

ROCK THE (NATURALIZED) VOTE II

The Size and Location of the
Recently Naturalized Voting Age
Citizen Population

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The Center for the Study of Immigrant Integration's (CSII) mission is to remake the narrative for understanding, and the dialogue for shaping, immigrant integration in America. CSII brings together three emphases: scholarship that draws on academic theory and rigorous research; data that provides information structured to highlight the process of immigrant integration over time; and engagement that seeks to create new dialogues with government, community organizers, business and civic leaders, immigrants, and the voting public.

See the interactive map of the data used in this report: <https://dornsife.usc.edu/csii/rtnv2016-map/>

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Table of Contents

Introduction	2
Naturalization, Registration, and Voting	5
Assembling the Data	9
The Geography of Naturalized Voters	11
Immigrant Voters and the Vote	13
Appendix A: Tables	16
Appendix B: Technical Documentation	21
Appendix C: Resources	24
Image Credits	31
References	32

Introduction

This research brief is an update of *Rock the Naturalized Vote: The Size and Location of the Recently Naturalized Voting Age Citizen Population*, a report released in the fall of 2012 that sought to illustrate the importance of the potential immigrant vote in that year's presidential election. The report was timely given the state of policy and political play around immigration at that time. For example, by the end of President Obama's first term, the Dream Act had been re-introduced twice and failed both in 2010 and 2011, pushing President Obama to issue administrative relief to the would-be "Dream Act students" in the form of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA).¹ At the same time, lack of federal action had pushed states to take steps to define their positions on immigration, with two states in particular, California and Arizona setting forth the most progressive and the most anti-immigrant policies, respectively.² By the time the 2012 election came around, the mix of events had simmered and made immigration an important topic of debate, especially for Latino voters.



The impact of the immigrant vote was felt that year as President Obama was re-elected with 71 percent of the Latino vote and 73 percent of the Asian vote; while there are no breakdowns available for those populations by nativity, of the citizen adult population in 2012, about a quarter of Latinos were naturalized citizens and two-thirds of Asians were naturalized citizens, much higher than the 3 percent for the rest of the adult citizen population, and so these were ethnic groups likely to be particularly sensitive to immigration dynamics.³ Indeed, some analysts suggest the timely introduction of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) just five months prior to the 2012 presidential election was critical in garnering the Latino vote for Obama (Barreto and Segura 2014). The subsequent "post-mortem" of the election by the Republican Party seemed to recognize these realities when it suggested that sensitivities to immigration rhetoric had played a role in the dismal outcome for the GOP and that a new approach for the party might include shedding calls for "self-deportation" and instead making progress on comprehensive immigration reform (Barbour et al. 2012).

What has happened since then? While some thought that the post-2012 political winds favored reform, President Obama and immigrant allies in both parties have been stymied in their effort to move pro-immigrant legislation and policy. In 2013, the Senate passed a comprehensive immigration reform measure that had strong bipartisan support, partly because of the GOP post-mortem—but the measure went on to die in the House of Representatives where more conservative Republican lawmakers (and Tea Party insurgents) were determined to

¹ President Obama's executive order, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), allowed immigrants who arrived as children to obtain temporary work permits and be protected against deportation.

² In 2010, "The Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act," SB 1070 was signed into law by Arizona Governor Jan Brewer. SB 1070 was the country's toughest anti-immigrant law to date, making it a crime to be undocumented in the State of Arizona, requiring people to carry immigration papers, and allowing police to detain individuals they suspected to be undocumented. Georgia, Alabama, South Carolina, and Indiana followed suit with a series of copycat laws. In 2011, AB 130 and AB 131 passed in California, allowing "eligible AB 540 students to apply for and receive scholarships at California public colleges and universities derived from non-state funds" and from "funds partially derived from the state," expanding access to financial resources already available in the state. Connecticut, Colorado, New Jersey, Minnesota, Oregon, and Florida passed similar in-state tuition provisions in the years that followed (National Conference of State Legislatures 2014).

³ For data on the electoral margins by ethnicity, see <http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/polls/us-elections/how-groups-voted/how-groups-voted-2012/>. The calculations of nativity by ethnicity for the citizen adult population were conducted by the authors.

derail any attempt to provide legal status to undocumented immigrants. In 2014, the President issued executive actions to create a program called Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) and to expand DACA in ways that would shield a large share of the undocumented population from the threat of deportation. That triggered a political backlash and a lawsuit led by the state of Texas; when the case worked its way up to an understaffed Supreme Court, a deadlocked court insured that executive action was put on hold.

Immigration is now once again central to the current presidential contest between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. The politics of the issue is probably more divisive than ever, partly because Trump began his campaign with an explicit focus on “building a wall” and deporting all (or nearly all) of the nation’s undocumented immigrants. Many observers wonder whether Trump’s rhetoric will be successful at building a winning coalition or whether it will instead provide a repeat of what happened in California in the mid-1990s: an awakening of Latino, Asian, and immigrant voters, and a long-lasting shunning of Republican office-seekers. Organizations on the ground sense that Trump’s nativist rhetoric is indeed encouraging eligible immigrants to become citizens and register to vote to keep him out of office in November (Kriel 2016; Preston 2016; Yee 2016).

What are the potential consequences of this new immigrant voting bloc? How sizeable is the potential immigrant vote, where do voters live, and could they make a difference in battleground and other states?

We sought to answer a similar set of questions in our 2012 research effort and it provided a unique insight into the margins that eventually emerged in such states as Virginia and Florida. Given the heat of the current moment, we thought it would be useful to update that empirical exercise to ascertain the share of the naturalized (citizen) immigrants in the citizen voting age population and explore the potential power of the immigrant vote for the upcoming election, with a particular focus on those who naturalized recently (who, as we suggest below in our review of the research, might be the most sensitive to rhetoric and policies about immigrants). Combining newly available 2015 American Community Survey (ACS) 1-year summary data from the U.S. Census Bureau with individual-level answers to the same survey from previous years found in the ACS “microdata,” we offer a detailed analysis of the geographic location, country-of-origin, and the race/ethnicity of the recently naturalized voting age population at a level of detail not seen since our original report in 2012.

Why focus on the recently naturalized? As noted in our previous report, we do this partly because evidence suggests that the recently naturalized may be the most motivated around immigration issues, partly because their registration rates may have the most room for improvement, and partly because they are most likely to be first-time voters in the 2016 presidential election—so they represent a new voting bloc whose full impact has not yet been seen. In this updated analysis, we define the recently naturalized (or newly naturalized) as those who naturalized in 2005 or later, and explore the importance of these potential new voters by quantifying their share of the citizen voting age population (CVAP)—a measure of the voting-eligible population.⁴

This measure of potential electoral impact of the recently naturalized is illustrated in our new interactive maps along with data on their racial/ethnic and country-of-origin composition, which is provided at both the state and sub-state (and indeed, in many cases, sub-county) level. We also include in our online maps measures of those who naturalized since 1995 as a share of the CVAP, and all naturalized as a share of the CVAP. While not as

⁴ Note that we use the terms “CVAP,” “eligible voters,” “voting age population,” and “voting-eligible population” interchangeably, all referring to the U.S.-citizen population age 18 or older.

recent in their naturalization experience, those naturalized between 1995 and 2004 may also be particularly motivated by the current heated electoral debate around immigration, since some of them came to their own naturalization decision in the decidedly anti-immigrant political climate in California (and to some extent, nationwide) during the mid-1990s.⁵

As it turns out, the naturalized vote may be critical this electoral season once again: Naturalized citizens of voting age are about 8.8 percent of eligible voters. Moreover, when breaking down these potential naturalized voters by period of naturalization (since 2005, 1995-2004, and pre-1995), the recently naturalized are the largest group, comprising 38 percent of the total, or 3.4 percent of the total CVAP (although they likely constitute somewhat less of a share of the actual voters because of lower registration rates).

The newly naturalized are also concentrated in key states and locations. For example, they constitute 6.2 percent of the eligible voters in Florida and 5.3 percent in Nevada, both considered key “swing” states in the upcoming presidential election. Northern Virginia in particular was considered crucial to the outcome of the 2012 election and the substantial recently naturalized vote may have played a role. Our [maps](#) show the already large concentration of voting age naturalized citizens in this part of the country remains significant.

Understanding the size and location of the newly naturalized may help with targeted voter registration efforts in both this and future elections—and as we note below, once registered, naturalized citizens tend to vote at rates close to those of the U.S.-born. Registering and then mobilizing this vote may also help contribute to a more reasonable (and less hostile) conversation about immigration—one in which politicians and parties propose realistic solutions on immigration policy so that both voters and political leaders can concentrate on other important issues such as the economy and healthcare.

In what follows, we lay out the analysis and the numbers. We start first with a discussion of the tendency of the recently naturalized to register and vote, and the degree to which polarized debates about immigration may motivate these potential voters. We then offer a brief description of the methodology used to generate our estimates of the size and location of the recently naturalized, and offer an updated look at the recently naturalized by state, within state, and by country of origin and ethnicity; an appendix offers more detail on our calculations for those undaunted by discussion of data “raking” and other challenges faced when trying to combine individual-level answers and summary counts from the Census. We conclude with a discussion of what these data suggest for future efforts in the realms of voter registration, civic engagement, and policy change.

⁵ As discussed later in the brief, while “defensive naturalization” seems to have been particularly pronounced in California in the mid-1990s (and about a quarter of all immigrants that naturalized between 1995 and 2004 live in California), the limiting of benefits for non-citizen immigrants at the federal level through welfare reform in 1996 had a similar effect nationally.

Naturalization, Registration, and Voting

We are focused in this brief on the voting potential of recently naturalized citizens. It is important to note, however, that naturalized voters have generally registered and voted at rates lower than those of the U.S.-born (Bell 2016; Wang 2013; Wang and Kim 2011). The discrepancy seems to lie more with a difference in *registration* behavior than in *voting* behavior: Once registered,



immigrant voting rates are similar to native-born voting rates, and this is one reason why many immigrant advocates have focused on improving registration rates for naturalized groups (Wang 2013; Wang and Kim 2011). Reasons cited for lower registration rates among immigrants center more around structural barriers, such as missing registration deadlines, not knowing where or how to register, and difficulty with English, than around lack of interest or a sense that one's vote will not matter (Wang and Kim 2011).

It is also the case that historically, the more recent the immigrant, the less likely that person is to register and vote (Abascal 2015; Johnson et al. 1999; Logan, Oh, and Darrah 2012; Pantoja and Gershon 2006). Part of the reason is that the more recently naturalized are also more likely to be young, lower-income, and from Latino and Asian groups considered to be “minority” ethnics in America, all of which demographers and political scientists have found to be associated with lower registration rates (Wang and Kim 2011). The result is a muted immigrant voice in civic affairs, and not surprisingly, this has led some politicians to ignore the more recently naturalized in favor of the U.S.-born and those immigrants with a longer experience as citizens (Wang 2013).

However, the relationship between registration and the length of time since naturalization is not always clear. Every other November (in even-numbered years), the Current Population Survey (CPS) includes a supplement that asks respondents about registration and voting. The November 2012 Survey offered up the usual bad news: voter registration rates were about 9.9 percentage points higher for the U.S.-born as compared to naturalized citizens (72.0 percent to 62.1 percent).⁶ However, that gap had closed slightly since 2008—and it may be the more recently naturalized who helped drive the improvement.

We say “may” because determining this is tough given that the CPS Supplement does not ask respondents the year of their naturalization. However, it does ask the year of arrival in the U.S. and if we assume that recency of arrival and recency of naturalization mirror each other more or less, this then hints at the relationship between registration and recency of naturalization. As it turns out, the median years of eligibility before naturalization in the U.S. is seven years; since those who naturalize generally must have had legal permanent resident status for

⁶ These numbers may seem a bit high overall, but there is a reason: respondents tend to over-report their own registration and voting in surveys. There is, however, no reason to expect that this over-reporting will differ by group and so analysts tend to focus on the relative differences.

five years (and if married to a U.S. citizen, three years), naturalized individuals that have been in the country for twenty years or less are likely a somewhat close parallel to the group that has naturalized in the last ten years.⁷


In any case, to get a sense of how recency of arrival (and thus naturalization) might relate to voter registration, we grouped naturalized immigrants in the November CPS by recency of naturalization relative to the last four presidential elections and examined voter registration rates. For each election, we track three periods of arrival relative to each election year—immigrants who arrived in last 20 years, those who arrived 20-30 years ago, and those who arrived more than 30 years ago.⁸ The results are shown in Figure 1. First, notice that the registration gap is closing over time between more recent arrivals compared to naturalized immigrants who arrived (and likely naturalized) earlier. This suggests that more recently naturalized immigrants may be becoming more politically engaged and registering at relatively higher rates over time.

Second, if we look more closely, this narrowing of the gap seems to be driven by increased registration of the cohort of immigrants who arrived during the 1980s and 1990s (if you interpret how each relative group translates to actual years). To see this, note that between 2000 (when this cohort is entirely in the red bars) and 2012, part of the cohort moves from the red bars to the blue bars with each election year. While it may be coincidental, that the largest jump in the red bars is seen between 2000 and 2004 (when they largely consist of the 1980s and 1990s cohort) and the largest jump in blue bars is seen between 2008 and 2012 (when they begin to pick up much more of the same cohort) suggests that immigrants arriving in the 1980s and 1990s may be increasingly motivated to have their voice heard.

⁷ Median years of eligibility prior to naturalization is calculated by the authors using the same data (2010 through 2014 ACS PUMS files pooled together) and basic procedures described in Pastor et al. (2016); there was a special separate run for the data point in this report. It is important to note that typical lag times between arrival in the U.S. and naturalization vary by immigrant group. In particular, previous research has shown that Latino Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs) tend to prolong naturalization much longer than other LPRs; for example, in the microdata we use for these calculations, median years of eligibility prior to naturalization is 11 for Latinos and five for those who self-identify as non-Hispanic Asian or Pacific Islander.

⁸ The decadal breaks we use, however, are not precisely as indicated given limitations of the CPS data. Namely, some years of arrival are grouped together and reported as a range of years, with the range sometimes differing depending on the survey year. Thus, for several of the ranges reported, the actual year breaks differ by one or two years from the breaks reported.

Figure 1. Voter-Registration Rate for Naturalized Immigrants by Period of Arrival in U.S.— Comparing Last Four Presidential Elections



Why might this be? This group may be more sensitive to the political climate around immigration than those who arrived at other times, as we see their relative registration rates increase alongside a concomitant rise in anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric. In the mid-1990s, California’s Proposition 187 sought to make undocumented immigrants ineligible for public benefits in the state, and to facilitate the marginalization of immigrant communities from public services like education and healthcare (Ayres Jr. 1994). At the national level, the two years just prior to 2008 saw the largest pro-immigrant protests rejecting H.R. 4437, the so-called the “Sensenbrenner Bill” that sought to, among other things, make it illegal to provide any assistance to undocumented immigrants; this wave of marches also prompted large citizenship campaigns and other immigrant mobilizations efforts to gear up for the upcoming presidential election.⁹ And the jump in registration rates among foreign-born citizens between 2008 and 2012 coincides with a new peak in anti-immigrant rhetoric at the national level with Republican candidate Mitt Romney’s calls for “self-deportation” and doing away with DACA.

The above observations are consistent with research that has shown that, at least for Latinos, those who naturalize in a politically charged environment on immigrant issues, as was the case in California in the mid-1990s and the early 2000s, vote at rates substantially higher than native-born or longer-term naturalized Latino citizens (Barreto, Ramirez, and Woods 2005; Barreto and Segura 2014; Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001;

⁹ In 2006, millions of people participated in immigration reform protests across the country. The protests were in response, in large part, to H.R. 4437, a proposed bill that would have severely raised penalties on undocumented immigrants. Although the bill was passed in the House of Representatives in December 2005, it failed to pass in the Senate.

Ramírez 2013).¹⁰ Scholars use the term “defensive naturalization” to refer to the act of seeking citizenship as a form of mobilization or in response to anti-immigrant sentiment (Ong 2011; Pantoja et al. 2001; Ramírez 2013). Another form of defensive naturalization can occur when anti-immigrant sentiment spills over into policy making as in the Clinton Administration’s 1996 reform of welfare law which limited benefits for non-citizen immigrants and effectively shifted incentives to favor naturalization (Fix 2009; Singer 2004).

In any case, the registration rates of immigrants do seem to generally track the intensity of the debate about and around them. Of course, immigration rhetoric seems to have hit a new peak—or low, depending on your view—with the current Republican nominee, Donald Trump. Analysts suggest that the pattern seen in California in the 1990s, with a decline in Republican Party registration and a spike of naturalizations, may now be possible for the country as a whole (Jaffe 2015). Already, studies offer evidence of a new highpoint developing: Migration Policy Institute reports that naturalization applications are up 21 percent in the first two quarters of fiscal 2016 (October through March 2016) over the same period in 2015 (Zong and Batalova 2016). The most recently released USCIS data includes application rates for the third quarter (April through June 2016), and National Partnership for New Americans (NPNA) notes that they are up 32 percent over the third quarter of 2015 (National Partnership for New Americans 2016). Making perhaps a more relevant comparison, Krogstad (2016) shows that over the nine month period from October 2015 to June 2016, naturalization applications were up 8 percent over the same period prior to the 2012 presidential election.

If historical patterns perpetuate, immigrant registration and voting rates will be higher in the upcoming election than in 2012. “Bread and butter” issues probably dominate for immigrants as they do for other voters—although this is hard to conclusively demonstrate since polling data on the relative importance of immigration policy is usually broken down by the race of respondents rather than their nativity. If we use race/ethnicity as a “second-best” approach and focus on Latinos, analysts suggest that while not the most important issue, immigration “can be a significant wedge issue that drives Latino voters to the polls at election time” (Bell 2016).

This is reflected in a June 2016 Pew Research Center poll which was used to rank a variety of issues by the share of registered voters indicating that a particular issue was “very important.” While immigration ranked 4th for Latinos with 79 percent saying it was very important, it ranked 6th for all registered voters combined, with only 70 percent of that group saying it was very important (Pew Research Center 2016). Perhaps more relevant to potential impact on turnout in pivotal states, a July 2016 poll of registered Latino voters in 12 battleground states suggests that while less enthusiastic about the current election than the 2012 election (36 percent said they are more enthusiastic in 2016 while 46 percent said they were more enthusiastic in 2012), for those who are more enthusiastic this time around, the number one reason identified by a significant margin is to stop Donald Trump and/or defend Latinos (Manzano 2016).

¹⁰ For example, a study by Adrian Pantoja, Ricardo Ramírez, and Gary Segura looked at the turnout of Latino citizens in California, Florida, and Texas for the 1996 national election, and, using a multivariate logit analysis, found that recently naturalized Latino citizens in California were more likely to vote than their newly naturalized counterparts in Florida and Texas. Those two states had no parallel salient and divisive state ballot measures on immigration (like California’s Proposition 187) in the same time period. Ricardo Ramírez (2013) also found that California Latinos who first registered to vote between 1994 and 1996 consistently had higher rates of turnout in 1996 and 2000 than Latinos who first registered before or after this politicized period of time.

Polling results, then, suggest that in states that matter, Latinos might be less motivated in this election than in 2012—but among those that are motivated, the inflammatory tone toward immigrants and Latinos is a key driver. Since not all Latino voters are immigrants and not all immigrants are Latinos, this is not the clearest evidence about how important proposed immigration reforms are to the naturalized voting public. Nonetheless, it is not a stretch to think that naturalized voters, many of whom may live in mixed-status families, might be particularly sensitive to immigration; while it might not be the most important issue to them, it might be a bit of a litmus test.

Indeed, recalling what has occurred politically since the last election, including fights over comprehensive reform, debates about immigration policy in key states, arguments about the legitimacy of President Obama’s executive action, and the rise of Donald Trump with an increasingly nativist sentiment, it is quite possible that recently naturalized voting age citizens are indeed more likely to be engaged—or to be engage-able by immigrant advocates and others interested in raising registration rates and guaranteeing an immigrant voice in this and other elections. So what do the numbers tell us about the potential that is out there?

Assembling the Data

It would be nice if the data were readily available to easily answer this question about the potential impact of immigrant voters; then again, if it were, we would be contributing little by writing this brief and creating the accompanying interactive maps. Fortunately, it turns out that we do have something to add: There is no handy information on where the voting-age naturalized by period of naturalization in fact reside—but it has become possible to generate those estimates by combining a series of different Census-based data sources.

Beginning in 2008, the ACS has asked naturalized citizens the year they were naturalized. The ACS reports the data to researchers and the public in two basic forms. The first is summary-level data in which the individual answers have been added up according to categories pre-determined by the Census, with this data available via “friendly” web-based tools such as American FactFinder—although some still find this site and the tool rather overwhelming. The second is a yearly sample equivalent to 1 percent of the U.S. population in which the actual individual answers to survey questions are available. The latter file is called the Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS)—and PUMS and “friendly” are not usually words found in the same sentence.

While there is much available in the more accessible summary data, the key measures we needed for this report were not pre-summarized: What we were interested in was the proportion of the citizen population age 18 and older (and hence able to vote) that had naturalized and, in particular, had naturalized by various periods. The summary data does have period of naturalization but it offers no breakdown for that data by age, race/ethnicity, or country of origin—and there are also sub-state geographic areas for which the period of naturalization data is missing entirely, something that would get in the way of both mapping and resource targeting.

The lack of an age breakdown in the summary data for period of naturalization is particularly problematic for this exercise: Since naturalized immigrants are generally older than the U.S.-born (that is, most people migrate as adults), any comparison of the aggregate totals would understate the potential impact of recently naturalized immigrants on the vote. Indeed, in the underlying microdata utilized in this exercise, 93 percent of those who

naturalized in the last ten years are adults while only 74 percent of the US-born are adults; as a result, if you simply calculate the share recently naturalized among the total citizen population, you will seriously understate the potential impact of the recently naturalized on voting power.

The lack of race/ethnicity and country of origin is also problematic given that efforts to encourage registration and voting are often tailored by language and culture. And given variations in where the recently naturalized might reside within states—something also of particular interest to those encouraging the registration and voting of immigrant citizens—the lack of consistent sub-state geography is also frustrating to both researchers and those who might be seeking to mobilize the immigrant vote.

The good news is that the individual answers in the PUMS do offer great detail, including age, country of origin, immigration status, naturalization status, and year of naturalization for naturalized citizens. Each individual is also tagged with a geographic location called a Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA); these are collections of census tracts such that each PUMA has at least 100,000 people (with the minimum set at such a high number because the Census wants to preserve confidentiality of the responses by tagging the observation with a large geographic area). These PUMAs are definitely sub-state: For example, a big state like California has 265 such PUMAs, while Florida has 151, Virginia has 56, and Nevada has 18.

Thus, the basic task in this exercise is to exploit the rich detail of the individual-level microdata, including age, country of origin, and geographic location, and match that to the summary-level data that has less detail but is more likely to accurately reflect the current numbers on an aggregate level. This involves first filling in what is missing geographically in the summary data and then using microdata detail to generate reliable estimates of the voting age population, the immigrant share thereof, and the countries of origin and racial/ethnic breakdown for the recently naturalized at the state and sub-state levels. It may sound easier than it was—believe us, it was not simple and the work involved just under ten thousand lines of computer code to develop and cross-check our work—but we confine the gory details to an appendix and go on here to describe what the numbers show.

The Geography of Naturalized Voters

Table 1 reports the share that voting-age naturalized citizens comprise of all citizens of voting age for the United States as a whole and by state (all tables from here on are at the end of the brief in Appendix A starting on page 16). Those naturalized in the last ten years comprise about 3.4 percent of the citizen voting age population. Immigrants naturalized in earlier periods comprise another 5.4 percent of the potential electorate, but we concentrate here on the most recently naturalized since, according to the research and data cited earlier, they may be more likely to be motivated by immigration as a sort of litmus test and are also the group where registration rates need to be improved the most.



While 3.4 percent is a relatively large share of the national voting age citizen population, what may be more significant are the geographic locations of the newly naturalized. Perhaps unsurprisingly, California, New York and New Jersey top the list in terms of the recently naturalized as a share of the voting age citizen population—and certainly political figures have historically made plays for the immigrant vote in these states. But more interesting is the sizable share of the recently naturalized as a percentage of the voting age citizen population in places like Florida and Nevada—considered key to “swinging” the electoral outcome by virtually all sources—as well as other states that could be competitive such as Virginia, Arizona, and Georgia (see Table 1).

Within the various states, immigrants from certain countries of origin may be key. To get at this, we used the available microdata to determine the top sending countries and racial/ethnic groups for each state’s recently naturalized voting age population. The results, which also include three measures of the potential electoral impact of the immigrant vote—the recently naturalized (since 2005), the somewhat recently naturalized (since 1995), and all naturalized as a share of potential voters—are shown for eight states in Table 2. Most of the states were chosen because they are both considered competitive and have a significant recently naturalized share of the CVAP, while two—California and Texas—are included because they have a significant naturalized population and so offer a benchmark to understand the other states.¹¹

In addition, because much of the literature has focused on how Latino immigrant voters have been mobilized, Table 3 offers the ethnic breakdown of the overall naturalized voting age citizen population and the recently naturalized voting age citizen population. There may be some surprises for those less conversant with the literature or the reality: For example, Asian Americans, Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders (AANHPIs) are a significantly higher share than Latinos of naturalized citizens of voting age in California and a slightly higher share of the recently naturalized. This reflects the underlying composition of the immigrant population. In California, Latinos may be a bit over half of all immigrants, naturalized and non-naturalized, but Latino immigrants are much more likely to be unauthorized (and hence not eligible to become citizens) and Mexicans,

¹¹ For those seeking the same data found in Table 2 but for all states, see our online maps: <https://dornsife.usc.edu/csii/rtnv2016-map/>.

the largest Latino group in California and the U.S., have very low rates of naturalization (Lopez and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013; Pastor et al. 2016).

While the view at the state level is interesting, those seeking to elevate registration rates and mobilize immigrant voters might also be interested in the view *within* states. To gauge more exactly where the newly naturalized might reside, we exploit the fact that the data we use for this exercise are available at a sub-state geographic level called the PUMA (remember that from just a few pages ago? Probably not, but recall that these are aggregations of at least 100,000 people and allow us a sub-state view).

Those interested in interactively mapping the data to zoom in on states and within states can (and should!) go to: <https://dornsife.usc.edu/csii/rtnv2016-map/>. There, we provide information at the state level for the recently naturalized as a share of the CVAP, as well racial/ethnic breakdowns and detail on the top ten sending countries for each state; we suspect such detail may help with targeting registration efforts for the last phase of this electoral cycle and for the future. We also include measures of the less recently naturalized (since 1995) as a share of the CVAP—a group we suggest above may also be particularly motivated by the current debate around immigration—and all naturalized as a share of the CVAP, just to give a sense of the overall potential impact of the immigrant vote. At the PUMA level, we provide much of the same information, however, due to the much smaller underlying sample sizes, we report a broader country/region of origin breakdown of the recently naturalized rather than detailing the top ten sending countries, and do not report racial/ethnic or county/region of origin data for PUMAs with fewer than 1,000 recently naturalized of voting age. So, happy mapping—and even better, happy registering and voting!

Immigrant Voters and the Vote

This research brief suggests that recently naturalized immigrants constitute an important share of the citizen voting age population. While it is likely that the actual share of the newly naturalized in the November 2016 vote will be lower than their share of the citizen voting age population (mostly due to issues with registration), it is also true that in the 2012 election, naturalized immigrant Latinos and Asians had higher voter turnout



rates than their U.S.-born co-ethnic counterparts (Krogstad 2016; Lopez and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013).¹² Our own analysis of the November CPS supplement confirms this, and also suggests that turnout rates have trended upward for these groups (as well as for naturalized immigrant African Americans) in recent elections. Thus, this may be a very important bloc because each newly naturalized person is improving the ability for racial/ethnic groups with historically lower turnout rates to exercise decision-making power at the polls.

This importance stems not just from size but from location. In the 2012 presidential election several key states were decided by low margins of victory. For example, the margin of victory in that year was less than 1 percentage point in Florida—a state where 6.2 percent of the citizen voting age population is recently naturalized, and nearly 10 percent are somewhat recently naturalized (naturalized since 1995).¹³ The margins of victory were also rather close in North Carolina and Virginia. In North Carolina the margin of victory in 2012 is similar to the current share of the CVAP that is recently naturalized (2 percent versus 1.7 percent), and is smaller than the share that is somewhat recently naturalized (2.7 percent). In Virginia, the margin was about 3.9 percent compared to a 3.6 percent recently naturalized share of the CVAP and 5.8 percent share that is somewhat recently naturalized. While the margin of victory was larger in Nevada at 6.7 percent, the recently naturalized are an entire 5.3 percent of the CVAP in that state and the somewhat recently naturalized are about 9 percent. All four of these are considered to be key swing states in this electoral cycle, as are Georgia and Pennsylvania, where somewhat recently naturalized citizens (again, those naturalized since 1995) constitute about 4.2 percent and 2.8 percent of the CVAP, respectively.

For those who hope to see a more civil, balanced, and solutions-oriented conversation about immigration policy, helping political figures understand the importance of the potential immigrant vote may be a good thing. For many immigrant voters, the tone of the discussion about immigration can affect their dispositions toward a candidate, party, or platform. Candidates do not need to shift their basic positions, even on immigration policy, in order to placate immigrant voters, but the way they talk about immigrant issues—and the relative hardness or flexibility of their positions—may be important for political and policy futures (Barreto and Segura 2014; Bell 2016).

¹² Note that by “voter turnout,” we mean voters as a share of the CVAP (and not as a share of registered voters), which seems to be the most common definition found in the literature.

¹³ Data on 2012 presidential election margins by state is from: <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federalelections2012.shtml>

While our hope is that the data here will have such an effect on the tone of the debate, the data may also be useful in an immediate sense. We are releasing this report just before the deadlines for registration close in many states (see Table 4)—and as noted earlier, the most important gap in electoral participation by naturalized citizens seems to come at the point of registration rather than voting. The data—particularly the estimates of race/ethnicity, country of origin, and sub-state location—could help target some last minute efforts in more effective and efficient ways.

There are already many effective efforts out there to register naturalized citizens.

“Tu Voto Es Cosa Seria” is one of National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials’ (NALEO) voter engagement campaign initiatives this year. Its focus is on leveraging opportunities for voter registration in Los Angeles. Included in this partnership is Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti, Latino celebrity Edward James Olmos, Mi Familia Vota, and Univision. At a national level, voter engagement efforts include “Get Out the Vote” in states with large Latino populations like California, Texas, and New Jersey; and in states with hard to reach, low propensity voter populations like Nevada, Arizona, and North Carolina. NALEO provides support for regional partners leading phone banks, door-to-door canvassing, and other efforts, to encourage voter registration nationwide (Caal 2016). Additionally, a product of NALEO in 2012, the “Ya Es Hora - ¡Ve y Vota!” program, continues to be one of the nation’s most comprehensive bilingual voter information websites. It features detailed state-specific election information and an easy-to-use voter registration tool (check it out here: <http://veyvota.yaeshora.info/>).

The AANHPI community is also being mobilized to register nationally. Asian and Pacific Islander American Vote (APIAVote) is a national nonpartisan organization that works with partners to mobilize AAPI groups in electoral and civic participation. The organization focuses on mobilizing groups on the ground, focusing on person-to-person interactions. In August 2016, APIAVote demonstrated the scale of its impact—it held one of the largest and most diverse gatherings of AANHPIs in history to motivate the community to take action and vote. Over 2,500 community members, advocates, business leaders, organizations, and others heard from presidential campaign representatives in the historic 2016 Presidential Election Forum. APIAVote hopes the forum built energy to continue to spread the message and importance of voting this year and in elections to come.

“Stand up to Hate” is a new initiative that directly responds to the “ugly anti-Latino, anti-immigrant, and anti-Muslim rhetoric,” taking place in the current presidential campaign. Representative Luis Gutierrez and a coalition of groups—Latino Victory Foundation, NPNA, Mi Familia Vota, iAmerica Action, United Food & Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW), Unite Here, and Service Employees International Union (SEIU)—partnered to encourage new citizens to vote against offensive Republican comments. The goal is to tour the country to provide about 100 citizenship workshops, resources, and microloans, to reduce barriers to citizenship and encourage one million of those who naturalized this year to register and vote (Latino Victory Project 2016; Ortiz 2016).

Highly local efforts are also important. For example, in Los Angeles, the Council of Mexican Federations, or Consejo de Federaciones Mexicanas en Norteamérica (COFEM), is taking a cultural approach toward voter registration. An October 2016 concert featuring a popular Mexican band is expected to draw thousands of fans to the event. COFEM’s campaign slogan is “¡Hoy Bailamos, Mañana Votamos!” (“Today we dance, tomorrow we vote!”), which describes the goal of the event: to celebrate immigrants’ contributions to the United States and

raise the community's voice by registering as many concert attendees as possible (Council of Mexican Federations 2016).

There is also a non-partisan campaign launched by the White House, "Stand Stronger," a good resource for web-based support for eligible-to-naturalize immigrants. The project was launched on September 17, 2015 and it leverages Obama Administration efforts to create a multi-year, nonpartisan, educational, public awareness initiative with support from groups across sectors and media. The website outlines benefits of becoming a citizen and consolidates a comprehensive collection of resources that vary from information on eligibility requirements to civics test previews. Users will find a variety of tools like a citizenship class locator or online test preparation widgets. The website is in English and Spanish but several resources can be found in other languages, as well (Stand Stronger 2016).

Immigration will always be a hotly debated topic in American politics, particularly as the nation tries to reconcile competing imperatives, values, and points of view about the immigrant effect on our economy and society. But one thing virtually every American political leader can agree on is that those who have joined this nation as citizens should participate as fully as possible in setting the direction for the country. Encouraging those who have naturalized to register and vote is surely critical to ensuring that the voices of all Americans—both those who are long-time citizens and those newer to our democracy—can contribute to a vibrant civic culture.

Appendix A: Tables

Table 1. Voting Age Naturalized Citizens as a Share of the Voting Age Citizen Population

	All Naturalized	Recently naturalized (since 2005)	Naturalized 1995-2004	Naturalized before 1995
Alabama	1.6%	0.6%	0.3%	0.7%
Alaska	5.8%	2.6%	1.6%	1.7%
Arizona	7.8%	2.9%	2.1%	2.8%
Arkansas	2.0%	0.9%	0.6%	0.5%
California	20.8%	7.2%	6.8%	6.9%
Colorado	5.1%	2.1%	1.2%	1.7%
Connecticut	9.4%	3.5%	2.3%	3.6%
Delaware	5.4%	2.0%	1.6%	1.8%
District of Columbia	8.1%	3.2%	2.8%	2.1%
Florida	14.8%	6.2%	3.7%	4.9%
Georgia	5.7%	2.5%	1.7%	1.6%
Hawaii	13.9%	3.9%	2.9%	7.2%
Idaho	2.9%	1.2%	0.8%	0.9%
Illinois	9.4%	3.5%	2.9%	3.1%
Indiana	2.4%	1.0%	0.6%	0.8%
Iowa	2.2%	1.1%	0.6%	0.6%
Kansas	3.6%	1.5%	1.0%	1.1%
Kentucky	1.6%	0.8%	0.3%	0.5%
Louisiana	2.1%	0.8%	0.5%	0.8%
Maine	2.3%	0.8%	0.5%	1.0%
Maryland	10.1%	4.3%	2.8%	3.1%
Massachusetts	11.2%	4.8%	3.1%	3.4%
Michigan	4.4%	1.6%	1.2%	1.6%
Minnesota	5.1%	2.5%	1.4%	1.2%
Mississippi	1.0%	0.4%	0.2%	0.4%
Missouri	2.2%	0.9%	0.6%	0.7%
Montana	1.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.7%
Nebraska	3.3%	1.4%	1.1%	0.8%
Nevada	13.2%	5.3%	3.7%	4.2%
New Hampshire	4.1%	1.5%	1.1%	1.5%
New Jersey	17.3%	6.5%	4.9%	5.8%
New Mexico	4.7%	1.6%	1.3%	1.8%
New York	17.8%	6.5%	5.4%	5.9%
North Carolina	3.9%	1.7%	1.0%	1.1%
North Dakota	2.1%	1.2%	0.4%	0.5%
Ohio	2.7%	1.1%	0.6%	1.0%
Oklahoma	2.7%	1.1%	0.7%	0.9%
Oregon	5.4%	2.0%	1.6%	1.8%
Pennsylvania	4.3%	1.7%	1.1%	1.5%
Rhode Island	9.6%	3.8%	2.2%	3.6%
South Carolina	2.4%	1.0%	0.5%	0.9%
South Dakota	1.4%	0.6%	0.3%	0.5%
Tennessee	2.3%	1.1%	0.5%	0.7%
Texas	9.2%	3.8%	2.8%	2.6%
Utah	4.7%	2.1%	1.4%	1.2%
Vermont	3.0%	0.9%	1.0%	1.2%
Virginia	8.2%	3.6%	2.2%	2.4%
Washington	8.7%	3.4%	2.5%	2.9%
West Virginia	1.0%	0.3%	0.3%	0.5%
Wisconsin	2.7%	1.1%	0.7%	0.9%
Wyoming	1.9%	0.8%	0.3%	0.8%
United States	8.8%	3.4%	2.6%	2.9%

Note: All numbers are estimated and subject to error. Figures for naturalized by recency may not add up to those for all naturalized due to rounding.

Table 2. A Profile of Naturalized Voting Age Citizens for Eight Key States

Florida

	Number	As % of CVAP	As % of all naturalized
Recently naturalized (since 2005)	895,091	6.2%	42%
Naturalized since 1995	1,432,278	9.9%	67%
All naturalized	2,140,774	14.8%	100%

Characteristics of the recently naturalized population

Race/ethnicity:	Number	Percent
White	121,707	14%
Black	157,306	18%
Latino	517,088	58%
AANHPI	82,724	9%
Mixed/other	16,266	2%
Total	895,091	100%

Country of origin (top ten):	Number	Percent
Cuba	213,518	24%
Haiti	78,188	9%
Colombia	78,036	9%
Jamaica	54,544	6%
Nicaragua	35,609	4%
Mexico	32,286	4%
Dominican Republic	31,120	3%
Peru	28,005	3%
Venezuela	27,072	3%
Philippines	19,510	2%
Other	297,202	33%
Total	895,091	100%

Virginia

	Number	As % of CVAP	As % of all naturalized
Recently naturalized (since 2005)	215,894	3.6%	43%
Naturalized since 1995	351,772	5.8%	71%
All naturalized	498,646	8.2%	100%

Characteristics of the recently naturalized population

Race/ethnicity:	Number	Percent
White	40,834	19%
Black	33,853	16%
Latino	51,880	24%
AANHPI	83,273	39%
Mixed/other	6,054	3%
Total	215,894	100%

Country of origin (top ten):	Number	Percent
India	22,056	10%
El Salvador	14,445	7%
Philippines	13,163	6%
Korea	10,269	5%
Ethiopia	8,706	4%
Vietnam	8,490	4%
Pakistan	8,234	4%
China	7,215	3%
Peru	7,096	3%
Bolivia	6,161	3%
Other	110,060	51%
Total	215,894	100%

Nevada

	Number	As % of CVAP	As % of all naturalized
Recently naturalized (since 2005)	102,639	5.3%	40%
Naturalized since 1995	174,379	9.0%	68%
All naturalized	256,267	13.2%	100%

Characteristics of the recently naturalized population

Race/ethnicity:	Number	Percent
White	16,433	16%
Black	5,699	6%
Latino	44,873	44%
AANHPI	33,941	33%
Mixed/other	1,693	2%
Total	102,639	100%

Country of origin (top ten):	Number	Percent
Mexico	30,103	29%
Philippines	20,177	20%
El Salvador	4,598	4%
Ethiopia	3,794	4%
China	3,583	3%
Cuba	2,351	2%
Korea	2,072	2%
India	1,829	2%
Vietnam	1,791	2%
Peru	1,777	2%
Other	30,564	30%
Total	102,639	100%

Arizona

	Number	As % of CVAP	As % of all naturalized
Recently naturalized (since 2005)	137,231	2.9%	37%
Naturalized since 1995	236,914	5.0%	64%
All naturalized	369,730	7.8%	100%

Characteristics of the recently naturalized population

Race/ethnicity:	Number	Percent
White	27,941	20%
Black	6,024	4%
Latino	71,199	52%
AANHPI	29,025	21%
Mixed/other	3,043	2%
Total	137,231	100%

Country of origin (top ten):	Number	Percent
Mexico	63,126	46%
Philippines	7,662	6%
India	5,811	4%
Vietnam	5,329	4%
Canada	4,246	3%
China	3,328	2%
Korea	1,841	1%
Other USSR/Russia	1,800	1%
Romania	1,619	1%
Iran	1,567	1%
Other	40,902	30%
Total	137,231	100%

Note: All numbers are estimated and subject to error. Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding.

Table 2 (continued). A Profile of Naturalized Voting Age Citizens for Eight Key States

Georgia

	Number	As % of CVAP	As % of all naturalized
Recently naturalized (since 2005)	178,852	2.5%	44%
Naturalized since 1995	297,541	4.2%	73%
All naturalized	409,481	5.7%	100%

Characteristics of the recently naturalized population

Race/ethnicity:	Number	Percent
White	33,141	19%
Black	40,065	22%
Latino	42,769	24%
AANHPI	58,382	33%
Mixed/other	4,496	3%
Total	178,852	100%

Country of origin (top ten):	Number	Percent
Mexico	22,258	12%
India	19,445	11%
Korea	9,719	5%
Vietnam	9,472	5%
Jamaica	7,449	4%
Nigeria	6,529	4%
Colombia	5,202	3%
Philippines	4,753	3%
China	4,382	2%
Ethiopia	4,014	2%
Other	85,630	48%
Total	178,852	100%

Colorado

	Number	As % of CVAP	As % of all naturalized
Recently naturalized (since 2005)	81,672	2.1%	41%
Naturalized since 1995	130,294	3.3%	66%
All naturalized	197,092	5.1%	100%

Characteristics of the recently naturalized population

Race/ethnicity:	Number	Percent
White	22,762	28%
Black	10,110	12%
Latino	29,501	36%
AANHPI	17,576	22%
Mixed/other	1,722	2%
Total	81,672	100%

Country of origin (top ten):	Number	Percent
Mexico	21,503	26%
Vietnam	3,870	5%
India	3,181	4%
Canada	3,075	4%
Ethiopia	2,835	3%
Other USSR/Russia	2,787	3%
Korea	2,661	3%
China	2,376	3%
El Salvador	2,302	3%
Germany	1,784	2%
Other	35,299	43%
Total	81,672	100%

Texas

	Number	As % of CVAP	As % of all naturalized
Recently naturalized (since 2005)	657,771	3.8%	41%
Naturalized since 1995	1,155,411	6.6%	71%
All naturalized	1,617,765	9.2%	100%

Characteristics of the recently naturalized population

Race/ethnicity:	Number	Percent
White	72,548	11%
Black	54,513	8%
Latino	334,791	51%
AANHPI	185,341	28%
Mixed/other	10,580	2%
Total	657,771	100%

Country of origin (top ten):	Number	Percent
Mexico	263,319	40%
India	46,551	7%
Vietnam	39,434	6%
Philippines	30,001	5%
El Salvador	22,735	3%
Nigeria	17,641	3%
Pakistan	16,765	3%
China	15,896	2%
Korea	10,022	2%
Colombia	9,165	1%
Other	186,242	28%
Total	657,771	100%

California

	Number	As % of CVAP	As % of all naturalized
Recently naturalized (since 2005)	1,797,009	7.2%	34%
Naturalized since 1995	3,484,924	13.9%	67%
All naturalized	5,212,870	20.8%	100%

Characteristics of the recently naturalized population

Race/ethnicity:	Number	Percent
White	281,270	16%
Black	39,803	2%
Latino	700,906	39%
AANHPI	740,470	41%
Mixed/other	34,560	2%
Total	1,797,009	100%

Country of origin (top ten):	Number	Percent
Mexico	516,889	29%
Philippines	188,663	10%
Vietnam	114,832	6%
China	113,646	6%
India	104,281	6%
El Salvador	72,692	4%
Korea	61,226	3%
Iran	54,373	3%
Guatemala	37,762	2%
Taiwan	32,915	2%
Other	499,730	28%
Total	1,797,009	100%

Note: All numbers are estimated and subject to error. Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding.

Table 3. Ethnic Composition of the Naturalized Voting Age Population

	All Naturalized as % of Voting Age Citizens	Of which:					Recently Naturalized as % of Voting Age Citizens	Of which:				
		% Latino	%AANHPI	%Black	%White	%Mixed/ other		% Latino	%AANHPI	%Black	%White	%Mixed/ other
Alabama	1.6%	25.1%	32.6%	7.6%	31.2%	3.5%	0.6%	35.8%	29.8%	11.7%	18.3%	4.3%
Alaska	5.8%	14.7%	51.5%	2.0%	27.7%	4.1%	2.6%	20.8%	53.4%	2.7%	19.8%	3.3%
Arizona	7.8%	48.7%	20.9%	2.7%	25.7%	2.0%	2.9%	51.9%	21.2%	4.4%	20.4%	2.2%
Arkansas	2.0%	46.7%	28.3%	1.5%	21.1%	2.3%	0.9%	60.2%	23.7%	2.2%	12.5%	1.3%
California	20.8%	35.8%	43.5%	1.5%	17.4%	1.8%	7.2%	39.0%	41.2%	2.2%	15.7%	1.9%
Colorado	5.1%	31.9%	26.2%	7.2%	32.8%	1.9%	2.1%	36.1%	21.5%	12.4%	27.9%	2.1%
Connecticut	9.4%	18.5%	21.3%	15.4%	42.8%	2.0%	3.5%	23.8%	24.3%	18.1%	30.8%	3.0%
Delaware	5.4%	17.3%	30.2%	23.2%	26.1%	3.3%	2.0%	21.9%	28.0%	26.6%	20.7%	2.9%
District of Columbia	8.1%	25.1%	16.4%	29.9%	25.2%	3.3%	3.2%	27.3%	12.5%	32.4%	23.9%	3.9%
Florida	14.8%	53.4%	10.7%	16.0%	18.0%	2.0%	6.2%	57.8%	9.2%	17.6%	13.6%	1.8%
Georgia	5.7%	22.5%	33.8%	21.5%	19.7%	2.5%	2.5%	23.9%	32.6%	22.4%	18.5%	2.5%
Hawaii	13.9%	5.3%	85.1%	0.6%	6.7%	2.2%	3.9%	8.1%	83.2%	1.1%	6.0%	1.7%
Idaho	2.9%	45.9%	20.0%	1.2%	30.6%	2.2%	1.2%	56.8%	16.2%	1.9%	22.1%	3.0%
Illinois	9.4%	30.3%	29.1%	3.5%	35.8%	1.2%	3.5%	29.9%	29.6%	5.5%	33.8%	1.1%
Indiana	2.4%	28.0%	31.9%	6.1%	31.4%	2.6%	1.0%	33.1%	33.6%	10.4%	21.0%	1.8%
Iowa	2.2%	27.6%	33.8%	6.2%	30.5%	2.0%	1.1%	33.2%	21.3%	11.0%	31.9%	2.6%
Kansas	3.6%	38.0%	35.5%	5.2%	19.8%	1.5%	1.5%	48.5%	27.7%	7.9%	14.3%	1.5%
Kentucky	1.6%	23.8%	31.3%	10.2%	31.1%	3.6%	0.8%	28.8%	27.2%	14.2%	25.9%	3.8%
Louisiana	2.1%	34.8%	35.4%	7.4%	20.4%	2.1%	0.8%	34.6%	36.7%	10.6%	15.4%	2.7%
Maine	2.3%	6.2%	21.9%	7.1%	64.1%	0.7%	0.8%	10.5%	30.2%	17.6%	40.8%	0.8%
Maryland	10.1%	18.4%	35.8%	23.3%	19.9%	2.6%	4.3%	20.3%	30.6%	32.5%	14.5%	2.2%
Massachusetts	11.2%	17.0%	25.8%	14.3%	39.7%	3.2%	4.8%	22.9%	24.3%	18.4%	30.1%	4.3%
Michigan	4.4%	8.4%	28.0%	4.0%	57.1%	2.4%	1.6%	9.9%	31.7%	6.0%	50.4%	2.0%
Minnesota	5.1%	11.1%	42.3%	23.0%	21.4%	2.2%	2.5%	10.4%	34.9%	34.6%	18.8%	1.2%
Mississippi	1.0%	21.2%	39.7%	8.9%	26.8%	3.5%	0.4%	27.1%	44.8%	7.4%	18.0%	2.8%
Missouri	2.2%	17.9%	32.9%	10.0%	35.8%	3.4%	0.9%	19.9%	31.0%	14.1%	31.4%	3.5%
Montana	1.3%	16.4%	21.2%	0.3%	59.9%	2.3%	0.3%	20.1%	29.5%	0.0%	49.7%	0.8%
Nebraska	3.3%	41.0%	26.3%	7.1%	24.4%	1.1%	1.4%	38.3%	24.3%	12.8%	23.4%	1.1%
Nevada	13.2%	39.1%	37.7%	3.2%	18.1%	1.9%	5.3%	43.7%	33.1%	5.6%	16.0%	1.6%
New Hampshire	4.1%	14.9%	24.6%	5.1%	53.9%	1.5%	1.5%	20.3%	27.4%	6.4%	44.4%	1.5%
New Jersey	17.3%	28.2%	31.8%	10.2%	27.8%	2.0%	6.5%	31.7%	34.0%	11.7%	20.4%	2.2%
New Mexico	4.7%	64.0%	14.7%	0.9%	19.3%	1.0%	1.6%	68.1%	16.7%	1.2%	13.4%	0.7%
New York	17.8%	23.9%	25.0%	19.8%	28.3%	3.1%	6.5%	28.4%	26.1%	20.8%	21.3%	3.3%
North Carolina	3.9%	26.8%	30.3%	12.1%	28.4%	2.4%	1.7%	30.8%	29.1%	15.0%	22.7%	2.3%
North Dakota	2.1%	18.7%	17.7%	10.1%	48.9%	4.5%	1.2%	10.0%	21.7%	17.9%	45.1%	5.3%
Ohio	2.7%	9.9%	31.6%	10.9%	45.2%	2.4%	1.1%	11.5%	32.7%	19.6%	33.9%	2.3%
Oklahoma	2.7%	35.9%	34.2%	6.0%	21.5%	2.4%	1.1%	42.5%	27.4%	11.8%	16.3%	2.0%
Oregon	5.4%	23.7%	36.5%	2.4%	34.6%	2.8%	2.0%	26.6%	33.2%	5.0%	31.8%	3.5%
Pennsylvania	4.3%	14.3%	34.1%	12.2%	37.3%	2.1%	1.7%	16.7%	36.5%	16.7%	27.8%	2.4%
Rhode Island	9.6%	33.1%	13.3%	11.3%	38.0%	4.3%	3.8%	43.3%	10.9%	16.9%	23.5%	5.5%
South Carolina	2.4%	24.8%	28.4%	7.9%	36.0%	2.9%	1.0%	31.4%	26.7%	6.2%	32.8%	2.9%
South Dakota	1.4%	18.6%	24.9%	19.6%	33.1%	3.8%	0.6%	24.2%	11.9%	25.9%	35.8%	2.3%
Tennessee	2.3%	22.3%	33.0%	10.9%	30.8%	3.0%	1.1%	24.1%	29.5%	17.3%	26.2%	2.9%
Texas	9.2%	52.8%	28.5%	5.5%	11.7%	1.6%	3.8%	50.9%	28.2%	8.3%	11.0%	1.6%
Utah	4.7%	41.8%	26.2%	3.4%	26.8%	1.8%	2.1%	51.4%	19.2%	6.2%	20.6%	2.6%
Vermont	3.0%	8.8%	21.1%	2.7%	63.9%	3.6%	0.9%	5.6%	26.6%	5.1%	55.7%	7.1%
Virginia	8.2%	20.0%	42.6%	11.2%	23.1%	3.1%	3.6%	24.0%	38.6%	15.7%	18.9%	2.8%
Washington	8.7%	14.6%	47.3%	5.3%	30.8%	2.0%	3.4%	16.9%	39.1%	8.0%	33.8%	2.2%
West Virginia	1.0%	15.4%	33.7%	8.1%	36.9%	5.9%	0.3%	20.7%	28.7%	9.3%	29.3%	12.0%
Wisconsin	2.7%	21.6%	37.1%	3.5%	36.4%	1.3%	1.1%	27.7%	38.4%	6.0%	26.6%	1.3%
Wyoming	1.9%	29.7%	22.4%	4.4%	42.0%	1.6%	0.8%	31.5%	16.5%	11.1%	40.7%	0.2%

Note: All numbers are estimated and subject to error. Figures by race/ethnicity may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding.

Table 4. Voter Registration Deadlines, 2016

State	Voter Registration Deadline for 2016 General Election
Alabama	October 24, 2016
Alaska	October 9, 2016
Arizona	October 10, 2016
Arkansas	October 10, 2016
California	October 24, 2016
Colorado	October 31, 2016
Connecticut	November 1, 2016
Delaware	October 15, 2016
District of Columbia	October 17, 2016
Florida	October 11, 2016
Georgia	October 11, 2016
Hawaii	October 10, 2016
Idaho	October 14, 2016
Illinois	October 11, 2016
Indiana	October 11, 2016
Iowa	October 29, 2016
Kansas	October 18, 2016
Kentucky	October 11, 2016
Louisiana	October 11, 2016
Maine	October 18, 2016
Maryland	October 18, 2016
Massachusetts	October 19, 2016
Michigan	October 11, 2016
Minnesota	October 18, 2016
Mississippi	October 8, 2016
Missouri	October 12, 2016
Montana	October 11, 2016
Nebraska	October 21, 2016
Nevada	October 18, 2016
New Hampshire	October 29, 2016
New Jersey	October 18, 2016
New Mexico	October 11, 2016
New York	October 14, 2016
North Carolina	October 14, 2016
North Dakota	Registration not required
Ohio	October 11, 2016
Oklahoma	October 14, 2016
Oregon	October 18, 2016
Pennsylvania	October 11, 2016
Rhode Island	October 9, 2016
South Carolina	October 8, 2016
South Dakota	October 24, 2016
Tennessee	October 11, 2016
Texas	October 11, 2016
Utah	October 11, 2016
Vermont	November 2, 2016
Virginia	October 17, 2016
Washington	October 10, 2016
West Virginia	October 18, 2016
Wisconsin	October 19, 2016
Wyoming	October 24, 2016

Source: <https://www.usvotefoundation.org/vote/state-elections/state-election-dates-deadlines.htm>

Appendix B: Technical Documentation

As noted in the text, the basic empirical work in this paper involved combining American Community Survey (ACS) summary data available from American FactFinder with additional detail available in the ACS Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS). Specifically, we used the version of the ACS microdata files from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) (Ruggles et al. 2015). Unless otherwise noted, all numbers of naturalized immigrants, and naturalized immigrants as a share of the citizen voting age population (CVAP) we report reflect 2015 estimates, while all measures of composition (e.g. race/ethnicity and country of origin) are based on a three-year pooled sample of the 2012-2014 IPUMS microdata.

Combining the ACS summary data with the microdata required some degree of data “fitting” for several reasons. First, we wanted to use the 2015 summary data from American FactFinder to get as close as possible to the population that will be participating in the 2016 election. Why use the summary data at all when you could potentially generate similar estimates from the PUMS? First, 2015 summary data is more recent; indeed, it was slated for release in mid-September 2016, and the corresponding 2015 PUMS microdata will not be available for some time. Even if it had been, using just one year of the PUMS microdata would not allow us a sufficiently large sample to have confidence about the share estimates generated from the microdata. While the Census weights the individual observations in the PUMS to ensure that they will add up to the summary totals, this is generally done with some basic controls for gender and race, and not for immigration experience. Thus, a straightforward summary from the microdata might not perfectly match the summary-level data for the same year and the summary data is actually generated from a slightly larger sample.

So we essentially wanted to use as much of the 2015 summary data as possible but couple that with information from the PUMS microdata. To work through these issues, we first self-pooled the currently available most recent three years (2012, 2011, and 2010) of the PUMS microdata (which also conveniently have consistent geography for the Public Use Microdata Areas, or PUMAs, discussed in the main text). We then generated estimates at the PUMA level for those individuals born in the U.S., immigrated but not naturalized, and immigrated and naturalized in eight different time periods. Aside from nativity, we also pulled data on age, race/ethnicity and country of origin; we did a run for those over 18 and naturalized in the last ten years (and the last ten to twenty and other period breaks) in order to generate a list of the top ten countries of origin for each state in the U.S., a bit of data used later in the process.

The eventual naturalization periods we were working to fit to were those specified in the 2015 summary data: 2010-2015, 2005-2009, 2000-2004, 1995-1999, 1990-1994, 1985-1989, 1980-1985, and pre-1980. To do this, we used five-year bands for each yearly sample (so last five years, for example, for any given year in the pool) to categorize the naturalization periods; we eventually used two ten-year bands for the most recent naturalization bands in our reporting and mapping, but using the five year bands *first* allowed for more accuracy before aggregating to the ten year bands. Another alternative would have been to cut the data for each time period strictly but that would have been non-representative: In the 2012 sample, for example, naturalization in 2010 covered only the past three years, not the past five years as in 2014.

This led a complete dataset which had, for every PUMA in the U.S., the total population, the total U.S.-born, and the total non-naturalized. It also generally had the total naturalized by our eight time periods (although occasionally there were missing cells, an issue we had to address in “fitting” the data), and the percent of each of these groups that was above the age of 18. We also obtained detail by ethnicity and for region of origin for naturalized immigrants in the voting age population as well as similar ethnic and region of origin breaks for those who naturalized in the last ten years and in the last eleven to twenty years. Finally, for the various breaks, we also generated a separate listing for the top ten countries of origin by state, with that order determined by the largest share of voting age population who had naturalized during the period in question.

The next task was to ensure that this set of PUMA-based estimates was consistent with the most recent 2015 summary data (we first did this entire exercise with the 2014 and 2013 summary data separately to get the programming and cross-checks ready for the release of the 2015 data). Unfortunately, the 2015 summary file is missing some key data points: While there is data on total population for all PUMAs, a sizable number of PUMAs lack information on the basic citizen/immigrant split and nearly twenty percent of the PUMAs do not report information on the period of naturalization. Such missing summaries are typical of summary data—if the Census feels the underlying sample is not large enough, they will not populate the cells.

To fill in the data (or populate the missing cells), we did a series of “iterative proportional fits,” with all data fitted to the state level; we chose the state as the fitting brackets since all summary data was available at the state level and this would allow for a greater degree of accuracy given state differences in immigrant patterns. To understand what an iterative proportional fit is, consider a table where one knows the totals for all the rows and columns but has less reliable information for the individual cell entries—say a state when you know the total number of people in every country (good news) and the total number of Blacks and whites in the state but you only know the number of Blacks and whites in 45 of the 52 counties. To fill in the gap, you start with your best guess for each cell—hopefully, one informed by other data points—and you then “rake” the data, adjusting first to fit the rows (the number of people in each PUMA), then the columns (the number of Blacks and whites in the state), and over and over again, until each successive rake has less impact and the rows and columns add up perfectly.

In this exercise, we took the 2015 summary data and populated the missing observations by taking as our “best guess” figures calculated from the microdata. We first filled in for the very small number of missing citizen/immigrant breaks, fit that, and then did the same exercise for a citizen adult by nativity series (since that is what counts for voting age calculations). For the year of naturalization categories, there is no summary-level data on adults. So we derived micro-data estimates of the share of adults in each category by PUMA and multiplied that by the number of all people in the year of naturalization category. We took advantage of the fact that everyone who naturalized more than twenty years ago is an adult (to have done something two decades earlier, you have to be older than 18!). That means that we can take the gap between the total number of naturalized adults (which we knew or had derived through the first fit) and the total number of adults naturalized more than twenty years ago (which we also know from the previous fitting of all observations) and allocate the remaining adults across the four most recent five year bands. Given the high variance in the microdata series, it was more likely than not that the first guess for the sum of adults in each year of naturalization category did not equal the total we had derived for all naturalized adults; we fitted that and also checked to make sure that the result never exceeded what we estimated to be state totals for these categories.

Once that was done for the PUMAs for which we had available summary data, we needed to fill in with the “raking” strategy described above. As noted, the fit was not to the entire U.S. (although it eventually fit that) but rather to the respective states as we knew those totals and this allowed for more accuracy. The easiest “rakes” were when only one PUMA was missing from a state—the totals obviously had to be the state total minus the total obtained from adding up all the non-missing observations. It was far more frequently the case that states lacked summary data for multiple PUMAs on the time period of naturalization data; this required more raking, but the data was made consistent with the state-level totals available in the summary data (and a special check was there to insure that the missing adults never exceed the missing all, in which case we adjusted the initial adult estimates). We completed the estimation procedure by calculating the children in each category as well.

As for the shares of each naturalization band from various countries/regions of origin and from each ethnic group, they are entirely derived from the microdata (since they are not summarized by the Census) and those percentages are applied to the final fitted totals to obtain our estimates for various countries/regions of origin and ethnic groups by state and PUMA. Because it was possible that microdata-derived estimates for an ethnic or region cell (the percent of immigrants who naturalized in the last ten years in a particular PUMA who were Black) could be positive in our PUMS data when in fact the summary data report zero, we had a procedure that set those percentages to zero for consistency. Likewise, if the summary data reported a positive number of naturalized in a particular time period but we did not have micro-level data to calculate percentages (the micro-data was missing for that cell), we swapped in the state ethnic or region-of-origin percentages. Both of these cases are rare but the process allows us to completely fill the data set.

In any case, our PUMA-level estimates for totals by period of naturalization are quite reliable—they are either taken directly from the summary data or emerge from the fitting procedure—and our state-level estimates of the national origin and ethnic composition for the different periods of naturalization are also generally reliable, as these are based on relatively large samples from the microdata. Because PUMA-level estimates by race/ethnicity or broad countries/regions of origin can emerge from a small sample size and have an uncomfortably wide margin of error, we suppress reporting such estimates in the PUMA-level maps that accompany this report for PUMAs with fewer than 1,000 recently naturalized citizen of voting age in 2015.

Appendix C: Resources

National

Asian Americans Advancing Justice

<http://www.advancingjustice.org/>

Asian Americans Advancing Justice seeks to promote a fair and equitable society by working for civil and human rights and empowering Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders and other underserved communities around the country. Advancing Justice provides legal counseling and free citizenship assistance with the purpose of empowering, mobilizing, and protecting the rights of Asian American, Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander voters.

Asian Pacific Islander American Vote (APIAVote)

<http://www.apiaivote.org/>

APIAVote is a national nonpartisan organization that works to mobilize Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders in electoral and civic participation. APIAVote envisions a world that is inclusive, fair, and collaborative, and where Asian Americans and Pacific Islander communities are self-determined, empowered, and engaged.

Commit to Citizenship

<https://committocitizenship.org/>

The “Stand Stronger” campaign is a project of Civic Nation, a non-profit that leverages the Obama Administration’s efforts to build a multi-year, nonpartisan, educational, public awareness initiative around naturalization. The website offers comprehensive resources for citizenship exam preparation, features a citizenship class locator, and provides information on upcoming United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) naturalization sessions.

Center for Citizenship and Immigrant Communities

<http://cliniclegal.org>

The Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc., helps strengthen immigrant rights groups by preparing charitable immigration programs to expand their service-delivery capacity and by coordinating a service-delivery and legal support structure.

Latino Victory Project

<http://latinovictory.us/>

The Latino Victory Project aims to build political power within the Latino community to ensure that Latino voices are represented at every level of government. It aims to build a permanent base of Latino voters through leadership development activities as well.

League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC)

<http://lulac.org/programs/civic/>

The League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) advances the economic condition, educational attainment, political influence, housing, health, and civil rights of the Hispanic population of the United States.

Mi Familia Vota

<http://www.mifamiliavota.org/>

Mi Familia Vota is a national organization working to unite the Latino and immigrant community and its allies to ensure social and economic justice through increased civic participation. In collaboration with other community organizations, Mi Familia Vota seeks to build civically cognizant and active neighborhoods.

Movimiento Hispano (Hispanic Movement)

<http://www.movimientohispano.org/>

Movimiento Hispano (Hispanic Movement) is a project of Latinos for Democracy (LFD). It aims to increase Latino civic engagement and voter turnout. LFD is a coalition comprised of the Hispanic Federation (HF), The Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA), and the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC). LFD launched the website (see link above) to create a nonpartisan, culturally competent virtual tool to guide citizens to register to vote and engage civically, online.

National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO)

<http://veyvota.yaeshora.info/>

Ya es hora ¡Ve y vota! is a nonpartisan voter information and education infrastructure that consists of both the campaign's 1-888-Ve-Y-Vota bilingual national hotline and a website tool to provide Latino voters nationwide with vital information on every aspect of the electoral process, from registering to vote, to voter ID requirements, to polling place locators.

National Partnership for New Americans (NPNA)

<http://www.partnershipfornewamericans.org/>

The National Partnership for New Americans (NPNA) advances the integration and active citizenship of immigrants to achieve a vibrant, just, and welcoming democracy for all. It self-identifies as a national multiethnic, multiracial partnership that harnesses its collective power and resources to mobilize millions of immigrants for integration and transformative social change. NPNA facilitates community voices, many that have previously been excluded, to speak on their own behalf.

PICO National Network

<http://www.piconetwork.org>

Let My People VOTE is an effort led by African American and Latino congregations within the PICO National Network to register voters and combat voter suppression. Resources offered include information about voter suppression and toolkits for faith-based community involvement.

United States Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS)

<http://www.uscis.gov>

USCIS offers resources and information for eligible permanent legal residents looking to naturalize. Among its tools for preparing for the naturalization process, USCIS offers information on the rights and responsibilities of citizens, in which voter registration is included.

Voto Latino

<http://www.votolatino.org/>

Voto Latino is a dynamic and growing nonpartisan organization. Its civic engagement campaigns have reached an estimated 55 million Latino households nationwide. Voto Latino is dedicated to bringing new and diverse voices into the political process by engaging youth, media, technology, and celebrities to promote positive change.

Regional

Arizona

Arizona Legal Women and Youth Services (ALWAYS)

<http://alwaysaz.org/>

ALWAYS is a legal center devoted to providing services to children and women. The organization assists undocumented immigrants who are homeless or victims of trafficking and abuse find pathways to employment, stability, and self-sufficiency. ALWAYS helps young people up to age 24 obtain the legal documents needed to file for DACA, specialized visas for abused and neglected children, and visas for survivors of human trafficking, domestic violence and other qualified crimes.

California

California Common Cause

<http://www.commoncause.org>

California Common Cause works for various issues to hold “higher power accountable.” Their efforts for voting rights and registration include protecting the vote through access, accuracy, and accountability.

Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (CHIRLA)

<http://www.chirla.org/>

Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (CHIRLA)’s civic engagement work is designed to meet the needs of low-propensity, new American voters to encourage them to participate in our democracy. CHIRLA’s “Inmigrantes en Acción/Immigrants in Action” campaign engages registered voters in six different regions in California: San Joaquin Valley, Central Valley, Antelope Valley, San Fernando Valley, San Gabriel Valley, and the Inland Empire. CHIRLA trains volunteer teams in these regions to increase voter contact through door-to-door canvassing with a pro-immigrant message. Phone banking stations call voters statewide while working side by side with the canvassing effort to contact voters multiple times to educate them on ballot initiatives and get them out to vote on Election Day.

Council of Mexican Federations (COFEM)

<http://www.cofem.org/>

COFEM is a community-based umbrella organization comprised of groups of people who share ideas and participate in efforts to create opportunities for Latino immigrants in North America, specifically in California. COFEM aims to empower immigrant communities to participate in all facets of social, political, economic, and cultural life of the United States and their countries of origin.

Mobilize the Immigrant Vote (MIV)

<http://mivcalifornia.org>

In California, Mobilize the Immigrant Vote (MIV) advocates for an approach to electoral organizing that emphasizes elections work as one component of a larger movement for social and economic justice. It focuses on short-term increases in voter turnout and wins on specific ballot initiatives. It also builds leadership and capacity within low-income immigrant communities and organizations, catalyzes and strengthens diverse multi-ethnic alliances, and connects electoral work to ongoing organizing for social justice.

National Korean American Service & Education Consortium (NAKASEC)

<http://nakasec.org/blog/>

The National Korean American Service & Education Consortium (NAKASEC) was founded to project a national progressive voice on major civil rights and immigrant rights issues and to promote the full participation of Korean American, in order to build a national movement for social change. The components of the campaign include: voter registration, voter education, voter mobilization, voter assistance, voter research, and voting rights advocacy.

Services Immigrant Rights & Education Network (SIREN)

<http://www.siren-bayarea.org>

Services Immigrant Rights & Education Network (SIREN) serves the Santa Clara County area in California. SIREN's platform includes articulating and sharing positions on the core issues that affect immigrants' ability to integrate, participate, and have a greater voice in their social and political life in American society.

Strategic Concepts in Organizing and Policy Education (SCOPE)

<http://scopela.org/>

SCOPE builds grassroots power to foster economic and social justice for low-income black and brown communities in Los Angeles. SCOPE organizes the South LA community and develops leaders so that they may have an active role in shaping policies in the region. In 2016, SCOPE launched a Get Out the Vote campaign in South LA with the goal of reaching 50,000 voters.

Colorado

Colorado Immigrant Rights Coalition (CIRC)

<http://www.coloradoimmigrant.org/>

The Colorado Immigrant Rights Coalition (CIRC) is a statewide, membership-based coalition of immigrant, faith, labor, youth, community, business, and other ally organizations. It was founded in 2002 to improve the lives of immigrants and refugees by making Colorado a more welcoming, immigrant-friendly state. CIRC achieves this mission through nonpartisan civic engagement, public education, and by advocating for workable, fair and humane immigration policies.

Florida

Americans for Immigrant Justice

<http://www.aijustice.org/>

Americans for Immigrant Justice created the Asylum, Residency, and Citizenship program to provide legal assistance to vulnerable immigrant populations that cannot afford to hire an attorney for representation before the Asylum office, Immigration Court, Board of Immigration Appeals, and US Citizenship and Immigration Services.

Florida New Americans

<http://www.flnewamericans.org>

Florida New Americans works for the full social, cultural and economic integration of immigrants in Florida and the country. The organization provides legal assistance for undocumented immigrants, helps lawful permanent residents become citizens, and encourages active civic participation through voter participation among New Americans.

Florida Immigrant Rights Coalition

<https://floridaimmigrant.org/>

The Florida Immigrant Rights Coalition is a statewide alliance of 62 organizations that work to advance the rights of immigrants. The organization supports the local immigrant population by providing services and information around administrative relief and naturalization processes. Through civic engagement and Get Out The Vote (GOTV) campaigns, it aims to fully integrate Florida's New Americans.

Illinois

Asian Americans Advancing Justice-Chicago

<http://www.advancingjustice-chicago.org/>

Advancing Justice-Chicago's Get Out the Vote (GOTV) campaign is conducted with partner organizations and community members to prepare the Asian-American community for the upcoming election. The GOTV campaign involves electoral base-building, ensuring no voter gets left behind, and encouraging less mobile or busier members of the Asian-American community to cast their ballots either.

Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights

<http://icirr.org/>

Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (ICIRR) and its member organizations, educate and organize immigrant and refugee communities to assert their rights; promote citizenship and civic participation; monitor, analyze, and advocate on immigrant-related issues; and, inform the general public of the contributions of immigrants and refugees.

Maryland

Casa de Maryland

<http://www.casademaryland.org/>

Casa de Maryland is a member of the Maryland New American Partnership (MNAP), which launched the New Americans Citizenship Project of Maryland in October 2009. The Project aims to build the capacity and effectiveness of existing community-based organizations that assist legal permanent residents (LPRs) in the naturalization process through integrated citizenship services. The Project, a statewide AmeriCorps program, addresses the unique reasons why priority immigrant groups are not naturalizing through a comprehensive and coordinated citizenship promotion plan.

Massachusetts

The Massachusetts Immigrant and Refugee Advocacy Coalition (MIRA)

http://www.miracoalition.org

MIRA works with local and national partners to make the citizenship process accessible to immigrants in the Commonwealth through Citizenship Clinics which take place across the state. In addition, MIRA offers free legal assistance for eligible legal permanent residents who want to become citizens.

Missouri

Advocate St. Louis

<http://www.oca-stl.org/>

Advocate St. Louis is part of OCA, a member-based organization dedicated to advancing the social, political, and well-being of Asian Pacific American advocates. The organization hosts voter registration drives in St. Louis to help residents become engaged citizens.

Milwaukee

Voces de la Frontera

<http://vdlf.org/>

Voces de la Frontera aims to build a world where workers and immigrants are treated with dignity. It provides legal clinics, citizenship classes, English classes, and DACA application support.

New Mexico

Encuentro

<http://www.encuentronm.org/>

Encuentro works with Latino immigrant families to transform New Mexico into a thriving place for all. It provides educational opportunities and strengthens the safety net for immigrant families by helping them build the skills needed to obtain economic and social justice. Encuentro provides citizenship classes, English classes, and high school equivalency preparation courses.

New Mexico Immigrant Law Center

<http://nmilc.org/>

New Mexico Immigrant Law Center provides high-quality services that enable immigrants to obtain legal status, fight deportation, and eventually become naturalized citizens. Through community partnerships, the organization works to provide bundled services that address other barriers immigrants face in increasing earning and asset development.

New York

New York Immigration Coalition (NYIC)

<http://www.thenyic.org/new-citizen-voters>

New York Immigration Coalition (NYIC) builds immigrant voting power through its nationally-recognized New Citizen Voter Registration Project. It is the largest voter registration project in New York State and the most successful initiative of its kind in the country. The volunteer-run project has registered more than 280,000 new citizens to vote over the past ten years.

Pathway to Citizenship-Long Island

<http://www.carecenny.org/#!pathway-to-citizenship-long-island/zq37r>

The mission of Pathway to Citizenship-Long Island is to incorporate immigrant communities in Long Island by emphasizing the importance of naturalization for immigrants, their families, and communities, while supporting immigrants through the naturalization process.

Oregon

Asian Pacific American Network of Oregon (APANO)

<http://www.apano.org/>

Asian Pacific American Network of Oregon (APANO) is a statewide, grassroots organization, uniting Asian and Pacific Islanders to achieve social justice. APANO and the Oregon Commission on Asian Affairs joined in a statewide Asian Pacific American Voter Education Project. The goal is to close voting gaps by increasing API voter participation and educating the community on the impact of elections.

Causa

<http://causaoregon.org/>

Causa is a statewide Latino immigrant rights organization. Causa works to defend and advance immigrant rights by coordinating with local, state, and national coalitions and allies. As the largest Latino civil and human rights organization in the Pacific Northwest, CAUSA has worked to push back against Police/Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and against ICE's immigration enforcement program, Secure Communities.

Oregon Voice

<http://www.oregonvoice.org/>

Oregon Voice strengthens the collective political impact of a broad network of community and advocacy organizations who serve underrepresented communities. Our goal is to prioritize a data-driven approach, support year-round civic engagement, and facilitate a culture of collaboration.

Pennsylvania

HIAS Pennsylvania

<http://hiaspa.org/services/citizenship>

HIAS Pennsylvania provides legal and supportive services to immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers to ensure fair treatment and full integration into American society. It offers representation and legal counseling before immigration agencies and courts, social services to assist newly arrived immigrants, and citizenship courses among other forms of support for those seeking to naturalize.

Pennsylvania Immigration and Citizenship Coalition (PICC)

<http://www.paimmigrant.org/programs>

The Pennsylvania Immigration & Citizenship Coalition (PICC) is a diverse coalition that represents the needs of immigrants, migrants, refugees, and other New Americans living in Pennsylvania among policy makers, public officials, and the general public. Through community citizenship classes and voter registration drives, PICC helps immigrants become fully participating citizens in the U.S.

Tennessee

Tennessee Immigrant and Refugee Rights Coalition (TIRRC)

<http://www.tnimmigrant.org/>

The Tennessee Immigrant and Refugee Rights Coalition (TIRRC) is a statewide, immigrant and refugee-led collaboration. Its mission is to empower immigrants and refugees throughout Tennessee to develop a unified voice, defend their rights, and create an atmosphere in which they are recognized as positive contributors to the state.

Washington

Washington New Americans Program (WNA)

<http://www.wanewamericans.org/>

The Washington New Americans Program (WNA) is a partnership between the State of Washington and OneAmerica (formerly Hate Free Zone), a non-profit dedicated to advancing justice and equality. Its goal is to promote successful immigrant integration by connecting eligible lawful permanent residents to the information and services needed to successfully pursue citizenship and become active members of their community.

Northwest Immigrant Rights Project (NWIRP)

<https://www.nwirp.org/>

The Northwest Immigrant Rights Project (NWIRP) promotes justice by defending and advancing the rights of immigrants through direct legal services, policy advocacy, and community education. The organization supports legal permanent residents in their naturalization process.

Wisconsin

Voces de la Frontera

<http://www.vdlf.org/>

Voces de la Frontera is Wisconsin's leading immigrant rights group. It has led campaigns on civil rights and social justice issues and mobilized large groups to take collective action. Its members have become community leaders that organize around legalization with a path to citizenship, the advancement of workers' rights, Get Out the Vote (GOTV) efforts, education rights, youth organizing, and around a movement of faith, the New Sanctuary Movement.

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