Online Papers

Pricean Ignorance

British Journal for the History of Philosophy (22 April 2024). DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2024.2334763.
© BSHP 2024
Download PDF

How Can ‘Evidence’ be Normative?

The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, ed. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn (Routledge, 2023): 74–90.
© Routledge 2023
Download PDF

Ethical Naturalism, Non-Naturalism, and In-Between

The Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism, ed. Paul Bloomfield and David Copp (Oxford University Press, 2023): 131–155.
© Oxford University Press 2023
Download PDF

Hierocles’ Concentric Circles

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 62, ed. Victor Caston (Oxford University Press, 2023): 293–332.
© 2023 Ralph Wedgwood
Download PDF

The Reasons Aggregation Theorem

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol. 12, ed. Mark Timmons (Oxford University Press, 2022): 127–148.
© 2022 Ralph Wedgwood
Download PDF

Doxastic Rationality

Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on their Nature and Significance, ed. Luis Oliveria and Paul Silva Jr (Routledge, 2022): 219–240.
© 2022 Taylor & Francis
Download PDF

Practical and Theorectical Rationality

The Handbook of Rationality, ed. Markus Knauf and Wolfgang Spohn (MIT Press, 2021): Chap. 2.2, 137–45.
© 2021 MIT Press
Download PDF

The Internalist Virtue Theory of Knowledge

Synthese 197, no. 12, Special Issue: The Epistemology of Ernest Sosa (2020): 5357–5378.
© 2018 Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018-1707-x

Moral Disagreement and Inexcusable Irrationality

American Philosophical Quarterly 56, no. 1 (2019): 97–108.
© 2019 the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
PDF

A Probabilistic Epistemology of Perceptual Belief

Philosophical Issues 28, Philosophy of Logic and Inferential Reasoning (2018): 374–398.
© 2018 Wiley Periodicals
DOI: 10.1111/phis.12130

The Unity of Normativity

in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity , ed. Daniel Star (Oxford University Press, 2018): 23–45.
© 2018 Ralph Wedgwood
PDF

Plato’s Theory of Knowledge

in Virtue, Happiness, Knowledge: Themes from the Work of Gail Fine and Terence Irwin , ed. David O. Brink, Susan Sauvé Meyer, and Christopher Shields (Oxford University Press, 2018): 33–56.
© 2018 Ralph Wedgwood
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198817277.003.0003

Epistemic Teleology: Synchronic and Diachronic

in Epistemic Consequentialism, ed. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn (Oxford University Press, 2018): 85–112.
© 2018 Ralph Wedgwood
PDF

The Coherence of Thrasymachus

in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. Victor Caston, Vol. 53 (Oxford University Press, 2017): 33–63.
© 2017 Ralph Wedgwood
PDF

Must rational intentions maximize utility?

Philosophical Explorations 20, sup. 2 (2017): 73–92.
© 2017 Informa UK Ltd, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2017.1356352

The Predicament of Choice

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau, Vol. 12 (Oxford University Press, 2017): 294–313.
© 2017 Ralph Wedgwood
PDF

Objective and Subjective ‘Ought’

Deontic Modality, ed. Nate Charlow and Matthew Chrisman (Oxford University Press, 2016): 142–68.
© 2016 Ralph Wedgwood
PDF

Is Civil Marriage Illiberal?

After Marriage: Rethinking Marital Relationships, ed. Elizabeth Brake (Oxford University Press, 2016): 29–50.
© 2016 Oxford University Press
PDF

Two Grades of Non-Consequentialism

Criminal Law and Philosophy, 10, no. 4 (2016): 795–814.)
© 2014 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
DOI: 10.1007/s11572-014-9351-0

The Pitfalls of ‘Reasons’

Philosophical Issues 25, Normativity (2015): 123–143.
© 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
DOI: 10.1111/phis.12054

An Inferentialist Conception of the A Priori

in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 5, ed. Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (Oxford University Press, 2015): 295–314.
© 2015 Ralph Wedgwood
PDF

Rationality as a Virtue

Analytic Philosophy 55, no. 4 (December 2014): 319–338.
© 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
DOI: 10.1111/phib.12055

Moral Disagreement among Philosophers

in Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution, ed. Michael Bergmann and Patrick Kain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 23-39.
© 2014 Ralph Wedgwood
PDF

The Right Thing to Believe?

in The Aim of Belief, ed. Timothy Chan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 123-139.
© 2013 Ralph Wedgwood
PDF

The Weight of Moral Reasons

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, ed. Mark Timmons, vol. 3 (2013): 35-58.
© 2013 Ralph Wedgwood
PDF

Akrasia and Uncertainty

Organon F, 20, no. 4, ed. Julian Fink (2013): 483–505.
© 2013 Ralph Wedgwood
HTML PDF

Rational ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’

Philosophical Issues 23 (2013): 70–92.
© 2013 Wiley-Blackwell
DOI: 10.1111/phis.12004

A Priori Bootstrapping

in The A Priori in Philosophy, ed. Albert Casullo and Joshua C. Thurow (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013): 226-246.
© 2013 Ralph Wedgwood
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0011

Doxastic Correctness

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. 87 (2013): 38–54.
© 2013 The Aristotelian Society
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2013.00219.x

Gandalf’s Solution to the Newcomb Problem

Synthese 190, no. 14 (2013): 2643–2675.
© 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-9900-1

Outright Belief

dialectica 66, no. 3, Special Issue on Belief and Degrees of Belief, ed. Philip Ebert and Martin Smith (2012): 309–329.
© 2012 Ralph Wedgwood
DOI: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01305.x

Justified Inference

Synthese 189, no. 2 (2012): 273-295.
© 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-0012-8

Defending Double Effect

Ratio 24, Special Issue on Deontological Ethics, ed. Brad Hooker (December 2011): 384-401.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00508.x

Instrumental Rationality

Oxford Studies in Metaethics, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau, vol. 6 (2011): 280–309.
© 2011 Ralph Wedgwood
PDF (A4 paper size) PDF (American Letter size)

Primitively Rational Belief-Forming Processes

in Reasons for Belief, ed. Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 180–200.
© 2011 Cambridge University Press
PDF (A4 paper size) PDF (American Letter size)

The Moral Evil Demons

in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010): 216-246
© 2010 Ralph Wedgwood
PDF (A4 paper size) PDF (American Letter size)

The ‘Good’ and the ‘Right’ Revisited

Philosophical Perspectives 23 (2009): 499-519.
© 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2009.00181.x

Intrinsic Values and Reasons for Action

Philosophical Issues 19 (2009): 342-363.
© 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2009.00172.x

Diotima’s Eudaemonism: Intrinsic Value and Rational Motivation in Plato’s Symposium

Phronesis 54 (2009): 297-325.
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden
DOI: 10.1163/003188609X12486562883093

The Normativity of the Intentional

in The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind, ed. Brian P. McLaughlin and Ansgar Beckermann (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009): 421-36.
© Oxford University Press
PDF (A4 paper size) PDF (American Letter size)

Contextualism about Justified Belief

The Philosophers’ Imprint, vol. 8, no. 9 (September 2008): 1-20.
© Ralph Wedgwood
http://www.philosophersimprint.org/008009/

Butler on Virtue, Self-Interest and Human Nature

in Morality and Self-Interest, ed. Paul Bloomfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007): 177-204.
© Oxford University Press
PDF

Normativism Defended

Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind, ed. Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen (Blackwell, 2007): 85-101.
© Blackwell Publishers
PDF

The Normative Force of Reasoning

Noûs 40, no. 4 (2006): 660-686.
© Blackwell Publishers
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2006.00628.x

The Meaning of ‘Ought’

Oxford Studies in Metaethics, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau, vol. 1 (2006): 127-160
© 2011 Ralph Wedgwood
PDF (A4 paper size) PDF (American Letter size)

Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly

in Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, ed. Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet (Oxford UP, 2003): 201-229
© Ralph Wedgwood
PDF

The Aim of Belief

Philosophical Perspectives 16 (2002): 267-297
© Blackwell Publishers
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0068.36.s16.10

Internalism Explained

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 349-369
© International Phenomenological Society
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00206.x

Practical Reason and Desire

Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms

The Price of Non-Reductive Physicalism

The Price of Non-Reductive Moral Realism

The Fundamental Argument for Same-Sex Marriage

The Essence of Response-Dependence

Theories of Content and Theories of Motivation

Can our reasons determine what it is rational for us to believe?

Comments on Mark Schroeder, Reasons First. Philosophical Studies (2023).
© 2023 Ralph Wedgwood, under exclusive license to Springer Nature B.V.
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-023-02034-1

Review of Against Marriage: An Egalitarian Defense of the Marriage-Free State, by Clare Chambers

Review of Fifteen Sermons and Other Writings on Ethics, by Joseph Butler, ed. David McNaughton

Journal of the History of Philosophy 56, no. 3 (2018):563–564.
© Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc.
DOI: 10.1353/hph.2018.0061

Review of Being Realistic about Reasons, by T. M. Scanlon

Review of Taking Morality Seriously: A Defence of Robust Realism, by David Enoch

Review of Minimizing Marriage: Marriage, Morality and the Law, by Elizabeth Brake

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2012)
© 2012 Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/35201-minimizing-marriage-marriage-morality-and-the-law/.

Review of The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, by Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar and Adrian Haddock

Scanlon on Double Effect

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83, no. 2 (2011): 464-472.
© 2011 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LLC
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00517.x

The Nature of Normativity: Précis

Philosophical Studies, Online First (8 April 2010).
© 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-010-9553-9

The Nature of Normativity: Reply to Holton, Railton, and Lenman

Philosophical Studies, Online First (8 April 2010).
© 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-010-9554-8

Schroeder on Expressivism: For — Or Against?

Review of Kieran Setiya, Reasons without Rationalism

Christopher Peacocke’s The Realm of Reason

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74, no. 3 (May 2007), 776-791.
© 2007 International Phenomenological Society
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00055.x

Railton on Normativity

(Comments on Peter Railton’s Fact, Values, and Norms, Part III), Philosophical Studies 126, no. 3 (December 2005), 463-479.
© 2005 Springer
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-005-2317-2

WORK IN PROGRESS

The Iniquity of Oblivion

Dilemmas as Conflicts between Values

Decision-Theoretic Virtue Ethics

The Internal / External Distinction in Stoic Modality

Morality and Collective Rationality

Values First

PUBLISHED ARTICLES