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Stephen Finlay
Curriculum Vitae

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APPOINTMENTS

Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California, 2014–present.
Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California, 2009–14.
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California, 2002–09.
Visiting Instructor, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2001–02.

EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Philosophy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2001.
Dissertation: *What Does Value Matter?* Advisor: James D. Wallace.
M.A. in Philosophy, first class honours, University of Auckland, 1996.
B.A. in Philosophy & History, University of Auckland, 1994.

AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION

Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Practical Reason

AREAS OF COMPETENCE

Ethics, Philosophy of Language

RESEARCH HONOURS

Charles A. Ryskamp Research Fellowship, Andrew W. Mellon Foundation/ACLS, 2008 – 2009.
Advancing Scholarship in the Humanities and Social Sciences Grant, USC Provost, 2008 – 2009.
2009 *AJP* Best Paper Award, Australasian Association of Philosophy.
The 2012 Burman Lectures in Philosophy, Umeå University, Sweden.
Research Fellowship, National Endowment for the Humanities, 2012 – 2013.

BOOK (MONOGRAPH)

1. *Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
(Oxford Moral Theory series, 288pp.)

EDITED COLLECTION

2. *Deontic Modality*, with Mark Schroeder. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 95 (4), 2014.

ARTICLES

3. 'The Conversational Practicality of Value Judgement,' *Journal of Ethics* 8 (3), 2004: 205-223.
4. 'Value and Implicature,' *Philosophers' Imprint* 5 (4), July 2005: 1-20.
5. 'The Reasons that Matter,' *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 84 (1), 2006: 1-20.
6. 'Responding to Normativity,' in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) *Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007: 220-39.
7. 'Too Much Morality,' in Paul Bloomfield (ed.) *Morality and Self-Interest*. Oxford University Press, 2007: 136-54.
8. 'Four Faces of Moral Realism,' *Philosophy Compass* 2 (6), 2007: 820-49.
9. 'Motivation to the Means,' in David Chan (ed.) *Moral Psychology Today: Values, Rational Choice & the Will*. Springer, 2008: 173-92.
10. 'The Error in the Error Theory,' *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 86 (3), 2008: 347-69. (Winner, 2009 AJP Best Paper Award)
11. 'Oughts and Ends,' *Philosophical Studies* 143 (3), 2009: 315-40.
12. 'The Obscurity of Internal Reasons,' *Philosophers' Imprint* 9 (7), 2009: 1-22.
13. 'Against All Reason? Skepticism about the Instrumental Norm,' in Charles Pigden (ed.), *Hume on Motivation and Virtue*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009: 155-78.
14. 'Normativity, Necessity, and Tense: A Recipe for Homebaked Normativity,' in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010: 57-85.
15. 'What *Ought* Probably Means, and Why You Can't Detach It,' *Synthese* 177 (1), 2010: 67-89.
16. 'Recent Work on Normativity,' *Analysis* 70 (2), 2010: 331-46.
17. 'Metaethical Contextualism Defended,' with Gunnar Björnsson, *Ethics* 121 (1), 2010: 7-36.
18. 'Errors upon Errors: A Reply to Joyce,' *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 89 (3), 2011: 535-47.
19. 'The Selves and the Shoemaker: Psychopaths, Moral Judgment, and Responsibility,' *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 49 (Spindel Supplement), 2011: 125-33.
20. 'Explaining Reasons,' *Deutsches Jahrbuch für Philosophie*, Vol. 4. Hamburg: Meiner, 2012: 112-26.
21. 'One Ought Too Many,' with Justin Snedegar, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 89 (1), 2014: 102-24.
22. 'The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement,' in Guy Fletcher & Michael Ridge (eds.), *Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014: 124-48.
23. "Deontic Modality Today: Introduction," with Mark Schroeder, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 95 (4), 2014: 421-3.
24. "'Ought": OUT OF ORDER,' forthcoming in Matthew Chrisman & Nate Charlow (eds.), *Deontic Modality*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

ENCYCLOPEDIA ENTRIES

25. 'Emotive Theory of Ethics,' in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2nd edition (Donald M. Borchert, ed.). New York: MacMillan, 2005.
26. 'Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External,' with Mark Schroeder, in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Edward N. Zalta, ed.), 2008; <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasons-internal-external/>
27. 'Metaethics,' in E. Craig (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. London: Routledge, 2012.
28. 'Moral Language, Uses of,' *International Encyclopedia of Ethics* (H. LaFollette, ed.). Wiley, 2013.
29. 'Ought,' *International Encyclopedia of Ethics* (H. LaFollette, ed.). Wiley, 2013.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

30. Review of Mark Eli Kalderon, *Moral Fictionalism*, in *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, 2006; <http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=6321>
31. 'Teaching and Learning Guide for: Moral Realism and Moral Nonnaturalism,' with Terence Cuneo, *Philosophy Compass* 3 (3), 2008: 570-2.
32. Review of A. W. Price, *Contextuality in Practical Reason*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 88 (1), 2010: 187-190.
33. Review of John F. Horty, *Reasons as Defaults*, *The Philosophical Review* 124 (2), 2015: 284-6.
34. Review of Jonas Olson, *Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence*, with Matt Lutz, *Ethics* 125 (4), 2015.

WORK IN PROGRESS

35. 'Quasi-Expressivism about Statements of Law: A Hartian Theory' (with David Plunkett), paper in preparation to appear in *Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law*.
36. 'What Might but Must Not Be' (with Ben Lennertz), paper in preparation.
37. 'The Empirical Armchair,' paper in preparation to appear in a volume on empirical approaches to metaethics edited by D. Loeb & T. Cuneo.
38. 'Moral Naturalism' (with Matt Lutz), article in preparation to appear in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
39. 'Conceptual Analysis and Metaethics,' paper invited to appear in the *Routledge Handbook on Metaethics*, edited by T. MacPherson & D. Plunkett.
40. Review of James Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer, *Constructivism in Practical Philosophy*, commissioned by *Philosophical Quarterly*.
41. 'Disagreement Lost and Found,' paper in preparation presumptively to appear in *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, vol. 12.
42. 'Formal versus Real Normativity,' paper in preparation to appear in D. Plunkett, S. Shapiro & K. Toh (eds.), *Philosophy of Law and Metaethics*.

CONFERENCE TALKS

1. 'Rethinking the Value-Realism Debate,' 28th Conference on Value Inquiry, Lamar University, Texas, April 15, 2000.
2. 'Against All Reason?' Conference on Hume, Motivation, 'Is' and 'Ought', University of Otago, New Zealand, Jan 23, 2003.
3. 'Motivation to the Means,' 8th Annual Southern California Philosophy Conference, University of California – Irvine, Oct 30, 2003.
4. 'Motivation to the Means,' Conference on Values, Rational Choice & the Will, University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point, Apr 1, 2004.
5. 'No Pretender is Wanting: Desire's Legitimate Claim to Authority,' 2nd Annual Metaethics Workshop, University of Wisconsin – Madison, Sept 18, 2005.
6. 'Desire, Normativity, and Freedom,' 10th Annual Southern California Philosophy Conference, California State University – Northridge, Oct 29, 2005.
7. 'Normativity, Necessity, and Tense,' 5th Annual Metaethics Workshop, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Sept 14, 2008.
8. 'Metaethical Contextualism Defended,' 2nd Annual Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, University of Colorado—Boulder, Aug. 10, 2009.

9. 'A Case for Analytic Naturalism(?)', Naturalisms in Ethics Conference, University of Auckland, New Zealand, July 14, 2011.
10. 'One Ought Too Many', with Justin Snedegar, 4th Annual Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, University of Colorado—Boulder, Aug 7, 2011.
11. 'Explaining Reasons,' XXII. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie, Ludwig-Maximilians Universität, Munich, Germany, Sept. 12, 2011.
12. 'One Ought Too Many', with Justin Snedegar, Conference on Practical Reason and Metaethics, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, April 21, 2012.
13. 'The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement,' Hybrid Theories in Metaethics Conference, University of Edinburgh, UK, July 3, 2012.
14. 'The Empirical Armchair,' Empirical Approaches to Metaethics Workshop, University of Michigan, June 18, 2013.
15. 'Ought: OUT OF ORDER' Arché Normative Language Workshop, University of St. Andrews, UK, Oct. 27, 2013.
16. 'The Empirical Armchair,' Eastern Division APA Meeting, Baltimore, MD, Dec. 28, 2013.
17. 'A Quasi-Expressivist Theory of Legal Statements,' (with David Plunkett), Legal Philosophy Workshop, University of Pennsylvania, May 3, 2014.
18. 'Disagreement Lost and Found,' Chapel Hill Metaethics Workshop, UNC-Chapel Hill, Oct. 30, 2015.

INVITED TALKS

19. 'Why We Need Not Be Nondescriptivists,' University of California – Davis, Jan. 7, 2002.
20. 'Why We Need Not Be Nondescriptivists,' University of Southern California, Jan. 18, 2002.
21. 'The Reasons that Matter,' University of British Columbia, Jan. 20, 2006.
22. 'The Reasons that Matter,' University of Vermont, Jan. 26, 2006.
23. 'The Reasons that Matter,' University of Alberta, Feb. 2, 2006.
24. 'Oughts and Ends,' New York University, Oct. 6, 2006.
25. 'The Obscurity of Internal Reasons,' University of Gothenburg, Sweden, March 25, 2008.
26. 'What *Ought* Probably Means,' Lund University, Sweden, March 26, 2008.
27. 'What *Ought* Probably Means,' Stockholm University, Sweden, March 27, 2008.
28. 'The Obscurity of Internal Reasons,' Uppsala University, Sweden, March 28, 2008.
29. 'Metaethical Contextualism Defended,' University of Edinburgh, May 11, 2009.
30. 'Metaethical Contextualism Defended,' University of Leeds, May 14, 2009.
31. 'Metaethical Contextualism Defended,' Oxford University (Seminar in Moral Philosophy), May 18, 2009.
32. 'Explaining Reasons,' Reed College (Portland, Oregon), March 31, 2011.
33. 'Explaining Reasons,' University of California—Davis, May 11, 2011.
34. 'Metaethics: What, Why, and How?' (Lecture 1, The Burman Lectures in Philosophy), Umeå University, Sweden, Feb 27, 2012.
35. 'The Semantics of "Ought"' (Lecture 2, The Burman Lectures in Philosophy), Umeå University, Sweden, Feb 28, 2012.
36. 'Explaining Reasons,' Umeå University Philosophical Society, Sweden, Feb 28, 2012.
37. 'The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement,' (Lecture 3, The Burman Lectures in Philosophy), Umeå University, Sweden, Feb. 29, 2012.
38. 'The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement,' North Carolina State University, April 19, 2012.
39. 'One Ought Too Many,' University of Otago, New Zealand, Aug 1, 2012.
40. 'The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement,' Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, Aug 9, 2012.

41. 'The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement,' University of Auckland, New Zealand, Aug 10, 2012.
42. Guest Speaker, Sarah McGrath's graduate seminar discussion of *Confusion of Tongues*, Princeton University, Feb 19, 2014.
43. Guest Speaker (Skype), Connie Rosati's graduate seminar discussion of *Confusion of Tongues*, University of Arizona, March 12, 2014.
44. "For Its Own Sake", University of Utah, April 11, 2014.
45. "For Its Own Sake", University of California-Riverside, April 30, 2014.
46. "For Its Own Sake", Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, July 24, 2014.

INVITED COMMENTARIES

47. On Rachel Cohon, 'Hume's Theory of Moral Sense and the Modern Philosophy,' Pacific APA Meeting, San Francisco, March 27, 2003.
 48. On Julie Tannenbaum, 'All Too Human,' 9th Annual Southern California Philosophy Conference, University of California-Irvine, Oct 30, 2004.
 49. On Robert Audi, *Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision*. Pacific APA Meeting, San Francisco, April 6, 2007.
 50. On Aaron Zimmerman, 'On Inferring "Ought" from "Is"', 12th Annual Southern Cal. Philosophy Conference, Pitzer College, Nov 7, 2009.
 51. On David Shoemaker, 'Psychopathy, Responsibility, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction', Spindel Conference, University of Memphis, Oct 8, 2010.
 52. On Alex Silk, 'Normativity in Language and Law,' Yale Law & Metaethics Workshop, Yale University, Apr 17, 2015.
 53. On Fabrizio Cariani, 'Logical Consequence for Actualists (and Other Contrastivists),' Eastern APA Meeting, Washington, D.C., Jan 7, 2016.
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