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Promising Returns:

How Embracing Immigrants with Temporary Protected Status can Contribute to Family Stability, Economic Growth, and Fiscal Health

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 NATIONAL
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Executive Summary

With the continuous announcements to terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and Deferred Enforced Departure (DED), immigrant families are at risk of deportation. This series of announcements started in 2016 with the decisions to terminate TPS for Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. It continued in 2017 with the decision to terminate TPS for six more countries, and later in 2018 with the decision to end DED: decisions that have since been contested.

While the immigrant community and organizers have contested these decisions, resulting in lawsuits and status extensions, fear and anxiety in the immigrant community persist. Many of these individuals with TPS or DED have been in the United States for quite some time, as some of the requirements for these statuses necessitate individuals to have been present in the United States as early as the 1990's.

As a result, many individuals with TPS have long records of working hard, purchasing homes, and even establishing businesses. And they are not alone: they are also forming and raising families, and so nearly a million individuals currently live in households in which at least one family member has TPS.

While it has been a stressful and chaotic time for TPS and DED recipients, recently introduced legislation like the Safe Environment from Countries Under Repression and Emergency Act of 2019 and the American Dream and Promise Act of 2019 may potentially provide relief. For the purposes of this brief, we focus on the American Dream and Promise Act of 2019 which would include current TPS and DED recipients as well as individuals who are eligible for TPS but have not registered for the program.

To highlight the potential implications of this bill, we use our most recent estimates of all eligible TPS recipients (referred to as Promise Act individuals throughout the brief) under this bill to provide data on households, contributions to state GDP, mortgage and rent payments that help sustain local housing markets, tax contributions, and labor market composition.

Some of our findings show that if passed, this bill would impact nearly 1.3 million people who have or are eligible for TPS themselves or live in a household with a family member who is eligible under the Promise Act. We also estimate that Promise Act households contribute more than \$35.2 billion to the country's GDP and more than \$4.6 billion to federal, state, and local taxes.

Promise households also help prop up our housing market: We estimate that the total sum of annual mortgage payments from Promise Act households is more than \$1.5 billion on an annual basis while the total annual sum of rent payments from Promise Act households exceed \$2.8 billion.

In regards to the labor sector and individuals eligible under the Promise Act, the industries with the highest presence of Promise Act workers are construction, accommodation and food services, administrative and support and waste management service, manufacturing, retail trade, and health care and social assistance. As shown through these results, the Promise Act could help the United States significantly retain rather than lose these economic contributions.

To capture the human stories behind the numbers, we collaborated with the National TPS Alliance, an organization led by TPS beneficiaries from across the United States. Through semi-structured interviews, the National TPS Alliance interviewed three TPS recipients in Nebraska, New York, and Texas. In all three interviews, individuals expressed excitement and hope for a path to permanent residency. While the American Dream and Promise Act of 2019 is only one piece of legislation, it is nevertheless a start to introducing policies that protect the current TPS population and expand the circle of those who could benefit and contribute. This could result in significant gains not only for the immigrant community, but for the United States as a whole.

Introduction

In 2016, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the decision to end Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leon (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 2016a, 2016b, 2016c). Later in 2017, DHS announced the termination of TPS for six more countries including, El Salvador, Honduras, Haiti, Nicaragua, Nepal, and Sudan (Chen 2018; Sidley Austin LLP, National Day Laborer Organizing Network, and Asian Americans Advancing Justice - Los Angeles 2019). And the willingness to end protection did not stop there: in March of 2018, DHS once again announced the termination of another temporary status known as Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) for Liberia (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 2018b).

While the administration claimed that conditions in the home countries necessitated the ending of TPS and DED, around the same time that these terminations were announced, the U.S. Department of State also issued travel advisory warnings for some of the same countries.¹ Moreover, leaked e-mails from the State Department show that the administration ended TPS over the objections of its own embassies and personnel (Gomez 2018).

Amidst what can be framed as attacks on immigrant communities, groups like Adhikaar, African Communities Together, Asian Americans Advancing Justice – LA, CARECEN, the National TPS Alliance, the National Day Labor Organizing Network, and the UndocuBlack Network, have actively advocated for the extension of TPS for different immigrant communities. For countries like El Salvador, Honduras, Haiti, Liberia, Nicaragua, Nepal, and Sudan, these advocacy efforts have included lawsuits that have in some cases led to TPS extensions.

The implications of these policy changes extend past TPS and DED recipients themselves. These policy changes create a chain reaction of effects, impacting the children of such recipients as well as other relatives, employers, employees, clients, and the overall economy.

In the midst of these policy changes, different bills that could potentially provide relief to TPS and DED recipients have been introduced. The American Dream and Promise Act of 2019, H.R.6, was introduced on March 12, 2019 (Congress.gov 2019). If passed, this bill would allow TPS, DED, and Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) recipients that meet certain criteria to apply for legal permanent residence (LPR) status. Later on March 26, 2019, the Safe Environment from Countries Under Repression and Emergency (SECURE) Act, S.879, was introduced. This bill would also allow TPS and DED recipients to apply for LPR status if they meet certain requirements (National Immigration Forum 2019). While these policies have just been introduced, they are an important step in thinking about comprehensive immigration legislation.

¹ The U.S. Department of State has issued Level 2 (exercise increased caution), Level 3 (reconsider travel), or Level 4 (do not travel) travel advisory warnings for Guinea, Sierra Leone, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Nepal, and Sudan. See, <https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories.html/>

Given the complexity of TPS and DED, this research brief first provides insight into the history of these immigration policies and explores the current context of these statuses. Using our most recent estimates of the TPS population, we first provide data on the number of current TPS recipients and TPS households by country of origin (see the Methodological Appendix section of the brief for details). In light of one piece of legislation that was recently introduced, known as the American Dream and Promise Act of 2019, focusing specifically on the Promise Act of 2019, we use our most recent estimates of all eligible TPS recipients under this bill to provide data on households, contributions to state GDP, mortgage and rent payments that help sustain local housing markets, tax contributions, and labor market composition. The Promise Act of 2019, includes individuals who currently have TPS, as well as individuals who are eligible for TPS but have not registered for the program. For the purposes of this research brief, all eligible TPS and DED recipients included in this legislation will be referred to as Promise Act individuals.

Of course, policy is about more than numbers. Thus, to provide a snapshot of the implications of these policy changes for TPS recipients, we conclude by detailing the personal experiences of TPS recipients across three states. Understanding the implications of TPS and DED for the immigrant community can help organizers and strategists advocate for the implementation of comprehensive legislation that can provide a path to permanent residency and U.S. citizenship.

Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and Deferred Enforced Departure (DED)

TPS was implemented into United States immigration law under the Immigration Act of 1990 (Chishti and Yale-Loehr 2016). Now, almost 30 years later, TPS has become one focus of the current immigration debate. The purpose of TPS was to create a category for noncitizens in the United States who are temporarily unable to return to their countries (Chishti and Yale-Loehr 2016). The Secretary of Homeland Security can designate a country for TPS due to ongoing armed conflict, an environmental disaster, or other extraordinary and temporary conditions that prevent nationals from safely returning to their home country (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 2019d). A total of 21 countries have been, or are currently beneficiaries of TPS (The U.S. Department of Justice 2019).

Individuals who are granted TPS are permitted to legally reside in the United States, obtain an Employment Authorization Document (EAD) to work legally, and can be granted a travel authorization known as Advanced Parole (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 2019d). Because immigrants with TPS have a work permit, they are able to apply for a Social Security Number (SSN) and a driver's license (Menjivar 2017). Far from permanent, TPS can only be granted for 6, 12, or 18 months at a time and it does not lead to permanent residency or U.S. citizenship (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 2019d). *Figure 1* below outlines the eligibility screening for TPS.

Figure 1. TPS Eligibility Screening

	To be ELIGIBLE , you must:		You are INELIGIBLE , if you:
✓	Be a national of a country designated for TPS, or a person without nationality who last habitually resided in the designated country	X	Have been convicted of any felony or two or more misdemeanors committed in the United States
✓	File during the open initial registration or re-registration period, or you meet the requirements for late initial filing during any extension of your country’s TPS designation	X	Are found inadmissible as an immigrant under applicable grounds in INA section 212(a), including non-waivable criminal and security-related grounds
✓	Have been continuously physically present (CPP) in the United States since the effective date of the most recent designation date of your country	X	Are subject to any of the mandatory bars to asylum
✓	Have been continuously residing (CR) in the United States since the date specified for your country	X	Fail to meet the continuous physical presence and continuous residence in the United States requirements
		X	Fail to meet initial or late initial TPS registration requirements
		X	If granted TPS, you fail to re-register for TPS, as required, without good cause

Source: USCIS, Temporary Protected Status (TPS), <https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status>, accessed 3/28/2019.

As listed in the figure above, the process of applying for TPS requires filing during a re-registration period that varies by country and can be very time specific. Abrego and Lakhani point out that these specific time frames make immigrants with TPS vulnerable to falling out of status at different points in the reregistration process (2015). Moreover, the registration fees are an additional component that can complicate the TPS application process as filing fees vary by age, type of registration (re-registration and initial registration), and whether a work permit is requested (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 2019c). Application fees for TPS can total up to \$545 (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 2019c). In short, while TPS does provide some benefits, the complexity of the application process creates barriers that can exclude many eligible individuals.

Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) is also another type of temporary immigration status. DED was designated to Liberia in 2000 because of the country’s unstable political and economic conditions at the time (Clinton 2000). Different from TPS, it is at the president’s discretion to authorize DED as part of conducting foreign relations and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can establish any other requirements (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 2019a). DED however, is similar to TPS in that recipients are protected from deportation, can obtain an EAD to work legally, and can be granted Advanced Parole (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 2019a). Prior to issuing DED to Liberia, TPS for Liberia had been designated from 1991 to 1999 due to civil war (Clinton 2000). Later in 2002, TPS for Liberia was issued again (Department of Justice 2002). Up until 2017, TPS and DED designations for Liberia have been extended interchangeably (The U.S. Department of Justice 2019). Like TPS, DED

application fees can be expensive. To request their permit, DED recipients must pay a \$495 fee (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 2019b).

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals is another temporary immigration status granted to young undocumented immigrants who were brought in to the U.S. as children and fall into specific guidelines (Napolitano 2012). Similar to TPS and DED, DACA recipients are protected from deportation and can obtain an EAD to work legally (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 2018a). Different from TPS and DED, DACA recipients renew their status every two years and are currently unable to apply for Advanced Parole². For the purpose of this brief, we focus only on TPS and DED, a set of programs that have achieved less media prominence than DACA.

While TPS, DED, and DACA are all different types of temporary immigration statuses, immigrants with provisional statuses are nevertheless considered to be living in what Cecilia Menjivar coined, “liminal legality” (2006). Cecilia Menjivar describes “liminal legality” as a temporary status that has characteristics of both undocumented and documented statuses (2006). For example, individuals are able to work and reside in the United States temporarily; however, when these permits expire, individuals fall back into undocumented status and can be deported (Menjivar 2006). While these immigration statuses may allow individuals to obtain better paying jobs, access driver’s licenses, and participate in society’s institutions and civic organizations, this “liminal legality” also creates a sense of blocked mobility when accessing resources or employment opportunities (Abrego and Lakhani 2015).

Some of these “liminal legality” issues surfaced in the interviews we conducted. For example, one interviewee reported that renewing their work permit frequently became a challenge because as they were waiting to receive their new work permit in the mail, their employer would request the new permit a month before the current work permit expired.³ Another interviewee reported that while he was able to obtain a driving permit, he was given a hard time when he tried to obtain his driver’s license, even though he was presenting proper documentation.⁴

² Due to federal court orders, USCIS is only accepting DACA applications for those who have previously been granted deferred action under DACA and DACA recipients can no longer apply for Advanced Parole. USCIS is not accepting requests from individuals who have never been granted DACA. See, <https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-response-january-2018-preliminary-injunction>

³ Data retrieved from an interview by the National TPS Alliance with Melissa Cetoute on April 2, 2019.

⁴ Data retrieved from an interview by the National TPS Alliance with Sr. Joel on April 3, 2019.

Current Context around TPS

Numerous TPS designations have been targeted for termination recently. *Figure 2* below lists the countries with previous TPS designations, along with their designation date and expiration date.

Figure 2. Countries with Previous TPS Designations

Country	Designation Date	Expiration Date
Angola	2000	March 29, 2003
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1992	February 10, 2001
Burundi	1997	May 2, 2009
Guinea	2014	May 21, 2017
Guinea-Bissau	1999	September 10, 2000
Kuwait	1991	March 27, 1992
Lebanon	1991	April 9, 1993
Montserrat	1997	February 27, 2005
Province of Kosovo	1998	December 8, 2000
Rwanda	1994	December 6, 1997
Sierra Leone	1997	May 21, 2017

Source: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives. Data accessed, February, 19 2019, available at <https://www.federalregister.gov/>

Note: Liberia is excluded from the chart because it has been granted TPS or DED interchangeably since 1991. See <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/temporary-protected-status>

In 2016, TPS terminations were issued for Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone on the basis that the countries' conditions for TPS designation were no longer met (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 2017). Yet, the case of Liberia is unique in that some qualified nationals were also under DED. So while, TPS for Liberia expired on May 21, 2017, DED for Liberia was initially set to expire on March 31, 2019 (The U.S. Department of Justice 2019). However, just a few days before DED expired this year, the administration released a memorandum extending the status for Liberia until March 31, 2020 (Trump 2019). Before this extension was announced, African Communities Together, the UndocuBlack Network, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Lawyers for Civil Rights, and 15 individuals filed a lawsuit against the current administration for ending DED in *African Communities Together, et al. v. Donald J. Trump, et al.* (Lawyers for Civil Rights and Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law 2019).

In 2017, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced the termination of TPS for El Salvador, Honduras, Haiti, Nicaragua, Nepal, and Sudan (Chen 2018; Sidley Austin LLP et al. 2019). However, in 2018, the terminations for El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Sudan were countered under *Crista Ramos*,

et al., v. Kirstjen Nielsen, et al., resulting in the protection and extension of TPS until further resolution (Chen 2018). Because the terminations for Honduras and Nepal were announced after the *Crista Ramos, et al., v. Kirstjen Nielsen, et al.* case was filed, these recipients filed a separate class action lawsuit in *Bhattarai, et al., v. Nielsen, et al.* (Sidley Austin LLP et al. 2019).

Figure 3 below summarizes these complex terminations, lawsuits, and extended expiration dates.

Figure 3. Summary of the Current Status of TPS and DED Designated Countries

Country	Designation Date	Initially Designated for Termination	Included in a Lawsuit	Expiration Date
El Salvador	2001	X	X	January 2, 2020
Haiti	2010	X	X	January 2, 2020
Honduras	1999	X	X	January 5, 2020
Liberia	2000	X	X	March 30, 2020
Nepal	2015	X	X	June 24, 2019
Nicaragua	1999	X	X	January 2, 2020
Somalia	1991			March 17, 2020
South Sudan	2011			November 2, 2020
Sudan	1997	X	X	January 2, 2020
Syria	2012			September 30, 2019
Yemen	2015			March 30, 2020

Source: U.S Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2019. Data accessed, April 3rd, 2019.


See, <https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status>.

Note: Liberia is the only country under DED.

A Snapshot of Current TPS Recipients

Of the current TPS recipients living in the United States, about 61 percent are from El Salvador, 18 percent from Honduras, and 15 percent from Haiti. These three countries comprise the vast majority of TPS recipients. *Figure 4* below highlights the percentage of TPS recipients by country of origin.

Figure 4. Percentage of Current TPS Recipients by Country of Origin as of February 2019



Source: These numbers are calculated using the 2016 5-year American Community Survey (ACS) microdata from IPUMS. Note: Liberia is currently under Deferred Enforced Departure (DED). Other category includes TPS recipients from Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.

For the three countries of origin with the most TPS recipients, such TPS holders are a relatively large share of those immigrants who lack status as lawful permanent residents (or do not hold a student or other visa). Around 42 percent of Haitians in this legal status limbo have TPS as well as about 31 percent of Salvadorans and 16 percent of Hondurans. And while it might be easy to think of the uncertainty around TPS as affecting only individuals with TPS, the fact that TPS has been frequently renewed means that many beneficiaries are long-settled and thus highly likely to be integrated into families and communities.

To illustrate this, *Figure 5* breaks down the total TPS population, the number of TPS households, the total population living in TPS households (defined in this demographic section as a household in which at

least one member of the primary family unit in the household has TPS), and the total number of U.S. Citizens in such defined TPS households. As seen below, we estimate that there are over 220,000 TPS households and approximately 44 percent of the population in these households are U.S. Citizens. The truly startling number: nearly one million people have TPS themselves or live in a household with a family member who is a beneficiary of TPS. Terminating TPS would disrupt families, potentially forcing family members to separate or leave their home behind to relocate (Schochet 2017). Already, families are living with the fear of separation that creates stressful situations, compromising the well-being of adults and even children (Schochet 2017). One interviewee who has been living in the United States for about 21 years explained that amidst all these policy changes, he is constantly reminded that one day he may not be able to see his children and grandchildren.⁵

Figure 5. Current TPS Population and Households by Country of Origin as of February 2019

Country	Total TPS population	Number of TPS households	Total population in TPS households	Total number of U.S. Citizens in TPS households	Percent of population in TPS households that are U.S. Citizens
El Salvador	194,453	136,515	583,195	255,511	44%
Honduras	56,912	41,455	167,080	72,047	43%
Haiti	49,952	31,451	144,480	64,758	45%
Nepal	8,666	5,847	20,684	4,483	22%
Syria	5,036	2,933	13,128	4,151	32%
Nicaragua	2,546	2,206	10,146	5,337	53%
Yemen	925	802	5,208	3,575	69%
Liberia	743	599	2,360	1,433	61%
Sudan	599	510	2,183	1,354	62%
Somalia	252	226	1,132	847	75%
Total	320,084	222,544	949,596	413,496	44%

Source: These numbers are calculated using the 2016 5-year American Community Survey (ACS) microdata from IPUMS.
 Note: Liberia is currently under Deferred Enforced Departure (DED).

⁵ Data retrieved from an interview by the National TPS Alliance with Sr. Joel on April 3, 2019.

The American Dream and Promise Act of 2019

Although the data above reflects the current TPS population, there are immigrants eligible for TPS that have yet to apply because of the complexities noted above, including high fees, complicated rules, and sometimes fear of interaction with the U.S. government. Understanding data on all immigrants eligible for TPS is important, especially with the introduction of one piece of legislation that includes current TPS recipients and immigrants who are eligible for TPS but may not have registered for the program.

On March 12, 2019, Representatives Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA), Nydia Velazquez (D-NY), and Yvette Clark (D-NY), introduced the American Dream and Promise Act of 2019, also known as H.R.6 (United We Dream, National Immigration Law Center, and UndocuBlack Network 2019a). The American Dream and Promise Act of 2019 are a set of bills that if passed, would provide a path to permanent legal residency and U.S. citizenship to young undocumented immigrants, DACA eligible individuals, DACA recipients, TPS eligible individuals, TPS recipients, and DED recipients (United We Dream et al. 2019a). It is important to note that this bill was just introduced and to come into effect, this bill would still need to pass through the House, the Senate, and the President.

The Dream Act section of the bill includes provisions that would benefit undocumented youth, DACA eligible individuals, and DACA recipients, while the Promise Act section includes provisions that would benefit TPS eligible individuals, TPS recipients, and DED recipients. Our latest estimates suggest that that as many as 2.5 million immigrants could benefit from this bill. This is due in part because the bill includes individuals who had not necessarily registered for DACA or TPS, but were nevertheless eligible to do so (United We Dream et al. 2019a).

For the purposes of this brief, we focused on the Promise Act. If passed, the Promise Act would (United We Dream, National Immigration Law Center, and UndocuBlack Network 2019b) :

- Provide a path to legal permanent residence (LPR) for individuals eligible for TPS (this includes nationals of a country with a TPS designation on September 25, 2016, if the person had TPS or was eligible but did not register for the program) and individuals who had a DED as of September 28, 2016.
- Facilitate paths to LPR status through existing channels.
- Grant a stay of removal for individuals while an application is pending.
- Establish a fee ceiling of \$1,140 for people with TPS or DED applying for LPR status.
- Require DHS provide a report within three days of publishing a notice to terminate TPS designation for certain nationals.
- Enable previous TPS or DED recipients that were deported or voluntarily departed to apply for relief from abroad if they meet certain requirements.
- Allow immigrants in deportation proceedings or detention to apply for relief and protect eligible applicants from deportation.
- Establish a grant program for nonprofit organizations to assist applicants.

- Provides a fee exemption for applicants who meet certain requirements.

The introduction of this piece of legislation is significant for various reasons. For one, this bill encompasses eligible individuals who may not have previously applied to TPS or DED. Moreover, it also includes certain immigrants who were deported or who are in deportation proceedings as well as detention. If passed, this bill would impact nearly 1.3 million people who have TPS themselves or live in a household with a family member who is eligible under the Promise Act. *Figure 6* below provides a breakdown of Promise Act individuals by country of origin.

Figure 6. Promise Act Population and Households by Country of Origin as of April 2019

Country	Total Promise Act population	Number of Promise Act households	Total population in Promise Act households	U.S. Citizens in Promise Act households	Percent of population in Promise Act households that are U.S. Citizens
El Salvador	260,625	172,963	729,041	313,014	43%
Haiti	91,628	50,353	231,664	102,201	44%
Honduras	77,336	53,270	214,604	89,622	42%
Nepal	11,328	7,453	28,247	5,527	20%
Syria	7,710	3,718	17,303	4,876	28%
Nicaragua	3,380	2,861	13,051	6,844	52%
Liberia	3,061	2,240	9,322	4,190	45%
Sierra Leone	1,495	1,176	4,359	1,896	43%
Guinea	1,353	850	4,018	1,776	44%
Yemen	1,265	1,033	6,361	4,297	68%
Sudan	852	677	2,792	1,655	59%
Somalia	330	325	1,707	1,290	76%
Total	460,363	296,919	1,262,469	537,188	43%

Source: These numbers are calculated using the 2016 5-year American Community Survey (ACS) microdata from IPUMS.

While this bill includes more than just current TPS recipients, there are still a number of immigrants who would be excluded. Nevertheless, this bill is an important step in the introduction of more comprehensive immigration legislation and understanding the potential implications for immigrant communities is still important to consider. When asked about the potential impact of a path to permanent residency for her and her family, one interviewee said she would feel much more accepted and have the opportunity to travel or obtain a better job.⁶ Another interviewee expressed that a path to permanent residency would be a dream come true, especially because he has contributed a lot to the economy by for example, paying taxes.⁷ The next section touches on this point by providing data on the economic contributions of Promise Act eligible individuals.

⁶ Data retrieved from an interview by the National TPS Alliance with Melissa Cetoute on April 2, 2019.

⁷ Data retrieved from an interview by the National TPS Alliance with Sr. Joel on April 3, 2019.

Economic Contributions of Promise Act Individuals

The households that would be covered under the Promise Act work, support local housing, pay taxes, and have spending power that positively contribute to the country's growing GDP. In this section, we estimate and briefly discuss the impact these households have on the economy through homeownership, mortgage payments, tax contributions, employment, and overall household income.⁸


Nearly 35 percent of Promise Act households are homeowners; while a small share of those households, approximately 16 percent, own their homes outright, the vast majority pay a mortgage, with an average annual payment of \$16,420.⁹ We estimate that the total sum of annual mortgage payments from Promise Act households is more than \$1.5 billion on an annual basis.

Not surprisingly, approximately 65 percent of this sum is concentrated in the five states with the highest numbers of TPS households: California (\$268.1 million annually), New York (\$258.1 million annually), Texas (\$164.9 million annually), Florida (\$158.7 million annually), and Maryland (\$156.5 million annually) [see *Figure 7*]. And while this means that banks and other lenders have a stake in the success of TPS households, so do landlords: TPS households pay more than \$236.5 million in gross rent every month, totaling more than \$2.8 billion a year. Approximately 66 percent of this sum is concentrated in five states with the higher numbers of TPS households: California (\$645.6 million annually), Florida (\$401.4 million annually), New York (\$341.9 million annually), Texas (\$251.3 million annually), and Virginia (\$234.5 million annually) [see *Figure 8*].

⁸ In this section, all the economic calculations are for households in which any resident would be eligible for the Promise Act, regardless of whether they are in the primary family unit. This expands the universe by about nine percent and was done to be consistent with the economic analysis work conducted jointly by CSII and the Center for American Progress (CAP).


⁹ This calculation utilized data from the 2012-2016 American Community Survey and includes payments on both first, and where it exists, second mortgages.

Figure 7. Top 10 States by Total Annual Mortgage Payments Paid by Promise Act Households, 2012 – 2016 (millions of 2016 dollars)



Source: These numbers are calculated using IPUMS version of the 2012-2016 ACS 5-year estimates.
Note: Universe includes all households with at least one member eligible for the Promise Act of 2019.


Figure 8. Top 10 States by Total Annual Rent Payments Paid by Promise Act Households, 2012 - 2016 (millions of 2016 dollars)



Source: These numbers are calculated using IPUMS version of the 2012-2016 ACS 5-year estimates.
 Note: Universe includes all households with at least one member eligible for the Promise Act of 2019.

We also estimate that the Promise Act households' sum of household income is approximately \$17.9 billion. Nearly 26 percent of this amount is paid in taxes, approximately \$4.6 billion. This comprises \$2.9 billion in federal taxes and \$1.7 billion in state and local taxes. States with the largest amount of Promise Act households saw the largest contribution from these households to state revenue: California (\$300.6 million), New York (\$284.1 million), Texas (\$196.8 million), Florida (\$156.2 million), and Maryland (\$149.6 million). See Figure 9 for the top ten states. Along with some congressional districts within these top-contributing states, we also find that congressional districts in Virginia (VA-01, VA-08, VA-10, and VA-11), Massachusetts (MA-05), and New Jersey (NJ-08) are among the top 20 of the 435 congressional districts in regards to total tax contributions from Promise Act households.


Figure 9. Top 10 States by Total Household Income and Total Tax Contribution from Promise Act Households (millions of 2016 dollars)



Source: These numbers are calculated using IPUMS version of the 2012-2016 ACS 5-year estimates.
 Notes: Universe includes all households with at least one member eligible for the Promise Act of 2019.

Overall, we estimate that Promise Act households contribute more than \$35.2 billion to the country’s GDP. States seeing the highest contribution from Promise Act households are California (\$6.9 billion), New York (\$5.2 billion), Texas (\$4.5 billion), Florida (\$3.5 billion), and Virginia (\$2.5 billion). See *Figure 10* below for the top 10 states by GDP contribution from Promise Act households. In regards to the labor sector and individuals eligible under the Promise Act, the industries with the highest presence of Promise Act workers are construction, accommodation and food services, administrative and support and waste management service, manufacturing, retail trade, and health care and social assistance. See *Figure 11* below for the top 10 industries by number of eligible individuals under the Promise Act.


Figure 10. Top 10 States by Total GDP Contribution from Promise Act Households (millions of 2016 dollars)



Source: These numbers are calculated using the IPUMS version of the 2012-2016 ACS 5-year estimates.

Note: The GDP estimates for each state and for the United States is an average of GDPs from 2012-2016. Each year's GDP was converted to 2016 dollars before they were averaged.

Figure 11. Top 10 Industries by Number of Promise Act Individuals



Source: These numbers are calculated using IPUMS version of the 2012-2016 ACS 5-year estimates.

Notes: Universe includes all Promise Act individuals who are 16 or older, employed, civilian, non-institutionalized, and who worked within five years of being surveyed.

Vignettes

To capture the narratives of immigrants with TPS status, we collaborated with the National TPS Alliance, an organization led by TPS beneficiaries from across the United States. The Alliance focuses on advocacy efforts to protect TPS beneficiaries in the short-term but also pushes for a path to permanent residency in the long term (National TPS Alliance 2019). Through semi-structured interviews, the National TPS Alliance interviewed three TPS recipients in Nebraska, New York, and Texas. The interviews focused on the following themes: the impact of TPS on interviewees and their families, the impact of current TPS policies on interviewees and their families, the potential impact of terminating TPS for interviewees and their families, and the potential impact of a path to permanent residency on interviewees and their families. The vignettes below highlight the narratives of each interviewee, and are complemented with data on the economic contributions from the interviewees' congressional district.

Señor Joel,* Omaha, Nebraska¹⁰

Señor Joel is 45 years old and has been living in the United States for 21 years. Joel has children and grandchildren that are U.S. citizens. He is originally from El Salvador but he now lives in Omaha, Nebraska. With the work authorization that TPS bestows, he has worked for a company as an arborist for the past 12 years. The company that he currently works for partners with another company that focuses on repairs after natural disasters. He shared that after Hurricane Irma, he traveled to Florida to assist with repairs. He also adds that his job requires skills that he has accumulated over time. When asked about how terminating TPS could affect his employer he shares:

“Mi compañía también será afectada por que tengo mucha experiencia en mi oficio, tengo 12 años de experiencia en la compañía ahorita. En mi opinión encontrar a personas con experiencia puede ser difícil. [My company would also be affected; I have more than 20 years of experience in this job. In my opinion, finding someone with the same level of experience would be difficult].”

In addition to employment, he was able to apply for a driver's license as well as purchase a home. While TPS has enabled Sr. Joel to work and even become a homeowner, in some ways he has also faced

Figure 12. Promise Act Individuals and Economic Contributions in Omaha, Nebraska's 2nd Congressional District

- Total Number of Promise Act Individuals: 603
- Total Number in Promise Act Households: 1,762
- Total Promise Act Annual Household Income: \$15.4 million
- Total Promise Act Annual Household Contribution to Taxes: \$3.7 million

¹⁰ Data retrieved from an interview by the National TPS Alliance with Sr. Joel on April 3, 2019.

Note: * indicates pseudonym

constraints. For example, Sr. Joel shares that he has not been able to reconnect with his parents since he moved to the United States. Moreover, he lives with a constant fear that one day he may not be able to see his children and grandchildren.

When asked about the possibility of a path to permanent residency, Sr. Joel expressed that it would be a dream come true, alleviating a lot of stress, allowing him to remain in the United States with his family, and reconnect with his parents in El Salvador.

Melissa Cetoute, Brooklyn, New York¹¹

Born in Haiti, Melissa is a 22-year-old recent college graduate who has been living in the United States for about 14 years. Melissa has two parents that are also TPS recipients and siblings that are U.S. citizens. As a TPS recipient, she was eligible to apply for a scholarship through TheDream.US, that she otherwise would not be eligible for, enabling her to obtain a college degree. Moreover, with a work permit, she has been able to obtain employment as a tutor. In addition to obtaining a scholarship and employment, Melissa also noted she was able to apply for a driver's permit and she and her parents (who are also TPS recipients) have been able to access certain health benefits that they are eligible for.

Though TPS offers certain protections and work authorizations, she also points out that TPS has some limitations. For example, Melissa shared that the constant renewal of her work permit has become a challenge. Employers sometimes ask for renewed work permits a month before the current work permit expires, and before she even receives the renewed permit. Though she is able to travel to Haiti with TPS, the fees for the travel permit become very expensive. While facing challenges with TPS and the current policy changes, she remains confident in that,

“...more people are involved in the movement and a lot of people are fighting, a lot of good things are being done.”

Figure 13. Promise Act Individuals and Economic Contributions in New York's 9th Congressional District

- Total Number of Promise Act Individuals: 3,755
- Total Number in Promise Act Households: 10,181
- Total Promise Act Annual Household Income: \$188.8 million
- Total Promise Act Annual Household Contribution to Taxes: \$58.7 million

¹¹ Data retrieved from an interview by the National TPS Alliance with Melissa Cetoute on April 2, 2019.

Señor Godinez, Dallas, Texas¹²

Señor Godinez is a 46-year-old business owner from Dallas, Texas. He is originally from El Salvador but has lived in the United States for about 23 years. For Sr. Godinez, TPS has allowed him to obtain an SSN, which has enabled him to establish his own mechanic shop. On an individual level, losing TPS would mean returning to an undocumented status and losing his driver's license. In the state of Texas, in particular, losing his driver's license would have serious repercussions as Senate Bill 4 (SB4) allows officers to ask about immigration status during a lawful stop or arrest (ACLU Texas 2018).

In addition, Sr. Godinez is a business owner, which means if he lost TPS, he would have to transfer all his business related matters to someone else. And the impact would extend beyond him: on a larger scale, losing TPS would mean his employees could potentially lose their jobs as well.

When asked how a path to permanent residency could potentially benefit him and his family, Sr. Godinez expressed that it would be a reward after many years of waiting. He remarks:

“Creo que sería lo más ético y recto que podría proveer este país a los recipientes de TPS. [I think this would be the most ethical and just solution that this country could provide to all TPS recipients].”

As described by TPS recipients themselves, TPS has been beneficial but also limiting. All the TPS recipients we spoke to have been living in the United States for an extended period of time - one for almost 15 years and the others for over 20 years. They have settled into the United States and contributed to their communities in many ways. Removing TPS would create a chain reaction of effects that would not only impact themselves, but also their relatives, employers, employees, co-workers, and the economy more broadly.

Figure 14. Promise Act Individuals and Economic Contributions in Dallas, Texas's 30th Congressional District

- Total Number of Promise Act Individuals: 2,448
- Total Number in Promise Act Households: 6,680
- Total Promise Act Annual Household Income: \$73.2 million
- Total Promise Act Annual Household Contribution to Taxes: \$17.2 million

¹² Data retrieved from an interview by the National TPS Alliance with Sr. Godinez on April 3, 2019.

Conclusion

As explained throughout the brief, TPS and DED have been a part of U.S. immigration law for a significant period of time. Most of the immigrant families impacted by these immigration policies are thus now long-settled and integrated into communities across the United States. The impact of TPS and DED terminations would immediately affect the security of nearly one million people. Taking a broader and more generous approach, legislation like the Promise Act of 2019 could instead yield benefits to nearly 1.3 million beneficiaries and their family members and could help the United States retain rather than lose more than \$35.2 billion in overall GDP.

Thanks to the efforts of the immigrant community, organizers, and other advocates, many TPS and DED terminations have been granted temporary extensions. While it has been a stressful and chaotic time for TPS and DED recipients, bills like the SECURE Act and the American Dream and Promise Act of 2019 may potentially provide relief. In the case of the American Dream and Promise Act of 2019, if it were to pass, about 2.5 million individuals will be eligible for a path to permanent residency and U.S. citizenship, including more than 460,000 individuals who either have or are eligible for the current TPS program. Policies that protect the current TPS population and expand the circle of those who could benefit and contribute – and providing them with permanent residency and a path to U.S. citizenship if they choose – could yield significant gains for both immigrants and the United States as a whole.

Methodological Appendix

Estimating Current TPS Holders

The Center for the Study of Immigrant Integration (CSII) estimates of TPS were developed using a method similar to that offered by Warren and Kerwin of the Center for Migration Studies (2017). First, we estimated and tagged the undocumented population in a version of the 2012-2016 5-year American Community Survey (ACS) microdata, downloaded from IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2017). The basics of that approach are reviewed in Le, Pastor, and Scoggins (2019) and differ from the CMS approach in that we apply fewer conditions and assign documentation status to a larger number of observations based on a stratified probability model.

The probability estimates needed to do the latter exercise come from a logistic model applied to characteristics and status information in the 2014 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Other approaches, including some of our past work, have relied on the 2008 SIPP but it is likely that the characteristics of the unauthorized immigrant population have changed significantly since then. However, using the 2014 SIPP requires a bit of extra work to estimate who is likely to have changed status if they arrived without proper documentation (a task that was easier in the 2008 SIPP) and that is part of our approach.

Once we apply probability estimates (along with conditions) to fully assign status, we more or less follow CMS in tagging TPS holders but with one exception. We first tag some of the undocumented as possible TPS holders based on country and year of arrival characteristics. While CMS then randomly selects from the pool till they hit country target totals, we select those with the highest likelihood of being authorized residents till we hit country target totals for adults (with the logic being TPS holders are more likely to resemble authorized immigrants). We then assign minor children to TPS status if they also meet the country and year of arrival bars and had at least one TPS parent.

The country targets for most countries are taken from Argueta (2017) with a few exceptions. First, immigrants from Guinea and Sierra Leone are now no longer eligible for TPS. Second, immigrants from Liberia are no longer eligible for TPS but a limited number who have been in the U.S. for a longer period are eligible for Deferred Enforced Departure (DED); we estimate that number by taking the previous TPS group and applying the new DED conditions to them.

Estimating Current TPS Households

In estimating the current TPS households in 2019, our definition of a TPS household or family is not limited to the TPS status of the householder or head of family; rather, we consider whether there is any individual in the primary family unit who has TPS status, including unmarried partners (but not including non-relatives such as roommates, boarders, employees, and foster children). We focus on the family because we believe this is where status concerns would be sharpest (versus another family unit sharing

the same domicile). We consider the first family only because family relationships are not well specified for secondary family units in the same households. When we total up all members in the primary family unit, we do not include the nonrelatives (such as the aforementioned roommates) who were also not used in assigning TPS status to the family unit. This method likely understates the family members affected by TPS because it does not include secondary family units or foster children, and does not consider relationships with family members not in the same domicile.

Estimating Promise Act Individuals

The Center for the Study of Immigrant Integration (CSII) estimates of individuals who might benefit from the Dream and Promise Act of 2019 (H.R. 6) are based on underlying estimates of the population that may be unauthorized and/or beneficiaries of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and Deferred Enforced Departure (DED).

Similar to estimating the current TPS population, the basic first step in the estimate of Promise Act individuals involves tagging the unauthorized immigrant population in a version of the 2012-2016 5-year ACS microdata, downloaded from IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2017). The basics of that approach are reviewed in Le, Pastor, Scoggins, et al. (2019). Essentially, we look at the non-citizen immigrant population and apply both a series of conditions that would imply legal status (such as veteran status or receipt of Social Security benefits) and then assign the rest of the observations based on a stratified probability model.

As explained above, the probability estimates needed to do the latter exercise come from a logistic model applied to characteristics and status information in the 2014 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Other approaches, including in some of our past work and in the estimates conducted by the Migration Policy Institute, have relied on the 2008 SIPP but it is likely that the characteristics of the unauthorized immigrant population have changed significantly since then. Using the 2014 SIPP requires a bit of extra work to estimate who is likely to have changed status if they arrived without proper documentation (a task that was easier in the 2008 SIPP). That adds not only complexity but a bit more uncertainty (or “noise”) in the estimates but it likely yields a more up-to-date picture, which is an important benefit.

Similar to the approach taken by the Center for Migration Studies (CMS), we then assign status as we seek to hit country targets (or “controls”) derived from residual methods developed by other researchers (Warren 2014). We differ from the CMS approach in that we apply fewer conditions and assign status to a far larger share of immigrants based on the stratified probabilities; by contrast, CMS applies more conditions and then uses a random method to select in the rest. That creates an overall sample to which the Dream and Promise requirements under Title I of H.R. 6—involving age at arrival, enrollment or educational attainment, etc.—are applied.

On a series of maps that are available at <https://dornsife.usc.edu/csii/map-dream-and-promise-act/>, we explain the additional steps we take to identify those who might be eligible for the Dream portion of the H.R. 6; here we focus on estimating both who currently holds TPS and who is eligible for protection under TPS/DED provisions under Title II of H.R. 6.

Country of origin	Must have arrived in the United States before:
El Salvador	2/13/2001
Guinea	11/20/2014
Haiti	1/12/2011
Honduras	12/30/1998
Liberia	11/20/2014
Nepal	6/24/2015
Nicaragua	12/30/1998
Sierra Leone	11/20/2014
Somalia	5/1/2012
South Sudan	1/25/2016
Sudan	1/9/2013
Syria	8/1/2016
Yemen	1/4/2017

Note: South Sudan is not included in our estimates because it is not identifiable in the ACS. The only DED holders in September 2016 were Liberians, and they were also all eligible for TPS in September 2016.

The methods we applied are similar to those offered by Warren and Kerwin of CMS (with one key difference in assignment discussed below that takes advantage of our probability estimates) (2017). We first tag possible TPS holders as those non-citizen individuals who do not have Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) status or another form of authorization (such as student visas), based on the procedure described above, for the three largest TPS countries (El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti); possible TPS holders are determined on country and year of arrival characteristics according to the TPS regulations in force in 2016. We are relatively confident in these totals because we have good country controls for the larger sending countries and our totals for overall TPS eligibility are close to those for the top three TPS countries reported in Warren and Kerwin (2017).

Note that those who actually have TPS status are less than those who would be eligible even under current regulations for the reasons discussed in the brief. For example, for the three large countries for which we have reliable numbers on both immigrants lacking legal status in general and those with TPS in 2016, the implied rate of take-up of TPS by eligible residents is around 75 percent in the cases of El Salvador and Honduras and far lower (around 54 percent) in the case of Haiti.

For the other smaller countries, our underlying country controls are less reliable and are often guided by regional data (that is, we assume that for smaller African countries, the share of immigrants who lack authorization is essentially the regional average). This is likely incorrect for countries such as Liberia that have a long and historically special relationship with the United States. To insure that we do not overstate the TPS-eligible population for these smaller countries, we calibrate the pools for the three largest countries against the actual number of nationals with TPS status as of 2016 according to Argueta (Argueta 2017). The basic approach is to take the highest take-up rate (75 percent) for the countries for which we have more reliable data and use this to deduce potential pools for the smaller countries using the numbers of actual TPS beneficiaries from Argueta (Argueta 2017). This may tend to understate eligibility and thus is an appropriately conservative approach.

With the target sizes of the potential pools for the smaller countries in place, we then selected those eligible for protection under Title II of H.R. 6 until we hit the targets. As explained in the methodology of a [TPS-related blog](#) in which we discussed our estimates of actual TPS holder, this is another way in which our estimates differ from those of the Center for Migration Studies (CMS). While CMS randomly selects from the pool till they hit country target totals, we select those with the highest likelihood of being authorized residents till we hit country target totals for adults (with the logic being TPS holders are more likely to resemble authorized immigrants). In this case, the country target totals are our pool targets rather than actual numbers. With estimates of all adults eligible for protection under the TPS/DED provisions in place, we then assign minor children as also being eligible if they meet the country and year of arrival criteria and had at least one TPS parent.

Estimating Promise Act Households

In our initial demographic profile, our definition of a Promise Act household or family is not limited to the eligibility status of the householder or head of family; rather, we consider whether there is any individual in the primary family unit who is eligible under the Promise Act, including unmarried partners (but not including non-relatives such as roommates, boarders, employees, and foster children). Like our estimates for current TPS households, we focus on the family because we believe this is where status concerns would be most impactful. In the demographic analysis, we consider the first family only because family relationships are not well specified for secondary family units in the same households. When we total up all members in the primary family unit, we do not include the nonrelatives (such as the aforementioned roommates) who were also not used in assigning Promise Act eligibility to the family unit. This method likely understates the family members affected by the Promise Act because it does not include secondary family units or foster children, and does not consider relationships with family members not in the same domicile.

Estimating Economic Contributions

Household tax contributions and spending power estimates are from the Center for American Progress (CAP), based on methodology developed by New American Economy (2019). In the economic contributions section, the estimates are for all households that contain a member who would be eligible for protection under the Promise Act of 2019 based on the methodology described above. One key distinction is that the CAP considers a TPS household to be one with any TPS member regardless of family relationship or family unit; this is a minor distinction that results in slightly larger numbers in terms of economic contributions than if our more restrictive family definition was used throughout. We calibrated our calculations of mortgage and rent payments to square with the rest of the economic data and so used this slightly broader approach in deriving those figures.

Household income, industry tags, mortgage status, and mortgage and rent payment come from the IPUMS version of the 2012-2016 ACS 5-year estimates. Federal tax rates come from the Congressional Budget Office (2018), while state and local tax rates come from the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (2018). Spending power is measured as household income after federal, state, and local tax contributions. To estimate Promise Act households' contribution to GDP, we took the percentage of all household income that was from Promise Act households then multiplied that percentage to the different states' total GDP. We repeated this estimation for the country's total GDP. The GDP estimates for each state and for the United States is an average of GDPs from 2012-2016. Each year's GDP was converted to 2016 dollars before they were averaged.

Estimating Congressional District Data

To assign all individual- and household-level estimates to Congressional Districts, we used a 2010 population-based crosswalk between Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) and Congressional Districts for the United States 116th Congress from the Missouri Census Data Center's Geocorr 2018 Geographic Correspondence Engine (beta version, revised 12/04/2018 with 2016 geographies). A geographic crosswalk was necessary because the ACS microdata includes only very limited geographic information, with the PUMA being the lowest level of geography attached to individuals. PUMAs contain a population of at least 100,000 while Congressional Districts have an average population of about 700,000.

We randomly assigned individuals to Congressional Districts in proportion to the 2010 population distribution (taking care to insure that all households remained intact, that is, that individuals were assigned in household "clumps" since no household could be split between two Congressional Districts), and then aggregated the results by Congressional District to derive the final estimates presented in several tables in the text and in an interactive map available at <https://dornsife.usc.edu/csii/map-dream-and-promise-act/>. While this introduces some unknown degree of geographic error in the resulting estimates, it is likely to be relatively minimal given that most PUMAs are either entirely contained or largely contained in a single Congressional District. We do not report data on the map when we deem the underlying sample to be too small to yield a reliable result.

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Image Credits

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