBOs to serve during and after disasters will benefit the people of California and enhance the ability of communities to prepare for and recover from disasters.

Polls show that during times of crisis, nearly 60 percent of Americans say they turn first to a religious leader for comfort and guidance.²¹  In the wake of crisis or disaster, it is often assumed that the government and first-responders have the largest and most important role to play. While structural mitigation often rests squarely on the shoulders of the public domain, the role of local primary social institutions cannot be underestimated in the response to a community crisis.²²

Hull (2006) points to three major assumptions regarding the work of FBOs in the aftermath of Katrina.

1. FBOs and NGOs augment government and American Red Cross response.
2. Their impact, though beneficial, is not significant, at least not compared to the impact of government and the American Red Cross.
3. Their contribution is limited to traditional areas of FBO and NGO service, such as mental health and spiritual services.

Each of these assumptions, however, is incorrect.²³  Rather, the roles that FBOs play during times of crisis are much broader in reach, have a greater impact in the communities they serve, and have a long-term presence and effect. Hull (2006) found that during Katrina, FBOs and NGOs frequently performed at least ten major services and 33 sub-functions. While many view the role of FBOs and religious leaders only through the lens of spiritual care and counseling, the services they provide often reach far beyond the emotional and spiritual wellbeing of their flock and the community.

Among the other, generally unexpected services congregations and FBOs provided in the aftermath of Katrina included:²⁴

1. Shelter services
2. Food services
3. Medical services
4. Personal hygiene services
5. Mental health and spiritual support
6. Physical reconstruction services
7. Logistics management and services
8. Transportation management and services
9. Children’s services
10. Case management services

The prevailing assumption is that FBOs and NGOs expand upon existing services (such as spiritual care) while extending to add a few emergency services such as providing shelter, food and water.²⁵  However, it is more often the case that spontaneous networks will emerge, producing organizations with advanced technical capabilities, swarms of volunteers, facilities, and innovative ideas to respond to needs.²⁶  For example, in response to Katrina, one church provided dialysis treatments for those in need of this essential medical treatment.²⁷  Moreover, FBOs often provided services not only for evacuees, but also for relief workers and volunteers.²⁸  “By hosting those who came into a community to rebuild and restore,” Hull (2006) explains, “FBOs and NGOs enabled communities to heal and return to a more normal condition.” Indeed, Patrick Dougherty, a former Red Cross employee and (at that time) the relief ministry leader at Calvary Chapel church in Burbank, California, says that in his work, feeding volunteers and official responders is as crucial as feeding those who have been directly affected by a disaster.

Faith-based organizations are effective for three broad reasons: first, their specific mission and strong motivation to be responsive to needs; second, their proximity to and familiarity with the communities they serve; third, their access, either directly or through networks, to unique resources and capabilities directly applicable to the types of services needed following a disaster.²⁹  In addition to these three reasons, congregations also are effective because they explicitly address issues of personal meaning and the common existential questions that most survivors will grapple with.³⁰

On the other hand, while congregations in the immediate vicinity of a disaster will most likely respond to the perceived needs of a community, this does not mean that they will do so as effectively as possible. Peter Gudaitis of NDIN describes the following:

[C]ongregations with no history of doing community service work during a disaster typically don’t always do very well. They perceive themselves as doing well because they don’t understand their work in the context of what’s going on community-wide, and this is one of the broader challenges for nonprofits and faith-based organizations in general. They tend to have a focused perception of what is right, and it’s not necessarily a best practice and it’s not necessarily coordinated with the broader community. And that, unfortunately, can cause congregations to do things that are not in the best interests of the public when it comes to sustainable disaster recovery.

In 2011, FEMA proposed to include the broadest range of community actors in disaster preparation, response and recovery, framing this as the “Whole Community” approach to emergency management. This shift in thinking is intended to increase individual and household preparedness by targeting communities as a whole, and utilizing congregations and faith-based organizations, among other community organizations, as an ideal means to reach entire communities and to strengthen their ability to prepare and respond to
disaster.³¹

The Whole Community approach is presented as a way for emergency managers and government officials to understand and assess the needs of local residents as well as the best ways in which to organize and strengthen their assets, capacities and interests.³²  In theory, the approach is meant to engage the full capacity of local citizens, the private sector, nonprofit community organizations—including faith based organizations—and governmental agencies at all levels.³³  Whole Community principles include:³⁴

• Understanding and meeting the actual needs of the whole community
• Engaging and empowering all parts of the community
• Strengthening what works well in communities on a daily basis
• Understanding community complexity
• Recognizing community capabilities and needs
• Fostering relationships with community leaders
• Building and maintaining partnerships
• Empowering local action
• Leveraging and strengthening social infrastructure, networks, and assets

The Whole Community theory is encouraging and inspiring, but the next step must be to match the rhetoric with specific actions and to involve the whole community in this process. Thus, while the report briefly mentions the importance of including faith-based organizations in this approach, it does not present a conceptual or operational method of reaching out to congregations and other faith groups. A future report should examine solutions for including religious minorities in these efforts to bring entire communities into the emergency management planning process.

The story of Katrina, and the role of the faith communities in response to the devastation caused both by the storm and human error, helped fuel a new and evolving interest in the role of faith-based organizations during public health emergencies and disasters. These local FBOs (the term is inclusive of congregations and faith-based nonprofits) are increasingly viewed as formal assets that are capable of mobilizing a disaster response without much support. Yet, the story of the overwhelming and effective response by FBOs in the Katrina context must be tempered by stories of the many congregations that did not respond, those that responded but were untrained or ineffective in their efforts, and those that responded only to be ultimately overwhelmed by the burdens on their programs and forced to close down or still suffer from the emotional and financial scars of their service.

A difficult reality exists between the extreme views that cast FBOs as either fully prepared and able to spring into action without much support in the event of a disaster, or as incompetent or irrelevant to planning and response. The category itself includes a entities such as fifty member storefront congregations, college campus-like megachurches, service organizations, advocacy groups, and many others. Understanding these groups and supporting their disaster planning, response and recovery efforts requires some complex navigation. There is admittedly, a significant lack of religious literacy on the part of government, and even between faith communities.

Nonetheless, the challenge of working with faith-based organizations should not be a deterrent to engaging them. FBOs currently play a critical and expanding role once disasters strike, providing “Mass Care” (food, shelter, and many other essential services), along with risk communication, transportation, emotional and spiritual care, among other services, to their congregants and their surrounding communities. These responses, however, lack systematization. Outside of the Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD) structure, FBOs and congregations are generally not included in the formal disaster mitigation planning process mandated by local emergency managers and public health emergency officials. The disaster response structure does not usually recognize congregations and their unique resources and capital that can be harnessed before, during, and after disasters. In addition to their typically recognized capabilities, some FBOs are also able to coordinate activities because of their formal partnerships with other FBOs and local government social service networks that license, contract, and coordinate those services.

Therefore, there is an opportunity to increase the effectiveness with which congregations and many FBOs prepare for and respond to disasters. The following actions can improve the effectiveness of FBOs:

1. Understand their individual and collective assets and risk communication capacity,
2. Make data on congregations available to incident commanders and public officials,
3. Train congregational leaders in best practices, and
4. Educate policy makers on how to work effectively within all faith communities.

This report attempts to address these issues and to create a framework and process for thinking about congregations and other FBOs—and their potential assets—and to identify the resources needed to support and sustain their potential efforts.

1 Lawson, Erma J. (2007) “Wading in the Waters: Spirituality and Older Black Katrina Survivors,” Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved,18.2: 341-354. Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. Testimony of Major General Harold A. Cross, the Adjutant General of Mississippi. In: Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. Hearing-Hurricane Katrina: preparedness and response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Washington, DC: 109th Congress, Select Bipartisan Committee, 2005 Oct 27. U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Bioterriosm and Public Health Preparedness (SBPHP). Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: public health and emergency preparedness. Washington, D.C.: 109th Congress, SBPHP, 2006 Feb 9. Horner K. “Evacuee survey gauges storm’s mental toll.” Dallas Morning News. 2006 March 10:A1, A5.

2 Ibid

3 Lawson (2007),

4–6 Ibid

7 Hull, 2006

8 Evans, Kromm, & Sturgis, 2008. Jervis, 2008

9 Szabo, 2007

10 Hull, Pete (2006) “Heralding Unheard Voices: The Role of Faith-Based Organization and Nongovernmental Organizations during Disaster (final report),” Homeland Security Institute, Prepared for the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate.

11–15 Ibid

16 Worden, 2006

17 Ibid

18 Table found in Szabo, 2007

19 Data from: http://unitedsikhs.org/Project_Accounts/US_Disaster_Response.pdf

20 ICNA Relief USA, After Action Summary Report

21 National Disaster Interfaith Network, Tip Sheet 1

22 Silver and Wicke, 2009

23 Hull, 2006

24–28 Ibid

29 Hull, 2006

30 From Jamie Aten, Humanitarian Disaster Institute, Wheaton College. Personal correspondence.

31 Aniskoff, Paulette. Kaufman, David. Lumpkins, Donald M. (2011) “A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Concepts and Pathways for Action,” Federal Emergency Management Agency

32–34 Ibid

35 See Appendix 1 for counts and categorizations of congregations in four areas of California: Los Angeles, Oakland, Irvine, and Imperial County.

36 For example Rev. Cecil Murray’s role during the 1992 L.A. riots, see “Forging a New Moral and Political Agenda: The Civic Role of Religion in Los Angeles, 1992-2010.” Center for Religion and Civic Culture, University of Southern California.

37 Severson, 2011

38 Ibid

39 De Vita and Kramer, 2008

40-42 Ibid

43 See “Politics of the Spirit: Religion and Multi-Ethnicity in Los Angeles,” (1994); and “Forging a New Moral and Political Agenda” (2010), USC Center for Religion and Civic Culture, for descriptions of Murray’s many and varied community organized activities.

44 Covello, 1992

45 Philbin and Urban. Leavitt, 2003. Blanchard et al., 2005. O’Toole, Mair, & Inglesby, 2002.

46–50 Ibid

51 In partnership with Peter Gudaitis and NYDIS, the authors have adapted the instrument to include measures that fit congregations into a four-tier system. See page 59 for a description of this system.

52 Hull, 2006

53–56 Ibid

57 Hunt, 2006

58–62 Ibid

63 Aten, Moore et al., 2008

64 Massey and Sutton, 2007. Chandler, McMillion, Stuart.

65 Schuster et al., 2001

66 Supra Note 59

67 Ai, et al

68 Aten, Graham et al.

69 Ibid

70 From Lockwood and Miller

71 Ibid

72 Philbin and Urban

73 “Communities of faith often found themselves in a position of offering counseling—both formally and informally—to displaced residents. For example, Catholic Charities Archdiocese of New Orleans reported that they offered crisis intervention and counseling to 864,547 people in a 2 ½ year period following Katrina. Similarly, Cain and Barthelemy (2008) reported that 40 percent of the churches in their study provided counseling to victims of the storm.” Chandler, McMillion, Stuart.

74 Ibid

75 Abbamonte, 2009

76 Ibid

77 Hull, 2006

78 From Hull, 2006

79–80 Ibid

81 See “Opening the Gates: Congregations Confronting Gang Violence,” University of Southern California, Center for Religion and Civic Culture, 2012.

82 Found on: http://www.namb.net/dr/ Date Accessed: May 4, 2012

83 Available at http://www.nvoad.org/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view =wrapper&Itemid=41; accessed 5/4/2012.

84 De Vita and Kramer, 2008

85 Ibid

86 Monroe, 2010

87 Monroe, 2010

88 Ibid

89 Jayasinghe, 2007

90 Severson, 2011

91–95 Ibid

96 This statement reads: “Respect is foundational to disaster spiritual care. Spiritual care providers demonstrate respect for diverse cultural and religious values by recognizing the right of each faith group and individual to hold to their existing values and traditions. Spiritual care providers: 1) refrain from manipulation, disrespect or exploitation of those impacted by disaster and trauma, 2) respect the freedom from unwanted gifts of religious literature or symbols, evangelistic and sermonizing speech, and/or forced acceptance of specific moral values and traditions. 3) respect diversity and differences, including but not limited to culture, gender, age, sexual orientation, spiritual/religious practices and disability.

97 Breed, 2008

98–100 Ibid

101 http://www.thearda.com/rcms2010/;
accessed 5/4/2012.

102 http://www.thearda.com/rcms2010/; accessed 5/4/2012.

103 Hull, 2006

104 For an application of this model, see Appendix 1, Four Geographic Areas. We have applied it fully to the database of congregations and FBOs in Imperial County.

105 From: http://bettergivingsd.guidestar.org/NonprofitProfile.aspx?OrgId=1052151; see also http://www.sdinterfaithdisastercouncil.com/ and https://www.facebook.com/pages/Interfaith-Disaster-Council-San-Diego/117181605037576?sk=info. The IDC also works with other organizations such as the San Diego Office of Emergency Services and the Red Cross.

106–114 Ibid

115 http://bettergivingsd.guidestar.org/NonprofitProfile.aspx?OrgId=1052151

116 From: http://enla.org/

117 Ibid

118 Aten, Leavell et al.

119 Ibid

120 De Vita and Kramer, 2008

121 Aten and Topping, 2010

122–123 Ibid

Imperial County is located in the Imperial Valley, in the far southeast of the U.S. state of California, bordering both Arizona and Mexico. It is part of the El Centro Metropolitan Area, which encompasses all of Imperial County. As of 2010, the population was 174,528. The county seat is the city of El Centro. Established in 1907, it was the last county to be established in California. Imperial County is also part of the Southern California border region, also referred to as San Diego-Imperial, the smallest but most economically diverse region in the state. Imperial County is a mixture of rural and suburban.
The racial makeup of Imperial County was 102,553 (58.8%) White, 5,773 (3.3%) African American, 3,059 (1.8%) Native American, 2,843 (1.6%) Asian, 165 (0.1%) Pacific Islander, 52,413 (30.0%) from other races, and 7,722 (4.4%) from two or more races. Hispanic or Latino of any race is 140,271 persons (80.4%).2

Disaster History
In this region, the geology is dominated by the transition of the tectonic plate boundary from rift to fault. The southernmost strands of the San Andreas Fault connect the northern-most extensions of the East Pacific Rise. Consequently, the region is subject to earthquakes, and the crust is being stretched, resulting in a sinking of the terrain over time. Imperial County-area historical earthquake activity is above California state average. It is 2,508 percent greater than the overall U.S. average.3 The Valley has been plagued by quakes and damaged by aftershocks since before reporting earthquakes became possible in 1933 and going back to the 1800s, according to the Southern California Earthquake DataCenter’s historic maps. Though the area has experienced thousands of quakes, some had more of an impact, destroying buildings, causing millions in damage and even causing death.

• 1852 Volcano Lake earthquake
  On about noon of Nov. 29, 1852, a magnitude 6.5 earthquake hit about 30 miles southwest of Yuma. Cracks were formed in the clay desert near the Colorado River and the quake caused mud volcanoes and geysers to become active southwest of Fort Yuma. Shaking was felt as far away as Guaymas, in the state of Sonora, Mexico.
• 1892 Laguna Salada earthquake At 11:20 p.m. on Feb. 23, 1892, a 7.0-magnitude quake shook the area, starting about 13 miles southwest of Mexicali. The remote location in an essentially uninhabited area of Baja California probably kept damage low, but also made determining its epicenter difficult. The quake left cracks in large buildings in San Diego and caused a general alarm among the people. Adobe buildings were destroyed in San Diego County and in Paradise Valley, a church and school were destroyed.
• 1915 Imperial Valley Earthquake At 7:59 p.m. on June 22, 1915, a 6.1-magnitude earthquake struck five miles east of El Centro. About an hour later a 6.3-magnitude quake followed. The earthquake was responsible for at least six deaths, numerous injuries and almost $1 million worth of damage.
• 1940 Imperial Valley Earthquake At 8:37 p.m. on May 18, 1940, a 6.9-magnitude quake struck the Imperial fault five miles north of Calexico. Until last April, it was the strongest recorded quake to strike the Imperial Valley. It caused at least $6 million in direct damage, not taking into consideration crops lost due to damage of irrigation systems. This earthquake was directly responsible for the deaths of eight people, and indirectly for several others. At least 20 people were seriously injured.
• 1942 Fish Creek
  Mountains Earthquake
  At 9:30 a.m. on Oct. 21, 1942, a 6.6-magnitude earthquake stuck 28 miles west of Brawley. Little damage was caused relative to the size of the quake. However, it was felt over a large area of Southern California, as well as parts of Baja California and Arizona. It caused minor damage in Brawley, El Centro, Westmorland and even San Diego. The hardest hit area was Jacumba Hot Springs, fairly close to the epicenter, though even there the damage was moderate.
• 1979 Imperial Valley Earthquake At 4:54 p.m. on Oct. 15, 1979, a 6.4-magnitude earthquake shook about 18 miles southeast of El Centro. The Imperial, Brawley and Rico faults ruptured.
• 1987 Superstition Hills
  Earthquake
  At 6:15 a.m. on Nov. 24, 1987 a 6.6-magnitude earthquake struck southeast of Salton City. The initial faults affected Superstition Hills and Wienert, but it triggered shaking on the Imperial, San Andreas and Coyote Creek faults. That quake was triggered by the 6.2-magnitude Elmore Ranch Earthquake about 17 miles southeast of Salton City that occurred just more than 12 hours earlier.4
• In April 2010, a 7.2 magnitude quake struck in Baja California and impacted the Imperial Valley. Since then, several minor quakes have impacted the area. Given the area’s history of strong earthquakes, it would be assumed that more congregations would have active disaster ministries.
• One group was formed following the 2010 earthquake that includes congregations. The Imperial Valley Disaster Recovery Team, made up of a coalition of community members, businesses, service groups and faith-based organizations, was put in place to address long-term unmet recovery needs for those impacted by the Baja California-Imperial Valley earthquake, according to the group’s mission statements. Different groups, like the El Centro Kiwanis, Imperial Valley Community Foundation, Red Cross and more, have been working together since the idea was suggested by the California and federal emergency management agencies. The team is modeled after others in California. The team was based on a pattern on similar disaster recovery efforts of agencies throughout Southern California. When a disaster strikes, agencies such as CalEMA, FEMA, Red Cross and Salvation Army arrive to assist, but the magnitude of this disaster made it difficult to facilitate the long-term needs of the affected individuals.
• Three separate churches created and hosted an Emergency Prepare Fair in March and April 2011.

Religion
Official (self-reported) membership counts from congregations in Imperial County show that there are 123 congregations with 67,372 adherents, totaling 38.6 percent of the population.5

Our research has been able to identify 160 congregations in Imperial Valley. We have also identified one interfaith council (the Interfaith Council of Imperial Valley) and one operational ministerial alliance (Imperial Valley/Yuma Area Ministerial Alliance). There is one faith-based disaster response group that started in response to the earthquake in Haiti called I.V. Hope for Haiti and several congregations that have responded to needs following earthquakes in the area, including two congregations that participate in the San Diego Interfaith Disaster Council.

The Imperial County congregational list has been used as a model for our categorization system. See map on page 28.

Oakland is a major West Coast port city on San Francisco Bay in the U.S. state of California. It is the eighth-largest city in the state with a 2010 population of 390,724. Originally incorporated in 1852, Oakland is the county seat of Alameda County and is a central hub city for a region of the San Francisco Bay Area known as the East Bay. According to the United States Census Bureau, the city has a total area of 78.0 square miles (202 km2). 55.8 square miles (145 km2) of it is land and 22.2 square miles (57 km2) of it (28.48 percent) is water.

Residents of Oakland most broadly refer to their city’s terrain as “the flatlands” and “the hills,” which until recent waves of gentrification have also been a reference to Oakland’s deep economic divide, with “the hills” being more affluent communities. About two-thirds of Oakland lies in the flat plain of the East Bay, with one-third rising into the foothills and hills of the East Bay range.

The 2010 United States Census reported that Oakland had a population of 390,724. The population density was 5,009.2 people per square mile (1,934.0/km²). The racial makeup of Oakland is below:

Since the 1960s, Oakland has been known as a center of Northern California’s African-American community. However, between 2000 and 2010 Oakland lost nearly 25 percent of its black population. The city demographics have changed due to a combination of rapid gentrification along with many African-Americans relocating to Bay Area suburbs, or moving to the Southern United States. Though blacks never constituted a majority of Oakland’s population, they formed a strong plurality for many years, peaking in 1980 at about 47 percent of the population. Despite the decline, black residents maintain their status as Oakland’s single largest ethnic group as of 2010, at 27 percent of the population, followed by non-Hispanic whites at 26 percent and Latinos of any race at 25 percent.

Recent trends have resulted in cultural shifts, leading to a decline among some of the city’s longstanding African-American institutions, such as churches, businesses, and nightclubs, which has been a point of contention for some long-time black residents.
Oakland is a hub of political activity. In recent years, immigrants and others have marched by the thousands down Oakland’s International Boulevard in support of legal reforms benefitting illegal immigrants. In 2009, Oakland’s city council passed a resolution to create municipally-issued “Oakland identification cards” to help residents get easier access to city and business services, improve their civic participation and encourage them to report crimes to police. The following year, Oakland’s city council resolved to divert new municipal economic investment from firms headquartered in Arizona in the wake of that state’s attempt to control illegal immigration.

Disaster History
On October 20, 1991, a massive firestorm (see 1991 Oakland firestorm) swept down from the Berkeley Hills above the Caldecott Tunnel, killing 25 people, injuring 150 people, and destroying 4,000 homes. The economic loss has been estimated at $1.5 billion, and it was the worst such firestorm in American history. Many of the original homes were rebuilt on a much larger scale.

Oakland-area historical earthquake activity is slightly below California state average. It is 1345 percent greater than the overall U.S. average. The Loma Prieta earthquake occurred on October 17, 1989, a rupture of the San Andreas Fault that affected the entire San Francisco Bay Area. The quake’s surface wave measured 7.1 on the Richter magnitude scale, and many structures in Oakland were badly damaged. The double-decker portion of the freeway (Interstate 880) structure collapsed. The eastern span of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge also sustained damage and was closed to traffic for one month.
The number of natural disasters in Alameda County (14) is near the U.S. average (12).

Major Disasters (Presidential) Declared: 12
Emergencies Declared: 2

Causes of natural disasters:
Floods: 9
Storms: 6
Landslides: 3
Winter Storms: 3
Mudslides: 2
Tornado: 1
Drought: 1
Earthquake: 1
Fire: 1
Freeze: 1
Hurricane: 1
(Note: Some incidents may be assigned to more than one category).6

Religion
The percentage of the population in Oakland affiliated with a religious congregation is 34.95 percent. Our research has identified 417 congregations and FBOs in Oakland. One interfaith coalition has been identified, Oakland Coalition of Congregations and one organization dedicated to disaster response and preparation which includes the faith community (Collaborating Agencies Responding to Disaster). Oakland’s religious landscape is diverse with a high number of Buddhist temples, synagogues, mosques and new religious movements.7

Oakland is an urbanized zone with a high population density. A majority of the population is economically disenfranchised and a number of marginalized groups and communities live within the city limits. Oakland is also known for its political activism. Oakland also tends to be a focal point for clashes between communities and law enforcement. A recent case of this is the Oscar Grant shooting, trial and community response.
Given the landscape, it is recommended that law enforcement agencies and government entities use a community-based civic approach to outreach with congregations. It is important for such agencies to work to gain trust and entry to these communities and invest in building healthy congregations outside of disaster work. Communities and congregations will need to buy-in to outreach attempts and feel as though their problems and concerns are being heard and addresses. Training programs should address areas of interest to faith communities and be dual-purpose.

Irvine is a suburban incorporated city in Orange County, California. It is a master planned city, mainly developed by the Irvine Company since the 1960s. Irvine was formally incorporated on December 28, 1971, and comprises 66 square miles with a population of 212,375 as of the 2010 census.

Because of its good schools, jobs, and housing, the city was chosen in 2008 by CNNMoney.com as the fourth best place to live in the United States; in September 2011, Businessweek listed Irvine as the 5th best city in the U.S. In June 2010, the Federal Bureau of Investigation reported that Irvine had the lowest violent crime rate among cities in the United States with populations of more than 100,000, and in August 2008 the Census Bureau ranked Irvine as having the seventh highest median income among cities in the United States with populations of more than 65,000.

Irvine is home to the University of California, Irvine (UCI), Concordia University, Irvine Valley College, the Orange County Center of the University of Southern California (USC), Brandman University (affiliated with Chapman University), and the satellite campuses of Alliant International University, California State University Fullerton (CSUF), University of La Verne and Pepperdine University.

The 2010 United States Census reported that Irvine had a population of 212,375. The population density was 3,195.8 people per square mile (1,233.9/km²). The racial makeup of Irvine was 107,215 (50.5 percent) White, 3,718 (1.8 percent) African American, 355 (0.2 percent) Native American, 83,176 (39.2 percent) Asian, 334 (0.2 percent) Pacific Islander, 5,867 (2.8 percent) from other races, and 11,710 (5.5 percent) from two or more races. Hispanic or Latino persons of any race are 19,621 persons (9.2 percent).

Religion
On January 26, 2003 the Los Angeles Times reported that

Irvine… has emerged as one of the nation’s most religiously diverse suburbs… Here, there’s a Buddhist temple that can house 42 monks, a Korean church that boasts 4,000 members and a $50-million K-12 Jewish day school. There’s a $ 4-million Islamic elementary school, the county’s largest Greek Orthodox Church and a university run by the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod… Ahead is a $37-million Jewish community center and a Mormon temple, which sits just outside Irvine’s border on land annexed by Newport Beach in 1998… The religious pluralism in Irvine reflects a national trend in which large institutions of faith are following immigrants to the suburbs, creating houses of worship that are also cultural centers for newcomers to America… The construction of mosques, temples and buildings more exotic than a standard church and steeple have caused some consternation in suburban neighborhoods not accustomed to the sights. But experts say acceptance is growing, especially in the post-Sept. 11 era.8

Our research has located 90 congregations in Irvine. We have also identified two interfaith groups, the Newport, Mesa, Irvine Interfaith Council and UCI’s Interfaith center. Mark Whitlock, pastor at Christ Our Redeemer AME Church in Irvine and executive director of USC’s Cecil Murray Center, reported that that one ministerial alliance exists, the Orange County Ministerial Alliance, which is a small group of African-American pastors.

Los Angeles, with a population at the 2010 United States Census of 3,792,621, is the most populous city in the state of California, and the second most populous in the United States, after New York City. It has an area of 468.67 square miles (1,213.8 km2), and is located in Southern California. The city is the focal point of the larger Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana metropolitan statistical area, which contains 12,828,837 people as of 2010, and is one of the most populous metropolitan areas in the world and the second largest in the United States. Los Angeles is also the seat of Los Angeles County, the most populated and one of the most ethnically diverse counties in the United States, while the entire Los Angeles area itself has been recognized as the most diverse of the nation’s largest cities.

Los Angeles was incorporated as a municipality on April 4, 1850, five months before California achieved statehood. Los Angeles is a world center of business, international trade, entertainment, culture, media, fashion, science, sports, technology, and education. It is home to renowned institutions covering a broad range of professional and cultural fields and is one of the most substantial economic engines within the United States. Los Angeles has been ranked the third richest city and fifth most powerful and influential city in the world. The Los Angeles combined statistical area (CSA) has a gross metropolitan product (GMP) of $831 billion (as of 2008), making it the third largest economic center in the world, after the Greater Tokyo and New York metropolitan areas.

Population
The 2010 United States Census reported that Los Angeles had a population of 3,792,621. The population density was 7,544.6 people per square mile. The 2010 census showed that the racial makeup of Los Angeles included: 1,888,158 Whites (49.8 percent), 365,118 African Americans (9.6 percent), 28,215 Native Americans (0.7 percent), 426,959 Asians (11.3 percent), 5,577 Pacific Islanders (0.1 percent), 902,959 from other races (23.8 percent), and 175,635 (4.6 percent) from two or more races.[114] Hispanics or Latinos of any race were 1,838,822 persons (48.5 percent).

Non-Hispanic whites were 28.7 percent of the population in 2010, compared to 86.3 percent in 1940. Mexicans make up the largest ethnic group of Latinos at 31.9 percent of Los Angeles’ population, followed by Salvadorans (6.0 percent), Guatemalans (3.6 percent), Hondurans (0.6 percent), Nicaraguans (0.4 percent), Puerto Ricans (0.4 percent), Peruvians (0.4 percent), Cubans (0.4 percent), Colombians (0.3 percent), Argentines (0.2 percent), and Ecuadorians (0.2 percent). The Latino population is spread throughout the city of Los Angeles and its metropolitan area but it is most heavily concentrated in the East Los Angeles region, which has a long established Mexican American and Central American community.

The largest Asian ethnic groups are Filipinos (3.2 percent) and Koreans (2.9 percent), which have their own established ethnic enclaves. Koreatown and Historic Filipinotown. The Chinese population of Los Angeles (1.8 percent) can be found mostly outside of Los Angeles city limits and in the San Gabriel Valley of Los Angeles County, but there is a sizable presence in the city, notably in Chinatown. Chinatown is also home to many Thais and Cambodians, who make up 0.3 percent and 0.1 percent of Los Angeles’ population, respectively. Japanese comprise 0.9 percent of L.A.’s population, and have an established Little Tokyo, and Vietnamese make up 0.5 percent of Los Angeles’ population. L.A. has a rather small South Asian population. Indians comprise up 0.9 percent of the city’s population.

Geography and Disaster History
Los Angeles is subject to earthquakes due to its location on the Pacific Ring of Fire. The geologic instability has produced numerous faults, which cause approximately 10,000 earthquakes annually. One of the major faults is the San Andreas Fault. Located at the boundary between the Pacific Plate and the North American Plate, it is predicted to be the source of Southern California’s next big earthquake. Major earthquakes to have hit the Los Angeles area include the 1994 Northridge earthquake, the 1987 Whittier Narrows earthquake, the 1971 San Fernando earthquake near Sylmar, and the 1933 Long Beach earthquake. Nevertheless, all but a few quakes are of low intensity and are not felt. The Los Angeles basin and metropolitan area are also at risk from blind thrust earthquakes. Parts of the city are also vulnerable to tsunamis; harbor areas were damaged by waves from the Valdivia earthquake in 1960.

Religion
The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles leads the largest archdiocese in the country. Cardinal Roger Mahony oversaw construction of the Cathedral of Our Lady of the Angels, which opened in September 2002 in downtown Los Angeles. Construction of the cathedral marked a coming of age of the city’s Catholic, heavily Latino community. There are numerous Catholic churches and parishes throughout Los Angeles.

With 621,000 Jews in the metropolitan area (490,000 in city proper), the region has the second largest Jewish population in the United States, with the largest population concentrated on the Westside and in the San Fernando Valley, though Boyle Heights and Northwest Los Angeles once had large Jewish populations. Many varieties of Judaism are represented in the area, including Reform, Conservative, Orthodox, and Reconstructionist. The Breed Street Shul in East Los Angeles, built in 1923, was the largest synagogue west of Chicago in its early decades. (It is no longer a sacred space and has been converted to a museum and community center.)

Los Angeles has also had a rich and influential Protestant tradition. The first Protestant service in Los Angeles was a Methodist meeting held in a private home in 1850 and the oldest Protestant church still operating was founded in 1867. In the early 1900s the Bible Institute of Los Angeles published the founding documents of the Christian Fundamentalist movement and the Azusa Street Revival launched Pentecostalism. Aimee Semple McPherson broadcast over the radio in the 1920s from the Angelus Temple, home of the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel. The Potter’s House Christian Fellowship and Metropolitan Community Church also had their origins in the city. Important churches in the city include First Presbyterian Church of Hollywood, Bel Air Presbyterian Church, First African Methodist Episcopal Church of Los Angeles, West Angeles Church of God in Christ, Second Baptist Church, Crenshaw Christian Center, McCarty Memorial Christian Church, and First Congregational Church.

The Los Angeles California Temple of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints is the second largest Mormon temple in the world. The Los Angeles California Temple, the second largest temple operated by the LDS is on Santa Monica Boulevard in the Westwood district of Los Angeles. Dedicated in 1956, it was the first Mormon temple built in California and it was the largest in the world when completed.

Because of Los Angeles’ large multi-ethnic population, a wide variety of faiths are practiced, including Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, Sikhism, Bahá’í, various Eastern Orthodox Churches, Sufism and others. Immigrants from Asia for example, have formed a number of significant Buddhist congregations making the city home to the greatest variety of Buddhists in the world.

We have identified 2,941 congregations in the City of Los Angeles, and 8,893 congregations in Los Angeles County. These are in addition to several ministerial alliances and interfaith groups that are active in the city’s religious scene. Because of the very large numbers of congregations and other religious groups in Los Angeles, we are currently working with the Los Angeles Region Red Cross to understand their assets and to assign congregations to appropriate tiers for analysis.

• Glossary of Acronyms
• Select Organizations
• Works Referenced
• California Congregations Assest Mapping and Risk Communication Survey for Public Health Emergencies and Disaster Preparedness and Recovery
• Selected Bibliography
• Contacts
• Best Practices