Janet Levin

Professor of Philosophy
Email levin@usc.edu Office MHP 113 Office Phone (213) 740-5170

Research & Practice Areas

Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Psychology , Epistemology


  • Ph.D. Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • B.A. , University of Chicago
  • Summary Statement of Research Interests

    Professor Levin’s research interests are dedicated to the study of epistemology, philosophy of the mind, and philosophy of psychology.

    • Participant, Penn Neuroscience Bootcamp (August 1-11, 2010): I was among 35 participants in an introduction to the latest research in the neurosciences, designed to promote interdisciplinary collaboration.
  • Book Chapter

    • Levin, J. M. (2014). Reclaiming the Armchair. Palgrave Handbook on Philosophical Methods pp. 448-477.Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Levin, J. M. (2011). Representational Exhaustion. Festschrift for Ned Block Oxford.
    • Levin, J. M. (2009). Thinking About ‘Phenomenal States’.
    • Levin, J. M. (2006). What is a Phenomenal Concept?. New York: Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge/Oxfor University Press.

    Book Review

    • Levin, J. M. (2009). Critical Notice of Experimental Philosophy. 4 pp. 761-769. Oxford, England: Analysis Reviews. Vol. 69 (4),
    • Levin, J. M. (2007). Empathy and Agency, by Karsten StueNotre Dame Philosophical Reviewber. Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Philosophical Review.

    Encyclopedia Article

    • Levin, J. M. (2009). Qualia. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (on-line).
    • Levin, J. M. (2009). Functionalism (substantial revision). Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

    Journal Article

    • Levin, J. M. (2013). Armchair Methodology and Epistemological Naturalism. 18 pp. 4117-4136.Synthese/Springer. Vol. 190 (18),
    • Levin, J. M. (2013). Do Conceivability Arguments Against Physicalism Beg the Question. Philosophical Topics.
    • Levin, J. M. (2011). Imaginability, Possibility, and Imaginative Resistance. 3 Calgary, Alberta: Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 41 (3),
    • Levin, J. M. (2011). Reconstruing Modal Intuitions. No 31 Croatian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. Vol. XI (No 31),
    • Levin, J. M. (2011). ‘Levy on Neuroscience, Psychology, and Moral Intuitions’. on-line: AJOB Neuroscience.
    • Levin, J. M. (2010). Tye’s Ptolemaic Revolution. Austin, TX: Analytic Philosophy (formerly Philosophical Books).
    • Levin, J. M. (2008). Taking Type-B Materialism Seriously. 4 Mind and Language/Blackwell. Vol. 23 (4),
    • Levin, J. M. (2008). Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of Knowledge. Oxford: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research/Basil Blackwell. Vol. NA,
    • Levin, J. M. (2008). Molyneux Meets Euthyphro: Does Cross-Modal Transfer Require Rational Transition?. Croatian Journal of Philosophy.
    • Levin, J. M. (2007). Molyneux’s Question and the Individuation of Perceptual Concepts. Norwell, MA: Philosophical Studies/Kluwer Academic Press. Vol. NA,
    • Levin, J. M. (2007). Can Modal Intuitions be Evidence for Essentialist Claims?. Inquiry/Taylor & Francis. Vol. NA,
    • Levin, J. M. (2007). Nagel vs. Nagel on the Nature of Phenomenal Concepts. RATIO.
    • Levin, J. M. (2006). Can Mental Images Provide Evidence for What is Possible?. 1-2 Siena: Anthropology and Philosophy. Vol. 7 (1-2),
    • on-line conference, Conference of consciousness (CO4): Comments on E. Schwitzgebel, ‘If Materialism is True, then the US is Probably Conscious’., 2012-2013
  • Editorships and Editorial Boards

    • Co-editor, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly”, 08/30/2005 –