Talkin’ ‘Bout Our Generations
DATA, DELIBERATION, AND DESTINY IN A CHANGING AMERICA

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By Manuel Pastor, Jennifer Ito, and Vanessa Carter
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We hope that that urge to do better – to honor both the young and the old by working together to create a world where conversations are frank, data drives policy, and opportunities are in abundance – will inform others in building a stronger future for the next generation and for America.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Seattle tends to be known for Starbucks and Amazon, Microsoft and Boeing, the World Trade Organization protests and the recent struggle to raise the minimum wage. Along with this combination of soy lattes, high tech, and social protest, the region has become a model for our nation’s future. A diverse city, Seattle is facing its demographic changes and future head-on. Decision makers in Seattle have come to a shared understanding that divergent outcomes by race, ethnicity, and nativity are holding everyone back. Among other efforts, the city has responded by adopting a data-driven initiative with the ambitious goal of ending institutional racism. One indicator of its success: city government purchasing from women- and minority-owned businesses has already tripled. Seattle is embracing and adapting to its changing demography.

Regions across America are experiencing demographic shifts, but not all of them are responding like Seattle. By 2044, the U.S. will be a majority-minority nation. While that projection seems far off, this change is already being experienced: The median age of non-Hispanic whites is 42; of Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders, 36; of African Americans, 33; and of Latinos, 27. That is a 15-year age gap between whites and Latinos, nearly an entire generation – and the emergence of this racial generation gap has had consequences all across the nation.

The reason is simple: Demographic change rarely proceeds without tension. Fights erupt around public school funding, zoning and permitting (think of NIMBYs), public transit, and more. Older residents become uncomfortable with how their communities are changing while younger families struggle to find quality education for their children. The generational chasm can then lead to lower spending on education and infrastructure: An older generation with the political power to make a difference in a region’s quality of life no longer sees itself in the younger generation and winds up pulling up the draw bridge behind it.

But the moats do not generally work as planned: Those inside the castle can get dangerously isolated and weakened. Indeed, the myth that we can survive apart is just that – a myth. Older Americans are already relying on younger generations to replace them in the workplace, fill the social security coffers, and buy their large homes upon down-sizing. They are also becoming dependent on home health workers to provide direct care, a workforce that is much younger and much less white. Forging a more secure future for elders requires more, not less, spending on children who will need to be highly educated and highly prepared for the 21st century economy.

How do we get older and younger generations to recognize their interconnected futures? Rather than starting with conflict, tension, and fears about the future, we suggest starting with the facts. In this report, we highlight the racial generation gap – that is, the phenomenon wherein older generations are disproportionately white compared to the younger generation – and consider what impact that has on underinvestment in education, workforce training, and other aspects key to our common future. Most importantly, we suggest how we might get past what seems like a current stalemate and move forward to craft new understandings, new policies, and new politics.
But we start with data. The reason is simple: Data has a way of replacing accusation with curiosity. Forget what anxieties or histories you might bring to the table. What are we to do if our future majority is dropping out of school at high rates? If so many Latinos are U.S.-born and so many immigrants are naturalized, why are we talking about immigration instead of integration? Who is going to replace retiring employees if the current workforce is not prepared? These are actionable questions and ones more likely to provoke conversation than circular scapegoating.

We thus begin the report with a discussion of the implications of the racial generation gap in order to stir the curiosity and calm that we think can drive a more productive conversation. In “Understanding the Gap: A Nation Transformed,” we walk through data on the current racial/ethnic and age breakdown of our nation and highlight what is slated for the future. We then look at the inverse relationship between the racial generation gap and public school spending and suggest that “outcome” measures are already reflecting that lower investment: For people of color, educational attainment is lower than for whites, and for younger generations, incomes are losing ground when compared to their counterparts three decades earlier.

In highlighting differences, we intend not to separate but to connect. Indeed, our driving question throughout this report is simple: What does it mean for our common future if we maintain an unequal status quo? We offer two basic answers. The first, based on a growing body of research, is that growing apart is not good for regional cohesion or economic sustainability – and so it is in everyone’s interest to address concerns now rather than later. The second involves where to start the discussion. We argue that the dragging impact of inequality on growth seems to be clearest when we examine metropolitan regions, and so it is in this arena – where local governments and civic leaders can shape the future – that may be the sweet spot for conversation and change.

For that reason, the second main section of this report, “Charting the Gap: Data for Deliberation,” looks at the racial generation gap in a few key metros by way of illustrating the tensions, the possibilities, and the shape that conversation might take. Given that there are nearly 400 U.S. Census-designated metropolitan regions in the U.S., determining which to highlight is no easy task. Therefore, we group U.S. regions into three broad categories: majority people of color metros, larger majority white metros, and smaller majority white metros (larger and smaller refer to the share of the metro that is white, not the sheer population of the region). We also highlight the pace and diversity of change as important dimensions of the gap. We then choose three regions and walk through the data on each.

The point of this section is not simply to profile these three particular regions – although we do think the cases are interesting in and of themselves. Rather, we seek to show how we can move from one data point to another to craft a story about the nature of change and the likely impact on future prosperity if regional civic leaders and decision makers do not act. In short, our central message is not that a region should look for its doppelgänger in our data but rather should think about the data we use to construct each region’s narrative and what nuances would need to be highlighted to tell one’s own story. And we stress that much of that regionally-specific work has been made easier by the National Equity Atlas (www.nationalequityatlas.org),
a new online tool developed by PolicyLink and the USC Program for Environmental and Regional Equity (PERE).

The first region we detail is Fresno, CA, a majority-minority metro region since the 1990s where population growth is nearly 90 percent from the Latino community. The racial generation gap has been wide for some time and the outcomes of non-white Fresnans are not good. Interestingly, the region was shocked into addressing the issue in part by the revelation of a key piece of data: In 2005, in a report meant to highlight the dilemmas of concentrated poverty in pre-Katrina New Orleans, Fresno actually turned up as the top large city in terms of crowding together its poor residents. That created a conversation about the future and some attempt to address workforce and land use issues. But the politics in Fresno remain largely entrenched, and Fresno should be a warning of the dangers of a racial generation gap unbridged. Like other regions in the Southwest U.S., Fresno has a large and long-present racial generation gap and must engage with, among many things, its lack of economic diversity and an immigrant population that is too easily racialized.

The second region explored is a smaller majority white metro: Charlotte, NC. Charlotte is experiencing rapid and complex demographic change as Latinos nuance the historical white-Black binary that has shaped the region. While Latinos are not projected to be the racial/ethnic majority, they are projected to match African Americans as the largest racial group by 2040. This will challenge coalitional politics in the region and has the potential to pit racial minorities against each other if not handled with care. Perhaps because it is in the South where the dynamics of race have been made so plain over the years, the region is already engaging in its changing demography through the Leadership Development Institute, among other initiatives. Charlotte is a guide for other regions (especially in the U.S. South) where race has always been part of the conversation, but is becoming more complex.

The third region is Minneapolis and St. Paul – the Twin Cities region – from the larger majority white category. Despite the majority white status, between 2000 and 2010, 80 percent of its net population growth was from people of color and in a sort of perfect rainbow fashion: 27 percent of the growth from Blacks, 25 percent from Latinos, and 21 percent from Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders. But in total, the non-white population was only 21 percent of the population in 2012. However, the Twin Cities region is already showing an awareness of its changing community and its multi-ethnic future and has the opportunity to begin bridging the gap now. The region is instructive for others early in the process of change and those looking to respond well from the start.

Good data is best when understood through a useful frame. In the report’s third section, “Conversing the Gap: Frames and Facts,” we suggest that numbers and graphs are only powerful to the extent that they are part of a broader narrative about a place, its identity, and its struggles. We offer four guidelines for these conversations and storytelling. First, we think leaders need to stress mutuality. In particular, there is new research showing that regions will grow strongest economically if they grow together. In addition, there is data
showing that not improving the skills of the new workforce will weaken the economy going forward. This framing around mutuality draws in not just the usual suspects in the social-justice field but also unlikely stakeholders like members of the business community.

Second, these conversations should be framed around fact-based possibilities. Fear-based reactions abound but typically are not tied to accurate data or a vision for the future. Fact-based possibilities include the reinvigoration of the workforce, a globally-connected nation, and more. Third, these conversations should be centered around public investment, not personal change. Changing racial bias is needed – and it is going to take time. In the meantime, we can make headway around public reinvestment in educational, workforce, and transportation systems to create opportunities for the new demography.

Fourth, good framing will get real about race. Dropping the lens of race/ethnicity from conversation may seem to ease the path to mutuality, but as organizer Anthony Thigpen frequently notes (paraphrasing an even more famous organizer, Fred Ross, Sr.), there are no short-cuts, only detours. The data we offer shows the variations in outcomes by race/ethnicity that can be drawn into conversation, particularly if those conversations are focused on systems and not race relations per se. Understanding the realities faced by different groups will lead to appropriate policy interventions that will make a real difference.

In closing this section, we note that talk needs to lead to action. We point to the best practices, policy innovations, or philanthropic recommendations provided at more length by others and stress the need to track progress and shore up the civic capacity of younger generations.

To track progress, we argue that data needs to be tailored to specific regions and turned into metrics to measure changes over time. Just as repeated interactions between people builds trust, repeated work with data also creates familiarity and refinements in knowledge and goals. To strengthen civic capacity, we note research that has shown that older generations have different policy preferences and more power than younger (and generally less white) groups. To make better and more equitable decisions for the future will require that youth, immigrants, and others have a stronger voice in regional decision making and that will require investments in expanding their abilities to analyze data and prescribe policy.

The key word is investment. Pundits frequently celebrate “the Greatest Generation” – those who grew up during the Great Depression, fought in (or worked in factories during) World War II, and then returned to forge the economic powerhouse that was post-war America. The father of one of the authors of this report grew up in exactly that mix and his grit and determination were typical – but part of what made that generation so great was a government that put people to work, managed a military effort to defeat fascism, and then launched a post-war system of opportunity that included federal investments in highways, a vast expansion of public universities and student aid (via the GI Bill), and programs and subsidies that dramatically increased home ownership and middle-class wealth.
The American story needs to be retold in a way that lifts up the role of those support systems and public investments and tries to think about what they might look like today. Some of this will simply be reworking investments we are already making, including those in transportation systems that can shore up housing and workforce opportunities. But underlying this must be an ethos in which various members of the community believe they have each other’s back and understand that individual success is not disconnected from the educational, workforce, and other structures in which a younger generation is coming of age.

It is not an easy challenge: Too many are trying to sow generational division rather than generational unity. We will need to highlight the intimate connection between our oldest generations (who need the care and support provided by younger workers) and our youngest generations (whose prospects in a changing, emerging economy depend on what we do now). We have many histories, but we have a single destiny – and we hope that what we have offered will enable others to consider and compile data profiles and data systems that can become a backbone for conversations that bridge across race, place, and space.
INTRODUCTION

As a nation, we have become disconnected and polarized. Differences between conservative and liberal, the one percent and the ninety-nine percent, the city and suburbs have become so stark that the work of finding common ground often cannot even get off the ground. Across all of this cuts another often-overlooked disconnect: what we term the racial generation gap. Narrowing this gap will improve our future and getting there will require a values-based conversation about ethnicity, the economy, and equity.

By 2044, the U.S. is predicted to become a majority-minority nation. Since 2011, the majority of births have been to people of color, and by the end of the decade, the majority of youth will be of color. While some worry that demographic change is shifting our traditional sense of national identity, others see a clear upside. A more diverse younger generation provides hope as today’s youth are more open to difference, more globally interconnected, and are coming into the workforce just as there are critical openings left by baby boomers moving into retirement.

But the positive benefits of a more diverse America are being threatened by the way in which we are reacting to these demographic shifts. As we will show, communities with a large racial generation gap – that is, where seniors are disproportionately white and youth are disproportionately people of color – tend to invest less in public education. It is as though no longer seeing themselves in the younger generation, older residents “pull up the draw bridge” of quality public services and public investment. But under-educated and under-prepared youth will not be able to support the nation’s tax base, assume the roles and responsibilities of retirees, or keep the economy afloat. The failure to invest – spurred by a failure to communicate – is bad for all of us.

This calls for new and transformative ways to engage and to connect across race and across generations – the heart of this report. We suggest that the racial generation gap is too often approached from a fear-based reality instead of a fact-based one. Here we take a data-driven approach to explore a key question: What does it mean for the future if we maintain the racial generation gap? And in answering that question, we seek to offer an approach that can shape new thinking, new conversations, and new actions.

Given the length of this report, a short roadmap only seems right. In the first section of this report, “Understanding the Gap: A Nation Transformed,” we explain what the racial generation gap looks like nationally, the consequences of leaving it unbridged, and how we propose that bridging should begin. In the second section, “Charting the Gap: Data for Deliberation,” we explain how change is happening differently across the nation, explain a typology, and then offer three regions as examples. We walk through nuanced data on Fresno, CA; Charlotte, NC; and the Twin Cities region (MN, WI) to show how regionally-specific data reveals the nuances of demographic change and what a data-centered story sounds like. Finally, in “Conversing the Gap: Frames and Facts” we suggest that numbers and graphs are only powerful to the extent that they are part of a broader
narrative about a place, its identity, and its struggles. We offer four guidelines for these conversations and two data-centered best practices for moving forward by tracking progress and shoring up civic engagement.

We hope that *Talkin’ ‘Bout Our Generations: Data, Deliberation, and Destiny in a Changing America* will appeal to many analysts and advocates, but we are aiming this analysis especially at regional decision makers across the nation. As we explain below, regions are a key geography for change: They are where people come face to face, race to race, and place to place in ways that can help residents see their mutual fate. This is why we focus on explaining the consequences of the gap and then illustrate what that gap looks like in three different types of regions – so that others can imagine telling that same story, but tailored to their own community.

Bridging the racial generation gap is about the American future. It is about recognizing the connection between the well-being of our oldest generations (who need a robust workforce coming up after them) and our youngest generations (whose prospects in the emerging economy are dimmed by underinvestment). It will require innovative organizing, creative policies, and hard-nosed politics, but it will also require a backbone of strong, accurate, and eye-opening data read through an equity lens. With such a foundation, we can come to new understandings of the challenges, start reconnecting across boundaries, and work together toward the possibilities ahead.
UNDERSTANDING THE GAP: A NATION TRANSFORMED

OUR RACIAL AND GENERATIONAL TRANSFORMATION

As a nation, we are undergoing a demographic transformation. According to the latest U.S. Census Bureau projections, by 2044 we will be a “majority-minority” nation, meaning that non-Hispanic whites will no longer constitute a demographic majority (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). By 2060, whites will drop to 44 percent of the population, Latinos will increase to 29 percent, and Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders (AAPIs) will grow to 9 percent (Figure 1). This shift is a result of rapid growth among non-white racial groups due to both immigration and, increasingly, due to births (Passel, Livingston, & Cohn, 2012). But that seemingly distant future is already here: The U.S. Census Bureau reports that 2011 was the first year in which a majority of births were non-white (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).

Figure 1: Changing Demographics, U.S., 1970-2060

That the majority of newborns are non-white points to an important dimension of our demographic transformation: It is not only racial but generational. The widening age gap between whites and non-whites can be seen in the differences in median age: 42 for whites, 36 for Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders, 33 for Blacks, and 27 for Latinos.¹ The 15-year difference between whites and Latinos is almost an entire generation.

¹ Throughout the report, unless otherwise stated, the data reflects USC PERE tabulations of 2008-2012 American Community Survey data (Ruggles et al., 2010). We use 2008-2012 data because the 5-year pooled sample increases the reliability of the results, especially at smaller geographies. For a full explanation of the methodology and data sources, see Appendix A: Technical Appendix. Each figure includes its exact source information.
We define the racial generation gap as the difference in the percentage of youth of color (under the age of 18) and percentage of seniors of color (age 65 and older). That gap has grown dramatically over time: In the U.S. overall, it was 14 percentage points in 1980 and in 2013 it was 27 percentage points.\(^2\)

You can see the gap in the contemporary demographics as well: Figure 2 is a snapshot of the distribution of the population by age and race/ethnicity but serves as a glimpse into the future as one can see the wave of diversity starting with today’s Millennial generation, which is comprised of mainly U.S.-born Latinos and AAPIs.

\[\text{The Racial Generation Gap} \text{ is the percentage point difference between the percentage of People of Color (POC) Youth and the Percentage of POC Seniors.}\]

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\(^1\) The racial generation gap is calculated for 2013, reflecting American Community Survey data released just prior to publication.
THE RACIAL GENERATION GAP AND OUR FUTURE

A widening racial generation gap has long-term implications for our nation’s future. For one, in states with larger racial generation gaps, there tends to be less investment in public schools. Figure 3 plots states by the generation gap and public school spending (as measured by per-student spending controlled for the overall level of state income; we look at the period prior to the Great Recession as that might give us a better picture of willingness rather than just ability).³

One can see that the disinvestment is sharpest in Nevada, Texas, California, Arizona, and Florida, places with the greatest racial generation gaps.⁴ This is consistent with other findings that U.S. communities that are more racially and ethnically fragmented devote a smaller share of resources to public goods, including education and infrastructure (Alesina, Baqir, & Easterly, 1999; Pastor & Reed, 2005).

Figure 3: Wider Generation Gaps Lead to Less Public School Spending, U.S. States, 2007-2008

Yet, education is more important than ever in securing quality employment. Blacks and Latinos continue to fall behind non-Hispanic whites in terms of educational attainment. As Figure 4 shows, among working-age (25-64 years old) adults, immigrant Latinos are the least prepared with a majority having less than a high school education. While the outcomes of U.S.-born Latinos are better, they are still falling behind: 18 percent have less than a high school diploma and 29 percent

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³ In upcoming research from PolicyLink and USC PERE, we update the analysis presented in Figure 3 and further it by drilling down to the county level to see if patterns of investment hold at a local level. This forthcoming analysis will be available at http://dornsife.usc.edu/pere.

⁴ Ron Brownstein (2014) notes, for example, that in Arizona (which currently has the nation’s largest racial generation gap), the state has, since 2008, produced the nation’s third-largest reduction in per-student K-12 spending and the nation’s highest reduction in per-student support for higher education.
with only a high school degree. And Blacks remain at a disadvantage with 14 percent having less than a high school diploma and 32 percent with only a high school degree. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 23 percent of jobs require a bachelor’s (B.A.) degree or higher (2013). Therefore, Latinos and Blacks are at a disadvantage in competing for higher-paying jobs.

**Figure 4: Educational Attainment for those Ages 25-64 by Race/Ethnicity/Nativity, U.S., 2008-2012**

![Educational Attainment Chart](chart)

*Source: IPUMS*

Given that higher educational attainment leads to better paying jobs (Carnevale, Rose, & Cheah, 2011), it should be of little surprise that there is an emerging economic gap between the generations. The economic generation gap can be measured by the percentage difference between the median household income of younger (ages 25-34) and older (ages 55-64) householders. As Figure 5 shows, over the past 30 years, that gap has widened from 2 percentage points in 1979 to about 18 (2008-2012). Moreover, younger householders are actually worse off in real terms than they were in 1979.

**Figure 5: Economic Generation Gap, U.S., 1979-2012**

![Economic Generation Gap Chart](chart)

*Source: IPUMS*

*Note: $2010 used given it is the midpoint between 2008-2012.*
DISCONNECTION AND CONNECTION ACROSS GENERATIONS

Thriving as a nation means growing stronger together. Given that immigrants and their children will comprise 38 percent of new workers – 31.5 million out of 83 million workers between 2010 and 2030 (Myers, Levy, & Pitkin, 2013, p. 3), an array of education, training, and experience requirements are critical for sustaining the workforce. But if the demographic realities and policy preferences of older generations are different than those of younger generations, we run the risk of making decisions around education, transportation, immigration, workforce, and infrastructure for the past instead of for the future (Kotkin, 2010; Myers, 2008).

The necessary link between the next America and the nation’s older generations, particularly Boomers soon to retire and those in the so-called “Silent” generation who have already retired, has drawn the attention of many scholars. Studies examining the impacts of the demographic transition have looked at workforce composition (Myers et al., 2013; Taylor, 2014), housing and the economy (Myers & Ryu, 2008), migration trends (Myers, 2008), voter outcomes (Kohut, Taylor, & Keeter, 2011), access to social services, and more. The essential argument most make is that since an older generation will rely on the taxes and direct care from the younger generations as they age, it is in their own self-interest that the younger generation become strong contributors to the economy (Myers et al., 2013). Indeed, it is these younger generations who will actually care for the baby boomers as they age (Poo, 2015).

But sometimes differing values and different perceptions mean that people protect their identities versus their interests. Political Scientist Ange-Marie Hancock (2011), for example, describes the cultural generation gap – detailing the ways the generations fundamentally miss each other and suggesting how to start connecting, again, at least interpersonally. The report Out of Many, One: Uniting the Changing Faces of America (Generations United & The Generations Initiative, 2013) flowed out of a dialogue between younger and older leaders who recommend new ways forward in employment, civic engagement, transportation, and housing – and who also note the deep challenges of bridging generational divides.

CONVERSATION AND CONSENSUS AS FIRST STEPS

If interests are clear but consensus is elusive, what we have, in the words of the famous 1967 movie Cool Hand Luke, is “a failure to communicate.” And getting to a new conversation that moves from failure to success will require a new frame, new data, and a new strategy for generating curiosity rather than accusation, linkage rather than disconnection.

In the book Just Growth (2012), co-authors Chris Benner and Manuel Pastor argue that creating communities with a common analysis of their metropolitan region is part of the foundation for change. In some places, the diverging viewpoints of business, labor, and community organizations are bridged by councils of governments; in others, by public-private collaborations; and in others,
by long-term cultures of working together. Whatever shape or size they come in, regional knowledge-sharing communities are both sustained and embedded in certain norms and processes.

This is perhaps most codified in Seattle. They even have a name, the “Seattle process,” for a strategy in which virtually every potential public policy conflict is subjected to study, conversation, and consensus. It has helped the region achieve a remarkable level of agreement about increasing the central city’s minimum wage. Indeed, by the time that policymakers were taking the action to a vote, employers and workers were not publicly pitted against each other because those conflicts had already been worked through in advance – for example, within the multi-sectoral task force convened by Mayor Ed Murray.

We have labeled such regional knowledge-sharing communities “epistemic communities.” A seemingly obscure and academic term, it is actually both clear and exact: An epistemic community is simply what you know and who you know it with. Formally, it is defined as “a group of people who share some common style of thinking, connected by some constellation of beliefs, values, and techniques that bind people into a collective endeavor” (Benner & Pastor, 2012, p. 158). The usual endeavor at a regional level often involves responding to short-term shocks by taking the time to consider systemic evolutions, understanding differences and common imperatives, and learning to chart a future together.

**REGIONS are JUST RIGHT**

Data and deliberation grounded in facts and figures can be an effective way to start such conversations and knowledge communities – and the metropolitan level seems to be the place where this works best. Why the metro? While this is also a national phenomenon, at this time, the stalemate and polarization in D.C. is not so conducive to conversation and compromise. Meanwhile, we find America’s metropolitan regions finding new routes to common ground, including supporting taxes to boost local infrastructure and pre-K education, collaborating with businesses to reengineer community college training, and working across party lines to find solutions (Katz & Bradley, 2013).

It is also at the regional level that recent research is showing that social separation – including income inequality, racial segregation, and metropolitan fragmentation – can be bad for economic health (Benner & Pastor, 2014; Eberts, Erickcek, & Kleinhenz, 2006). The reason seems to be that such separation erodes the sense of the commons and the desire for public investment even as it makes political consensus on how to share burdens or prosperity more challenging. This is exactly parallel to the racial generation gap and its impact on outcomes we highlighted before.

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5 The importance of epistemic communities is not just anecdotal, but showed up in their regressions: participating in regionalist meetings was statistically significant to just growth.

6 For more on the “Seattle process,” see our forthcoming 2015 volume *Equity, Growth, and Community*. This sequel to *Just Growth* (Benner & Pastor, 2012) explores more deeply the meaning and functioning of diverse epistemic communities.
Epistemic communities help to reduce such separation by fostering roots in a region, forging ties that bind, and developing leaders that share an understanding of regional problems and possibilities.7

Practically speaking, the region is also the scale at which people can meet time and again. But it is more than convenience: It is at the metro level that the consequences of inequitable investment – failing schools, a low-skilled workforce, and high levels of social conflict – often become most immediately apparent.

And while individual escape to suburbs has often been seen as a sort of American safety valve, poverty is now rising more rapidly in suburbs than in cities (Kneebone & Berube, 2014). Central cities within large metros are often key testing grounds for new strategies. They can provide leadership, but it is also clear that they cannot solve problems without forging new ties with their suburbs (and vice versa). If we are to bridge gaps and generate a more inclusive and prosperous America, we are going to need to work across geographies as well as generations – and the metro level offers one important venue to do just that.

7 For a region to be dynamic or resilient, you also need structural factors such as an employment base that is responsive and able to successfully adjust to market changes. This emerges in part from the flexibility and inclusive nature of the knowledge community but in this report our focus is on the conversational characteristics.
GETTING STARTED

So how do we get a regional conversation going about the racial generation gap and its consequences for metropolitan futures? In this section, we offer a roadmap that starts by examining data for three regions. In each, we start by highlighting demographic change, talking about its complexity, and discussing the racial generation gap. We then turn to what this means for the future by noting disparities by race in terms of income and education and also by discussing the economic generation gap – the phenomenon in which the economic possibilities of younger householders seem to have deteriorated over the past decades.

As we explain below, the regions we chose – from a wider range that we initially studied—offer a set of archetypes: Fresno is already a majority-minority area, and its pattern of miscommunication has sorely hurt its economic potential; Charlotte is a fascinating case of diversity increasing in the context of what was historically a Black-white binary; and the Twin Cities is a region in which diversity is low but increasing, and the region seems to be gearing up to address the challenges.

While the cases are important and interesting in their own right (and also chosen so that many readers can find at least parts of their own regional story in the tales we tell), the point of this section is mostly to illustrate how one can bring data to bear in conversations about regional futures. Thus we suggest the reader pay attention to how the narrative is crafted in each case and think about how it might be told in your own region. (In Appendix B, we offer a full set of potential data markers that can be collected and presented at a regional level, with only some of those presented in the discussion below.)

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8 Detailed regional profiles based primarily on the 2010 data are available on our website: http://dornsife.usc.edu/pere. The regions are: Charlotte (NC), Fresno (CA), Oklahoma City (OK), Phoenix (AZ), Seattle (WA), and the Twin Cities (MN, WI). The profiles were part of the preliminary analysis for this report and include additional data points.
WHAT SORT OF REGIONS?

While the racial generation gap is a national phenomenon, it is playing out differently across the nation. Figure 6 shows the racial generation gap by county (again, the gap is defined as the percent of youth who are non-white minus the percent of seniors who are non-white). In the map, the darker counties are where the gap is larger. Even in New England where demographic change is relatively slow, there are quite a few counties with large racial generation gaps – but it is clear that the gap is most profound in other parts of the country.

Figure 6: Racial Generation Gap by County, U.S., 2010

Figure 7 ranks the largest 150 U.S. metropolitan regions by the racial generation gap. Naples-Marlo Island in Florida leads with a 48 percentage point gap while Honolulu, HI has the lowest gap with a 7 percentage point difference. For the three regions profiled in this report: Fresno, CA ranks 10th, Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC region is 60th, and the Twin Cities region of Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI is 68th. We make frequent references to Seattle and it is 63rd.

Figure 7: The Racial Generation Gap, Largest 150 U.S. Metros, 2008-2012

Source: IPUMS

Source: U.S. Census Bureau
Of course, no change happens the same way. The pace of demographic change matters because it may affect how noticeable the change is to residents. Demographic shifts that are occurring rapidly may “shock” long-time residents and seem overwhelming to local institutions. Another consideration is the complexity of change: In Phoenix, for example, the growth in the people-of-color population is almost entirely due to Latinos while in, say, Jackson, MS, growth is from both Black and Latino populations.

Why do the pace and diversity of change matter? A very rapid change coming from one group can produce a racialized and problematic response – think Phoenix and the broader state of Arizona and the complex political stew around immigration, ethnic studies, education spending, and other matters that have been boiling for the past few years.

On the other hand, changes that are coming from multiple new groups can produce other challenges, including the importance of relationship-building between minority groups and not just between whites and people of color. While pace and diversity are important, another crucial aspect is simply the level of the people-of-color population. With those other dimensions as backdrops, we can identify three basic types of metro areas.\footnote{A definition of metropolitan areas (the geographic basis for our typology) is available at: http://www.census.gov/population/metro.} Those basic categories are as follows:

1. \textit{Majority People of Color} metro regions are over 50 percent people of color;
2. \textit{Smaller Majority White} metro regions are between 30 and 50 percent people of color; and
3. \textit{Larger Majority White} metro regions are less than 30 percent people of color.

Figure 8 applies the categories to the largest 150 U.S. metros; within each, we also consider the pace and complexity or diversity of change over the 2000-2010 period.\footnote{While this report generally reflects the most recent data, in some instances, 2010 data is more appropriate. First, we can draw on the U.S. Census which includes nearly every person in the U.S., whereas the American Community Survey is a small fraction of the population and the analytic results more accurately estimate the population. When we use 2010 Census data we can drill-down to smaller geographies and retain confidence in the results. Second, sometimes we use 2010 data because we are comparing decades against each other to illustrate relative change. In the case of Figure 8, this is an earlier analysis using U.S. Census data that establishes an analytic frame for this report, and as such should be grounded in the most reliable data possible.} The purpose of this typology is to help identify regions that may be experiencing similar shifts and thus may be places to look for shared learning and best practices.
Of course, we also need to know where regions are headed. Figure 9 uses projection data to indicate what parts of the country will be experiencing demographic change in the next three decades. By 2040, every state, except Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, will have at least one county with at least 40 percent of its residents identifying as non-white. Most regions and counties have reason to consider the racial generation gap moving forward.
Figure 9: Percent People of Color by County, U.S., 2010 & 2040

A. 2010 Percent People of Color by County

B. 2040 Percent People of Color by County

Source: PERE analysis from (map B) and based on (map A) Treuhaft et al. (2011)
In what follows, we focus on three regions as examples of the three basic types: Fresno, CA, is an example of a majority people of color region; Charlotte, NC, is a smaller majority white region; and the Twin Cities, MN-WI, is larger majority white metro (again, smaller and larger refer to the relative share of the white population, not the size of the region’s population). To see where these fit in terms of pace and diversity (and to see which other metros are similar in one way or another), see pages 23-24.

While limiting our focus to three regions makes the report more manageable, it has its drawbacks. For example, we did not include New England. Change in that region is occurring more slowly with the exception being the seaboard, which is more metropolitan, accustomed to diversity, and (more or less) addressing it by default. We also do not have a case study region that is losing population. But in those places, the reception of a changing demographic may also be more welcomed. For example, in Lewiston, Maine, Somalian immigrants have revitalized the economy by opening new restaurants and businesses throughout the city and have significantly bumped up enrollment at local universities (Ellison, 2009).

But the purpose of this report is to identify places where transition is ongoing and bridging the racial generation gap may require a more intentional process. The three metros we have chosen are indeed places where change is happening quickly: From 1979 to 2010, the U.S. population grew by 38 percent, but in Fresno that rate was 84 percent, 52 percent in the Twin Cities region, and an astonishing 111 percent in Charlotte. And while the fit of these three may not be perfect for your region, the point simply is to show how we can use data to tell a regional story.
MAJORITY PEOPLE OF COLOR METROS
(>50% POC, e.g. Fresno, CA)

Slow and Not Diverse Change
- Albuquerque, NM
- Brownsville-Harlingen, TX
- Corpus Christi, TX
- El Paso, TX
- Honolulu, HI
- Laredo, TX
- Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA
- McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX
- New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA
- San Antonio, TX

Fast and Not Diverse Change
- Bakersfield, CA
- Fresno, CA
- Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX
- Las Vegas-Paradise, NV
- Merced, CA
- Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL
- Modesto, CA
- Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA
- Riverside-San Bernardino-Orlando, CA
- Salinas, CA
- San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA
- San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA
- Santa Barbara-Santa Maria, CA
- Stockton, CA
- Vallejo-Fairfield, CA
- Visalia-Porterville, CA
- Yakima, WA

Fast and Diverse Change
- Fayetteville, NC
- Jackson, MS
- Memphis, TN-MS-AR
- Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV

SMALLER MAJORITY WHITE METROS
(30-50% POC, e.g. Charlotte, NC)

Slow and Diverse Change
- Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC
- Baton Rouge, LA
- Birmingham-Hoover, AL
- Charleston-North Charleston, SC
- Clarksville, TN-KY
- Columbia, SC
- Columbus, GA-AL
- Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI
- Durham, NC
- Greeley, CO
- Huntsville, AL
- Jacksonville, FL
- Lafayette, LA
- Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR
- Mobile, AL
- Montgomery, AL
- New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA
- Richmond, VA
- Savannah, GA
- Shreveport-Bossier City, LA
- Tallahassee, FL
- Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC

Fast and Not Diverse Change
- Amarillo, TX
- Anchorage, AK
- Atlantic City, NJ
- Austin-Round Rock, TX
- Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT
- Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI
- Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX
- Denver-Aurora, CO
- Kennewick-Richland-Pasco, WA
- Killeen-Temple-Fort Hood, TX
- Lakeland, FL
- Lubbock, TX
- Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI
- Naples-Marco Island, FL
- New Haven-Milford, CT
- Oklahoma City, OK
- Orlando-Kissimmee, FL
- Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ
- Port St. Lucie-Fort Pierce, FL
- Reno-Sparks, NV
- Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA
- Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA
- Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA
- Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA
- Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL
- Trenton-Ewing, NJ
- Tucson, AZ
- Tulsa, OK

Fast and Diverse Change
- Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA
- Baltimore-Towson, MD
- Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX
- Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC
- Gainesville, FL
- Greensboro-High Point, NC
- Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD
- Raleigh-Cary, NC
- Winston-Salem, NC
Large Majority White Metros
(< 30 percent POC, e.g. The Twin Cities)

Slow and Not Diverse Change

- Asheville, NC
- Binghamton, NY
- Boise City-Nampa, ID
- Boulder, CO
- Bremerton-Silverdale, WA
- Cedar Rapids, IA
- Colorado Springs, CO
- Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL
- Des Moines, IA
- Duluth, MN-WI
- Eugene-Springfield, OR
- Fort Collins-Loveland, CO
- Fort Smith, AR-OK
- Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI
- Green Bay, WI
- Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton, NC
- Holland-Grand Haven, MI
- Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH
- Kalamazoo-Portage, MI
- Lancaster, PA
- Lansing-East Lansing, MI
- Lincoln, NE
- Madison, WI
- Manchester-Nashua, NH
- Ogden-Clearfield, UT
- Olympia, WA
- Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA
- Portland-South Portland-Biddeford, ME
- Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA
- Provo-Orem, UT
- San Luis Obispo-Paso Robles, CA
- Spokane, WA
- Springfield, MO

Slow and Diverse Change

- Akron, OH
- Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY
- Ann Arbor, MI
- Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY
- Canton-Massillon, OH
- Charleston, WV
- Chattanooga, TN-GA
- Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN
- Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH
- Columbus, OH
- Dayton, OH
- Erie, PA
- Evansville, IN-KY
- Flint, MI
- Fort Wayne, IN
- Greenville, SC
- Gulfport-Biloxi, MS
- Hagerstown-Martinsburg, MD-WV
- Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA
- Indianapolis, IN
- Kansas City, MO-KS
- Kingsport-Bristol-Bristol, TN-VA
- Knoxville, TN
- Lexington-Fayette, KY
- Louisville, KY-IN
- Lynchburg, VA
- Myrtle Beach-Conway-North Myrtle Beach, SC
- Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro, TN
- Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL
- Peoria, IL
- Pittsburgh, PA
- Roanoke, VA
- Rochester, NY
- South Bend-Mishawaka, IN-MI
- Spartanburg, SC
- St. Louis, MO-IL
- Syracuse, NY
- Toledo, OH
- Utica-Rome, NY
- Wilmington, NC
- Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA

Fast and Not Diverse Change

- Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ
- Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH
- Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL
- Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL
- Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO
- Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT
- Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI
- Norwich-New London, CT
- Ocala, FL
- Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL
- Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA
- Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY
- Reading, PA
- Rockford, IL
- Salem, OR
- Salt Lake City, UT
- Sarasota-Bradenton-Venice, FL
- Scranton–Wilkes-Barre, PA
- Springfield, MA
- Wichita, KS
- Worcester, MA
- York-Hanover, PA

Source: Treuhaft et al. (2011)
Majority people of color metros are most prevalent in California and along the southern border of our nation (Figure 8). However, in the near future, most of the Southern border will be majority-minority along with a handful of other places throughout the nation (see Figure 9). Fresno is a good example of what it can look like to become a majority-minority region where diversity is limited and where inequality has deepened.

While Fresno is the country’s most agriculturally productive region, it is also one of poorest partly because it lacks a diverse economic base. The three dominant industries are real estate development, oil production, and the aforementioned agriculture (which is reliant on a pool of poorly-paid workers, creating a dynamic in which inequality becomes inextricably linked into the regional DNA). Business elites representing the three leading sectors – nicknamed “D.O.A” (development, oil, agriculture) by some locals – dominate decision-making processes. This has often meant that new ideas about economic development, especially notions that would push up the price of land or labor, are “D.O.A.” in the other sense of the expression (“dead on arrival”).

Fresno, however, was shocked into concern about how economic strategies could address poverty when a 2005 Brookings report prompted by the Hurricane Katrina disaster found that of the 50 largest cities in the U.S., New Orleans was second in the nation in terms of concentrated poverty, which was no surprise to those seeing the pictures of those stranded in the wake of the storm. But the report also noted that the first in the nation in terms of concentrated poverty was Fresno (Berube & Katz, 2005).

That bit of national publicity stirred the public sector into taking action (Nieves, 2005). This has subsequently included efforts around sectoral workforce development as well as a new approach to achieving sustainable growth through urban infill – a plan that has the possibility to serve long-neglected communities of color in Fresno but has raised the ire of both developers and suburbanites (Benner & Pastor, Forthcoming). And getting to a new approach is complicated by long-standing racial tensions and generational divides.

**DEMOGRAPHICS**

With a median age of 31 in 2008-2012, Fresno is the youngest of the three metros we profile. This is partly due to the area’s demographic composition: Fresno is majority Latino, for whom the median age in the region is 25; for Blacks, 29; Asian Americans/Pacific Islander, 28; and whites, 45.

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11 Background information drawn from research soon to be published in *Equity, Growth, and Community* by Chris Benner and Manuel Pastor (University of California Press, forthcoming).
Partly because so many Latinos are around prime age for family formation, the Fresno metro has a larger share of children than in the U.S. as a whole and a smaller share of the population that is of prime working age (25-64, see Figure 10).

**Figure 10: Population by Age Group, Fresno, 2008-2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fresno Metro</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>under age 18</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age 65 or older</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IPUMS

**ON THE SIDE OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT: BUILDING HEALTHY COMMUNITIES IN FRESNO, CA**

Fresno is one of 14 communities of The California Endowment’s Building Healthy Communities (BHC) Initiative. Launched in 2010, BHC is a 10-year, place-based investment in building the civic capacity in low-income communities across the state to achieve policy and systems change. In Fresno, politics has been traditionally dominated by leaders from business, public agencies, and larger non-profit and faith organizations; it is a layer of civic leadership that does not reflect the shifting demographics. Furthermore, the entrenchment of traditional power brokers provides little opportunity for residents to have their voice heard and to influence policy decision making that shapes their lives. But that is starting to change.

The Fresno BHC Initiative has brought together organizations serving African Americans with Latinos, including Mixteco-speaking residents, and a diverse Asian-American/Pacific-Islander community that includes Hmong, Laotian, and Cambodian populations all working together on one issue at the same time – increasing community involvement in the Fresno General Plan Update. This was unprecedented collaboration in West Fresno.

The work started in the streets, knocking on doors, and asking residents about the changes they would want to see. The result: In the City of Fresno’s general plan update, the City Council chose “Alternative A,” a plan that focused on infill and urban redevelopment rather than on sprawl – a first in the city’s history. And it envisions “complete” neighborhoods with access to healthy foods, open space, jobs, and health care services.

*Source: Ratner & Robison (2013)*
As a result, the region’s younger and elderly generations are more heavily reliant upon that workforce for economic productivity as well as for their direct care (think of the sandwich generation that is both rearing children and helping parents as they move into old age). This “dependency ratio” – measured by determining the percent of the working-age population compared to the non-working-age population – is depicted in Figure 11.

As would be expected from the previous chart, the dependency ratio is higher than in the U.S., but interestingly, it has actually declined from higher levels in 1990 and 2000. However, it is projected to rise more or less in tandem with the rest of the U.S. – or, in other words, the U.S. will get closer to Fresno, which seems to have gotten to the future first. Preparing the next generation to be as economically productive as possible is in the interest of old and young alike.

![Figure 11: Dependency Ratio, Fresno, 1980-2040](image)

This is not the only data point on which Fresno is ahead. Several trends that have already occurred in Fresno and in other majority-minority places are soon to be felt elsewhere. For example, the region was just barely majority white in 1990, majority people of color in 2000, and became majority Latino by 2010, a pattern that significantly outpaced the nation (the dashed line in Figure 12 shows the percent white for the U.S. as a whole). One can also see that that demographic transformation is slated to slow in the years ahead: The share of Latinos will more or less stabilize as the population turns more U.S.-born and birthrates for that group fall.
One way in which Fresno stands out from the rest of the country is in the relative lack of diversity in its Latino population: 94 percent of Fresno’s Latinos are Mexican, with many of the immigrants (who then have U.S.-born children) initially attracted to the region’s agriculture work. Monolithic new majorities are prevalent in some other southwestern regions and need to be handled deftly as immigration, poverty, and unemployment can easily become racialized under those circumstances (Pastor & Mollenkopf, 2012).

In any case, Fresno’s population growth is a Latino story, and it is, more precisely, a story involving U.S.-born Latinos. Figure 13 shows that in the last two decades nearly 90 percent of net population growth came from Latinos while there was a decline in the non-Hispanic white population. The majority of all growth was from U.S.-born residents: From 2000 to 2010, 79 percent of the net increase in the population was from the U.S.-born population, up from 60 percent in the 1990s and 57 percent in the 1980s. In places like Fresno, although often misconstrued, it is really the U.S.-born population that is driving the majority of population growth.
What does all this mean for the racial generation gap? Because the processes of demographic change began long ago in this region, we would imagine a larger initial generation gap and less change than elsewhere. And so it is: As Figure 14 shows, the gap started at 30 percentage points and only grew 10 percentage points in the last three decades. This comes in high contrast with places like the Twin Cities region where in 1980 the gap was 6 percentage points and in 2010 was 25 percentage points. Does this stabilization of the generation gap mean that the need for public investment can be more successfully addressed? One hopes so since Figure 14 also shows that more than four-fifths of young people are non-white. What happens to them will determine the future of the region as a whole, including of older and more established residents.

Figure 14: Racial Generation Gap, Fresno, 1980-2013
OUTCOMES

So how are Fresno’s current and future workers faring as they are soon to assume the mantle of civic, economic, and political leadership? Is the population ready to take on the growing dependency ratio? Should an older generation feel secure that a younger generation will be able to provide the needed tax base for key social and health services?

There are reasons to worry, particularly when one looks at the current income and education profile for people of color in Fresno. Figure 15 shows that Blacks have the lowest household incomes across the age spectrum, with Latinos (now the majority population in Fresno) doing only slightly better. The graph also illustrates that the gaps close as the population ages and moves into retirement – but that also reflects past performance in a period of less inequality. If existing disparity among younger cohorts persists, one can imagine a dismal and unequal future.

Figure 15: Median Household Income by Age and Race/Ethnicity, Fresno, 2008-2012

![Median Household Income by Age and Race/Ethnicity, Fresno, 2008-2012](chart)

Source: IPUMS
Note: Universe is householders ages 25 and older. $2010 used given it is the midpoint between 2008-2012.

Figure 16 looks at how Fresno is doing now, compared to in earlier decades when there was less inequality, by charting household income by age of householder for various years (all dollar amounts are inflation-adjusted to 2010 dollars so that they can be directly compared). The way to interpret this chart is as follows: Start with the 1979 dotted line and compare it to the 1989 dashed line. Real income fell in those 10 years for nearly every age of householder except for the oldest. You can also see that in 1979 and 1989, income peaked around ages 46-48 although at a lower dollar amount in 1989, in 1999 around 55 years old but again at a lower income, and in the most current period around retirement, at yet a lower income. So Fresno is getting poorer, but the peak income level is older, a recipe for generational conflict.
The result of this is yet another type of gap: the economic generation gap, which we define as the difference in median income for householders of two different generations (ages 25-34 and ages 55-64). We would expect such a gap to exist – older workers presumably have more experience and hence higher wages – but what is striking is the growth of this gap. As depicted in Figure 17, the gap was large in 1979 at 14 percent, and it has grown to 50 percent by 2012.

Inequity almost always tracks back to and is mirrored in educational outcomes. Figure 18 shows the percent of people by race/ethnicity with an associate’s (A.A.) degree by age (while a B.A. might be a preferable degree for earnings, an A.A. degree is increasingly critical to any quality employment).
Latinos consistently have the lowest educational attainment, followed by Blacks. Younger Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders actually have higher rates of educational attainment than whites, although many AAPIs in Fresno struggle with poverty (Asian Americans for Advancing Justice, 2013; Peng, Pech, De La Cruz-Viesca, Ong, & Wong, 2013). AAPI, as with any racial/ethnic category, is a broad one that reflects a range of people. In particular, AAPI includes those of diverse income and education levels who break the “model-minority” myth.

In any case, there is reason to be concerned for the new majority in Fresno. Latinos are not showing as strong in indicators of success as others. African Americans are also struggling and at risk of their voices not being heard because they account for a smaller share of the population. This is a situation which is especially problematic when their workforce outcomes require different interventions than Latinos (Pastor & Carter, 2009).

Poorer outcomes from Blacks and Latinos are perpetuated by geographic segregation. Fresno is divided between north and south, with poorer residents and people of color concentrated in the south, as can be seen in Figure 19. By our measures, segregation by race actually decreased between 1990 and 2010, but marginal decreases do not mean much when segregation is so high. On the other hand, segregation between youth of color and white seniors has increased slightly, something that poses challenges for communication and community-building.
Figure 19: Percent People of Color by Census Tract, Fresno, 1980 & 2010

Source: U.S. Census Bureau; GeoLytics, Inc.
LOOKING FORWARD

What has happened in Fresno would seem to suggest that majority people of color metros are destined for economic slowdown and social crisis. But this need not be the case. For example, Benner and Pastor (2015) do a direct comparison of San Antonio and Fresno, two metros that exhibit similar demographics and historically-exhibited, equally-fractious politics. They argue that a combination of community groups that agitated for change, data systems that made apparent the common future, and particularly powerful civic leaders (such as Henry Cisneros) allowed San Antonio to escape the low-wage high-tension predicament in which Fresno now finds itself.

So there are ways for Fresno to be more than a warning to other metros. It will require a dedicated effort to shift business leaders from a development, oil, and agriculture framework that values cheap land and cheap labor to one that realizes the real wealth is in the skills of the populace. It will also require attempts to slow the sprawl that has allowed ethnic groups and generations to think that Fresno’s slipping incomes and high levels of concentrated poverty can simply be avoided by suburban escape. Getting onto a positive path will necessitate a new set of connections and conversation. And data that highlights current dilemmas but also suggests the challenges if such dilemmas are not addressed can be an important part of making change.
Charlotte has transformed from a “small-town” into a reinvigorated 21st century Southern metro that is serving as model for emerging cities throughout the South. One of the faster growing regions in the country, Charlotte’s largest wave of “new” residents is a mix of former East Coast and Midwest residents and immigrants from Latin America and Asia. They have contributed to Charlotte’s population growth of over 1.3 million people in the last decade.

The demographic changes are forcing Charlotte not only to move past a Black-white understanding of race but also to reconfigure its political and economic structures to meet the needs of its growing diversity. The way Charlotte diversifies and engages all its residents can be instructive for other regions becoming multi-ethnic, particularly those in the South. And Charlotte, with a proud history of having addressed issues of racial integration in a more progressive way than much of the rest of the South, can build on the past to forge a new common future. (See the box for how Charlotte is approaching these issues.)

NEW LEADERSHIP FOR A NEW ECONOMY: CHARLOTTE, NC

Demographics in Charlotte are changing quickly. The growth of Asian-American/Pacific- Islander and Latino populations is challenging the region to move beyond the Black-white dynamic of its past. However, the economic downturn bankrupted the region of many of its long-term stakeholders towards whom the community would typically turn for leadership.

To move forward together as a region will require the remaining traditional leadership circles to welcome new leaders and to have new conversations. In the meantime and while these “sponsorship” type relationships do not exist, younger leaders are taking a more grassroots approach to change.

Nonetheless, some institutions exist that are easing this transition. Cohorts of leaders have participated in the Leadership Development Institute (LDI) which formed after a racially-charged police shooting. LDI has led individuals from 25 community, public, and private organizations through critical discussions to raise awareness and influence on matters of equity in the region.

While Charlotte has a history of engaging in courageous conversations, the next frontier is moving through the “culture of politeness” to face race head on, and then on to action. Charlotte, with its diverse demographic change, is a region to watch as it reimagines its future.

Source: Generations Initiative (2013b, 2014)
DEMOGRAPHICS

The Charlotte metropolitan area has undergone fast-paced demographic, racial, and residential transformation over the past three decades. From 1979 to 2012, the region experienced 119 percent population growth, which is considerably higher than the rest of the nation (see Figure 20). Along with this increase has come more racial/ethnic diversity.

**Figure 20: Net Population Growth, Charlotte, 1979-2012**

![Population Growth Chart](chart.png)

Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis

Figure 21 shows that in 2010, 61 percent of residents were white, although it has been steadily declining since 1990. African Americans comprise 24 percent of the total population. Latinos are newer to the scene in Charlotte. Figure 21 shows that they make up 10 percent of the population (double the share in 2000) and are quite diverse in terms of national origin: 51 percent report Mexican origin, 9 percent Puerto Rican, 8 percent Salvadoran, and 5 percent Honduran. The Asian-American/Pacific-Islander population is also incrementally increasing, near 3 percent of the population now and slated to more than double in share by 2040.

**Figure 21: Population by Race/Ethnicity, Charlotte, 1980-2040**

![Race/Ethnicity Chart](chart.png)

Source: U.S. Census Bureau; Woods & Poole Economics, Inc.

Note: Much of the increase in the “Other” group between 1990 and 2000 is due to a change in the survey question on race.
And therein lies the real story of Charlotte's demographic future. Population estimates suggest that people of color will outnumber non-Hispanic whites before 2030 – but it is the growth of Latinos (and, to a lesser extent, Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders) driving that change. Charlotte, in short, is shifting from a Black-white community (see the demographics in 1990) to a multi-ethnic region with all the new subtleties and complexities that will imply.

Population growth will come largely from the U.S.-born. Figure 22 shows that in the 1980s, only 6 percent of the increase in the population came from immigrants whereas nearly one-quarter of the population increase in the 1990s was from immigrants. But between 2000 and 2012, the contribution of immigrants to population growth fell to 20 percent, with the U.S.-born population contributing towards 80 percent of the population increase, 3 percent more than in the previous decade. Figure 23 shows the share of the population that is immigrant.

**Figure 22: Immigration Share of Population Growth, Charlotte, 1980-2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Period</th>
<th>Net Increase in Population</th>
<th>Share of Net Increase Attributable to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980-1990</td>
<td>169,161</td>
<td>6% Immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>94% U.S. Born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-2000</td>
<td>305,805</td>
<td>23% Immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>77% U.S. Born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2012</td>
<td>436,004</td>
<td>20% Immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>80% U.S. Born</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IPUMS
Note: Data for 2012 represent a 2008 through 2012 average.

**Figure 23: Percent Foreign Born, Charlotte, 1980-2012**

Source: IPUMS
Youth of color – often the children of immigrants – have experienced exponential growth rates between the years 2000 to 2012 (Figure 24). During this time, Latino youth grew by 221 percent, and Asian-American/Pacific-Islander youth grew by 91 percent. In comparison to national averages, Charlotte’s increases are dramatic. Part of the reason for seemingly huge increases in minority youth population is that there were so few youth of color with which to begin (and so a small base from which to calculate growth rates). For example, there were just under 20,000 Latino youth in 2000 but about 63,550 in 2008-2012.

Growth rates can seemingly overstate the situation, but the increase in the raw numbers suggests why it is no surprise that people of color in Charlotte are, on average, younger than the non-Hispanic white population. At 26, Latinos have the youngest median age while non-Hispanic whites are the oldest, at 40. For Native Americans, African Americans, Asian American/Pacific Islanders, and median ages are 34, 33, and 32 years, respectively, in 2008-2012. The age structure in Charlotte is resulting in better workforce possibilities than elsewhere in the nation, as seen in Figure 25. Here, 56 percent of the population is working-age, a higher share than the nation.
Consistent with the larger working-age population, Figure 26 shows that the dependency ratio is lower than in the U.S., although the recent run-up in children now means that dependency ratio is creeping upward. And, as in the rest of the United States, it is projected to rise significantly in future years, meaning that future workers will need to be even more productive than the current workforce to support the tax base needed for both the very young and the very old.

One way in which Charlotte may be able to make lighter that dependency is by attracting outsiders who are generally of working age. This includes immigrants, of course, but also migrants from other states. Figure 27 looks at the age structure of those born in-state, those who hail from other states, and those who have arrived from foreign shores. These out-of-state residents are much more likely to be of prime working age although a little less so than immigrants; however, they are also whiter and better educated (for the latter, see Figure 28).
Figure 28 illustrates an important phenomenon: For both whites and Blacks, the educational performance of the “home-grown” is well below that for those who migrate from other states (the Latino numbers for the “home-grown” are too small to present with any reliability but those who are arriving from out of state are much better educated than immigrants, a pattern unique to that group). This is important because it means that Charlotte has its own version of what is often called the Colorado paradox (because it is so prevalent in that state): Residents born in the region have worse outcomes than those who move to the region for high-skilled, higher-wage jobs, and overall regional data may wind up looking “better” even though a region’s own is lagging.

**Figure 28: Percent with an A.A. or More by Place of Birth and Race/Ethnicity, Charlotte, 2008-2012**

![Bar chart](chart.png)

Source: IPUMS
Note: Universe is population ages 25 through 64.

**OUTCOMES**

The way in which locals are lagging can be seen by looking at educational outcomes for younger cohorts (recall the concentration in the youth population for the “born-in-state” group from Figure 27). When you do that, Charlotte’s multi-ethnic future may present some reasons for concern. Figure 29 looks at high school completion for youth between the ages of 16 and 24 who are not currently in school; of that group, likely out and hopefully looking for employment, 29 percent of Latinos lack a high school degree, which is 13 percent more than Latino youth nationally.

Given that immigration is more recent in Charlotte, the rate may be so high because some of those included are younger Latino migrants. In some sending countries, economic pressures on families force younger members to leave school, particularly because the lack of a high school degree says less about basic work aptitude than it might in the U.S. (Pastor, Scoggins, & Tran, 2010). Still, this educational performance is of concern.

African Americans are doing somewhat better: In Charlotte, the rate of those aged 16 to 24 who are not in school and lack a high school degree is 8 percent – nationally it is 10 percent. Our data analysis also shows that while the “home-grown” have improved in high school completion, they lag behind those from out of state. Given that today’s economy is less forgiving of early missteps or untraditional educational choices, this is a problem (Blackwell & Pastor, 2010).
Figure 29: High School Dropout Status by Race/Ethnicity, Charlotte, 2008-2012

Source: IPUMS
Note: High school dropout status is defined as the percent of persons ages 16 through 24 year that are not enrolled in school and do not have a high school diploma.

Figure 30 shows the racial income gaps by the age of the householder. Blacks, non-Hispanic whites, and AAPIs experience peak income during the 35 to 44 age range. Latinos experience that peak a bit later. There are too few older Latinos and AAPIs to reliably report on their incomes. The main point is the significantly lower household incomes of Latinos and Blacks – in part because of lower educational outcomes just mentioned – and that it takes Latinos longer than others to reach peak income.

Figure 30: Median Household Income by Age and Race/Ethnicity, Charlotte, 2008-2012

Source: IPUMS
Note: Universe is householders ages 25 and older. $2010 used given it is the midpoint between 2008-2012.
Bringing attention to the issues of inequality requires closing social distance as well as economic distance. Part of that is physical location and Figure 31 shows that in 1980, racial minorities resided primarily in the central and eastern parts of the region. In 2010, however, the minority population had expanded its footprint from the 1980s. In our more complex analysis of that change, we found that segregation between Blacks and whites and between Blacks and Latinos has been declining (between 1990 and 2010), but it has been rising for Latinos and whites. This means that whites may be less aware – at least in a real daily sense – of the demographic change that is structuring Charlotte’s future.

Figure 31: Percent People of Color by Census Tract, Charlotte, 1980 & 2010

Source: U.S. Census Bureau; GeoLytics, Inc.
LOOKING FORWARD

The Charlotte metro area currently has a non-Hispanic white majority – and will continue as so until it flips between 2020 and 2030 (Figure 21). But Charlotte has already started to incorporate programs, organizations, and initiatives that foster collective multilingual, multi-ethnic, and multiracial partnerships. This is a useful antidote to the rest of the state of North Carolina that has tilted in a more ideologically rigid and anti-immigrant direction in recent years.

The reason for this more positive approach may include the good will of key civic leaders but that good will has been fortified and reinforced by self-interest: For decades, Charlotte’s business community, seeking to make the region a key financial and logistics hub for the South (and, indeed, the country) tried to project itself as a symbol of the “New South.” For example, the region integrated its schools peacefully, and business leaders supported the election of a Black mayor in the central city even though the city was majority white.

Building on that regional legacy will be important for forging common ground – particularly stressing how accommodating, rather than excluding, a new demographic is crucial to economic success. At the same time, Charlotte will need to develop new skills at data and deliberation: When a growing racial and ethnic diversity meets a demographic dynamic traditionally rooted in a Black-white binary, the old language and framework may not fit. And what happens in Charlotte will likely not just stay in Charlotte. There are similar places in the South and the Mid-West where complex change is causing strains even as it offers new possibilities.
Tilting in the Twin Cities: Larger Majority White Metros

Our two cases thus far have involved a metro that is already majority people of color and one that is on its way, albeit with a new complexity in terms of the populations driving the change. But what happens when the metro area is quite large, quite white, and change seems to be coming slowly? What happens when the tide is more of a tilt? The Twin Cities region (Minneapolis and St. Paul, MN-WI) offers a chance to think about why conversations and action on the racial generation gap are still significant for the future of larger majority white metros (i.e. those less than 30 percent people of color).

In the 1990s, the Twin Cities region was marked by a thriving economy with decreases in poverty. In the 2000s, the economy ebbed more than it flowed. For example, from 2000 to 2012, the inflation-adjusted median hourly wage dropped for both people of color and whites, from $18 to $17 and from $25 to $24, respectively. Whereas only 2 percent of whites live in high-poverty neighborhoods, that number is 11 percent for Blacks, 6 percent for Latinos, and 8 percent for Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders, in 2012.

In response, the region has a set of local civic organizations at the forefront of anti-poverty efforts; together with local city government, organizations like Twin Cities RISE!, United Front, and A Minnesota Without Poverty (AMWP) have initiated programs to combat poverty through workforce training, for example, and policy advocacy to combat poverty and joblessness. The Minnesota Compass is a statewide social indicator project with multi-sector membership that works to provide a common foundation of understanding for Minnesotans (see box “Taking Data Seriously in the Twin Cities” for more).12

12 A recent report by PolicyLink and PERE (Tran & Treuhaft, 2014) details the potential for growth and equity in the state, with the aspiration of sparking action on an equitable growth agenda.
TAKING DATA SERIOUSLY IN THE TWIN CITIES: ITSACA PROJECT

The Itasca Project is a private sector, employer-led, civic alliance working to build economic vitality and improve the quality of life in the Twin Cities region (www.theitascaproject.com). The alliance produces research and other analysis tools that highlight the role that employers can take to eliminate socioeconomic disparities. Two particular resources developed by the Itasca Project are the report “Mind the Gap” (Sohmer, 2005) and the Twin Cities Compass (which became what is now the Minnesota Compass).

First, “Mind the Gap,” by the Brookings Institution with funding from the Itasca Project, in 2005, provided an overview analysis of race, class, and space disparities in the Twin Cities region. The authors argued that reducing disparities across those three areas would build a competitive workforce, bring more money into the region, and increase the strength and sustainability of the regional economy. It was a frontrunner in the fields of racial and generational change and regional equity.

Second, the Twin Cities Compass was created to give the region access to regional data analysis. It was so successful that it grew into a statewide effort, The Minnesota Compass (www.mncompass.org). Business, government, nonprofit and philanthropy were all interested. Today, the Compass tracks trends in demographics, civic engagement, transportation, environment, and housing with an eye for disparities by race, gender, age, and income, for example. The indicators are available for all seven regions in the state. In 2011, the Itasca Project came full circle with the emergence of the EquityNow Twin Cities regional equity network. “Mind the Gap” and the Minnesota Compass were important foundations for conversations between multi-sectoral regional leaders and national organizations like PolicyLink and the Center for American Progress. Together, they have worked to build an equity framework that puts race upfront, with the future of the region in mind. (Mehta & Babler, 2013)

DEMOGRAPHICS

The Twin Cities metro is growing: Since 1980, the population has grown by 55 percent, slightly faster than the national average (40 percent) but quite slow compared to regions like Charlotte. As the population has grown, the region has become more diverse. Figure 32 shows that the population went from 95 percent non-Hispanic white in 1980 – probably what most people still think of when they conjure up images of Minnesota – to 79 percent white in 2010. The non-white population is expected to grow to 25 percent by 2020, 29 percent by 2030, and 34 percent by 2040.

13 Minnesota and the entire Midwest is transitioning, demographically, as well. Jennifer Bradley in “The Changing Face of the Heartland” (2015) mixes demographic data and the experiences of civic leaders to show how this change is coming down in Minnesota and Twin Cities metro area. Bradley argues that the market is now demanding what “moral suasion” has not been able to affect; the region’s future is at stake and improving educational, economic, and workforce outcomes for people of color is imperative.
While the Twin Cities is not especially diverse, its non-white population is split quite fairly between people of different racial/ethnic backgrounds. In 2008-2012, 6 percent of the region identified as Asian American/Pacific Islander, 5 percent as Latino, 7 percent as Black and 3 percent as some other race/ethnicity. While only 0.5 percent are Native Americans, it is a group that has historically been an important element of the Twin Cities. A detailed look at ethnicity shows that the AAPI population is very diverse and includes Hmong, Asian Indian, Chinese or Taiwanese, Vietnamese, Korean, and Laotian communities (Figure 33). Likewise, the majority of Latinos may identify as Mexican (68 percent), but this is much lower than in, say, Fresno. Five percent of Latinos identify as Puerto Rican, 4 percent as Salvadoran, 4 percent as Ecuadorian, and then many other countries of origin follow.
Put together, people of color are the drivers of population growth in the Twin Cities, as seen in Figure 34. Non-white groups accounted for 56 percent of growth between 1990 and 2000 then 80 percent of the growth from 2000 to 2010. And each of the aforementioned groupings – Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders, Latinos, Blacks, and those identifying as “Other” – all have a fairly representative hand in growing the region. Unlike other places where Latinos are growing considerably faster than African Americans, in the Twin Cities most non-white groups are growing at once (except Native Americans). These are good conditions for multi-ethnic coalition building.

**Figure 34: Net Decadal Population Growth by Race/Ethnicity, Twin Cities, 1980-2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>340,644</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native American</td>
<td></td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian American/Pacific Islander</td>
<td></td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census Bureau
Note: Much of the increase in the “Other” group between 1990 and 2000 is due to a change in the survey question on race.

Even as the majority of population growth is U.S.-born, immigrants represent an increasing share of that growth: 5 percent from 1980 to 1990, 29 percent to 2000, and 36 percent to 2012 (Figure 35). Comparing against Fresno and Charlotte, the Twin Cities is early on its journey towards a multi-ethnic future. Indeed, in 2008-2012, citizens represented 46 percent of the immigrant population, an increase from 36 percent in 2000.

There is an important other element of diversity in the immigrant population: In the Twin Cities region, a large share of the foreign-born are refugees. In 2014, the Office of Refugee Resettlement estimated about 2,200 refugees arrived in the state, making it the 13th most popular state of arrival (Office of Refugee Resettlement, 2015).
While the Twin Cities has some unique patterns when it comes to immigration, it is more similar to the U.S. when it comes to the demographics of the workforce. In 2012, 55 percent of the population was working age (25-64 years old) in the Twin Cities compared to 52 percent nationwide (Figure 36). But if we cut the data a little differently (Figure 37) we also see that residents 45 and older are a growing share of the overall population of the region. In 1990, 27 percent of the population was 45 and older, as compared to 37 percent in 2012.
The working-age population in Figure 36 supports the aging population shown in Figure 37. And we put them together (along with the young) in the dependency ratio depicted in Figure 38. The Twin Cities region has hovered fairly close to the U.S. rates and like the U.S., is expected to increase through 2030. As elsewhere, the dependency ratio illustrates the need to insure that the next generation is as economically productive as possible.
The racial dimensions of the age structure are important: In 2008-2012, the median age for white residents is 40, compared to 25, 27, and 28 among Latino, Black, and Asian-American/Pacific-Islander residents, respectively. The gap is likely to widen because of the growth of the youth-of-color population: Looking at the most recent prior decade (2000-2010), Latino youth grew by 89 percent, Black by 44 percent, and Asian-American/Pacific-Islander by 27 percent – as compared to a 9 percent net drop in the white youth population. Indeed, in 2009-2013, 33 percent of youth were non-white, as compared to 8 percent of those ages 65 or older, a 25 percentage point gap that was way up from the 6 percentage point gap in 1980 (Figure 39). Keeping a sense of common destiny is particularly challenging in these circumstances.

**Figure 39: Racial Generation Gap, Twin Cities, 1980-2013**

Source: U.S. Census Bureau; IPUMS

**OUTCOMES**

As is true elsewhere in the country, the Twin Cities region has an economic generation gap – that is, the median income is higher for households between 55 and 64 years of age than for households headed by younger (24-34) generations (again, this is to be expected given differences in work experience). Figure 40 shows the slowly widening economic generation gap in the Twin Cities region. Historically, the region has had a larger generation gap than the U.S., although the new millennium saw a reversal of that trend.
But that gap will likely widen over time given the large educational differences by race/ethnicity for the younger cohort. Figure 41 shows that less than one-quarter of Latino and around one-quarter of Black young adults (age 25 to 34) had an associate’s (A.A.) degree or higher in 2012, as compared to approximately 60 percent of Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders and whites in that age group. Moreover, the educational gaps are actually largest for the young, suggesting a widening divergence of racial fortunes over time.

Another way of looking at this educational issue is by focusing on the share of young adults who have not completed high school (Figure 42). Eleven percent of Black young adults (16-24 years old) in the Twin Cities who are not currently enrolled in school have not completed high school. That rate is slightly higher than the U.S. rate for 2008-2012. Latino young adults have a quite alarming 22 percent rate – and while that partly reflects young adults who have recently migrated from Latin
America without finishing high school, it remains worrisome for the future of the region. Breaking the “model-minority” myth, AAPI young adults who are out of school have more than three times the rate of high school non-completion as the region’s whites, and more than twice the rate of AAPIs nationally. This is likely connected to the large share of Southeast Asian refugees who historically (Singer & Wilson, 2007) and currently (Office of Refugee Resettlement, 2015) live in the region.

Figure 42: High School Dropout Status by Race/Ethnicity, Twin Cities, 2008-2012

![High School Dropout Status by Race/Ethnicity](chart)

Source: IPUMS
Note: High school dropout status is defined as the percent of persons ages 16 through 24 year old that are not enrolled in school and do not have a high school diploma.

Income gaps follow from educational gaps. Figure 43 shows that the median income of white householders is above the regional average at all ages. Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders have the next highest household income, followed by Latinos, and then African Americans. This is not a matter of different households with working-age adults not trying to pull their economic weight. Rather, the one place where the rates of whites and people of color do come close is in labor force participation (Figure 44). From ages 25-64, workers from each racial/ethnic group have about the same level of participation.

Figure 43: Median Household Income by Age and Race/Ethnicity, Twin Cities, 2008-2012

![Median Household Income by Age and Race/Ethnicity](chart)

Source: IPUMS
Note: $2010 used given it is the midpoint between 2008-2012. Universe is householders ages 25 and older.
LOOKING FORWARD

The Twin Cities region has considerable potential. In a report by the McKnight Foundation called *Mary Tyler Moore Doesn’t Live Here Anymore* (2011), the author argues that one of the main struggles of the region is actually branding. The Twin Cities region is one of the most active regions around, it has the most (or near the most, depending on the year) Fortune 500 companies per capita, and tends to weather economic storms quite well – among other accolades. Unfortunately, outsiders typecast the region as one of cold weathers and giant malls, and nothing else.

Beyond branding, the region does have major challenges, particularly when it comes to the economic outlook for racial and ethnic minorities. The businesses and workforce strength is impacted by lower educational outcomes among people of color, which local experts link to factors like school segregation. Among other things, Twin Cities businesses have not taken the necessary risks to advance in a globalized economy – most businesses are home grown and small businesses need nurturing. (Walljasper, 2011)

That said, there are opportunities ahead. The Twin Cities region is home to regional tax-base sharing, which helps to prevent pockets of deep poverty and sets a precedent for creative solutions to complicated challenges (Orfield, 1997). The growing diversity of the region may also lend itself to competing in the global economy – not to mention the regional consciousness that addressing changing demography, equitably, matters (Tran & Treuhaft, 2014) – even as it is only “tilting.”
The previous section gave a sense of the narratives in which to wrap regionally-specific data. In each case, we characterized the demographic changes, explained the generation gap as we highlighted generational interdependence, and pointed to key economic and educational shortfalls for populations of color that can threaten all of a region’s residents. But how do you take that data and analysis and use it to build consensus for regional decision making?

The simple answer is conversation. The old saying that “talk is cheap” has a point when talk fails to lead to action. But when talking allows for common understandings to take root, that can be the basis for action (Benkler, 2011). For example, in 2003, a group of philanthropies known as The Fund for Our Economic Future drew together to share their vision of Cleveland’s economic revival. The Fund commissioned the Cleveland Federal Reserve to study the region and found that segregation and inequality were hindering competitiveness. This, in turn, spurred an 18-month, awareness-building outreach process as well as a data-driven action plan, “Advance Northeast Ohio.” The plan was intended to bolster the presence of minority-owned businesses among other efforts in order to foster racial and economic inclusion in the Cleveland region (Benner & Pastor, 2012; Eberts et al., 2006).

For conversation to yield action, one needs to successfully frame the conversation. To do this, talk needs to start with fact-based instead of fear-based realities and to be bold about recognizing key racial and other realities and reimagining the future. Such talk also needs to be coupled with two key elements: improving the capacity track progress with regionally-specific and generationally-nuanced metrics as well as shoring up civic capacity within growing (and often underrepresented) demographic groups. These are not the only best practices and policies for bridging the racial generation gap – and we point to the recommendations of other authors as well – but these are the contributions that emerge from our own focus on data, deliberation, and destiny.

**SEEING THE SWAMP: CONNECTING WITH PUBLIC OPINION**

A series of The Frameworks Institute’s reports focus on the disconnect between public and expert opinions on a variety of issues, including generational change. The Institute identifies these gaps as the “swamp” through which expert opinion passes on its way to public understanding. The swamp results in us talking past each other and poor (if any) policy solutions.

With regards to the generation gap, the public at-large does not have good models for thinking about generational differences. For example, tech savvy youth see elders as luddites out of touch with changing times; elders do not often understand youth who seem to be addicted to screens rather than conversation. The public tends to see the generations as separate and disconnected rather than part of a continuum and mutually dependent.

*Source: Lindland et al. (2014)*
FRAME THE CONVERSATION…

Most Americans do not have a model for generational unity and instead accept difference between generations as part of the national norm (Lindland, Vomert, Haydon, & Ford, 2014). Data designed to bridge multiple gaps across age, race, and geography can actually be interpreted in very different ways. What one person may consider a lack of investment in youth is seen by another as simply safeguarding scarce resources; what one person may see as an older generation sopping up government resources (note that we have had universal health care for the elderly for nearly half a century but the extension to more Americans has been viewed as encroaching state power) is seen by another as a logical reward for a lifetime of work.

In research on the need to link the imperative of economic growth and equity (see “Regions are Just Right,” earlier), we have found that framing the conversation in terms of a shared destiny within the region creates more room for genuine interest and care for the other. As noted in “Seeing the Swamp” (see the box), getting to a sense of interdependency requires breaking through stereotypes about the disconnections between the generations – what The Frameworks Institute calls the “swamp.” Sharing data that sparks “a-ha” moments for a shared future among diverse actors can be helpful in traversing that swamp.

AROUND MUTUAL GAINS

For civic leaders who might think it is not worth their time to understand the racial generation gap, framing this conversation around regional economic growth and long-term sustainability can help. To do this, one must root the argument in what at first glance seems like a novel argument: that improving equity might actually have positive consequences for economic growth.

We say novel only because governments and business (and the U.S. public at-large) have been stuck believing that prosperity and inclusion are competing interests: Too much attention to distribution will kill the economy. But the International Monetary Fund has found that the single most statistically significant impediment to sustained economic growth is income inequality (Berg & Ostry, 2011), and a wide range of studies find a relationship between equity and growth at the metropolitan level (e.g., Eberts et al., 2006).

In a recent volume co-authored by one of us (Benner & Pastor, 2012), we wanted to find out what makes for more equitable regions. In large-scale econometric work we found that regions were more likely to achieve “just growth” if they had less-fragmented jurisdictions, more economic diversity, a cushion of public sector employment, and a Black and Latino middle class with political interests in both growth and equity. But based on over 100 interviews with regional leaders across the nation, it also became clear that getting that knowledge out – developing a lived sense of
mutual gains through sustained conversations – really makes it all come together. To get there, we need to rely on the statistical results but also on basic common sense. For example, businesses have long known that a happy workforce is a more sustainable one and that it makes sense to treat your customers, suppliers, and workers fairly if you want long-term growth. And the emerging demographics firm up the case for how fairness and opportunity now makes for mutual gains later: With the dependency ratio slated to rise, the very living standards of those who will retire will depend on the economic success of someone who may not look a lot like them.

Caring Across Generations: Finding Mutual Gains Through the Eldercare Dialogues

Co-founded in 2011 by the National Domestic Workers Alliance (NDWA) and Jobs With Justice, the Caring Across Generations campaign is a national initiative to transform the way long-term care is delivered. It brings together families who seek access to the care and support they need at a price they can afford, workers who too often lack basic labor protections, and consumers who want to age with dignity and independence in their own homes.

Caring Across Generations is based on the premise that by improving the way our country cares for one another, as family members and as workers, millions of high quality in-home care jobs can be created while also increasing access to affordable care. Too often the demand for an increase in worker wages is pitted against the provision-of-care hours. The initiative is dedicated to transcending these traditional dividing lines and to finding solutions based on mutual gains for workers and consumers and on shared values of love, dignity, and respect.

In New York, NDWA and five local affiliate organizations piloted a two-year process called the Eldercare Dialogues. It was comprised of 11 sessions designed to build deep and caring connection between direct-care workers, seniors, and their families so as to come to a point of mutual interest and gain. They shared personal experiences; explored the relationship between immigration, care, and gender; and sought to understand the care economy, among other things. In a 2014 report The Eldercare Dialogues: A Grassroots Strategy To Transform Long-term Care, the six organizations documented the process and provide a toolkit for others (Adhikaar et al., 2014).

While the topics and learnings were important, so were the relationships among participants and the new leadership that was developed through the Dialogues. Beyond the safe space of the Dialogues, participants took joint action in campaigns targeting federal changes to extend minimum wage and overtime protections to homecare workers, demanding comprehensive immigration reform, and mobilizing to restore local public funding for in-home services for the elderly. Workers and employers waging these campaigns side-by-side is the kind of engagement that it will take to move towards a society that cares for all generations.

Sources: Caring Across Generations, www.caringacross.org; Adhikaar et al. (2014)
2…TO IMAGINE THE (FACT-BASED) POSSIBILITIES

Using data is intended to pull listeners out of their feelings-based realities and into fact-based realities. While the public at-large tends to view diversity and immigration with ambivalence (Lindland et al., 2014), older generations tend to be more tentative (Taylor, 2014) – and it is these older skeptics who often exercise more political and decision-making power. From our experience in listening to pundits and talking with decision makers across the nation, much of this is fear stoked by bad and poorly-explained data.

Data on immigrants is a telling example: Simply showing data on the increases of immigrants might not contribute towards a new narrative but instead provoke fears about a changing nation. To paint a different picture of the future and the possibilities, data on immigrants should be tied to data on the high rates of immigrant entrepreneurship (Fairlie, 2008), how immigrants complement rather than replace the current workforce (e.g., Peri, 2012), and the contributions of immigrants to regional economic resilience (Lester & Nguyen, forthcoming).

Similarly, youth of color should not be portrayed as problems to be addressed but as assets for the future. Interestingly, we have found that this argument works best with business audiences who tend to look at demographic projections data and think, “New workers? New customers? How do I adapt?” For that reason, the data profiles on Fresno, Charlotte, and the Twin Cities try to offer a clear picture of what the future looks like, demographically, but leaves open what that will translate to socially. The projections are facts but what they lead to in terms of futures and fortunes is a choice. Data, in short, should be a platform for aspirational conversations, calling on us to step up to the challenges and possibilities of bridging the racial generation gap.

3…AROUND THE NEED FOR PUBLIC INVESTMENT

Our third stress in framing: Interventions resulting from the above data can either focus on individuals or public investment. Both are needed, of course – we celebrate those success stories where someone puts in the time and effort to escape difficult circumstances – but when entire populations have higher dropout rates and lower incomes, this tends to point to systemic ills. Thus, we need to stress what the data is pointing to: the need for broader investments that cannot simply help a few individuals beat the odds but can help whole communities change the odds.

Pitching public investment is tricky both because of the prevailing ethos of “lifting yourself by your bootstraps” and because the public tends to view demographic change independently of other issues (Lindland et al., 2014). Demographic change also impacts the willingness to invest, as demonstrated by the inverse relationship between the racial generation gap and public education spending depicted way back in Figure 3. But another approach is possible and even in a place where the gaps can be big.
Consider San Antonio, TX, a region that ranks 26 out of the top 150 metro areas in terms of the racial generation gap, far closer to Fresno on this spectrum than to Charlotte or the Twin Cities. Yet, in 2012, voters in the City of San Antonio passed an increase in the local sales tax to fund pre-K education for disadvantaged children in the most distressed neighborhoods in the city. That voters, who are generally more middle class than the population as a whole, would do that for what was likely to be someone else’s children is impressive. But perhaps more impressive is that the measure had the support of the San Antonio Chamber of Commerce who argued to both the public and their members that this was an investment in having the right workforce 20 years from now (Serna, 2012).14

A shared emphasis on public investment in the future, as illustrated by San Antonio, must be cultivated. Pundits frequently look longingly as what is called “the Greatest Generation” – those folks who grew up during the Great Depression, fought in (or worked in factories during) World War II, and emerged to forge the economic powerhouse that was post-war America. Not to diminish their individual achievements – the father of one of the authors of this report was part of that era and his grit and determination were typical – but part of what made that generation great was a government that put people to work, managed a military effort to defeat fascism, and then launched a post-war opportunity system that included federal investments in highways, a vast expansion of public universities and student aid (via the GI Bill), and a series of programs and subsidies that dramatically increased home ownership and so middle-class wealth.

It is time to retell the American story in a way that lifts up the role of those support systems and tries to think about what they might look like in the current day. Some of this will simply be reworking investments we are already making, including in transportation systems that can shore up housing and workforce opportunities.15 But underlying this must be an ethos in which various members of the community believe they have each other’s back and understand that individual success is not disconnected from the educational, workforce, and other structures in which a younger generation is coming of age.

14 The Chamber’s argument is not only its own but that of academics who have found that an array of education, training, and experience requirements is critical for sustaining the American workforce (Alba, Sloan, & Sperling, 2011; Myers, Levy, & Pitkin, 2013).

15 For more, see PolicyLink’s Center for Infrastructure Equity, here: http://www.policylink.org/focus-areas/infrastructure-equity
4…TO GET REAL ABOUT RACE

Race is typically avoided in conversations in the U.S., with the idea being that if we dance away from the uncomfortable topic and focus instead on the places where we agree, we will come to common ground without ever having to address the topic. But racial differences in experience and perception have a way of festering if not explored honestly: think of the chasm in beliefs about the experience of Black men with the police that came to the surface over the summer of 2014 or the way in which unaccompanied minor children fleeing violence in Central America that same summer were portrayed as illegal invaders.

In our view, we cannot bridge the racial generation gap without addressing race head on. As shown in the earlier data, there are such significant social and economic differences by race that ignoring them would provide a poor guide to properly-nuanced public policy and public investments. For example, improving work outcomes for the new demography requires different types of interventions: While working poverty is more of a problem for Latinos (think, low wages), unemployment is a bigger issue for African Americans (think, discrimination) (Pastor & Carter, 2009). So programs and policies to improve the workforce outcomes of our majority people-of-color future will need to be tailored to be effective (powell, 2008).

What these sort of data-driven conversations should do is highlight outcomes, rather than interpersonal experiences. John powell argues that “a systems approach helps illuminate the ways in which individual and institutional behavior interact across domains and over time to produce unintended consequences with clear racialized effects” (2007, p. 791). Powell does not argue that human bias is absent, but focuses on structures. Data cut by race/ethnicity makes clear the outcomes of these institutional interactions.

Focusing on racialized outcomes makes the job of getting to regional solutions easier, too. It is not a matter of changing human behavior per se so much as changing our policies so that our institutions and systems are remade to allow for better results. This is exactly what Seattle is doing through its data-driven Race and Social Justice Initiative (see “Seattle Sets the Bar” box). The City of Seattle is using data to understand the region, adapting policies accordingly, and is seeing better outcomes by race/ethnicity. This requires cutting the data in ways that shows that not considering race/ethnicity would wind up missing a huge part of the social reality.
**FORGE AHEAD…**

So far, we have focused on talk – how we can use data to spur a hard-hitting conversation to create an “epistemic community” that can inform, shape, and contribute to bridging the racial generation gap. Talk, of course, should then lead to action and the Generations Initiative and its partners have generated a catalog of best practices (The Generations Initiative, 2013a), a list of innovative policy solutions (Generations United & The Generations Initiative, 2013),¹⁶ and a set of recommendations for philanthropy (The Generations Initiative, 2014).

This coupling of issue awareness with solutions is important. There is a parallel in the complex field of immigrant rights and immigration reform: Communications consultants strongly recommend that advocates and activists highlight problems but follow them up with clear, sensible solutions (O’Neil, Simon, & Haydon, 2014; Simon & Gilliam, 2013; The Opportunity Agenda, 2008). Americans, after all, are eminently pragmatic: If something cannot be fixed, they are not convinced they should be listening to complaints about the situation. Fortunately, there are plenty of policy ideas – and we do not intend to rehash them here.

However, we do wish to add two major recommendations that reflect the data-driven approach to creating awareness about the gap and its consequences that have been the focus of this report. The first follows directly: setting up a system of data and metrics to move the region towards a better future. The second comes from years of working in partnership with community organizers: engage the new demography in the decision-making processes that affect their lives. Smart policy options are half the battle, but engaging those communities most affected will even out the power differential that is at the root of the racial generation gap.

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¹⁶ Generations Initiative and Generations United in their report, *Out of Many, One* (2013) highlight policy solutions from eight leaders across generations who thought through their particular policy issue through a generational lens. Seasoned thinkers and millennials offered new bold ideas around work, civic engagement, transportation, and housing.
With the introduction of the Race and Social Justice Initiative (RSJI) in 2005, Seattle became the first city government to explicitly focus on ending institutional racism (http://www.seattle.gov/rsji/about). Since then, the initiative to increase understanding and decrease the impacts of institutional racism within city government policies and services has grown into a multidimensional and collaborative approach to achieving equity and closing racial gaps in educational outcomes, homelessness, health, and other indicators throughout the city.

One major area of improvement has been in the City of Seattle’s contracting. During the 2009-2011 strategic plan period, the city “more than tripled the amount of purchasing dollars to women and minority-owned businesses” (Race & Social Justice Initiative n.d.: 3). Such are the results of new policies and better understanding by city staff (Race & Social Justice Initiative 2012).

Efforts to institutionalize the principles of equity and social justice in local government extend beyond the city of Seattle to the encompassing King County. In 2010, the Social Justice and Equity Team was established to address disparities in the county (Benner and Pastor Forthcoming). The County mainstreamed the work of this unit by adopting its principles into its strategic plan which requires all agencies to improve policy by considering equity impacts on populations with the greatest needs, to incorporate equity into organizational practices such as hiring, and to remove barriers to engagement for marginalized communities (King County 2014). In addition, King County reports annually on concrete efforts implemented to advance equity.

Some notable progress: In 2013, nearly 350 employees attended a Basic Equity and Social Justice class. In addition, nearly 250 employees attended workshops on cultural competency to better serve their constituencies and make the workplace more respectful to a diverse workforce. In the County budget, funding programs and positions that promote equity have been prioritized. For example, the Department of Public Defense eliminated the fee charged for their services because the majority of clients are low-income (King County 2014).

The Seattle metro area may be viewed as somewhat unique – markedly liberal, significantly diverse, and economically sure-footed. But it should also be noted that more regions may be like Seattle in the future: a place where the central city is growing and gentrifying, where suburbs are experiencing increases in both diversity and poverty, and where the sharp inequalities of the high-tech economy are in full display.
5…by Tracking Progress with Metrics that Matter

Data creates the conditions for a productive conversation about regional realities and futures but data collection should not stop with a contemporary snapshot. Goals are more likely to be achieved when there are systems by which to evaluate progress. In Appendix B, we recommend a full set of potential data markers that can be collected and presented at a regional level (a subset of which we presented in the data discussion above). For those with less data processing capacity, the recently launched National Equity Atlas (http://nationalequityatlas.org/) has many of these variables – and many still being added – at the regional level.

Beyond these standard sets of data, analysts should look for regionally-specific trends. When we presented our data to decision makers in Seattle, they alerted us to the “Homegrown Problem” which we then explored, statistically (see “The Homegrown Problem” box). Data needs to be tailored to specific regions and turned into metrics to be tracked. Just as repeated interactions between groups builds trust, repeated work with data creates familiarity and refinements in knowledge and goals.

THE HOMEGROWN PROBLEM: Regionally-Specific Data for Equity

When presenting to a set of regional decision makers in Seattle, reflections from the audience indicated that we had potentially missed a data point that they suspected was critical: the poor outcomes of those born locally as compared to those who moved from elsewhere. This was an informed hunch, but when we returned to our data sets, the evidence was there to back it up.

The homegrown problem refers to a striking disparity in opportunities between migrants and homegrown populations—defined as those born locally (due to data limitations, we measure this as being born in the same state). The same phenomenon in a different state is known as “The Colorado Paradox.” As the below figure shows, Seattle’s residents who were born in the state have lower educational outcomes across the age spectrum than those who moved from elsewhere.

![Percent with an AA degree or higher, Seattle, 2008-2012](chart)

While the phenomenon is important and the data is interesting, what we learned was the need to tailor data to the region and to let new metrics be catalyzed by the intuitions and interests of local civic leaders.
Several communities already have regional indicator projects: the Boston Foundation’s Boston Indicators project (http://bostonindicators.org), Charlotte Regional Indicators Project (http://ui.uncc.edu/programs/ri), the San Diego Regional Quality of Life Dashboard (http://equinoxcenter.org/regional-dashboard.html), and San Antonio’s forward-looking SA2020 (http://sa2020.org) to name a few. While collecting data is not the be-all, end-all – one sometimes need to move on issues before all the data is in – it is also true that establishing and tracking metrics can be important for achieving long-term change.

Indeed, all of this is best when linked to action. For example, Cincinnati Public Schools (CPS) students were not enrolling in postsecondary education programs at expected rates. In response, CPS convened an alliance of 30 members from different community, educational, and private agencies to analyze data and focus on getting more Cincinnati students into college. When the alliance was formed, CPS was facing drastic cuts so the alliance used data to identify the top five critical activities that most correlated to college enrollment. The alliance then provided access to and support for those five activities, which are leading to better outcomes (Strive Together, n.d.). (The Generations Initiative, 2013a).

6… BY SHORING UP CIVIC CAPACITY FOR THE NEW AMERICA

The social disconnection between the generations and the disproportionate civic voice of boomers and their elders have gotten us to where we are (Hancock, 2011; Myers, 2008). Older voters have more political influence – both because they vote more and because they have longer established civic and political organizations (Myers, 2008). Indeed, there is a correlation between age, length of residence, and even length of residence at a single address and political participation (Myers, 2008; Ramakrishnan, 2005; Timpone, 1998). As a result, older (whiter) residents have disproportionate political power that undermines the principles of equal representation.

Moreover, differential civic influence in addition to differences in public policy preferences means we are making policy for the present and past, instead of the future (Myers, 2008). A poignant example: Children of immigrants, in particular, are not having their interests represented because neither they nor their parents have significant political power (Myers, 2008). Without the civic inclusion of the new majority, the future is at best being left to chance. At worst, the future has the scales tipped against it: Baby boomers, in particular, have a reputation for holding political power and more than other generations, “not paying the full tab for the goods and services it has asked for and gotten from the government” and now the next generation is left with the bill (Taylor, 2014, p. 25).

So, part of the project of a generationally-engaged region is to set up youth and immigrants to be civically influential. This is both a matter of getting their needs met and setting up the region for a more productive and resilient future (Myers, 2008). Civic activity is more than voting; youth and immigrants can be influential as stakeholders in schools (Terriquez, 2011, 2012), as get-out-the-vote neighborhood precinct walkers, or as part of regional community organizing institutions, for example.
Youth, in particular, can play an important role in shaping their region’s future. In Ohio, an Interfaith Youth Core affiliate is showing that it is possible to bridge across race and religion for the common good. Motivated by an interfaith commitment to food justice, these youth planted community gardens, provided free meals, and implemented a campus recycling campaign (Interfaith Youth Core, n.d.). In New York, Brotherhood/Sister Sol youth are working to reform the “Stop and Frisk” policing policy (Brotherhood/Sister Sol, n.d.). And, of course, undocumented youth across the nation have spoken out, sat in, and marched miles for a change in immigrant and immigration policy, through organizations like United We Dream.17

Immigrants, too, need focused investment around civic engagement as they are new to our civic processes. In nearly every region in the nation, immigrants make up substantial and growing shares of the population. While there is a tendency to think of immigrants as “newcomers,” many are long-term residents. For example, in California in 2009-2011, half of all naturalized immigrants had been in the country at least 27 years; half of all non-naturalized, documented immigrants, 19 years; and nearly half of all undocumented immigrants had been in the country nine years (Pastor & Marcelli, 2013). Moreover, immigrants tend to be small business owners (Fairlie, 2008) and can be an important group for revitalizing economies, like in Dayton, Ohio (Preston, 2013).

As long-term contributors to regions, they are important stakeholders with distinct sets of experiences and needs (Ramakrishnan & Viramontes, 2006). Naturalization is part of shoring up their civic voice but so too is active civic engagement work: Across the nation, community organizers are empowering immigrant residents through integrated voter engagement (e.g., French American Charitable Trust, 2011; Winkelman & Malachowsky, 2009). In the 2012 California election, the landslide of policies passed benefiting minorities and immigrants in the Golden State was connected by many to the activation of minority and immigrant voters (Damore & Pantoja, 2013; Wolgin & Garcia, 2013).

17 By engaging youth politically, we are not only preparing our future civic leaders, but improving their educational and life outcomes (Billig, 2000; CIRCLE staff, 2010; Eyler, Giles, Stenson, & Gray, 2001; Zaff, Youniss, & Gibson, 2009).
BRIDGING THE GAP: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

A region in which the racial generation gap is bridged is one where the older generation sees its future in the younger generation – and public investment reflects it. It is one in which a younger generation correspondingly recognizes and honors the contributions seniors have made to their families and communities – and gears systems of care in a way that reflects that awareness (Poo, 2015). It is one where there is a shared knowledge about the strengths of the region and the barriers holding back some segments of the community – and there is a commitment to enable all groups to participate equitably in civic decision making.

We have stressed above that one way to get to that sense of mutual gain and obligation across generations is through new sets of civic conversations rooted in data not division. But it is also crucial that we recognize the need to go beyond shared interests to shared values. After all, interests can be met in multiple ways: Social Security for the elderly can be saved by slashing education spending while workforce development for the young can be preserved by slashing Medicare benefits. In short, you can protect your interests with generational warfare but this is no way to realize your values – that our elders should be treated with dignity, that our youth should have every opportunity to learn, and that our workers should be helped in adjusting to economic change.

Common interests are a good guide to policy solutions but common values will drive us to stay together even when conflicts and trade-offs require choices. Developing those shared values requires new mechanisms for bringing diverse constituencies into the same set of ongoing deliberations and face-to-face communications. This is the realm of community organizing and civic capacity building and we applaud the efforts to move this crucial communicative work forward neighborhood by neighborhood, region by region, till we manage to shift the national as well as the local dialogue.

This report offers a view on how data can become part of such values-based coalition building. We are not naive; we know that data will not solve problems on its own. There are strong interests that will drag our politics in ways that data can never fully counter. That said, strong data and analytic frameworks for thinking about the racial generation gap in the U.S. can move our politics forward, and actually budge us past fear-based reactions by showing us our future, together.

We need to bridge the racial generation gap urgently. We have become a nation spinning apart—socially, economically, and even epistemically—when we need to be a nation growing together. We have many histories but we have a single destiny, and we hope that what we have offered will enable others to consider and compile data profiles and data systems that can become a backbone for conversations that bridge across race, place, and space.
References


In this appendix, we describe the data underlying the analysis presented in this report. We also provide detail on terms and methodology. While data sources are included in abbreviated form beneath each figure, the following is a list of data sources in more detailed form:

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<th>Source</th>
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<tr>
<td>Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS)</td>
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<td>1990 5% Sample</td>
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<td>2000 5% Sample</td>
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<td>2012 American Community Survey, 5-year microdata sample</td>
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<td>2013 American Community Survey, 1-year microdata sample</td>
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<td>U.S. Census Bureau</td>
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<td>1990 Summary Tape File 2A (STF2A)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1990 Modified Age/Race, Sex and Hispanic Origin File (MARS)</td>
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<td>2010 Summary File 1 (SF1)</td>
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<td>2014 Complete Economic and Demographic Data Source</td>
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<td>U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis</td>
<td>Local Area Personal Income Accounts, CA30: regional economic profile</td>
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The terms “region,” “metropolitan area,” “metro area,” and “metro,” are used interchangeably to refer to the geographic areas defined as Metropolitan Statistical Areas by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Specifically, we rely on the December 2003 definition of Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs). While official OMB definitions of metro areas change over time (particularly from decade to decade), all of the data presented in this report reflects the December 2003 CBSA definitions.

In all of the analysis presented, all categorization of people by race/ethnicity is based on responses to two questions in census surveys – one on race and one on Hispanic origin. All racial groups reported on refer to people who identified with the indicated racial group and as not being of Hispanic or Latino origin. “Latino” refers to all people who identified as being of Hispanic or Latino origin. The term “US-born” refers to all people who identify as being born in the United States (including U.S. territories and outlying areas), or born abroad of American parents. The terms “foreign-born” or “immigrant” refer to all people who identify as being born abroad, outside of the U.S., of non-American parents. The few
instances (i.e., Figure 33) that we present data on detailed Asian-American/Pacific-Islander and Latino sub-groups are based on the more detailed responses to the questions on race and Hispanic origin within the broader Asian-American/Pacific-Islander and Latino categories.

Although a variety of data sources were used, much of our analysis is based on a unique dataset created using microdata samples (i.e., "individual-level" data) from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), for four points in time: 1980, 1990, 2000, 2008-2012 “pooled” together (Ruggles et al., 2010). While the 1980 through 2000 files are based on the decennial census and cover about 5 percent of the U.S. population each, the 2008-2012 pooled files are from the American Community Survey (ACS) and cover only about 1 percent of the U.S. population each. Five years of ACS data were pooled together to improve the statistical reliability and to achieve a sample size that is comparable to that available in previous years.

Compared with the more commonly used census “summary files,” which include a limited set of summary tabulations of population, housing, economic and other characteristics, use of the microdata samples allows for the flexibility to create more illuminating metrics of racial, and inter-generational equity and inclusion. It is important to keep in mind, however, that because these metrics are based on samples, they are subject to a margin of error and should be regarded as estimates – particularly in smaller regions and for smaller demographic subgroups. That said, most of the metrics we report are based on relatively large sample sizes, and all of them all of them are based on a universe of at least 100 individual survey respondents.

A key limitation of the IPUMS microdata is geographic detail: each year of the data has a particular “lowest-level” of geography associated with the individuals included, known as the Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) or “County Groups” in 1980. PUMAs are generally drawn to contain a population of about 100,000, and vary greatly in size from being fairly small in densely populated urban areas, to very large in rural areas, often with one or more counties contained in a single PUMA. One challenge in generating the underlying data for this report is that PUMAs do not neatly align with the boundaries of metropolitan areas, often with several PUMAs entirely contained within the core of the metropolitan area but several other, more peripheral PUMAs straddling the metropolitan area boundary. Another challenge is that the PUMA geography is updated with each decennial census. Thus, in order to summarize measures at the regional level, we had to first create a set of geographic crosswalks between the PUMAs and the region for each year of microdata, down-weighting appropriately when PUMAs extended beyond the regional boundary.

To create the geographic crosswalks between PUMAs and metropolitan areas for the each year of the microdata, we estimated the share of each PUMA’s population that fell inside each metro area using population information specific to each year from GeoLytics, Inc. at the 2000 census block group level of geography (2010 population information was used for the 2008-2012 geographic crosswalk). If the share was at least 50 percent, then the PUMAs were assigned to the metro area and included in generating our regional summary measures. For most PUMAs assigned to the region, the share was 100 percent – and we refer to these as “completely contained” PUMAs. For the remaining PUMAs, the share was somewhere between 50 and 100 percent, and this share was used as the “PUMA adjustment factor” to adjust downward the survey weights for individuals included in such PUMAs when estimating regional summary measures. Finally, we made one final adjustment to the individual survey weights in all PUMAs assigned to a metro area: we applied a “regional adjustment factor” to ensure that the weighted sum of the population from the PUMAs assigned to each metro area matched the total population reported in the official census summary files for each year/period. The final adjusted survey weight used to make all metro-area estimates was thus equal to the product of the original survey weight in the IPUMS microdata, the PUMA adjustment factor, and the regional adjustment factor.

Although the microdata was our key source, other data displays that warrant further explanation include the projection charts and the residential segregation trends written into the text.

For example, we present both national and regional projections of the percentage population by race/ethnicity. The national projections are based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2014 National Population Projections while the regional projections are based on aggregating county-level projections from Woods & Poole Economics, Inc. However, because both sets of projections follow a slightly difference categorization of the population by race/ethnicity than the 2000 Census classification (which is used for the historical data on the racial/ethnic composition we report), we adjusted each underlying data series to be consistent with the 2000 Census classification. For the national projections, the adjustments involved estimating the number of non-Hispanic other single race alone in each projection year and combining it with the projection for the non-Hispanic multiracial group to form the “Other” category in the relevant data displays. Similar adjustments were made to the county projections, but in this case there was no underlying data for the non-Hispanic multiracial group (which comprises the vast majority of “Other” category). We therefore generated a simple straight-line projection for the “Other” share of the total population using data from SF1 of the 2000 and 2010 Census for each county, and keeping the projected “Other” share fixed, allocated the remaining population share to each of the other five
racial/ethnic groups following distribution implied by the Woods & Poole data. Finally, an Iterative Proportional Fitting (IPF) procedure was applied to bring the county level results into alignment with our adjusted national projections by race/ethnicity.

The trends for residential segregation by race/ethnicity and age written into the text is based on the “dissimilarity index.” The formula for the dissimilarity index is well established and made available by the U.S. Census Bureau at: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing_patterns/app_b.html. We calculated the dissimilarity index for a variety of groups defined by race/ethnicity and age using census-tract level data for 1990 and 2010 from GeoLytics, Inc. While the data originate from the decennial censuses of each year, an advantage of the GeoLytics data is it has all been “re-shaped” to be expressed in 2000 census tract boundaries, and so the underlying geography for our calculations is consistent over time. The census tract boundaries of the original decennial census data change with each release, which could potentially cause a change in the value of a residential segregation index even if there was no actual change in segregation.
APPENDIX B: LIST OF DATA POINTS TO EXPLORE FOR REGIONAL PRESENTATIONS

Current Composition by Race/Ethnicity/Nativity and Age Structure

- Population by race/ethnicity/nativity, compared to the U.S.
- Composition of Asian-American/Pacific Islander and Latino population by detailed origin, compared to the U.S.
- Population by age group (0-17, 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65+), compared to the U.S.
- Dependency ratio compared to the U.S. and ranking among largest 150 metros
- Educational attainment by race/ethnicity/nativity
- Poverty rates by race/ethnicity/nativity
- Median household income by race/ethnicity/nativity of householder

Causes and Characteristics of Change

Population size and racial/ethnic composition

- Population growth and ranking among largest 150 metros, 1979 to present
- Racial/ethnic composition 1980-2010 and projections to 2040

Growth rates and components of change

- Decadal growth rates for population by race/ethnicity, compared to the U.S., (e.g., 1980 to 1990, 1990 to 2000, 2000 to 2010)
- Share of net population growth by race/ethnicity, compared to the U.S., (e.g., 1980 to 1990, 1990 to 2000, 2000 to 2010)
- Share of net population growth by nativity, compared to the U.S., (e.g., 1980 to 1990, 1990 to 2000, 2000 to 2010)
  - For just the Asian-American/Pacific-Islander population
  - For just the Latino population
- Immigrant share of the population, compared to the U.S., 1980 to present

Net in- vs. out-migration: newcomers and “home-grown” population

(Based on state of birth)

- Percent “home-grown” (born in same state), born out of state, and immigrant population, compared to the U.S., 1980 to present
- Share of net population growth by home-grown/born out of state/immigrant status, compared to U.S., (e.g., 1980 to 1990, 1990 to 2000, 2000 to 2010)
- Share of population by race/ethnicity for home-grown/born out of state/immigrant population, 1980 to present
- Educational attainment of home-grown/born out of state/immigrant population, 1980 to present (population ages 25-64 only)

(Based on place of residence one year prior to survey)

- Share of population living in state, out of state, and abroad one year ago, compared to the U.S.
- Share of population by race/ethnicity for those in state, out of state, and abroad one year ago
- Educational attainment for those in state, out of state, and abroad one year ago (population ages 25-64 only)
Generational Dimensions of Change

Population dimensions

- Share of population by age group, compared to the U.S., 1980 to present
- Dependency Ratio, compared to the U.S., 1980 to present
- Share of population by race/ethnicity and age group
- Median age by race/ethnicity
- Racial Generation Gap, 1980 to present
- Racial Generation Gap ranking among largest 150 metros
- Growth rates for the youth (<18) population by race/ethnicity, compared to the U.S. (e.g., 2000-2010)
- Growth rates for the senior (>64) population by race/ethnicity, compared to the U.S. (e.g., 2000-2010)
- Share home-grown/born out of state/immigrant population by age group
- Share of population by race/ethnicity for home-grown/born out of state/immigrant population by age group

Economic dimensions— snapshot

- Educational attainment by age group and race/ethnicity (population ages 25+ only)
- Household poverty status by age group and race/ethnicity of householder (householders ages 25+ only)
- Median household income by age group and race/ethnicity of householder (householders ages 25+ only)
- Labor force participation rate and unemployment rate by age group and race/ethnicity (population ages 18+ only)
- Educational attainment for home-grown/born out of state/immigrant population by age group (population ages 25+ only)

Economic dimensions— over time

- Unemployment rate gradient by age, 1980 to present
- Average annual earnings gradient for full-time wage and salary workers by age, 1980 to present
- Median household income gradient for householders by age, 1980 to present
- Home-ownership gradient for householders by age, 1980 to present
- Rent-burden gradient for householders by age, 1980 to present
- Economic Generation Gap, compared to the U.S., 1980 to present (measure of the ratio of median household income of householders ages 55-64 to those ages 35-44)
- Economic Generation Gap, ranking among the largest 150 metros, 1980 to present

Spatial Dimensions of Change

- Share of population in cities/suburbs, 1980 to present
- Share of population by race/ethnicity in cities/suburbs, 1980 to present
- Median household income for cities/suburbs, 1980 to present
- Poverty rate for cities/suburbs, 1980 to present
- Map of populations by race/ethnicity by census tract over time, 1980 to present
- Racial dissimilarity indices 1980 to present
- Map of youth (<18) and senior (>64) populations by census tract over time, 1980 to present
- Map of youth of color and white senior populations by census tract over time, 1980 to present
- Dissimilarity index for youth and senior population over time, 1980 to present
- Dissimilarity index for youth and white senior population over time, 1980 to present
- Dissimilarity index for youth of color and white senior population over time, 1980 to present
- Ranking of dissimilarity index for youth of color and white senior populations among largest 150 metros

- Map of poverty rate by census tract
- Map of senior and youth populations with high-poverty tracts overlay
- Share of youth and seniors populations living in high poverty tracts, compared to the U.S., 1980 to present
APPENDIX C: FRAMEWORKS INSTITUTE’S GAPS IN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN EXPERTS AND PUBLIC

1. Demographic Trends: Integrated vs. Compartmentalized. Experts are highly attuned to the intersection of changes in the country’s generational and ethnic profiles, and to the implications of that intersection for the country, while the public’s compartmentalized perspective leaves these intersections unrecognized.

2. Ethnic Diversity: Benefit vs. Threat. While experts view ethnic diversity primarily in positive terms, the public is much more ambivalent about the effects of diversity and, in particular, of immigration.

3. Unit of Analysis: Population vs. Family. Experts easily consider questions of generational change, responsibility and interdependence at the population level, while the public’s strong default is to think about these topics at the individual family level.

4. Fates of Different Generations: Linked vs. Separate. Experts view the fates of generations as inextricably linked, asserting that elderly segregation brings with it a cost to society. The public, on the other hand, lacks a robust model of population-level generational interdependence.

5. Age Structure of the Country: Getting Older vs. Getting Younger. While experts note that the country is currently aging overall, the public is split on their level of knowledge about this trend, with the default guess being that the nation is getting younger.

6. Age: Life-Course Perspective vs. Binary Structure. Experts adopt a life-course perspective in talking about the interdependencies that run across generations. The public, meanwhile, is much more likely to focus attention on the young and the old at either end of the spectrum.

7. Orientation: Forward vs. Backward. While experts are focused on the macro-scale policy changes necessary to best leverage our changing demographics, public thinking is subject to a strong nostalgia that looks back to a “lost village,” and wishes for a return to a simpler time.

8. Allocation of Resources Across Generations: Critical Policy Question vs. Invisible Consideration. Experts recognize that demographic trends in the U.S. represent a challenge for public resources, with an aging baby boomer generation requiring substantial health care and income security dependent upon a smaller working-age population. The public, meanwhile, is largely not attuned to the generational contours of these resource challenges.

9. Relationships Among Generations: Assets vs. Contrasts. Experts focus on the various assets that different generations bring to our collective experience. The public’s default models, on the other hand, center on the positives and negatives of each generation, and often identify the strength of one (youthful open-mindedness) in terms of its negative contrast in the other (older people’s closed-mindedness).

10. Demographic Change: Policy Problem vs. Simple Fact. Experts maintain that smart policymaking is critical to positively leveraging our country’s changing demographics, while, with the exception of immigration, the public does not see our nation’s changing demographics as a public policy issue but more a natural occurrence.

Source: Lindland et. al. (2014, pp. 6–7)
Established in 2007, the Program for Environmental and Regional Equity (PERE) is a research unit situated within the University of Southern California’s Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences. PERE conducts research and facilitates discussions on issues of environmental justice, regional inclusion, and social movement building.

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