

CHAPTER OUTLINE: *PROBLEMS FROM REID*

1. *Sensation and perception.* Reid's distinction (now standard in psychology texts) between sensation and perception; whether sensations are objectless or have themselves as objects; Reid's threefold account of perception.
2. *Reid's nativism.* Reid's rejection of the empiricist tenet that all concepts are derived from experience; the concept of extension as an exception to empiricism; Reid's *experimentum crucis*.
3. *Direct realism versus the way of ideas.* What it means to say we perceive external objects directly; Reid's critique of arguments for the way of ideas; his way of securing direct realism.
4. *Primary and secondary qualities.* What Reid regards as right and wrong in the view that primary qualities (e.g., shape) exist in objects while secondary qualities (e.g., color) exist only in the mind.
5. *Acquired perception.* Perception enhanced by learning is what Reid calls "acquired perception." Is it really perception? Are there any limits to how far it may extend?
6. *The geometry of visibles.* Why Reid thinks visual space is non-Euclidean; the case for his having preceded the mathematicians; whether his geometry compromises his direct realism.
7. *Erect and inverted vision.* Why do we see things right-side up, given that our retinal images are inverted? The opposing answers of Berkeley and Reid; how Reid's answers are borne out by contemporary cognitive science.
8. *Molyneux's question.* Would a man born blind and made to see be able to know by sight the objects he formerly knew by touch? Why Berkeley says no and Reid says yes; why Reid is right.
9. *Memory and personal identity.* Reid's rejection of the Lockean view (still popular today) that personal identity is grounded in memory; memory as direct awareness of things past.
10. *Conception and its objects.* How can there be cognitive relations to objects that do not exist, as in imagination and hallucination? How Reid answers without invoking ideas; whether his view anticipates Meinong's theory of nonexistent objects; how his view may be used in the service of direct realism.
11. *Epistemology 1: The nature of first principles.* What are Reid's first principles about our cognitive faculties meant to tell us—what things humans naturally believe, what things are reliably true, or what things are self-evident? What warrants the principles themselves?
12. *Epistemology 2: Reid's reply to the philosophical skeptic.* The anti-skeptical force of three Reidian motifs: direct realism, naturalism (the view that we believe certain things by our nature), and externalism (the view that knowledge-giving factors need not themselves be known).
13. *Epistemology 3: Lehrer's Reid.* A special role for principle 7; knowledge of reliability as indispensable for knowledge; faculties that vouch for themselves.
14. *Theory of action 1: Causation, action, and volition.* Event causation versus agent causation; actions as events caused by volitions, which are themselves caused by agents.
15. *Theory of action 2: Determinism, freedom, and agency.* How Reid's theory of agent causation slips between the horns of arbitrary uncaused acts of will and deterministic causal chains stretching back to dinosaur days; whether his view succumbs to infinite regress.
16. *Reid versus Hume on morals.* Reid's insistence (in opposition to the still-influential views of Hume) that moral approbation involves judgment, not just feeling, and that reason can select ends, not just means; analogies between positions in meta-ethics and epistemology.