Publications List

“Fact and Value”

Essays in Ethics and Metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson, ed. Alex Byrne, Robert Stalnaker, and Ralph Wedgwood (MIT Press, 2001).

1. How Can ‘Evidence’ be Normative?

   The Routledge Handbook of Evidence, ed. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn (Routledge, 2024): 74–90.

2. Ethical Naturalism, Non-Naturalism, and In-Between

   Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism, ed. Paul Bloomfield and David Copp (Oxford University Press, 2023), 131–155.

3. Hierocles’ Concentric Circles

   Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 62, ed. Victor Caston (Oxford University Press, 2023), 293–332.

4. The Reasons Aggregation Theorem

   Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol. 12, ed. Mark Timmons (Oxford University Press, 2022), 127–148.

5. Doxastic Rationality

   Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on Their Nature and Significance, ed. Luis Oliveira and Paul Silva Jr. (Routledge, 2022), 219–240.

6. Practical and Theoretical Rationality

   The Handbook of Rationality, ed. Markus Knauf and Wolfgang Spohn (MIT Press, 2021): Chap. 2.2, 137–45.

7. The Internalist Virtue Theory of Knowledge

   Synthese 197, no. 12, Special Issue: The Epistemology of Ernest Sosa (2020): 5357–5378. doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1707-x

8. Moral Disagreement and Inexcusable Irrationality

   American Philosophical Quarterly 56, no. 1 (January 2019): 97–108.

9. A Probabilistic Epistemology of Perceptual Belief

   Philosophical Issues, 28 – Philosophy of Logic and Inferential Reasoning (2018): 374–398. doi: 10.1111/phis.12130

10. The Unity of Normativity

    in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, ed. Daniel Star (Oxford University Press, 2018): 23–45.

11. Plato’s Theory of Knowledge

    in Virtue, Happiness, and Knowledge: Themes from the Work of Gail Fine and Terence Irwin, ed. David Brink, Susan Sauvé Meyer, and Christopher Shields (Oxford University Press, 2018): 33–56.

12. Epistemic Teleology: Synchronic and Diachronic

    in Epistemic Consequentialism, ed. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn (Oxford University Press, 2018): 85–112.

13. The Coherence of Thrasymachus

    in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. Victor Caston, Vol. 53 (Oxford University Press, 2017): 33–63.

14. Must Rational Intentions Maximize Utility?

    Philosophical Explorations 20, Sup. 2 (2017): 73–92. doi: 10.1080/13869795.2017.1356352

15. The Predicament of Choice

    in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau, Vol. 12 (Oxford University Press, 2017): 294–313.

16. Two Grades of Non-consequentialism

    Criminal Law and Philosophy, 10, no. 4 (2016): 795–814. doi: 10.1007/s11572-014-9351-0

17. Objective and Subjective ‘Ought’

    Deontic Modality, ed. Nate Charlow and Matthew Chrisman (Oxford University Press, 2016): 142–68.

18. Is Civil Marriage Illiberal?

    in After Marriage: Rethinking Marital Relationships, ed. Elizabeth Brake (Oxford University Press, 2016): 29–50.

19. The Pitfalls of Reasons

    Philosophical Issues 25, Normativity (2015): 125–143. DOI: 10.1111/phis.12054

20. An Inferentialist Conception of the A Priori

    in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 5, ed. Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (Oxford University Press, 2015): 295–314.

21. Rationality as a Virtue

    Analytic Philosophy 55, no. 4 (December 2014): 319–338. DOI: 10.1111/phib.12055

22. Moral Disagreement among Philosophers

    in Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Evolution and Disagreement, ed. Michael Bergmann and Patrick Kain (Oxford University Press, 2014): 23–39.

23. The Right Thing to Believe

    in The Aim of Belief, ed. Timothy Chan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 123–139.

24. The Weight of Moral Reasons

    Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, ed. Mark Timmons, vol. 3 (2013): 35–58.

25. Gandalf’s Solution to the Newcomb Problem

    Synthese, 190, no. 14 (2013): 2643–2675. doi: 10.1007/s11229-011-9900-1

26. Akrasia and Uncertainty

    Organon F, 20, no. 4, ed. Julian Fink (2013): 483–505.

27. Rational ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’

    Philosophical Issues 23 (2013): 70–92. DOI: 10.1111/phis.12004

28. A Priori Bootstrapping

    in The A Priori in Philosophy, ed. Albert Casullo and Joshua C. Thurow (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013): 226–246. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0011

29. Doxastic Correctness

    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. 87 (2013): 38–54.

30. Justified Inference

    Synthese, 189, no. 2 (2012): 273–295. doi: 10.1007/s11229-011-0012-8.

31. Outright Belief

    dialectica 66, no. 3, Special Issue on Belief and Degrees of Belief, ed. Philip Ebert and Martin Smith (2012): 309–329. DOI: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01305.x

32. Defending Double Effect

    Ratio 24, Special Issue on Deontological Ethics, ed. Brad Hooker (2011): 384–401.

33. Instrumental Rationality

    Oxford Studies in Metaethics, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau, vol. 6 (2011): 280–309.

34. The Refutation of Expressivism

    in Truth, Reference, and Realism, ed. Zsolt Novak and Andras Simonyi (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2011): 207–234.

35. Primitively Rational Belief-Forming Processes

    in Reasons for Belief, ed. Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 180–200.

36. The Moral Evil Demons

    in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010): 216–246.

37. Diotima’s Eudaemonism: Intrinsic Value and Rational Motivation in Plato’s Symposium

    Phronesis 54 (2009): 297–325.

38. The ‘Good’ and the ‘Right’ Revisited

    Philosophical Perspectives 23 (2009): 499-519.

39. Intrinsic Values and Reasons for Action

    Philosophical Issues 19 (2009): 342-363.

40. The Normativity of the Intentional

    in The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind, ed. Brian P. McLaughlin and Ansgar Beckermann (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009), 421-36.

41. Contextualism about Justified Belief

    The Philosophers” Imprint 8, no. 9 (September 2008), 1-20 <http://www.philosophersimprint.org/008009/>.

42. Butler on Virtue, Self-Interest, and Human Nature

    in Morality and Self-Interest, ed. Paul Bloomfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

43. Normativism Defended

    in Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind, ed. Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen (Blackwell, 2007), 85-101.

44. The Normative Force of Reasoning

    Noûs 40, no. 4 (December 2006), 660-686.

45. The Meaning of ‘Ought’

    Oxford Studies in Metaethics, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau, vol. 1 (2006), 127-160.

46. The Internal and External Components of Cognition

    Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, ed. Robert Stainton (Blackwell, 2006), 307-325.

47. How We Know What Ought to Be

    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106, no. 1 (September 2005), 61-84.

48. The Metaethicists’ Mistake

    Philosophical Perspectives 18 (2004), 405-426.

49. Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly

    in Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, ed. Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet (Oxford UP, 2003), 201-229.

50. The Aim of Belief

    Philosophical Perspectives 16 (2002), 267-297.

51. Internalism Explained

    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002), 349-369.

52. Practical Reason and Desire

    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002), 345-358.

53. Practical Reasoning as Figuring Out What is Best: Against Constructivism

    Topoi 21 (2002), 139-152.

54. Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms

    Philosophical Review 110 (2001), 1-30.

55. The Price of Non-Reductive Physicalism

    Noûs 34 (2000), 400-421.

56. The Price of Non-Reductive Moral Realism

    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (1999), 199-215.

57. The Fundamental Argument for Same-Sex Marriage

    Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (1999), 225-242.

58. The A Priori Rules of Rationality

    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1999), 113-131.

59. The Essence of Response-Dependence

    European Review of Philosophy 3 (1998), 31-54.

60. The Fundamental Principle of Practical Reasoning

    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (1998), 189-209.

61. Non-Cognitivism, Truth, and Logic

    Philosophical Studies 86 (1997), 73-91.

62. Theories of Content and Theories of Motivation

    European Journal of Philosophy 3 (1995), 273-288.

63. Scepticism and Rational Belief

    Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1990), 45-64.

1. The Sources of Moral Knowledge

   Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2023). doi: 10.1111/phpr.13022

2. Can our reasons explain what it is rational for us to believe?

   Philosophical Studies (2023). DOI: 10.1007/s11098-023-02034-1.

3. Review of Against Marriage: An Egalitarian Defense of the Marriage-Free State, by Clare Chambers

   Ethics 129, no. 2 (2019): 398–403. doi: 10.1086/700046

4. Review of Fifteen Sermons and Other Writings on Ethics, by Joseph Butler

   Journal of the History of Philosophy 56, no. 3 (2018): 563–564.

5. Review of Being Realistic about Reasons, by T. M. Scanlon

   Philosophical Quarterly 66, no. 262 (2016): 213–217. doi: 10.1093/pq/pqv029

6. Review of Taking Morality Seriously: A Defence of Robust Realism, by David Enoch

   Philosophical Quarterly 63, no. 251 (2013): 389–94.

7. Review of Minimizing Marriage: Marriage, Morality and the Law, by Elizabeth Brake

   Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2012) <http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/35201-minimizing-marriage-marriage-morality-and-the-law/>.

8. Review of The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, by Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar and Adrian Haddock

   Analysis (Published online: November 12, 2011). DOI: 10.1093/analys/anr116

9. Scanlon on Double Effect

   Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2011): 464–472.

10. The Nature of Normativity: Précis

    Philosophical Studies (2010): DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9553-9.

11. The Nature of Normativity: A Reply to Holton, Railton, and Lenman

    Philosophical Studies (2010): DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9554-8.

12. Schroeder on Expressivism: For — Or Against?

    Analysis 70 (2010): 117-129.

13. Review of Reasons without Rationalism, by Kieran Setiya

    Mind 117 (2008): 1130-5.

14. Critical Notice of Christopher Peacocke’s The Realm of Reason

    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74, no. 3 (May 2007), 776-791.

15. Railton on Normativity

    Comments on Peter Railton, Facts, Values, and Norms, Part III, Philosophical Studies 126, no. 3 (December 2005), 463-479.

16. Review of Hate Crimes: Criminal Law and Identity Politics, by James B. Jacobs and Kimberly Potter

    Journal of Homosexuality 45, no. 1 (2003), 152-159.

17. Sensing Values?

    Comments on Mark Johnston, “The Authority of Affect”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001), 215-224.

18. Critical Notice of The Authority of Reason, by Jean E. Hampton

    Philosophical Books 40 (1999), 218-227.

19. Review of Value-Judgment: Improving our Ethical Beliefs, by James Griffin

    Philosophical Review 107 (1998), 447-449.

20. Review of Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness, edited by Christopher Peacocke

    Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1997), 255-257.

21. Review of The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics, by Philip Pettit

    European Journal of Philosophy 4 (1996), 111-116.

22. Review of White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice, by Ruth Garrett Millikan

    Philosophical Review 104 (1995), 156-159.