Books

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023)

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017)

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)

  • “Fact and Value”

    Essays in Ethics and Metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson, ed. Alex Byrne, Robert Stalnaker, and Ralph Wedgwood (MIT Press, 2001).

    1. Pricean Ignorance

      British Journal of the History of Philosophy (22 April 2024). doi:10.1080/09608788.2024.2334763.

    2. How Can ‘Evidence’ be Normative?

      The Routledge Handbook of Evidence, ed. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn (Routledge, 2024): 74–90.

    3. Ethical Naturalism, Non-Naturalism, and In-Between

      Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism, ed. Paul Bloomfield and David Copp (Oxford University Press, 2023), 131–155.

    4. Hierocles’ Concentric Circles

      Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 62, ed. Victor Caston (Oxford University Press, 2023), 293–332.

    5. The Reasons Aggregation Theorem

      Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol. 12, ed. Mark Timmons (Oxford University Press, 2022), 127–148.

    6. Doxastic Rationality

      Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on Their Nature and Significance, ed. Luis Oliveira and Paul Silva Jr. (Routledge, 2022), 219–240.

    7. Practical and Theoretical Rationality

      The Handbook of Rationality, ed. Markus Knauf and Wolfgang Spohn (MIT Press, 2021): Chap. 2.2, 137–45.

    8. The Internalist Virtue Theory of Knowledge

      Synthese 197, no. 12, Special Issue: The Epistemology of Ernest Sosa (2020): 5357–5378. doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1707-x

    9. Moral Disagreement and Inexcusable Irrationality

      American Philosophical Quarterly 56, no. 1 (January 2019): 97–108.

    10. A Probabilistic Epistemology of Perceptual Belief

      Philosophical Issues, 28 – Philosophy of Logic and Inferential Reasoning (2018): 374–398. doi: 10.1111/phis.12130

    11. The Unity of Normativity

      in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, ed. Daniel Star (Oxford University Press, 2018): 23–45.

    12. Plato’s Theory of Knowledge

      in Virtue, Happiness, and Knowledge: Themes from the Work of Gail Fine and Terence Irwin, ed. David Brink, Susan Sauvé Meyer, and Christopher Shields (Oxford University Press, 2018): 33–56.

    13. Epistemic Teleology: Synchronic and Diachronic

      in Epistemic Consequentialism, ed. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn (Oxford University Press, 2018): 85–112.

    14. The Coherence of Thrasymachus

      in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. Victor Caston, Vol. 53 (Oxford University Press, 2017): 33–63.

    15. Must Rational Intentions Maximize Utility?

      Philosophical Explorations 20, Sup. 2 (2017): 73–92. doi: 10.1080/13869795.2017.1356352

    16. The Predicament of Choice

      in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau, Vol. 12 (Oxford University Press, 2017): 294–313.

    17. Two Grades of Non-consequentialism

      Criminal Law and Philosophy, 10, no. 4 (2016): 795–814. doi: 10.1007/s11572-014-9351-0

    18. Objective and Subjective ‘Ought’

      Deontic Modality, ed. Nate Charlow and Matthew Chrisman (Oxford University Press, 2016): 142–68.

    19. Is Civil Marriage Illiberal?

      in After Marriage: Rethinking Marital Relationships, ed. Elizabeth Brake (Oxford University Press, 2016): 29–50.

    20. The Pitfalls of Reasons

      Philosophical Issues 25, Normativity (2015): 125–143. DOI: 10.1111/phis.12054

    21. An Inferentialist Conception of the A Priori

      in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 5, ed. Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (Oxford University Press, 2015): 295–314.

    22. Rationality as a Virtue

      Analytic Philosophy 55, no. 4 (December 2014): 319–338. DOI: 10.1111/phib.12055

    23. Moral Disagreement among Philosophers

      in Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Evolution and Disagreement, ed. Michael Bergmann and Patrick Kain (Oxford University Press, 2014): 23–39.

    24. The Right Thing to Believe

      in The Aim of Belief, ed. Timothy Chan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 123–139.

    25. The Weight of Moral Reasons

      Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, ed. Mark Timmons, vol. 3 (2013): 35–58.

    26. Gandalf’s Solution to the Newcomb Problem

      Synthese, 190, no. 14 (2013): 2643–2675. doi: 10.1007/s11229-011-9900-1

    27. Akrasia and Uncertainty

      Organon F, 20, no. 4, ed. Julian Fink (2013): 483–505.

    28. Rational ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’

      Philosophical Issues 23 (2013): 70–92. DOI: 10.1111/phis.12004

    29. A Priori Bootstrapping

      in The A Priori in Philosophy, ed. Albert Casullo and Joshua C. Thurow (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013): 226–246. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0011

    30. Doxastic Correctness

      Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. 87 (2013): 38–54.

    31. Justified Inference

      Synthese, 189, no. 2 (2012): 273–295. doi: 10.1007/s11229-011-0012-8.

    32. Outright Belief

      dialectica 66, no. 3, Special Issue on Belief and Degrees of Belief, ed. Philip Ebert and Martin Smith (2012): 309–329. DOI: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01305.x

    33. Defending Double Effect

      Ratio 24, Special Issue on Deontological Ethics, ed. Brad Hooker (2011): 384–401.

    34. Instrumental Rationality

      Oxford Studies in Metaethics, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau, vol. 6 (2011): 280–309.

    35. The Refutation of Expressivism

      in Truth, Reference, and Realism, ed. Zsolt Novak and Andras Simonyi (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2011): 207–234.

    36. Primitively Rational Belief-Forming Processes

      in Reasons for Belief, ed. Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 180–200.

    37. The Moral Evil Demons

      in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010): 216–246.

    38. Diotima’s Eudaemonism: Intrinsic Value and Rational Motivation in Plato’s Symposium

      Phronesis 54 (2009): 297–325.

    39. The ‘Good’ and the ‘Right’ Revisited

      Philosophical Perspectives 23 (2009): 499-519.

    40. Intrinsic Values and Reasons for Action

      Philosophical Issues 19 (2009): 342-363.

    41. The Normativity of the Intentional

      in The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind, ed. Brian P. McLaughlin and Ansgar Beckermann (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009), 421-36.

    42. Contextualism about Justified Belief

      The Philosophers” Imprint 8, no. 9 (September 2008), 1-20 <http://www.philosophersimprint.org/008009/>.

    43. Butler on Virtue, Self-Interest, and Human Nature

      in Morality and Self-Interest, ed. Paul Bloomfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

    44. Normativism Defended

      in Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind, ed. Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen (Blackwell, 2007), 85-101.

    45. The Normative Force of Reasoning

      Noûs 40, no. 4 (December 2006), 660-686.

    46. The Meaning of ‘Ought’

      Oxford Studies in Metaethics, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau, vol. 1 (2006), 127-160.

    47. The Internal and External Components of Cognition

      Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, ed. Robert Stainton (Blackwell, 2006), 307-325.

    48. How We Know What Ought to Be

      Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106, no. 1 (September 2005), 61-84.

    49. The Metaethicists’ Mistake

      Philosophical Perspectives 18 (2004), 405-426.

    50. Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly

      in Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, ed. Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet (Oxford UP, 2003), 201-229.

    51. The Aim of Belief

      Philosophical Perspectives 16 (2002), 267-297.

    52. Internalism Explained

      Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002), 349-369.

    53. Practical Reason and Desire

      Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002), 345-358.

    54. Practical Reasoning as Figuring Out What is Best: Against Constructivism

      Topoi 21 (2002), 139-152.

    55. Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms

      Philosophical Review 110 (2001), 1-30.

    56. The Price of Non-Reductive Physicalism

      Noûs 34 (2000), 400-421.

    57. The Price of Non-Reductive Moral Realism

      Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (1999), 199-215.

    58. The Fundamental Argument for Same-Sex Marriage

      Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (1999), 225-242.

    59. The A Priori Rules of Rationality

      Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1999), 113-131.

    60. The Essence of Response-Dependence

      European Review of Philosophy 3 (1998), 31-54.

    61. The Fundamental Principle of Practical Reasoning

      International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (1998), 189-209.

    62. Non-Cognitivism, Truth, and Logic

      Philosophical Studies 86 (1997), 73-91.

    63. Theories of Content and Theories of Motivation

      European Journal of Philosophy 3 (1995), 273-288.

    64. Scepticism and Rational Belief

      Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1990), 45-64.

    1. The Sources of Moral Knowledge

      Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2023). doi: 10.1111/phpr.13022

    2. Can our reasons explain what it is rational for us to believe?

      Philosophical Studies (2023). DOI: 10.1007/s11098-023-02034-1.

    3. Review of Against Marriage: An Egalitarian Defense of the Marriage-Free State, by Clare Chambers

      Ethics 129, no. 2 (2019): 398–403. doi: 10.1086/700046

    4. Review of Fifteen Sermons and Other Writings on Ethics, by Joseph Butler

      Journal of the History of Philosophy 56, no. 3 (2018): 563–564.

    5. Review of Being Realistic about Reasons, by T. M. Scanlon

      Philosophical Quarterly 66, no. 262 (2016): 213–217. doi: 10.1093/pq/pqv029

    6. Review of Taking Morality Seriously: A Defence of Robust Realism, by David Enoch

      Philosophical Quarterly 63, no. 251 (2013): 389–94.

    7. Review of Minimizing Marriage: Marriage, Morality and the Law, by Elizabeth Brake

      Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2012) <http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/35201-minimizing-marriage-marriage-morality-and-the-law/>.

    8. Review of The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, by Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar and Adrian Haddock

      Analysis (Published online: November 12, 2011). DOI: 10.1093/analys/anr116

    9. Scanlon on Double Effect

      Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2011): 464–472.

    10. The Nature of Normativity: Précis

      Philosophical Studies (2010): DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9553-9.

    11. The Nature of Normativity: A Reply to Holton, Railton, and Lenman

      Philosophical Studies (2010): DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9554-8.

    12. Schroeder on Expressivism: For — Or Against?

      Analysis 70 (2010): 117-129.

    13. Review of Reasons without Rationalism, by Kieran Setiya

      Mind 117 (2008): 1130-5.

    14. Critical Notice of Christopher Peacocke’s The Realm of Reason

      Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74, no. 3 (May 2007), 776-791.

    15. Railton on Normativity

      Comments on Peter Railton, Facts, Values, and Norms, Part III, Philosophical Studies 126, no. 3 (December 2005), 463-479.

    16. Review of Hate Crimes: Criminal Law and Identity Politics, by James B. Jacobs and Kimberly Potter

      Journal of Homosexuality 45, no. 1 (2003), 152-159.

    17. Sensing Values?

      Comments on Mark Johnston, “The Authority of Affect”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001), 215-224.

    18. Critical Notice of The Authority of Reason, by Jean E. Hampton

      Philosophical Books 40 (1999), 218-227.

    19. Review of Value-Judgment: Improving our Ethical Beliefs, by James Griffin

      Philosophical Review 107 (1998), 447-449.

    20. Review of Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness, edited by Christopher Peacocke

      Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1997), 255-257.

    21. Review of The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics, by Philip Pettit

      European Journal of Philosophy 4 (1996), 111-116.

    22. Review of White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice, by Ruth Garrett Millikan

      Philosophical Review 104 (1995), 156-159.