Mark Schroeder

Professor of Philosophy
Mark Schroeder
Email Office MHP 113 Office Phone (213) 740-3609

Center, Institute & Lab Affiliations

  • USC Center for Law and Philosophy,


  • Ph.D. , Princeton University, 11/2004
  • M.A. Philosophy, Princeton University, 11/2002
  • B.A. Philosophy, Mathematics, and Economics, Carleton College, 6/2000
  • Summary Statement of Research Interests

    I’m interested in the ways in which rationality, reasons, value, and other ‘evaluative’ or ‘normative’ categories are related to the mundane, physical world in which we live, in which things are round, red, or left of one another. For example, are there really facts about what is rational or not, to go along with the facts about what is round or not? And if so, what are those facts like, and what is their relationship to other sorts of facts? Or is are normative sentences like ‘fearing heights is irrational’ not really in the business of stating facts at all? Does normative language, perhaps, have a different sort of purpose, and what would that tell us about how language works, in general?

  • Book

    • Schroeder, M. A. (2010). Noncognitivism in Ethics. Oxford: Routledge.
    • Schroeder, M. A. (2008). Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Schroeder, M. A. (2007). Slaves of the Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Journal Article

    • Schroeder, M. A. (2009). An Issue of Principle. Nous.
    • Schroeder, M. A. (2009). Means-End Coherence, Stringency, and Subjective Reasons. Philosophical Studies.
    • Schroeder, M. A. (2009). Hybrid Expressivism: Virtues and Vices. Ethics.
    • Schroeder, M. A. (2008). How Expressivists Can and Should Solve Their Problem with Negation. Nous/Blackwell Publishers. Vol. NA
    • Schroeder, M. A. (2008). Having Reasons. Philosophical Studies/Kluwer Academic Press. Vol. NA
    • Schroeder, M. A. (2008). Expression for Expressivists. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research/Basil Blackwell. Vol. NA
    • Schroeder, M. A. (2007). Reasons and Agent-Neutrality. Philosophical Studies/Kluwer Academic Press. Vol. NA
    • Schroeder, M. A. (2007). The Humean Theory of Reasons. Oxford Studies in Metaethics/Oxford University Press. Vol. 2, pp. 195-219.
    • Schroeder, M. A. (2007). Weighting for a Plausible Humean Theory of Reasons. Nous/Blackwell Publishers. Vol. 41(1), pp. 138-160.
    • Schroeder, M. A. (2007). Teleology, Agent-Relative Value, and ‘Good’. Ethics/University of Chicago Press. Vol. 117(2), pp. 265-295.
    • Schroeder, M. A. (2005). Cudworth and Normative Explanations. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy/University of Southern California. Vol. vol. 1 (no. 3)
    • Schroeder, M. A. (2005). The Hypothetical Imperative?. Australasian Journal of Philosophy/Taylor and Francis. Vol. 83, pp. 357-372.
    • Schroeder, M. A. (2005). Realism and Reduction: The Quest for Robustness. Philosophers’ Imprint/The University of Michigan, University Library. Vol. 5, pp. 1-18.
    • Schroeder, M. A. (2004). The Scope of Instrumental Reason. Philosophical Perspectives/Blackwell. Vol. 18, pp. 337-364.