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Motives and Modes of Processing in the Social Influence of Groups

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Influence in everyday life occurs in social contexts marked by group memberships and group identities. This is an obvious point in mass persuasion; for example, in politics, an electorate identified by political party membership or ideology (e.g., conservative, libertarian) receives information from elected representatives in government and other party officials, who similarly belong to or represent political groups. This point holds also in dyadic influence in close relationships. For example, married couples and family members may exert influence through reminders of relationship norms and standards (e.g., when children are told, "We don't use that kind of language in this house"). Even nonpartisan news coverage of current events is often grounded in discussion of the implications for international relations and the domestic groups likely to suffer or benefit.

The present chapter considers how acceptance of influence from others is regulated by social groups. In particular, the chapter considers how the social group identity of the source of an appeal and that of the recipient affect the influence process. I will argue that social group identity is important to the extent that it establishes particular motivations for recipients to agree or disagree with the source.

TYPES OF GROUPS AND TYPES OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE

Social groups have wide-ranging impact, extending beyond those people holding formal group membership. Hyman (1942, 1960) proposed the idea of reference groups to represent this broad impact—specifically, to explain how the values and standards of other people and of reference groups are, through evaluation and through self-appraisal processes, adopted as a comparative frame of reference.

Reference groups proved useful in early studies of group attitudes, especially explanations of soldiers' attitudes during World War II. Soldiers apparently relied on a variety of reference groups as personal standards of comparison when interpreting their experiences (Merton, 1957), including "actual groups" (defined as those who interact with each other in accord with established patterns, who label themselves as a group, and who are labeled as such by others), "collectivities" (defined as "people who have a sense of solidarity by virtue of sharing common values and who have acquired an attendant sense of moral obligation to fulfill role-expectations," p. 299), and "social categories" (defined as "aggregates of social statuses, the occupants

of which are not in social interaction," p. 299). For example, ambitious soldiers appeared to reject the values and attitudes of those of similar rank (i.e., their current membership group) in favor of the standards advocated by the social category of senior officers. Following Newcomb (1950), Merton (1957) did not limit his discussion to positively valued groups, but also included as reference groups those negatively viewed, derogated groups that motivate rejection and development of counternorms (e.g., the prototypic adolescent rebellion).

Reference groups exert influence because they provide comparison standards for self-evaluation and because they provide valued outcomes (e.g., group acceptance). These motives for agreement were formalized in Kelley's (1952) distinction between the "social comparison" function of reference groups, in which group members' responses provide an informational standard or comparison for evaluating people's own attitudes and behavior, and the "normative" function, in which group members' responses represent social norms with which people comply in order to gain or maintain group acceptance.

Comparative and normative motives for agreeing or disagreeing with groups reflect Deutsch and Gerard's (1955) more general distinction between "informational" needs and "normative" needs. People who are influenced for informational reasons are motivated by validity concerns and accept information obtained from others as evidence about reality (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Informational influence is independent of the target's social relationship to the source and derives solely from the validity of the information communicated, such as the logic of the arguments in the appeal. People who are influenced for normative reasons are motivated to conform with the positive expectations of another (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). The other can be a group, another person, or the self. Supposedly, fulfilling others' positive expectations leads to positive rather than negative feelings and to solidarity rather than alienation. When conforming to self-expectations, people feel self-esteem and self-approval, and avoid feeling anxiety and guilt. Thus Deutsch and Gerard's definition of normative pressures specifies a broadly conceived set of social motives and goals that excludes

only informational reasons for agreement. (See similar distinctions proposed in Festinger's [1950] motive to evaluate social reality vs. the motive to promote group locomotion toward a goal, Jones and Gerard's [1967] information dependence vs. effect dependence, and Abrams and Hogg's [1990] reasons to agree vs. pressures to comply.)

The usefulness of Deutsch and Gerard's (1955) distinction between normative and informational motives is apparent in its having provided an organizing framework for the field for the past 40 years. This perspective has been adapted to explain social influence phenomena ranging from individuals' agreement with groups, as in minority group influence (Moscovici, 1985a), to group-level shifts in attitude, as in group polarization (Isenberg, 1986). Across these various lines of investigation, Deutsch and Gerard's dual-motive view is typically interpreted as specifying not only separate goals or motives for influence, but also unique influence outcomes tied to these motives.

In general, social influence researchers have assumed that agreement with others for informational, validity-seeking reasons generates enduring change that is apparent in publicly as well as privately expressed attitudes. In the typical social influence experiment, enduring change is demonstrated through shifts in recipients' attitudes that are maintained in private assessment settings, outside the social context in which the appeal was delivered. Enduring change is also captured on "indirect" measures of agreement—measures that are not, from the recipients' perspective, directly linked to the position advocated by the source.¹ The processes through which this change is produced involve informational mechanisms, including attention to and evaluation of the content of the appeal and other information about the issue or object under consideration. In contrast, agreement for normative reasons is thought to generate superficial (public but not private) conformity that is relatively unstable across time and context, and that arises from people's analysis of the social implications of their attitudes. In the typical social influence experiment, this transitory change is demonstrated by comparing recipients' attitude statements in public settings, usually under surveillance of the source of the appeal, with their subsequent attitude

judgments in private settings. Attitude shifts toward the appeal that are apparent in public but not private settings are interpreted as evidence of normatively based influence. The processes that underlie normatively based judgment change have been more clearly defined in terms of what they are *not* than in terms of what they are: Normative influence is presumed to involve minimal processing of the content of the appeal or information related to the attitude object itself. As a consequence, normatively based attitude judgments supposedly are bolstered by minimal issue-relevant information in memory (i.e., supporting affective reactions, cognitions, behaviors) and are not maintained across social contexts.

There is good reason, however, to question whether informational motives produce both public and private judgment change, whereas normative motives yield public, overt shifts but not private judgment change. As Levine and Russo (1987) note, because social influence research has rarely obtained direct measures of the instigating motives (or, I add, the mechanisms through which agreement is generated), the link between motive and influence outcome is "better viewed as an hypothesis than as a fact" (p. 20). Indeed, this hypothesis has been challenged by the extensive empirical findings of message-based persuasion studies, indicating that people are highly flexible and use multiple strategies to meet their goals (see, e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The predominant goals investigated in persuasion research are informational ones. It appears that validity-seeking recipients, when motivated and able, engage in extensive, systematic, issue-relevant thought and evaluation that yields relatively stable attitudes. When less motivated or able, validity-seeking recipients appear to use relatively efficient peripheral and heuristic strategies that yield more transitory shifts in judgment.

This chapter considers whether recipients motivated by normative and informational concerns associated with group membership are similarly flexible in meeting their processing goals. The analysis draws heavily on research in the area of minority and majority group influence; this work provides an especially complete representation of the range of social and informational goals that can direct

agreement with social groups. Furthermore, the theoretical model of influence outlined in this chapter was originally developed to explain the findings in this research literature (Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, & Blackstone, 1994; Wood, Pool, Leck, & Purvis, 1996).

It is important to note that researchers' definitions of normative motivations have varied somewhat over the years, beginning with Deutsch and Gerard's (1955) highly inclusive construct covering a wide range of outcomes associated with self and other. Normative motives are now often limited to concern with evaluation by others or with the outcomes provided by others (e.g., group acceptance, rejection); self-definitional aspects of social pressures, especially the motive to align one's attitudes with valued reference groups, are excluded (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Turner, 1991). Self-related motives are excluded in part because these pressures supposedly direct influence through unique processes that differ from those instigated by impression-related goals. In the present chapter, I revert to Deutsch and Gerard's (1955) inclusive definition, in which normative motivations arise from (1) the outcomes provided by others, including both the influence source and those who have surveillance over the opinion expressed by recipients; and (2) the implications of agreement or disagreement for recipients' own self-evaluation and self-integrity. The resulting tripartite model of goals in social influence contexts thus differentiates among normative motives grounded in concern for self, normative motives stemming from concern with others, and informational motives reflecting concern for the stimulus object or issue (see similar distinctions by Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996; Johnson & Eagly, 1989).

The idea that a general set of needs or motives energizes and directs attitudinal functioning has been a central component of classic theories of attitude functions. The present set of motives overlaps to some extent with these earlier schemes. For example, many important outcomes provided by others have been considered in terms of the social adjustment function of attitudes (Smith, Bruner, & White, 1956) and, in Greenwald and Breckler's (1985) self-concept theory, as the public facet of the self. Self-defining reasons

for holding attitudes have been included in ego-defensive functions (Katz, 1960) and are part of the collective facet of the self (Greenwald & Breckler, 1985). Validity seeking incorporates aspects of knowledge (Katz, 1960) and object appraisal functions (Smith et al., 1956) of attitudes, and it overlaps with the private facet of the self (Greenwald & Breckler, 1985). I do not claim that the present tripartite model represents a comprehensive list of potential motives. It does, however, identify three aspects of social influence that are likely to be made salient by group identity in a wide variety of settings.

NORMATIVE MOTIVES TO AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH MINORITY AND MAJORITY GROUPS

A "majority" source group has typically been defined as one that advocates the numerically most frequent or consensual position within a larger group. A "minority" source group is one proposing a low-frequency, nonconsensual position, and may also be a nonmainstream social group (e.g., for environmental issues, a minority group may consist of Greenpeace members). Minority sources have also been defined more broadly in terms of their legitimacy to influence others (Perez, Papastamou, & Mugny, 1995). In this view, minority influence occurs when recipients of an appeal are in an ascendant relation to the appeal's source: They possess the legitimate right to exert influence over the source, but instead are influenced by the source's position.

Moscovici's (1980, 1985a, 1985b) theory of minority influence can be understood in terms of the distinction between normative and informational motives. He argued that majorities exert influence through a "comparison" process. That is, people publicly agree with opinion majorities for normative reasons stemming from the outcomes they can provide (attaining social position and other rewards, and avoiding rejection and other punishments). However, Moscovici maintained that agreement with majorities is not reflected in private assessments, because people wish to maintain their personal integrity and sense of control. From the present perspective, the lack of private agreement also emerges from normative pressures. The wish to maintain

one's individuality represents a self-defensive motive to differentiate from the source. In contrast, minorities that advocate deviant positions consistently without compromise are thought to instigate conflict and a "validation" process (Moscovici, 1985a). Similar to the processes involved in informational influence, people evaluate the minority view to determine how the source could advocate such a deviant idea; they reevaluate the bases for their own position; and they change their judgments on private and on indirect measures that appear to them to be unrelated to the appeal. Agreement with minorities is not apparent on public, direct measures. From the present perspective, this resistance occurs because of the negative normative motivations associated with the source's deviant identity; people do not want to be aligned with a minority source group.

A meta-analytic synthesis (Wood et al., 1994) of past research on minority influence revealed distinct patterns of influence associated with minority and majority source groups. However, little support emerged for the idea that majorities exert influence primarily on public measures of agreement and minorities on private measures. Instead, majorities had greater influence than minorities on public measures as well as private measures that directly tapped agreement with the issue in the appeal.

Even more troubling for Moscovici's perspective is the equivocal support that emerged for the prediction that minority sources foster a validation process that generates change in people's underlying beliefs and attitudes. This informationally based change should have been reflected in private, indirect agreement. However, we (Wood et al., 1994) found that minorities were not overall more influential than majorities on indirect measures. Minorities' indirect influence emerged only inconsistently.

It appears, then, that responses to minority appeals are more typically directed by normative motives than by validation. The negative normative motives established by the source's deviant identity inhibit influence. When we (Wood et al., 1994) compared the impact of minority sources to that of no-message control conditions, minority sources generated less influence on public and private direct measures than on private, indirect mea-

asures, on which recipients were unaware that agreement aligned them with the minority source. This pattern suggests that recipients suppressed agreement with minority sources on direct measures in order to differentiate themselves from the deviant source group. To account for these patterns of influence effects associated with opinion majority and minority groups, it is useful to consider in detail the normative and informational motives established by group membership.

NORMATIVE MOTIVES: OUTCOMES PROVIDED BY OTHERS

The idea that influence is regulated by the reward and punishment outcomes provided by others was an important component of early typologies of social influence (Kelman, 1958; French & Raven, 1959; French, 1956). Social groups were thought to exert influence through their control over such outcomes: People align their attitudes with groups in order to receive rewards and avoid punishments. Even social norms such as reciprocity may direct influence through instrumental means, so that people tend to express greater agreement with those who have agreed with them in the past than with those who have resisted their past influence attempts (Cialdini, Green, & Rusch, 1992).

Being influenced by valued groups also yields less tangible, more affective outcomes, such as being accepted as a group member and avoiding social rejection. Although these goals are typically associated with an alternate form of normative pressure, involving personal identification with the source (i.e., Kelman's [1958] "identification" and French and Raven's [1959] "referent power"), acceptance and approval outcomes may function like other instrumental reasons for agreement with reference groups. Hogg and Turner (1987) take this position, suggesting that "since reference groups are implicitly defined in terms of emotional attachment on the basis of liking and admiration," people comply with such groups for instrumental reasons, such as "avoidance of punishment, censure, or rejection for deviation, or in order to cultivate social approval and acceptance" (p. 142).

To what extent do the outcomes pro-

vided by others motivate direct agreement with majority and minority sources? My colleagues and I (Wood et al., 1994) suggested that this can be detected by comparing recipients' stated attitudes in public settings, in which a source can potentially deliver rewards and punishments, with attitudes given in private settings, in which interpersonal consequences should be less apparent. Because in the meta-analytic synthesis the influence of majority sources proved comparable across public and private direct measures of agreement, as did the influence of minority sources, we (Wood et al., 1994) concluded that recipients' attitude judgments in this research paradigm were not simply a function of the rewards and punishments present in the immediate influence setting. These findings, then, contradict Moscovici's (1980) argument that majority advocacy yields public agreement designed to attain immediate social rewards, and that this agreement does not extend to private measures.

The general idea that influence can be controlled by the specific interpersonal outcomes of fear of others' rejection and desire for others' approval has formed the basis for theories of impression motivation (Schlenker, 1980; Tetlock & Manstead, 1985). Impression-motivated recipients wish to convey particular impressions to the source of the influence attempt or to others, who may have surveillance over their responses (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996; see also Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, Chapter 11, this volume). This desire to project a particular impression orients people to consider the social consequences of their attitude judgments. Recipients are likely to adopt the source's position to the extent that by so doing, they can convey the desired social identity.

The outcomes provided by others motivate agreement by focusing recipients on the positive and negative consequences of their opinion judgments. When other-provided outcomes are not highly important, recipients are likely to use efficient strategies to determine the best position to take. They may rely, for example, on the heuristic rule "Go along to get along" and align their opinions with those of others in a relatively superficial manner. Considerable empirical evidence suggests that outcomes provided by others can instigate limited processing and transitory shifts in atti-

tudes while recipients are under surveillance and their judgments can yield the desired rewards and prevent punishments. For example, forewarning participants that their attitudes will be challenged by a discussion partner has been found to generate strategic shifts toward midrange positions that are easily defended and unlikely to offend the partner. When participants are then informed that the discussion is canceled, they revert to their original position, suggesting that the original judgment change represented an "elastic shift" (Cialdini & Petty, 1981; Babcock & Wood, 1998).

When other-provided outcomes are important and people are highly motivated to acquire them, they are likely to conduct a careful, systematic analysis of the relevant information when deciding what position to take, and this analysis is likely to yield relatively enduring change in opinion. For example, Higgins's (1992) research on the "communication game" suggests that communicators are influenced by their own statements as they try to achieve a shared understanding with their audience. In this research, people's goal of conveying an interpretable reasonable position affected their understanding of the issue under discussion. The impression motivations instigated in forewarning paradigms can also yield systematic processing and enduring change in attitudes. For example, Chen, Schechter, and Chaiken (1996, Study 2) had some participants read passages that primed the need to tailor thought and behavior to social demands. When subsequently informed of the opinions of their partners in an impending discussion, these participants evaluated a set of persuasive arguments on the topic in a direction congruent with their partners' position and shifted their attitudes to be more consistent with their partners' views. Further suggesting that impression goals colored recipients' thoughtful, careful analysis of the issue, these attitude shifts were maintained across a span of several weeks (see Chen & Chaiken, Chapter 4, this volume).

Given that the outcomes provided by others can motivate not only superficial change in people's attitudes that is apparent primarily in the influence context, but also more enduring change that is apparent across contexts, comparisons between publicly and privately expressed attitudes may

not be a reliable strategy to identify these motives for agreement. That is, recipients' concern for other-provided outcomes could yield superficial processing of relevant information and attitude change observable primarily when they are under others' surveillance, or more extensive analyses and enduring attitude judgments that emerge in both public and private contexts. Baldwin and Holmes (1987) nicely demonstrated the effects of others' approval and disapproval on attitudes expressed privately. In this study, female college students read a sexually explicit passage after they had engaged in a directed-imagery procedure in which they imagined their elderly relatives or their campus friends. Ratings of how much they liked the passage conformed to what would be acceptable to the previously imagined group; those who thought about older people rated it as significantly less enjoyable than those who thought about peers.

The often-used strategy, then, of comparing attitude change in public contexts under others' surveillance with attitude change expressed privately, can identify certain kinds of other-related motives—ones made salient by others' surveillance. The strategy is less useful, however, for detecting the effects of other-related motives that do not depend on surveillance. For example, some issues (e.g., caffeine consumption) can chronically elicit other-related motives (i.e., for Mormons, concerns about Church disapproval). In the domain of minority and majority influence, then, the comparable source impact across public and private measures (Wood et al., 1994) provides suggestive but not definitive evidence that participants in the original studies were not highly motivated by other-related goals. As I explain in the next section, clearer evidence of the kind of normative motives directing influence in these studies emerged in Wood et al.'s (1994) analyses that considered the extent to which the minority source was socially deviant.

NORMATIVE MOTIVES: SELF AND IDENTITY

The idea that influence can arise from a motivation to align the self with personally valued reference groups and to defend the self

against alliance with derogated groups is analogous to a central assumption of social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978, 1981, 1982) and self-categorization theory (Turner, 1991; Turner & Oakes, 1989). Tajfel argued that people are driven by the need for a positive identity, which can be met through social comparison with other individuals or with relevant reference groups. When a social group or category is evaluated favorably or unfavorably, people engage in social comparison on relevant dimensions and achieve a positive identity through alignment with positively valued ingroups or categories and differentiation from negatively valued outgroups.

In general, the motives to align with positive groups and to differentiate from negative ones can be considered manifestations of a defensive orientation that emerges from the desire to achieve a valued, coherent self-identity (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996; Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996). Most experimental tests of this idea have examined the effects of group membership on the evaluative components of people's self-images (Tajfel, 1978; Tesser, 1988). However, self-related goals in addition to self-esteem may direct agreement with groups, including the desire for an optimally distinctive identity (Brewer, 1991), and consistency-related motives in which people strive to be true to themselves, achieve a coherent self-view, and reduce uncertainty about the world (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hogg & Abrams, 1993; Swann, 1990).

Direct evidence of the role of recipients' self-esteem in group influence was provided in a recent experiment (Pool, Wood, & Leck, 1998). In this work, social groups exerted normative pressure by advocating positions that threatened recipients' self-definitions. In an initial session of the study, participants rated their self-esteem on Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem scale. In the experimental session, participants indicated their attitudes on a social issue, learned the attitudes supposedly held by a social group, and then rated their self-esteem a second time. For some participants, the social group represented a majority (either students at their university or residents of their state), and the attitudes supposedly held by the group on the target social issue differed from participants' own. For other

participants, the social group was a minority (either a gay and lesbian student organization or a lesbian feminist group), and the position advocated was similar to participants' own. It was predicted that participants' self-esteem would be threatened when the valued majority group held a contrasting position to their own or the derogated minority held a position similar to their own.

To determine the extent to which the target group was self-relevant and thus likely to exert normative pressure, we had participants complete a questionnaire that assessed the extent to which they defined themselves as being similar to (for a majority) or dissimilar from (for a minority) the group. On the basis of their responses, participants were categorized as those for whom the group was highly relevant and those for whom it was less relevant. As anticipated, self-esteem decreased from the initial session to the experiment only for those participants rating groups as highly self-relevant. This decrease was approximately equal in magnitude for disagreement with majority groups and agreement with minority groups.

To further clarify the type of normative threat posed by the group's attitude, we evaluated whether the decrease in self-esteem occurred when participants' attitudes were displayed publicly versus privately. In the public condition, participants were led to believe that others present in the experimental session would receive information on the group position and the participants' attitude (i.e., their disagreement with the majority or their agreement with the minority). In the private condition, only a participant was informed of his or her own and the group's attitude. Self-definitional motives should be present in both public and private contexts; they emerge from failures to conform to self-standards (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) and are not necessarily tied to surveillance by others and the rewards or punishments they can provide (e.g., rejection for deviant positions). Indeed, the decrease in self-esteem was uniform across public and private conditions (Pool et al., 1998).

Influence and Self-Relevant Normative Pressures

The idea that personally relevant social groups can motivate influence emerged early

in the history of communication and persuasion research, and was evident in the program of Hovland and his coworkers at Yale (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). Groups were found to regulate attitudes to the extent that a group was personally important and salient. For example, Boy Scouts who reported valuing their troop membership were more resistant to a message criticizing woodcraft activities than Scouts who placed little value on the troop (Kelley & Volkart, 1952). Similarly, Catholic high school students who had been reminded about their religious identity proved more resistant to anti-Catholic positions (e.g., involving censorship of books and movies) than students who were not reminded of their Catholic identity (Kelley, 1955).

The influence of minority and majority source groups can also be understood in terms of their implications for recipients' personal identities. In the Wood et al. (1994) review, recipients' motivation to align themselves in judgment with the consensus represented by majority sources was apparent in the greater impact of majorities than of minorities on recipients' public and private direct agreement. In addition, recipients' desire to differentiate themselves from the deviant views of minorities was apparent in the greater agreement that emerged on private, indirect measures of attitudes (on which recipients were not aware that their judgments had implications for agreement with the appeal) than on direct public or private measures of attitudes. Additional evidence that identity-related normative motives inhibited agreement with minorities was obtained in analyses that compared minority sources who had a deviant social identity (e.g., members of a radical political group) to those who that lacked a clear social identity and were instead identified through, for example, a statistical designation (e.g., the "minority" position supposedly had been endorsed by 12% of prior subjects). Specifically, the characteristic pattern of minority influence, represented by less public and private direct agreement and greater private, indirect change, appeared only with minority sources that had a deviant social group identity; other types of minorities did not generate any clear pattern of agreement. In sum, it appears that normative pressures to adopt majority views and to disown

minority views regulated both public and private measures of agreement in our (Wood et al., 1994) review.

Normative Motives and Information Processing

In general, self-relevant groups motivate influence by focusing people on the implications of their attitudes for adopting positively valued group identities and rejecting negatively valued identities. When people are highly motivated to align with or to differentiate from a source group, they are likely to conduct a careful, systematic analysis of the relevant information when deciding what position to take. When group identities are less important or people are unable to conduct a detailed analysis (e.g., they are distracted), they are likely to use more efficient strategies, relying on peripheral or heuristic rules to identify the position they should hold (e.g., for political issues, "Vote the party line").

These various information-processing strategies instigated by self-related normative pressures are apparent in earlier research findings, although it should be kept in mind that these studies were not designed to be interpreted from this perspective. For example, in the hostile-media phenomenon, partisan group members have been found to judge "balanced" media presentations in a directed manner, perceiving them as biased in favor of the opposing side (Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985). Process-oriented research has found that judgments of bias arise from heuristic processing in which people base their evaluations of a specific presentation on their general beliefs that the media is biased against their group (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994). In addition, simple perceptual processes were suggested by social judgment theory's accounts of group membership effects. In this research paradigm, membership in a self-defining group was sometimes used as an indicator of ego involvement (Sherif & Hovland, 1961). Ego-involved persons are supposedly more resistant to counterattitudinal messages than less involved ones, because involvement widens their latitude of rejection (i.e., the range of unacceptable positions) and narrows their latitude of acceptance (i.e., the range of acceptable positions). Indeed, Sherif and Hovland (1953) found

black participants more likely than whites to reject so-called "moderate" attitude statements on the issue of "the social position of Negroes." Black participants evaluated these moderate positions from their own favorable stance and grouped them with "anti-Negro" positions. White participants, presumably because of their lower ego involvement in the issue, judged these statements as representing relatively neutral positions.

Turner's (1982, 1991) model of group influence (developed from Tajfel's [1978, 1982] social identity theory) also suggests a relatively efficient, heuristic-like process of attitude judgment. Group identity is thought to affect people's attitudes as part of a cognitive categorization process. When people define themselves as members of a social group, they supposedly infer attitudes and opinions from the available exemplars or prototypes of the social group category and assign these to all members including themselves. Those whom people categorize as similar to themselves are expected to agree; agreement indicates that people's own judgments or attitudes are valid responses to objective reality. Especially for issues that are centrally related to group membership, the group position is adopted with certainty and confidence because it possesses high subjective validity (McGarty, Turner, Oakes, & Haslam, 1993; Mackie & Skelly, 1994). When similar others disagree, people experience uncertainty because their evaluation cannot be unambiguously attributed to reality, and they may engage in mutual influence to produce the expected agreement. Ingroups that are especially effective at reducing subjective uncertainty—those that are distinctive, consistent, and consensual—should be especially influential (Turner, 1991; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994).

Turner's (1982) self-categorization analysis of influence (initially called "referent informational influence") derives from Kelman's (1961) idea that influence can arise from identification with socially valued sources, and from French and Raven's (1959) argument that a source's power to influence others can derive from his or her value as a social referent. Consistent with these perspectives, self-categorization based agreement is supposed to be apparent on both public and private judgments. Change is maintained as long as the source group remains salient and re-

tains its positive or negative value. It is important to note, however, that Turner (1982) conceived of this mode of influence as an alternative to normative bases for agreement (which he defined narrowly as involving other-provided social outcomes; see also Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Hogg & Abrams, 1993) and not, as I am treating it here, as a type of normative motive.

In addition to the relatively efficient process in self-categorization theory, evaluation of information on issues related to group membership can also arise from a relatively thoughtful, cognitively demanding analysis of information. For example, Asch's (1940, 1948) Gestalt approach to social influence suggested that influence appeals do not directly affect recipients' attitudes, but instead change their interpretations of the object or issue referenced in the appeal. In one of Asch's (1940) experiments, participants exposed to others' favorable evaluations of the attitude object, "politicians," appeared to assume that this referred to "statesmen"; because of this interpretation, participants reported relatively favorable views themselves. In contrast, participants exposed to others' unfavorable judgments apparently inferred that "politician" referred to the "more offensive forms" of the political animal (meaning, back then, Tammany Hall, low politics, underlings), and they expressed relatively negative evaluations. Apparently, the positions "imputed to congenial groups produced changes in the meaning of the objects of judgment" (Asch, 1940, p. 462). Similar ideas emerged, although in slightly different form, in other theoretical analyses within the Gestalt tradition (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958). More recently, Allen and Wilder (1980) extended Asch's ideas into a multistage process of meaning change, in which (1) recipients modify their interpretation of an issue in light of the position advocated by a majority group; (2) this new interpretation of the issue makes the source's position seem reasonable and acceptable; and (3) recipients then agree with their (new) interpretation of the advocated position.

My colleagues and I conducted process-oriented research to test whether self-defining normative motives can generate shifts in interpretation of positions held by minority and majority groups (Wood et al., 1996). Partici-

pants were informed of the positions held by social groups on attitude issues, which were phrased so as to be ambiguous and open to multiple interpretations. For example, one issue was whether sex of employees should be considered in promotion. Pretesting suggested that the phrase "should be considered" could be given a qualified interpretation, meaning that the best person should be promoted (regardless of sex) unless a job requires certain physical skills such as strength, or that it could be given a more extreme interpretation involving sex discrimination—in other words, that sex of employees should *determine* who gets promoted. At the beginning of the study, most participants believed that it meant discrimination and thus were strongly opposed to the statement.

In the first study in our research (Wood et al., 1996), participants were told that a majority group, composed of students at their university, had indicated in an earlier poll a counterattitudinal position on the issue. Given this normative pressure, the phrase "should be considered" was construed in the relatively congenial terms of disregarding sex unless the job required certain physical skills. This interpretation rendered the source's position that sex should be considered in promotion reasonable and acceptable, and recipients who adopted this interpretation could then align their attitudes with the majority and endorse the statement themselves.

However, the shifts in interpretation and attitudes were not shown by all participants. On a separate questionnaire, participants had rated the extent to which their self-definition was tied to their student identity. On the basis of these ratings, participants were divided into two groups: those for whom the student identity was highly self-relevant, and those for whom it was not especially relevant (i.e., participants who were indifferent but not opposed to the group). Only those participants judging the majority source group as highly self-relevant experienced normative pressure and shifted interpretation and attitudes to align with majority opinion. Those judging it as less self-relevant were not influenced.

Our second experiment (Wood et al., 1996) examined whether the normative pressures instigated by (negatively) self-relevant minority groups similarly affect influence through directed interpretation of appeals.

The source group in this second study was presented as holding a position that recipients endorsed. Aligning source and recipient allowed us to examine the extent to which recipients shifted their own positions away from that of the minority group. Conceptually, this effect parallels the negative normative pressures that appeared to attenuate direct (vs. indirect) agreement with minority source groups in the Wood et al. (1994) review.

Participants in this second study were thus told that a derogated minority group (e.g., the Ku Klux Klan) agreed with them about an ambiguously phrased attitude issue, such as "In the United States, anyone who is willing and able to work hard has a good chance of succeeding." Pretesting had established that the attitude statements were open to multiple interpretations: The phrase "anyone who is willing and able" could be interpreted in absolute terms, suggesting that success is attainable by anyone, regardless of race or sex; or it could be given the more qualified interpretation that although most people can succeed if they work hard, women and minorities have it tougher than others because of discrimination.

As predicted, the negative normative pressure to differentiate from the minority group affected recipients' interpretations and attitudes. When faced with agreement from the Klan, for example, participants adopted a qualified interpretation of the attitude statement, recognizing the barriers for women and minorities, and as a result were able to shift their attitudes away from the minority group's position. Again, however, not all subjects evidenced this shift. Only those who indicated on a separate questionnaire that the Ku Klux Klan was negatively self-relevant (i.e., they defined themselves as not being members of this group) experienced the normative pressure to differentiate their attitudes from the group position. Other students who indicated that the Klan had minimal relevance for their self-definitions (i.e., they were indifferent to the group but did not support it) did not shift interpretations and did not change their attitudes.

In addition, to ensure that the interpretation shift mediated change and was not an after-the-fact justification for change (Buehler & Griffin, 1994), the order in which partici-

pants completed the questionnaires was varied in our research; participants either indicated their attitudes first and then rated their interpretations or rated their interpretations before attitudes. Supporting the interpretation-then-attitude-change causal ordering, recipients judging the source group as high in personal relevance shifted their attitudes toward the majority group's views and away from those of the minority group only when they had been given an initial opportunity to rate the meaning of the issue in the appeal, and thus to reinterpret it to support their desired identity of being a good university student or not being a Klan member. When rating attitudes first, they were apparently unable or not sufficiently motivated to construct a biased interpretation of the appeal themselves, and as a result did not shift their attitudes.

In general, constructing an interpretation that is congruent with a desired attitude position is likely to be cognitively demanding and effortful. My colleagues and I suspect that people do not often face this challenging task in everyday life; one of the functions of social groups is to provide these interpretations for members. Thus, for example, members of prolife groups interpret abortion as "murder," whereas members of prochoice groups label it a "woman's right to choose." Reference groups, then, do not just provide guides for the stance to take on an issue; they also suggest what the issue means. Indeed, investigations of attitude structure have indicated that people who endorse opposing attitudes on a social issue accord different meaning to the issue. For example, Kerlinger's (1984) investigation of political ideology revealed that liberals favor social equality, tolerance, and constructive social change and are relatively indifferent to conservative values, whereas conservatives endorse social stability, morality, and individualism and are indifferent to liberal values. Thus liberals and conservatives may hold divergent positions on political issues in part because they are invoking different value systems to interpret the issues (see also Tourangeau, Rasinski, & D'Andrade, 1991).

When groups do not provide congenial interpretations, people may be able to achieve their processing goals with strategies that are less effortful than generating their own inter-

pretation of an attitude position (see Abelson, 1959 for the extensive variety of strategies people use to achieve cognitive consistency). One possibility is to reassess the self-relevance of the source group, reducing normative pressure by judging that the group is not especially important for their self-definition. However, in our research (Wood et al., 1996), this strategy was not used by high-relevance participants; their ratings of the negative self-relevance of the minority sources remained high from pre- to postappeal (unfortunately, change in relevance ratings was not assessed in the study of majority influence).

Instead, it appears that in this paradigm, participants who experience high levels of self-definitional normative pressure but are not sufficiently motivated or able to reinterpret the advocated position simply misrecall the group view. We (Pool, Wood, & Leck, 1997), using a paradigm similar to that used in the Wood et al. (1996) research, informed participants that a majority social group (e.g., residents of their state) had taken a position on an issue that diverged from participants' own. However, half of their participants were not given the cue about how to reinterpret the group's position (by completing the interpretation rating scales). After participants had engaged in a 20-minute interpolated task, their recall of the advocated position was assessed. Participants who had earlier indicated that the group was highly self-relevant demonstrated the greatest error in recall; they misremembered the valued majority group as advocating a position closer to their own than the group actually had. In addition, we administered the interpretation measures to the remaining participants and, after 20 minutes, assessed their recall of the group position. In this condition, participants who indicated that the group was highly self-relevant reinterpreted the source position to be congenial with their own and revealed minimal recall errors. Thus, misrecall appears to be an alternative processing strategy to reinterpretation; the negative correlation between misrecall and reinterpretation in this condition suggested that participants misremembered the message position (i.e., remembering valued majority positions as similar to their own and derogated minority positions as divergent from their own) to the extent that they had

not initially reinterpreted the source group position when given the opportunity on the interpretation scales.

In general, our findings (Pool et al., 1997) suggest that normative pressures instigated by self-relevant minority groups have a variety of effects on recipients' processing of influence appeals. Reinterpretation of the advocated position to be congenial with participants' own appears to be a relatively effortful strategy that recipients are unable or unwilling to implement without a structured guide in the form of the interpretation rating scales. Distortions in recall appear to be a less effortful strategy that research participants spontaneously adopt to meet the normative goals of aligning with valued majorities and differentiating from derogated minorities.

One striking finding from this research paradigm is that the negative and positive self-definitional normative pressures exerted by social groups appear to be mirror images of each other; the motivation to align with positively self-relevant majorities differed only in direction from the motivation to differentiate from negatively self-relevant minorities. However, positive and negative normative pressures may not mirror each other in all respects. The effects for the majority source in the Wood et al. (1996) research proved to be slightly larger in magnitude than those for the minority source, despite our attempts to identify minority groups that were strongly self-relevant for at least some participants. It may be that negative normative pressures are typically less strong than positive pressures.

Supporting the idea of asymmetry in self-relevant normative pressures, research on the self-concept has found that people are more likely to focus on attributes that they possess and groups they belong to (e.g., "I am a Texan") than on attributes that they lack (e.g., "I am not a New Yorker"; see McGuire & McGuire's [1992, 1996] cognitive-positivity bias). Indeed, affirmations of personal attributes plausibly hold more information value than negations of attributes and should more effectively meet the self-relevant goals of a coherent identity (e.g., Swann, 1990) and a positive self-view (e.g., Tesser, 1988). An important exception to this generalization occurs when groups are in conflict with each other; self-definitions of "not the adversary group" may be highly salient and meaningful for

members of rival groups. However, in nonconflict situations, people may experience pressures to align with positively valued self-relevant groups more often and perhaps more intensely than pressures to differentiate from negatively valued self-relevant groups.

INFORMATIONAL MOTIVES ESTABLISHED BY GROUP IDENTITY

When motivated by informational concerns, people wish to adopt the most valid, correct position on an attitude issue (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Research on message-based persuasion has typically established validity-seeking motives by highlighting the personal relevance of message topics for recipients (however, see Liberman & Chaiken, 1996). When recipients are highly motivated to identify an accurate, valid position on a topic, they carefully consider persuasive arguments and other issue-relevant information. When they are only moderately motivated by such concerns or are limited in their ability to evaluate information critically, recipients are likely to rely on heuristic cues and other less cognitively demanding strategies; an example is agreeing more with majorities than with minorities, using the heuristic "Consensus is correct" (see Petty & Wegener, Chapter 3, this volume).

Informationally based agreement was a central feature of Moscovici's (1985a, 1985b) account of minority group influence. As I have noted in the introductory section of this chapter, minorities that consistently advocate a counterattitudinal position were thought to instigate a validation process. Recipients do not experience the normative pressures to comply that constrain their responses to majority groups, and instead experience informational conflict as they try to understand why a minority is advocating such a deviant position. However, our review (Wood et al., 1994) did not find an overall pattern suggestive of minority informational influence. That is, in the overall analysis, minority sources were not more influential than majorities on indirect or private measures; given that recipients did not wish to align directly with a deviant minority, attitude measures that were indirect and did not appear to be linked to the influence appeal should have been more likely

to reveal shifts toward the source position than public or direct measures. A greater informational impact of minority than of majority sources did emerge, however, in certain selected analyses in the review, and we concluded that the effect was "fragile and easily muted by a number of not well-understood moderating factors" (Wood et al., 1994, p. 336).

One possible explanation for this inconsistency is that minorities in past research have not presented uniformly strong, valid appeals, and people who are highly motivated to identify an accurate position are unlikely to shift their attitudes in the absence of cogent evidence. In the conformity paradigm in which most research on minority influence has been conducted, appeals typically consist of only a stated position, and people motivated to engage in critical evaluation of such a message need to generate their own interpretation of the message position and reasons for supporting it or opposing it. If the advocated position appears arbitrary or is not easily understood, it may, like "weak" messages in research on message-based persuasion, fail to be influential for informationally motivated people.

It is also possible that minority group identity alone is not sufficient to motivate validity seeking. In the information-rich environment provided by modern communication technology, people are likely to be exposed to divergent views from a variety of groups on a daily basis. Even consistently advocated minority group positions may not be sufficient to engage validity seeking (see a similar point by De Vries, De Dreu, Gordijn, & Schuurman, 1996). Indeed, process-oriented research evaluating the extent to which minorities instigate careful analysis of persuasive messages has yielded inconsistent effects: Although minority messages have been found to attract more attention than majority ones (Tesser, Campbell, & Mickler, 1983), majority messages have sometimes been found to elicit greater thought from recipients than minority messages (e.g., Mackie, 1987), and still other studies suggest no overall difference in amount of cognitive response to majority versus minority sources (e.g., Martin, 1996; Maass & Clark, 1983; Trost, Maass, & Kenrick, 1992).

Minority group identity probably com-

bines with other factors to instigate informational motives. In particular, more extensive processing is elicited by unexpected positions. Given that people expect their attitudes to be shared by a majority of others, majorities that violate this expectation and advocate counterattitudinal positions may evoke careful, extensive thought (Mackie, 1987). Incongruity between source group and message position can also explain instances of minority influence. Baker and Petty (1994) presented participants with expected source-position pairings, in which majority sources advocated consensual positions and minorities deviant ones, or with unexpected pairings, in which majorities advocated deviant positions and minorities consensual ones. Unexpected pairings were surprising and evoked curiosity; consequently, recipients were more likely to systematically process unexpected (vs. expected) appeals, and were more likely to be influenced by (unexpected) appeals supported by cogent than by specious arguments. Expected pairings of source and message were processed at a more superficial level and suggested use of a consensus heuristic, in which majorities' positions were more influential than minorities'.

Instead of informational motives, minority influence may sometimes stem from the normative motivations associated with pressures to innovate. When social norms support innovation, people are likely to favorably evaluate unique, creative ideas (Moscovici, 1985b). Especially in decision-making contexts, minority task solutions and strategies are likely to appear innovative and to pose minimal threat to recipients' understanding of social reality or to valued social identities. Similarly, in social influence contexts in which people expect a range and diversity of opinions, being in the minority may be evaluated positively, as with exclusive tastes in clothing or the arts (Maass, Volpato, & Mucchi-Faina, 1996). These innovative contexts, in which minorities possess a positive identity, can be contrasted to the standard social influence experiment, in which recipients appear to be concerned with validating their views and minority positions seem deviant and unacceptable (Wood et al., 1994).

The idea that minorities can stimulate innovation formed the basis for Nemeth's (1986) work on group decision making and

judgment. Exposure to consistent, unusual solutions from minorities in decision-making groups apparently inspires other members to generate more creative, high-quality task solutions than does exposure to these same solutions from majorities (Nemeth, 1986; Nemeth, Maysless, Sherman, & Brown, 1990). These findings are typically explained by the absence of normative pressure with minority advocacy; recipients are not pressured to converge on the majority view, and instead engage in divergent thought and consider the full range of possible solutions and perspectives on the focal issue (Martin, 1996; Nemeth & Rogers, 1996; Smith, Tindale, & Dugoni, 1996). However, given that divergent thought, like other forms of systematic analysis, requires substantial effort, it seems unlikely to be instigated simply through the absence of pressure toward uniformity. Instead, I suggest that minorities exert their own unique normative pressure in problem-solving contexts.

Minorities are likely to instigate creative analysis and problem generation to the extent that they model "courage" and innovation in problem solution (Crano, 1991; Nemeth & Chiles, 1988). Innovative-appearing minorities are especially likely to increase consideration of a wide range of positions and perspectives, although they may have little effect on the overall level of message-relevant thought (Maass, West, & Cialdini, 1987; Nemeth, 1986). Whether innovative-appearing minorities generate shifts toward the advocated position is less clear. Moscovici and Lage (1978) provided participants with (false) feedback indicating that they were creative, thereby presumably enhancing the extent to which they valued innovation; as a result, participants demonstrated significant direct agreement with minority sources. However, to the extent that recipients are motivated to be innovative and creative in their own judgments, judgment shifts will not necessarily be in the direction of the minority position. Instead, recipients may generate new, divergent perspectives not represented in the minority appeal (Nemeth, 1986).

Certain of the normative pressures associated with minority advocacy may work in conjunction with informational motives to generate Moscovici's (1985a) predicted pattern of stronger indirect than direct minority

influence. When ingroup members advocate a minority stance, the shared group identity may motivate recipients to adopt a lenient, live-and-let-live orientation (Alvaro & Crano, 1996, 1997; see also Mucchi-Fahina, Maass, & Volpato, 1991). Although the minority's position is not necessarily accepted, it is also not actively disparaged. Because the minority identity is not really favorable, however, most people will not want to align with the minority on direct measures of agreement. The informational component emerges because the minority position is distinctive and unexpected. Ingroup minorities attract attention, and people are likely to be motivated to process their appeals carefully. This informational analysis should, when the minority advocates a reasonable position, yield change on indirect measures of agreement. Indeed, in an elegant series of studies, Alvaro and Crano (1996, 1997) found that ingroup minority positions, although they had little direct impact, were recalled as well as majority positions, were not actively counterargued, and (most importantly) exerted influence on issues indirectly related to the topic of the appeal. This pattern of influence results, in which normative pressures stemming from negative source identity inhibit agreement on measures directly but not indirectly related to an appeal, is reminiscent of the "sleeper" effect. In persuasion contexts, low-credibility sources have been found to gain influence over time as the negative source cue is forgotten or becomes dissociated from the message, and as recipients' attitudes continue to be influenced by strong, cogent message arguments (Cook, Gruder, Hennigan, & Flay, 1979).

In summary, there appears to be little evidence that the minority group identity by itself instigates informational pressures to evaluate the content of an influence appeal. Instead, careful processing of an appeal appears to be instigated when any sources, including minorities, advocate unexpected, distinctive positions. Minorities can, however, instigate relatively favorable normative motives. People are unlikely to discount a minority view when the person advocating this view is an ingroup member. They may even be motivated to evaluate such an appeal carefully, yet with a favorable orientation, when a minority appears creative and unique and recipients wish to be innovative themselves.

Some group identities do appear to be linked to informational motives. In task-performing groups, in which members are motivated to achieve group goals, influence may be regulated by members' beliefs about how to achieve the best group-level outcomes. This idea has been used to explain Bales's (1953) research findings on participation rates and influence in small ad hoc discussion groups. Bales noted that even though his groups were composed of highly similar members, stable status hierarchies emerged, with some members reliably contributing to the group task and influencing others at an especially high rate. These status hierarchies are thought to develop from the performance expectations members form about their own and others' likely value to the group, based on initial task contributions, presentational style, and personal attributes (Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977; Ridgeway, 1984; Webster & Foschi, 1988).

Although normative goals such as acquisition of personal status may also regulate influence in task groups (e.g., Ridgeway & Diekema, 1989), it is thought to be in the rational self-interest of each member to defer to others on the basis of relative expectations for performance, so that the group may generate higher rewards for all members through greater success at the task (Berger et al., 1977). As a result, the task contributions of high-expectations group members receive more careful consideration and attention from others, are evaluated more favorably, and are more influential than the ideas of less competent members.²

I suspect that the processes through which influence occurs in task groups vary with the extent to which members adopt validity-seeking motives. In real-world group interactions, a large amount of information is available about other group members, interaction procedures, and possible task solutions. When group members are only moderately motivated by group goals, or when the task is especially ambiguous or difficult, the members will not be motivated or able to verify the accuracy of solutions. They are then likely to rely on relatively efficient strategies, using others' and their own performance expectations as a guide to accepting influence. However, when group members are highly motivated to achieve the best performance

outcome, and when solution accuracy can be verified, the members will probably be willing to conduct more effortful, cognitively demanding analyses of relevant information in order to identify the best solution. Highly motivated recipients, then, should be more likely than less motivated ones to recognize valid suggestions and ideas proposed by low-expectations members. Similarly, if they themselves possess low expectations, they should be more willing to counter others' views and advocate solutions they believe to be accurate.

Empirical evidence of the effects of accuracy motivation on social influence was recently provided by Baron, Vandello, and Brunzman's (1996) adaptation of Asch's (1955) classic line-judging conformity paradigm. Although Baron et al. (1996) manipulated individual and not group accuracy motivation, their study provides insight into the effects of validity seeking in group contexts. Participants estimated the length of a series of lines after hearing other participants, who were actually experimental confederates, give wrong answers to the task. Participants' accuracy motivation was increased in some conditions by stressing the importance of the task and offering monetary incentives to participants for correct answers. The results replicated those of Asch's earlier research: Participants who were not highly motivated to perform well were moderately influenced by confederates' incorrect estimates, regardless of whether participants had the opportunity to inspect the lines and determine the correct answer themselves. In contrast, participants who were strongly motivated to be accurate processed others' responses more carefully. When they had an extensive opportunity to view the stimuli and could verify the correct solution, they were relatively unaffected by others' judgments; when the stimuli were presented too briefly for them to identify the correct answer clearly, they conformed markedly to others' suggestions. In most real-world task groups, members cannot easily verify the quality of suggestions. Consequently, when others' judgments are the only source of valid information, they are likely to have a strong impact even when the group task is highly important. Thus high motivation to achieve the correct answer should encourage group members to rely on all available information about

solution validity, including others' suggestions and their own analysis of the issue, to decide whether to accept or reject the solutions others propose.

INFORMATIONAL VERSUS NORMATIVE MOTIVATIONS ESTABLISHED BY GROUP IDENTITY

According to social identity theory, informational and normative motives instigated by group identity are not separable, but are inextricably linked aspects of the search for a valid understanding of reality congruent with one's social identity (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1991; Turner et al., 1994). In this view, people use the normative standards of relevant reference groups to determine the validity and cogency of information. Consequently, validity-seeking and normative motives are interdependent. In a strong statement of this position, Turner (1991) argued that for self-categorization theory, "the distinction between normative and informational influence is replaced by the idea that the basic influence process is one where the normative position of people categorized as similar to self tends to be subjectively accepted as valid" (p. 171).

It would be difficult to argue with the conclusion that assessments of the validity of information ultimately rest on social consensus. This valuable insight has often been overlooked in research on message-based persuasion, which has treated validity as an intrinsic attribute of information that can be evaluated outside of social norms (see a related criticism by Moscovici, 1980). The social identity perspective, in conjunction with theories of individual information processing, provides a useful framework for identifying the social determinants of validity. Specifically, assertions supported by consensus are more likely to be perceived as valid to the extent that (1) people value the relevant social group or collectivity yielding consensus; (2) the consensus was established through the convergence of independent rather than dependent views; and (3) the consensual position is validated by an individual's own cognitive processing (Mackie & Skelly, 1994). Asch (1952) similarly stressed individual information processing in his analysis of the contingencies under

which consensus suggests validity (see Levine, 1996). In his words, a consensual response is valid only if "each individual asserts his own relation to facts and retains his individuality" (Asch, 1952, p. 494).

From the perspective of predicting and understanding social influence, however, there is good reason to maintain the distinction between informational and normative goals. Quite simply, in everyday influence contexts, people's responses vary when they are motivated by social groups to achieve the informational goal of a valid opinion or the normative goals of receiving a valued outcome or establishing a desired identity. To the extent that groups instigate these different motives, theories of social influence must also differentiate between these orientations.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INFLUENCE

The present perspective counters the popular assumption in social influence research that normative motives yield relatively transitory shifts in attitudes that are apparent primarily on public measures of change, and that informational motives yield more enduring shifts that are apparent on both public and private measures. Indeed, one of the striking findings from the literature on minority influence is that the normative motivations to agree with positively valued majorities and to disagree with negatively valued minorities affect both public attitude statements and private attitude judgments (Wood et al., 1994). Uniformity across public and private measures of agreement is also anticipated by self-categorization approaches to social influence (Turner, 1991).

Maintenance of attitude judgments across settings and types of attitude measures is most likely to emerge when recipients are sufficiently motivated to conduct a careful, thoughtful analysis of the (self-, other-, or issue-related) information relevant to the motivational goal, and when the goal continues to hold value across settings and measures. Stability in attitude judgments across public and private settings also can emerge from a variety of other processes, including people's after-the-fact interpretation of their publicly expressed attitudes. For example, people may internalize and privately adopt their publicly stated views through self-perception (Bem,

1972) and through cognitive-dissonance processes (Festinger, 1957). However, after-the-fact interpretations can also lead people to question the veracity of their attitude statements and can yield unstable, transitory judgments. For example, publicly expressed attitudes that are attributed to salient contextual forces, and are considered strategic pronouncements or interpersonal tactics, are unlikely to be internalized as private opinions (Cialdini et al., 1992). Thus, in attribution analyses to determine the cause of people's public attitude statements, contextual forces can serve as discounting cues that reduce the plausibility of intrinsic belief in the attitude position.

In general, then, I suggest that the distinction between public and private agreement is not a reliable indicator of the motives underlying participants' responses in social influence research. Consider Sherif's (1936/1966) classic finding that participants judging the movement of lights in the presence of others in a darkened room converged in judgment and developed seemingly arbitrary "group" norms, which were maintained when individuals later gave their judgments privately. This conformity in the "autokinetic" paradigm is commonly interpreted as an example of informational influence because of the continuity in participants' responses across public and private settings. The present review suggests, in contrast, that participants' processing goals are difficult to infer from the form of their agreement response. Although participants may have relied on others' judgments for informational reasons (i.e., they wished to attain an accurate estimate but were unable to achieve a clear assessment themselves), they also may have conformed because of normative goals (i.e., they wished to obtain favorable outcomes, such as appearing reasonable and likable to the other participants). Both of these motives can elicit enduring change.

The conformity evident in Asch's (1955, 1956) classic line-judging experiments, by contrast, is typically attributed to normative pressures. In this paradigm, participants publicly stated their own estimates of the length of a series of lines after hearing several experimental confederates provide obviously incorrect answers. The standard interpretation of participants' conformity centers on the dis-

continuity between public and private responding evident from Asch's postexperimental interviews with participants; when adopting others' judgments, most did not report believing the positions they publicly endorsed. In addition, normative pressures are suggested by the unambiguous physical stimulus, which should have obviated any need for subjects to rely on one another for information about physical reality. Because participants had to contradict objective reality in order to conform, this paradigm opposes social outcome concerns with motives to respond accurately. It is interesting to note that Asch himself did not emphasize normative factors, preferring to focus on the two-thirds of the trials in which participants resisted others' influence rather than the one-third in which they conformed (cf. Levine, 1996). Evidence suggesting the conflicting social and informational motives was provided by Bond and Smith's (1996) meta-analytic synthesis of 133 experiments that used an Asch-type conformity paradigm. Conformity increased with increasing normative pressures based on others' responses (i.e., when the majority was composed of ingroup rather than outgroup members, when the majority was larger in size) and with limits on participants' ability to meet validity-seeking goals (i.e., when the majority's incorrect answer was not easy to distinguish from the correct one). Similarly, in related research paradigms, conformity has been found to decrease when validity-seeking motives are strong—at least when people can conduct their own evaluations of the task (e.g., monetary incentives are offered for accuracy; Baron et al., 1996) and when normatively based pressures are reduced (e.g., experimental payoff schemes that apply to other group members but not participants; Ross, Bierbrauer, & Hoffman, 1976).

MOTIVATIONS AND INFORMATION PROCESSING

The overarching theme of this chapter is that a variety of motivations can be instigated by social groups to direct attitude processes. The group identities of sources and recipients direct influence by motivating recipients to be concerned with the outcomes provided by others; with their own self-definitions; and

with the adoption of accurate, valid positions. People hold other-motivated attitudes because these judgments help them achieve desired interpersonal outcomes in a given social context. They hold self-defining attitudes because these views are congruent with material self-interests or with important aspects of their self-definition. People hold accuracy-motivated attitudes because these judgments reflect the "objective" truth on an issue or the most valid approach to a problem.

Understanding the motivations instigated by social groups is important because it provides insight into the manner in which people process relevant information. When people are only moderately motivated by one of these goals, their processing strategies are likely to be governed by efficiency concerns, and they may use heuristic rules or other economical strategies to evaluate the influence appeal (Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996; Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996). As a result, the expressed attitudes are likely to be transitory and tied to specific contexts, interaction partners, or short-term social identities. To the extent that any motivation increases the desired levels of judgmental confidence or decreases actual judgmental confidence, it should increase the extensiveness of information processing (Chaiken et al., 1989). When desired confidence is especially high, people presumably conduct a more careful, thoughtful analysis of the relevant information. Moreover, any shifts in judgment are likely to be relatively stable, reflecting enduring change. Note that these various types of processing are not necessarily mutually exclusive; when individuals are motivated to conduct a careful, thoughtful analysis, they are also likely to simultaneously pursue more efficient strategies, such as heuristic rules. The conclusions reached through one analysis may augment or detract from the conclusions reached through other analyses, or they may have no impact on each other (Chaiken et al., 1989).

In addition, understanding the motives instigated by groups is important because people's motivations focus their processing on goal-relevant thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. People motivated to attain positive and avoid negative outcomes provided by others are likely to consider the social consequences of their attitudes and to adopt positions most

likely to yield the desired result (e.g., more favorably evaluating positions yielding reward than yielding punishment). People motivated by self-related concerns to identify with positively valued social groups and to differentiate themselves from derogated groups are likely to process information in a manner that allows them to achieve these normative goals (e.g., more favorably evaluating positions taken by valued than by derogated groups). People motivated by validity seeking are likely to process information in a way that they believe will yield an accurate judgment (e.g., more favorably evaluating cogent than specious positions).

I speculate also that normative and informational motivations affect how judgments are represented in memory. When normative concerns based on interpersonal outcomes are salient, and attitudes are generated in response to the rewards and punishments that a group can deliver, attitudes are likely to be represented in memory as part of achieving interpersonal goals and to be endorsed as long as these outcomes remain salient and retain their value. When self-related normative concerns are salient, and attitudes are generated in response to the implications of social group positions for recipients' identity, attitudes are likely to be represented in memory as part of the self-concept and to be endorsed as long as this self-view is salient and valued. In contrast, when a validity-seeking motivation is primary, and attitudes are generated in response to the cogency of information, attitudes are more likely to be embedded in cognitive structures related to the attitude object itself or the broader values tied to it, and maintenance of the relevant attitude will depend on the accessibility of these structures.

Echabe, Guede, and Castro's (1994) investigation of beliefs about smoking provides preliminary support for the idea that attitude structure is related to function, at least with respect to self-related attitudes. In the study, smokers' beliefs proved to be organized around their self-identification with the group, so that those who identified with it also endorsed favorable beliefs about smoking. Nonsmokers' beliefs, in contrast, were organized around negative personal attributes of smokers; to the extent that they believed in this stereotype, they also endorsed other negative beliefs. Echabe et al. (1994) suggest that

smokers, like other stigmatized groups, organize group-related information in a defensive manner, and link attitudes and beliefs together in terms of judged relevance for their self-concept.

RESEARCHING MOTIVES IN PERSUASION AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE PARADIGMS

The single motivational theme of accuracy seeking has predominated in the history of message-based persuasion research. Persuasion researchers have devised a variety of measures to identify the extent to which participants are motivated by accuracy concerns, and they have elegantly documented the effects of this motive on information processing (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Social influence paradigms have the advantage of considering a broader range of possible motivations, including (self- and other-related) normative concerns along with validity seeking. Unfortunately, the research methods in social influence paradigms typically have not matched the sophistication of this dual-motive scheme. The central variables of interest have usually not been assessed directly; only rarely have researchers assessed the motives instigated in the influence setting or the information-processing mechanisms through which these motives yield influence and resistance.

A call for measures to distinguish among the variety of motives established by source group identity may seem like yet another tired reminder of the need for manipulation checks in experimental research. The lack of standard procedures to assess the meaning of source group identity is, however, a real problem that hinders cumulative integration of social influence research findings (see also Levine & Russo, 1987). Indeed, to explain the outcomes of a number of studies, I have often been forced in the present review to speculate about the likely motivation established by source groups.

It may be argued that measures of the goals established by source group identity are not always necessary to predict influence and other group behaviors. In Tajfel's minimal-group paradigm, for example, a generic perception of oneself-as-group-member emerges

with the categorization processes involved in differentiating people into groups. In this research, ingroup and outgroup identities can be formed from merely dividing people into groups based on trivial criteria or random assignment (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel & Billig, 1974; Rabbie & Horwitz, 1969). Tajfel (1982) maintained, however, that group identity involves more than simple categorization. Supposedly it depends on personal identification with the group (i.e., knowledge of group membership, along with the value and emotional significance of that membership) and on the external, social definition of the group or category. In support, research that has obtained participants' ratings of their identification with a group has revealed the usefulness of such ratings, demonstrating, for example, that discrimination toward outgroups occurs primarily among participants who personally identify with their ingroup (e.g., Gagnon & Bourhis, 1996).

In research on minority influence, the assumption that a source's minority status elicits a standard cognitive representation for recipients has similarly discouraged checks on the motivations established by the minority identity. Moskowitz (1996) makes a similar point, arguing that the standard definition of a "minority" in numerical terms (e.g., the percentage of a population that holds a deviant opinion) has led researchers to ignore the prior expectancies, attributional biases, and needs for a positive social identity that guide processing of appeals from minority social groups. Whatever the reason for disregarding the nature of minority identity, it is now clear that "minority" refers to a heterogeneous category. Indeed, the Wood et al. (1994) review revealed that different types of minorities yielded characteristically different influence effects. Studies in which the source was a member of a minority social group (e.g., civil libertarians) appeared to generate the standard pattern of greater indirect than direct agreement, presumably because recipients were motivated to differentiate themselves from the source on direct measures. However, studies in which the minority source held positions endorsed by a small percentage of the population appeared to yield no systematic influence effects, presumably because this source identity established no clear motivation for recipients.

A variety of strategies can be used to assess group-related motivations, although most of these have been tailored to evaluate the extent of self-related normative motives established by groups. Ratings of the extent to which respondents identify with a group have proved to be effective measures of a group's self-related importance (e.g., Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Hogg & Hains, 1996; Pool et al., 1998; Wood et al., 1996). The self-related impact of a group potentially can also be assessed through more objective measures, such as the frequency with which participants engage in group activities. Similarly, in research on other-related motives, assessments of the extent to which participants are concerned about attaining positive outcomes and avoiding negative outcomes should be useful in predicting the extent to which the groups that deliver these outcomes are likely to exert influence. Direct assessment or manipulation of the group attributes that instigate these motives may also be useful, such as the actual ability of the group to deliver rewards and punishments (e.g., group resources and immediacy). It is unlikely, however, that validity-seeking motives instigated by groups can be assessed through self-report measures of the importance of achieving a valid, accurate judgment. Most people believe that their judgments are valid, regardless of the extent to which they are motivated by validity seeking (or other concerns), and such ratings may be uniformly high. Instead, researchers may want to manipulate a feature of the group that instigates validity motives, and to assess perceptions of that feature. For example, validity-seeking motives may be enhanced through incentives for accurate group performance.

CONCLUSION

The approach to social influence taken in this chapter builds on the informational mechanisms identified in dual-process models of persuasion (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and includes the broad range of informational and social motives instigated by group identity (Kelley, 1952). When motivated by normative concerns, people try to obtain favorable outcomes provided by others and to avoid unfav-

orable ones, and they try to maintain and bolster a coherent, positive self-view. When motivated to achieve informational goals, people try to identify a valid, accurate position. These motives affect people's judgments by directing the way they process information about the source and the influence appeal. Motives direct attention to relevant information, instigate favorable evaluation of information that meets people's goals, and direct the organization and retrieval of judgment-relevant information in memory.

Given that the content of the appeal in social influence paradigms is typically less rich and provides less information than that in persuasion studies, information processing has unique features in influence contexts. In addition to attention, evaluation, organization, and retrieval, groups direct interpretation of attitude issues. In daily life, the interpretative framework provided by valued groups determines, for example, whether abortion is murder or a woman's right to choose, and whether capital punishment represents justified retribution, an effective crime deterrent, or inhumane treatment. The other-provided outcomes, social identity concerns, or informational goals that motivate people to adopt or reject a group's position work by guiding how people think about the issue, including the way they interpret what the issue means.

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NOTES

1. Indirect measures assess change in attitudes without recipients' awareness that their responses indicate acceptance or rejection of the advocated position. For example, the source may advocate that corporations are primarily responsible for pollution, and an indirect measure of acceptance of this position may be recipients' disagreement with the idea that individuals are primarily responsible for pollution.

2. Presumably, members accorded higher performance expectations typically provide better quality, more accurate suggestions than lower expectation members, and for this reason expectations serve as a reliable heuristic cue to the relative

validity of each member's contributions. However, performance expectations are no guarantee of the quality of any given suggestion or of any member's ideas. For example, expectations that are based on general social attributes that are not tied to actual task competence (e.g., social stereotypes that value men's performance at many tasks above women's) are likely to be poor indicators of members' actual task contributions, and reliance on such expectations will not maximize group performance.

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The Social Contingency Model

IDENTIFYING EMPIRICAL AND NORMATIVE BOUNDARY CONDITIONS ON THE ERROR-AND-BIAS PORTRAIT OF HUMAN NATURE

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About 20 years ago, the first author of this chapter began his first study of accountability—although he did not categorize it as such at the time. Levi and Tetlock (1980) were interested in constructing cognitive maps of the Japanese decision to go to war with the United States in 1941. They quite accidentally discovered that the cognitive maps of Japanese decision making looked different, depending on whether they constructed those maps from the verbatim deliberations of the Liaison conferences (at which military leaders actually made policy decisions) or from the Imperial conferences (at which those same leaders justified their decisions before the Emperor and his advisors). By the fall of 1941, there was relatively little tolerance in the Liaison conferences for dissenters who wanted to avoid military confrontation with the United States; there was accordingly little need to anticipate such objections and to incorporate them into the group's shared assessment of Japan's geopolitical predicament. The Emperor and his key advisors, however, were known to be skeptical about the wisdom of attacking a country with a vastly larger economy. When

the military leaders came before this high-status audience, they went to considerable lengths to demonstrate that they had thought through all the alternatives, weighed the pertinent tradeoffs, and worked through the necessary contingency plans. As a result, the cognitive maps in the Imperial conferences were considerably more complex—with more references to interactive causation and tradeoffs—than were the cognitive maps derived from the Liaison conferences. In the spirit of this volume, we might say that a dual-process model fits these two levels of the Japanese decision-making process.

This chapter examines the evolution of research on the impact of accountability on judgment and choice over the last 20 years. The story to be told is one of progressive "complexification," in which temptingly parsimonious hypotheses have been repeatedly confounded by recalcitrantly complex patterns of evidence. One example is the pure-impression-management model of how people cope with accountability. This model gained empirical sustenance from findings that people often respond to pressures to justify their