Stochastic Games with Delay: a Toy Model

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Networking



Fish Schooling



Literature Review

- Mean Field Games:
 - R. Carmona, J.-P. Fouque, L.-H. Sun [2015].
 - R. Carmona, F. Delarue [2018].
 - P. Cardaliaguet, F. Delarue, J.-M. Lasery, P.-L. Lions [2015].
 - C. Wu and J. Zhang [2018].
 - etc.
- Control Problems with Delay:
 - Y. Alekal, P. Brunovsky, DH. Chyung, and EB. Lee [1971].
 - RB Vinter and RH Kwong [1981].
 - F. Gozzi and C. Marinelli [2004].
 - S. Peng and Z. Yang [2009].
 - Y. Saporito and J. Zhang [2018]
 - etc.
- Stochastic Games with Delay:
 - R. Carmona, J.-P.Fouque, M. Mousavi, L.-H. Sun [2016].
 - ▶ J.-P.Fouque, Z. Zhang [2018].
 - etc.

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Introduction: Linear Quadratic Stochastic Games

Linear Quadratic Game

Bank *i* for $i = 1, \dots, N$ is borrowing from and lending to a central bank:

$$dX_t^i = \alpha_t^i dt + \sigma dW_t^i, \quad X_0^i = \xi^i.$$

where

- > X_t^i represents the log-monetary reserves of the *i*th bank,
- Wⁱ_t are independent standard Brownian motions,
- $\sigma > 0$, the diffusion coefficients are constant and identical,
- Bank *i* controls its rate of borrowing (αⁱ_t > 0)/lending (αⁱ_t < 0) to a central bank through the control αⁱ_t.

The Cost Functional

Bank *i* wants to minimize

$$J^{i}(\alpha) = \mathbb{E}\left\{\int_{0}^{T} f_{i}(X_{t}, \alpha_{t}^{i}) dt + g_{i}(X_{T})\right\},\$$

with running cost

$$f_i(x,\alpha^i) = \frac{1}{2}(\alpha^i)^2 + \frac{\epsilon}{2}(\overline{x} - x^i)^2,$$

and terminal cost

$$g_i(x) = \frac{c}{2} \left(\overline{x} - x^i\right)^2.$$

Value function

$$V^{i}(t,x) = \inf_{\alpha} J^{i}(\alpha).$$

Solving for an Exact Nash Equilibrium

Definition

A set of admissible strategy profiles $\hat{\alpha} = (\hat{\alpha}^1, \cdots, \hat{\alpha}^N) \in \mathbb{A}^{(N)}$ is said to be a Nash equilibrium for the game if:

$$\forall i \in \{1, \cdots, N\}, \forall \alpha^{i} \in \mathbb{A}^{i}, \quad J^{i}(\hat{\alpha}) \leq J^{i}(\alpha^{i}, \hat{\alpha}^{-i}),$$

where $(\alpha^{i}, \hat{\alpha}^{-i})$ stands for the strategy profile $(\hat{\alpha}^{1}, \cdots, \hat{\alpha}^{i-1}, \alpha^{i}, \hat{\alpha}^{i+1})$, in which the player *i* chooses the strategy α^{i} while the others keep the original ones $\hat{\alpha}^{j}$.

- Probabilistic Approach (*N*-coupled Forward-Backward SDEs)
- PDE Approach (N-coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) PDEs)
- This is an example of Mean Field Game (MFG) studied extensively by P.L. Lions and collaborators, R. Carmona and F. Delarue, ...

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Stochastic Game/Mean Field Game with Delay

Stochastic Game with Delay

Banks are borrowing from and lending to a central bank and money is returned at maturity $\tau:$

$$dX_t^i = \left[\alpha_t^i - \alpha_{t-\tau}^i\right] dt + \sigma dW_t^i, \quad i = 1, \cdots, N$$

where α^{i} is the control of bank *i* which wants to **minimize**

$$J^{i}(\alpha) = E\left\{\int_{0}^{T} f_{i}(X_{t}, \alpha_{t}^{i})dt + g_{i}(X_{T})\right\},$$

$$f_{i}(x, \alpha^{i}) = \frac{1}{2}(\alpha^{i})^{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{2}(\overline{x} - x^{i})^{2},$$

$$g_{i}(x) = \frac{c}{2}(\overline{x} - x^{i})^{2},$$

$$X_{0}^{i} = \xi^{i}, \qquad \alpha_{t}^{i} = 0, \quad t \in [-\tau, 0).$$

Case $\tau = 0$: no lending/borrowing \longrightarrow no liquidity. Case $\tau = T$: no return/delay \longrightarrow full liquidity.

Mean Field Game with Delay

- Mean field game theory is the study of strategic decision making in very large populations of small interacting agents, i.e., a game with infinite many indistinguishable players.
- All players are rational, i.e., each player tries to minimize their cost against the mass of other players.
- ► The running cost and terminal cost only depend on *i*th player's state xⁱ and the empirical distribution of (x^j)_{j≠i}.

• As
$$N \to \infty$$
, denote $m_t = \int_R x d\mu_t(x)$,

$$f(X_t, \mu_t, \alpha_t) = \frac{1}{2} (\alpha_t)^2 + \frac{\epsilon}{2} (m_t - X_t)^2,$$

$$g(X_T, \mu_T) = \frac{c}{2} (m_T - X_T)^2.$$

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Probabilistic Approach

Forward-Advanced-Backward SDEs

Theorem. The strategy $\hat{\alpha}$ given by

$$\hat{\alpha}_t = -Y_t + \boldsymbol{E}^{\mathcal{F}_t}(Y_{t+\tau})$$

is a **open-loop Nash equilibrium** where (X, Y, Z) is the unique solution to the following system of **FABSDEs**:

$$\begin{aligned} X_t &= \xi + \int_0^t (\hat{\alpha}_s - \hat{\alpha}_{s-\tau}) \, ds + \sigma \, W_t, \quad t \in [0, \, T], \\ Y_t &= c \, (X_T - m_T) + \int_t^T \epsilon \, (X_s - m_s) \, ds - \int_t^T Z_s \, dW_s, \quad t \in [0, \, T], \\ Y_t &= 0, \quad t \in (T, \, T + \tau], \end{aligned}$$

where the processes Z_t are adapted and square integrable, and $E^{\mathcal{F}_t}$ denotes the conditional expectation with respect to the filtration generated by the Brownian motions.

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Outline of the Proof

Proof.

Let $\alpha' \in \mathbb{A}$ be a generic admissible control, and $X' = X^{\alpha'}$ the corresponding controlled state.

$$J(\hat{\alpha}) - J(\alpha') = \mathbf{E} \left\{ \int_0^T \left(f(X_t, \mu_t, \hat{\alpha}_t) - f(X'_t, \mu'_t, \alpha'_t) \right) dt + g(X_T, \mu_T) - g(X'_T, \mu'_T) \right\}.$$

Since g is L-convex in (x, μ) ,

$$E(g(X_T, \mu_T) - g(X'_T, \mu'_T))$$

$$\leq E[(\partial_x g(X_T, \mu_T) + \tilde{E}[\partial_\mu g(\tilde{X}_T, \mu_T)(X_T)]) \cdot (X_T - X'_T)]$$

$$= E[Y_T(X_T - X'_T)].$$

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Outline of the Proof

Applying Itô's formula, we have

$$\begin{split} & \boldsymbol{E}(Y_{T}(X_{T}-X_{T}')) \\ &= \boldsymbol{E}\left[\int_{0}^{T}(X_{t}-X_{t}')dY_{t}+\int_{0}^{T}Y_{t}d(X_{t}-X_{t}')\right] \\ &= \boldsymbol{E}\int_{0}^{T}\left\{-\epsilon(X_{t}-m_{t})(X_{t}-X_{t}')+Y_{t}\left(\hat{\alpha}_{t}-\alpha_{t}'-\left(\hat{\alpha}_{t-\tau}-\alpha_{t-\tau}'\right)\right)\right\}dt \\ &= \boldsymbol{E}\int_{0}^{T}\left\{-\epsilon(X_{t}-m_{t})(X_{t}-X_{t}')+\left(Y_{t}-\boldsymbol{E}^{\mathcal{F}_{t}}(Y_{t+\tau})\right)\left(\hat{\alpha}_{t}-\alpha_{t}'\right)\right\}dt. \end{split}$$

due to the change of time,

$$E \int_{0}^{T} Y_{t} \left(\hat{\alpha}_{t-\tau} - \alpha_{t-\tau}' \right) dt = E \int_{-\tau}^{T-\tau} Y_{s+\tau} \left(\hat{\alpha}_{s} - \alpha_{s}' \right) ds$$
$$= E \int_{0}^{T} Y_{s+\tau} \left(\hat{\alpha}_{s} - \alpha_{s}' \right) ds = E \int_{0}^{T} E^{\mathcal{F}_{s}} (Y_{s+\tau}) \left(\hat{\alpha}_{s} - \alpha_{s}' \right) ds.$$
$$\hat{\alpha}_{s} = \alpha_{s}' = 0 \text{ for } t \in [-\tau, 0] \text{ and } Y_{s} = 0 \text{ for } t \in (T, T+\tau].$$

since $\hat{\alpha}_t = \alpha'_t = 0$ for $t \in [-\tau, 0)$ and $Y_t = 0$ for $t \in (T, T + \tau]$. Z. Zhang (UCSB) Stochastic Games with Delay

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Outline of the Proof

Convexity of f in (x, μ, α) , we deduce

$$J(\hat{\alpha}) - J(\alpha')$$

$$\leq \mathbf{E} \int_{0}^{T} \left[\left(\partial_{x} f(X_{t}, \mu_{t}, \hat{\alpha}_{t}) + \tilde{\mathbf{E}} [\partial_{\mu} f(\tilde{X}_{t}, \mu_{t}, \hat{\alpha}_{t})(X_{t}) \right) (X_{t} - X_{t}')] \right]$$

$$+ \partial_{\alpha} f(X_{t}, \hat{\alpha}_{t}) (\hat{\alpha}_{t} - \alpha_{t}') \right] dt + \mathbf{E} [Y_{T}(X_{T} - X_{T}')]$$

$$= \mathbf{E} \int_{0}^{T} \left\{ \epsilon (X_{t} - m_{t}) (X_{t} - X_{t}') + (\partial_{\alpha} f(X_{t}, \mu_{t}, \hat{\alpha})) (\hat{\alpha}_{t} - \alpha_{t}') \right\} dt$$

$$+ \mathbf{E} \int_{0}^{T} \left\{ -\epsilon (X_{t} - X_{t}') (X_{t} - m_{t}) + (Y_{t} - \mathbf{E}^{\mathcal{F}_{t}} [Y_{t+\tau}]) (\hat{\alpha}_{t} - \alpha_{t}') \right\} dt.$$

$$= \mathbf{E} \int_{0}^{T} (\hat{\alpha}_{t}^{i} - \alpha_{t}') \times \left[\hat{\alpha}_{t} + (Y_{t} - \mathbf{E}^{\mathcal{F}_{t}} (Y_{t+\tau})) \right] dt$$

$$= 0$$

Forward-Advanced-Backward SDEs

Theorem. The strategy $\hat{\alpha}$ given by

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is a **open-loop Nash equilibrium** where (X, Y, Z) is the unique solution to the following system of **FABSDEs**:

$$\begin{aligned} X_t &= \xi + \int_0^t (\hat{\alpha}_s - \hat{\alpha}_{s-\tau}) \, ds + \sigma \, W_t, \quad t \in [0, \, T], \\ Y_t &= c \, (X_T - m_T) + \int_t^T \epsilon \, (X_s - m_s) \, ds - \int_t^T Z_s \, dW_s, \quad t \in [0, \, T], \\ Y_t &= 0, \quad t \in (T, \, T + \tau], \end{aligned}$$

where the processes Z_t are adapted and square integrable, and $E^{\mathcal{F}_t}$ denotes the conditional expectation with respect to the filtration generated by the Brownian motions.

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Existence, no Uniqueness

No simple explicit formula for the optimal strategy $\hat{\alpha}$.

Recurrent Neural Network

Long-Short Term Memory module: LSTM



http://colah.github.io/posts/2015-08-Understanding-LSTMs/ Eugenio Culurciello

 $\begin{array}{l} \blacktriangleright \quad Y_t \approx \phi(t, (W_s)_{0 \leq s \leq t} | \Theta_t) \\ \blacktriangleright \quad \mathbb{E}[Y_{t+\tau} | \mathcal{F}_t] \approx \psi(t, (W_s)_{0 \leq s \leq t} | \Lambda_t) \\ \blacktriangleright \quad Z_t \approx \chi(t, (W_s)_{0 \leq s \leq t} | \Gamma_t) \end{array}$

$$\begin{split} f_t &= \sigma_g(W_f x_t + U_f h_{t-1} + b_f) \\ i_t &= \sigma_g(W_i x_t + U_i h_{t-1} + b_i) \\ o_t &= \sigma_g(W_o x_t + U_o h_{t-1} + b_o) \\ c_t &= f_t \circ c_{t-1} + i_t \circ \sigma_c(W_c x_t + U_c h_{t-1} + b_c) \\ h_t &= o_t \circ \sigma_h(c_t) \end{split}$$

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Stochastic Games with Delay

Algorithm

- Time discretization. h = T/N, $D = \tau/h$. $-\tau = t_{-D} \le \cdots \le t_{-1} \le t_0 = 0 = t_0 \le t_1 \le \cdots \le t_N \le T$.
- ► Initial states. $X_0 = 0$, $Y_0 \approx \phi(0, W_0 | \Theta_0)$, $\boldsymbol{E}[Y_\tau | \mathcal{F}_0] \approx \psi(0, W_0 | \Lambda_0)$, $Z_0 \approx \chi(0, W_0 | \Gamma_0)$. $\alpha_0 = -Y_0 + \boldsymbol{E}[Y_\tau | \mathcal{F}_0]$.
- Euler–Maruyama method.

$$\begin{aligned} X_{t_{k+1}} &= X_{t_k} + (\alpha_{t_k} - \alpha_{t_{k-D}}) * h + \sigma \Delta W_{t_{k+1}}, \text{where } \Delta W_{t_{k+1}} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, h). \\ \tilde{Y}_{t_{k+1}} &= Y_{t_k} - \epsilon X_{t_k} * h + Z_{t_k} \Delta W_{t_{k+1}}. \\ Y_{t_{k+1}} &\approx \phi(t_{k+1}, (W_s)_{0 \le s \le t_{k+1}} | \Theta_{t_{k+1}}) \end{aligned}$$

► Loss =
$$\sum_{m=1}^{M} \sum_{k=1}^{N} (Y_{t_k}^m - \tilde{Y}_{t_k}^m)^2 + \sum_{m=1}^{M} (Y_{t_N}^m - cX_{T_N}^m)^2 + \sum_{m=1}^{M} \sum_{k=0}^{N-D} (Y_{t_{k+D}}^m - \boldsymbol{E}[Y_{t_{k+D}}^m | \mathcal{F}_{t_k}])^2.$$

 Apply stochastic gradient descent (SGD) to minimize loss and update parameters.

Results

 $T = 10, \tau = 1, h = 0.1, \epsilon = 1, c = 1, M = 2560.$



Results

$$T = 10, \tau = 1, h = 0.1, \epsilon = 1, c = 1, M = 2560.$$



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PDE Approach

Infinite-dimensional HJB Approach

• Denote
$$H := L^2([-\tau, 0]; R)$$
.

▶ Given $z := (z_0, z_1) \in \mathbf{R} \times \mathbf{H}$, where $z_0 \in \mathbf{R}$, and $z_1 \in \mathbf{H}$. The inner product on $\mathbf{R} \times \mathbf{H}$ will be denoted by $\langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle$, and it is defined by

$$\langle z, \tilde{z} \rangle = z_0 \tilde{z}_0 + \int_{-\tau}^0 z_1(s) \tilde{z}_1(s) ds.$$

Therefore, the new state is denoted by Z_t = (Z_{0,t}, Z_{1,t}(s)), s ∈ [−τ, 0], which corresponds to (X_t, α_{t−τ−s}), i.e., the states and the past of the strategies in our case.

Infinite-dimensional HJB Approach

In order to use the **dynamic programming principle** for stochastic game in search of a **closed-loop Nash equilibrium**, at time $t \in [0, T]$, given the initial state $Z_0 = z$, one representative bank chooses the control α to minimise its objective function $J(t, z, \alpha)$.

$$J(t,z,\alpha) = \mathbf{E}\bigg\{\int_t^T f(Z_{0,s},\mu_{0,s},\alpha_s)dt + g(Z_{0,T},\mu_{0,T}) \mid Z_t = z\bigg\},\$$

The value function V(t,z) is

$$V(t,z) = \inf_{\alpha} J(t,z,\alpha).$$

subject to

$$dZ_t = (AZ_t + B\alpha_t)dt + GdW_t.$$

Coupled HJB Equations

The value functions V(t,z) is the unique solution (in a suitable sense) of the following HJB equations:

$$\begin{split} \partial_t V + \frac{1}{2} Tr(Q \partial_{zz} V) + \langle Az, \partial_z V \rangle + H_0(\partial_z V) &= 0, \\ V(T) = g(Z_{0,T}, \mu_{0,T}), \end{split}$$

$$Q = G * G, \quad G : z_0 \to (\sigma z_0, 0),$$

$$A : (z_0, z_1(\gamma)) \to (z_1(0), -\frac{dz_1(\gamma)}{d\gamma}) \quad a.e., \quad \gamma \in [-\tau, 0],$$

$$H_0(p) = \inf_{\alpha} [\langle B\alpha, p \rangle + f(z_0, \alpha)], \quad p \in \mathbf{R} \times \mathbf{H},$$

$$B : u \to (u, -\delta_{-\tau}(\gamma)u), \quad \gamma \in [-\tau, 0].$$

Forward Kolmogorov Equation

Next, since we "lift" the original non-Markovian optimization problem into a infinite dimensional Markovian control problem. We are able to write the corresponding generator, which is denoted by (L_t)_{t∈[0, T]},

$$\pounds \varphi(t,z) = \langle (AZ + B\hat{\alpha}), \partial_z \varphi \rangle + \frac{1}{2} Tr(G^* G \partial_{zz} \varphi).$$

Forward Kolmogorov Equation

$$\begin{split} \partial_{t}\nu &= \int_{-\tau}^{0} \partial_{z_{1}} \left(\frac{d}{ds} z_{1}\nu \right) ds - \int_{-\tau}^{0} \partial_{z_{1}} (z_{1}\nu) (\delta_{0}(s) - \delta_{-\tau}(s)) ds \\ &+ \partial_{z_{0}} \{ (\partial_{z_{0}}V - [\partial_{z_{1}}V](-\tau))\nu \} \\ &- \int_{-\tau}^{0} \partial_{z_{1}} \{ (\partial_{z_{0}}V - [\partial_{z_{1}}V](-\tau))\nu \} \delta_{-\tau}(s) ds + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2} \partial_{z_{0}z_{0}}\nu, \\ \nu_{0} &= \pmb{P}(\xi, \phi(s)_{s \in [-\tau, 0]}). \end{split}$$

Derivative in P(H)

Definition

We say that $F : P(H) \to H$ is C^1 if there exists an operator $\frac{\delta F}{\delta \nu} : P(H) \times H \to H$ such that for any μ_1 and $\mu'_1 \in P(H)$

$$\lim_{\epsilon\to 0^+}\frac{F(\mu_1+\epsilon(\mu_1'-\mu_1))-F(\mu_1)}{\epsilon}=\int_H\frac{\delta F}{\delta\mu_1}(\mu_1,y_1)d(\mu_1'-\mu_1)(y_1).$$

Definition

If $\frac{\delta F}{\delta \mu_1}(\mu_1, y_1)$ is of class C^1 with respect to y_1 , the marginal derivative $D_{\mu_1}F : P(H) \times H \to H$ is defined in the sense of Fréchet derivative:

$$D_{\mu_1}F(\mu_1, y_1) := D_{y_1} rac{\delta F}{\delta \mu_1}(\mu_1, y_1).$$

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Derivative in P(H)

Remark

Usually we will encounter a map $U : P(H) \to R$. In this case, U can be expressed in a form of composition $\tilde{U} \circ F$, where $\tilde{U} : H \to R$, and $F : P(H) \to H$, i.e., $U = (\tilde{U} \circ F)(\mu_1)$.

If $\frac{\delta F}{\delta \mu_1}$ is C^1 with respect to y_1 , and \tilde{U} is Fréchet differentiable, then $\frac{\delta U}{\delta \mu_1} : \boldsymbol{P}(\boldsymbol{H}) \times \boldsymbol{H} \to \boldsymbol{H}$, and $D_{\mu_1}U : \boldsymbol{P}(\boldsymbol{H}) \times \boldsymbol{H} \to \boldsymbol{H}$ are defined by

$$\frac{\delta U}{\delta \mu_1}(\mu_1,y_1) := \left(D_F \tilde{U}\right) \left(\frac{\delta F}{\delta \mu_1}\right), \text{ and } D_{\mu_1} U(\mu_1,y_1) := \left(D_F \tilde{U}\right) \left(D_{\mu_1} F\right).$$

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The Master Equation For any $(t_0, \nu_0) \in [0, T] \times P(R \times H)$, we define

$$U(t_0,\cdot,\nu_0):=V(t_0,\cdot),$$

where (V, ν) is a classical solution to the system of forward-backward equations. Then U must satisfy the following master equation

$$\begin{split} \partial_{t}U(t,z_{0},z_{1},\nu) &+ \frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2}\partial_{z_{0}z_{0}}U(t,z_{0},z_{1},\nu) + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2}\int_{R}\partial_{y_{0}}D_{\mu_{0}}U(t,z_{0},z_{1},\nu,y_{0})d\mu_{0}(y_{0}) \\ &+ \int_{-\tau}^{0}z_{1}\frac{d}{ds}\partial_{z_{1}}U(t,z_{0},z_{1},\nu)ds + \int_{-\tau}^{0}\int_{H}y_{1}\frac{d}{ds}\left[D_{\mu_{1}}U(t,z_{0},z_{1},\nu,y_{1})\right](s)d\mu_{1}(y_{1})ds \\ &- \int_{R\times H}(\partial_{y_{0}}U(t,y_{0},y_{1},\nu) - [\partial_{y_{1}}U(t,y_{0},y_{1},\nu)](-\tau))D_{\mu_{0}}U(t,z_{0},z_{1},\nu,y_{0})d\nu(y) \\ &+ \int_{R\times H}(\partial_{y_{0}}U(t,y_{0},y_{1},\nu) - [\partial_{y_{1}}U(t,y_{0},y_{1},\nu)](-\tau))\left[D_{\mu_{1}}U(t,z_{0},z_{1},\nu,y_{1})\right](-\tau)d\nu(y) \\ &- \frac{1}{2}(\partial_{z_{0}}U(t,z_{0},z_{1},\nu) - [\partial_{z_{1}}U(t,z_{0},z_{1},\nu)](-\tau))^{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{2}\left(\int_{R}y_{0}d\mu_{0}(y_{0}) - z_{0}\right)^{2} = 0, \end{split}$$

where μ_0 and μ_1 are the marginal law for Z_0 and Z_1 respectively.

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Explicit Solution of the Master Equation with Delay

It turns out that this master equation can be solved explicitly by making the following ansatz.

We define $m_0:=\int_{I\!\!R} y_0 d\mu_0(y_0)$ and $m_1:=\int_{I\!\!H} y_1 d\mu_1(y_1)$ for convenience, then

$$U(t, z_0, z_1, \nu) = E_0(t)(m_0 - z_0)^2 - 2(m_0 - z_0) \int_{-\tau}^0 E_1(t, -\tau - s)(m_1 - z_1) ds$$

+ $\int_{-\tau}^0 \int_{-\tau}^0 E_2(t, -\tau - s, -\tau - r)(m_1 - z_1)(m_1 - z_1) ds dr + E_3(t).$

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Explicit Solution of the Master Equation with Delay

We compute the partial derivatives needed in the master equation explicitly, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \partial_{t}U &= \frac{dE_{0}(t)}{dt}(m_{0} - z_{0})^{2} - 2(m_{0} - z_{0})\int_{-\tau}^{0}\frac{\partial E_{1}(t, -\tau - s)}{\partial t}(m_{1} - z_{1})ds \\ &+ \int_{-\tau}^{0}\int_{-\tau}^{0}\frac{\partial E_{2}(t, -\tau - s, -\tau - r)}{\partial t}(m_{1} - z_{1})(m_{1} - z_{1})dsdr + \frac{dE_{3}(t)}{dt}, \\ \partial_{z_{0}}U &= -2E_{0}(t)(m_{0} - z_{0}) + 2\int_{-\tau}^{0}E_{1}(t, -\tau - s)(m_{1} - z_{1})ds, \\ \partial_{z_{1}}U &= 2E_{1}(t, -\tau - s)(m_{0} - z_{0}) - 2\int_{-\tau}^{0}E_{2}(t, -\tau - s, -\tau - r)(m_{1} - z_{1})dr, \\ D_{\mu_{0}}U &= 2E_{0}(t)(m_{0} - z_{0}) - 2\int_{-\tau}^{0}E_{1}(t, -\tau - s)(m_{1} - z_{1})ds, \\ D_{\mu_{1}}U &= -2E_{1}(t, -\tau - s)(m_{0} - z_{0}) + 2\int_{-\tau}^{0}E_{2}(t, -\tau - s, -\tau - r)(m_{1} - z_{1})dr, \\ \partial_{z_{0}z_{0}}U &= 2E_{0}(t), \end{aligned}$$

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Stochastic Games with Delay

Collecting $(m_0 - z_0)^2$ terms, $(m_0 - z_0)(m_1 - z_1)$ terms, $(m_1 - z_1)^2$ terms, and constant terms, we obtain That the function E_i , $i = 0, \dots, 3$, satisfy the system of PDEs:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dE_0(t)}{dt} &- 2(E_0(t) + E_1(t,0))^2 + \frac{\epsilon}{2} = 0, \\ \frac{\partial E_1(t,s)}{\partial t} &- \frac{\partial E_1(t,s)}{\partial s} - 2(E_0(t) + E_1(t,0))(E_1(t,s) + E_2(t,0,r)) = 0, \\ \frac{\partial E_2(t,s,r)}{\partial t} &- \frac{\partial E_2(t,s,r)}{\partial s} - \frac{\partial E_2(t,s,r)}{\partial r} \\ &- 2(E_1(t,s) + E_2(t,s,0))(E_1(t,r) + E_2(t,r,0)) = 0, \\ \frac{dE_3(t)}{dt} + E_0(t)\sigma^2 &= 0, \end{aligned}$$

with boundary conditions

$$\begin{split} E_0(T) &= \frac{c}{2}, \quad E_1(T,s) = 0, \quad E_2(T,s,r) = 0, \quad E_2(t,s,r) = E_2(t,r,s), \\ E_1(t,-\tau) &= -E_0(t), \quad E_2(t,s,-\tau) = -E_1(t,s), \quad E_3(T) = 0. \end{split}$$

Finite Dimensional Projection

- ► Set $u^i(t, z_0, z_1) := U(t, z_0^i, z_1^i, \nu^i)$, where $\nu^i = \frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{k \neq i} \delta_{(z_0^k, z_1^k)}$, denotes the joint empirical measure of z_0 and z_1 . The empirical measure of z_0 is given by $\mu_0^i = \frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{k \neq i} \delta_{z_0^k}$, and the empirical measure of z_1 is given by $\mu_1^i = \frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{k \neq i} \delta_{z_1^k}$.
- ▶ By direct computation, for $k \neq i$, and any $N \geq 2$,

$$\begin{split} \partial_{z_0^k} u^i(t, z_0, z_1) &= \frac{1}{N-1} D_{\mu_0^i} U(t, z_0^i, z_1^i, \nu^i, z_0^k), \\ \partial_{z_1^k} u^i(t, z_0, z_1) &= \frac{1}{N-1} D_{\mu_1^i} U(t, z_0^i, z_1^i, \nu^i, z_1^k), \\ \partial_{z_0^k z_0^k} u^i(t, z_0, z_1) &= \frac{1}{N-1} \partial_{z_0^k} [D_{\mu_0^i} U](t, z_0^i, z_1^i, \nu^i, z_0^k) \\ &+ \frac{1}{(N-1)^2} D_{\mu_0^i \mu_0^i} U(t, z_0^i, z_1^i, \nu^i, z_0^k, z_0^k). \end{split}$$

Convergence of the Nash System

Proposition

For any $i \in \{1, \cdots, N\}$, $u^i(t, z_0, z_1)$ satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} \partial_t u^i + \sum_{k=1}^N \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 \partial_{z_0^k z_0^k} u^i + \sum_{k=1}^N \int_{-\tau}^0 z_1^k \frac{d}{ds} (\partial_{z_1^k} u^i) ds \\ &- \sum_{k \neq i}^N \left(\partial_{z_0^k} u^k - [\partial_{z_1^k} u^k] (-\tau) \right) \left(\partial_{z_0^k} u^i - [\partial_{z_1^k} u^i] (-\tau) \right) \\ &- \frac{1}{2} \left(\partial_{z_0^i} u^i - [\partial_{z_1^i} u^i] (-\tau) \right)^2 + \frac{\epsilon}{2} (\bar{z}_0 - z_0^i)^2 + e^i(t, z) = 0, \end{aligned}$$

where $\|e^i(t,z)\| < \frac{c}{N}$, with terminal condition $u^i(T,z) = \frac{c}{2}(\bar{z}_0 - z_0^i)^2$.

This shows that $(u^i)_{i \in \{1,...,N\}}$ is "almost" a solution to the Nash system.

Convergence of the Nash System

Let V^i be the solution to the HJB equation of the *N*-player system, where $N \ge 1$ fixed, and *U* be the solution to the master equation. Fix any $(t_0, \nu_0) \in [0, T] \times P(\mathbf{R} \times \mathbf{H})$. For any $z \in \mathbf{R}^N \times \mathbf{H}^N$, let $\nu^i = \frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{j \neq i}^N \delta_{(z_0^i, z_1^i)}$, then we have

$$rac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}|V^{i}(t_{0},z)-U(t_{0},z^{i},
u^{i})|\leq CN^{-1}.$$

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The End

THANKS FOR YOUR ATTENTION