{"id":4,"date":"2022-11-02T18:09:55","date_gmt":"2022-11-02T18:09:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/dornsife.usc.edu\/finlay-research\/?page_id=4"},"modified":"2025-09-04T05:09:32","modified_gmt":"2025-09-04T12:09:32","slug":"home","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/dornsife.usc.edu\/finlay-research\/","title":{"rendered":"Home"},"content":{"rendered":"\n\n \n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
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Professor of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
\nAdjunct Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California<\/h3>\n
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USC Profile<\/a>\u00a0 |\u00a0 \u00a0Contact<\/a>\u00a0 |\u00a0 Short CV<\/a><\/p>\n

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Book<\/strong><\/h2>\n

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Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014<\/a><\/i><\/h4>\n

Can normative words like “good,” “ought,” and “reason” be defined in entirely non-normative terms?\u00a0Confusion of Tongues<\/i>\u00a0argues that they can, advancing a new End-Relational theory of the meaning of this language as providing the best explanation of the many different ways it is ordinarily used. Philosophers widely maintain that analyzing normative language as describing facts about relations cannot account for special features of particularly moral and deliberative uses of normative language, but I argue that the End-Relational theory systematically explains these on the basis of a single fundamental principle of conversational pragmatics. These challenges comprise the central problems of metaethics, including the connection between normative judgment and motivation, the categorical character of morality, the nature of intrinsic value, and the possibility of normative disagreement. This linguistic analysis has deep implications for the metaphysics, epistemology, and psychology of morality, as well as for the nature and possibility of normative ethical theory. Most significantly it supplies a nuanced answer to the ancient Euthyphro Question of whether we desire things because we judge them good, or vice versa. Normative speech and thought may ultimately be just a manifestation of our nature as intelligent animals motivated by contingent desires for various conflicting ends.<\/p>\n

Order:<\/strong>\u00a0US<\/a>\u00a0\u2013\u00a0UK<\/a><\/p>\n

Review:<\/strong>\u00a0\u201cThis is one of the richest, most sophisticated, and most impressive books on metaethics to have been published in my lifetime. Everyone with an interest in normative language ought to read it. Those who would seek to defend naturalist views of the sort Finlay develops here will find it a treasure trove of dialectical resources that they will want to plunder repeatedly. Those who seek to attack such views or to defend rival views will find it a challenge it would be shameful to ignore.\u201d James Lenman,\u00a0Language<\/a><\/i>.<\/p>\n

More Reviews:<\/strong>\u00a0Matthew Chrisman,\u00a0Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews<\/a><\/i>, Alex Gregory,\u00a0Analysis<\/a><\/i>, Russell Blackford,\u00a0The Philosopher\u2019s Magazine<\/a><\/i>, Janice Dowell,\u00a0Mind<\/a><\/i>, Dan Fogal,\u00a0Ethics<\/a><\/i>. (See also\u00a0Analysis<\/i>\u00a0symposium and my “Reply” below.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n <\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n

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\n Papers in Preparation\n <\/h2>\n\n\n<\/div>\n \n \n
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Comments welcome!<\/p>\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n \n \n <\/div>\n \n \n \n\n <\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n

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\n Papers Published & Forthcoming\n <\/h2>\n\n\n<\/div>\n \n \n \n <\/div>\n \n