A STUDY OF NEGATIVE DOMESTIC REACTIONS TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCES INTO AN ALLIED STATE

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Abstract

Although international protests are a fixture in today's news, negative reactions to US deployments are hardly a new phenomena, even when the deployments are ostensibly for the protection of allies. This paper studies the underlying motivations that encourage negative domestic reactions to military deployments in allied states. It uses case study methods to analyze the deployment of US cruise missile forces to the United Kingdom in the early 1980s. The paper analyzes a wide range of primary sources including personal interviews with key anti-cruise organizers, government records, opinion polls and published books and articles. It was discovered that four aspects of extra-territorial allied deployments greatly influence negative reactions: 1. The perceived level of threat incurred by hosting the forces, 2. the level of control that the host state maintains over the forces, 3. the level of mistrust and anti-ally sentiment present in the host state, 4. the level of protestability of the forces.

The paper also sets up ordinal scales in order to judge the presence of each of these factors in the cruise missile case and also in any future cases. The study concludes with a discussion of the implications for potential host and deploying states both at the international and domestic levels. It also explains the significance of the findings to current international relations theory.
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Introduction

An oft-overlooked consideration in security planning, severe and policy-shifting consequences can result from the deployment of military forces into an allied state. A negative reaction to the deployment within the host state itself is one of the most visible. In defiance of careful negotiations, domestic dissatisfaction has historically altered policies and security objectives of the host state, deploying state, and larger alliance structure if applicable. With the rise in media and communication technology fueling international grassroots political movements, it is now more critical than ever that policy planners understand the exact factors that encourage negative domestic reactions.

Growing international concerns have prompted many to establish, or consider establishing, postings in allied countries and future deployments of this type are currently being planned. Thus it is also vital to future security studies. Yet despite its importance and relevance there has been little focus onto this general question within international relations literature. Thus we are left asking: What motivates and encourages negative domestic reactions to the deployment of military forces into an allied state?

The answer is critical to a growing number of nations. Several states maintain a military presence within allied countries today. French military personnel are located in at least 9 different allied countries outside of France. British troops can be found in Canada, Germany and Cyprus. The US military reports that it maintains 702 facilities worldwide.1 Russian troops are located in several former soviet countries. India has

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1 This number can be misleading as a facility can be anything from a Girl Scout park to an operational airbase. The actual number of bases is far less than 702. Source: Department of Defense’s Base Structure Report: Fiscal Year 2003 Baseline. This report is produced by the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment).
recently established a base at Farkhor in Tajikistan.\(^2\) The placement of military forces into an allied state occurs often and is done by more than just the United States.

As the world's security landscape and alliance structures become increasingly interwoven it is increasingly probable that extraterritorial military bases will become the norm. A current example is the Pentagon's plans to restructure the US's overseas military deployments in order to meet "the nation's evolving security challenges."\(^3\) Kurt Campbell and Celeste Johnson wrote recently in *Foreign Affairs* that the US "will shift people and assets from safe, secure, and comfortable rear-echelon facilities to jumping-off points closer to the flame."\(^4\)

In these new areas the presence of US forces might spark a negative public reaction. These future host states which may be relatively less stable will face heightened protest with intensified results. Being able to anticipate potential uprisings will assist planners and negotiators in determining where to deploy troops and how best to do so.

Analyzing this research question has the potential to cast light on two international relations theories as well. Extraterritorial deployments require intensive negotiations and because of this it adds to the knowledge base which supports Robert Putnam's two level game theory. This is the idea that negotiating states must consider what will be accepted at both the international and domestic levels. Regarding this research, a decision made to host foreign forces may be workable at the international level but may not be accepted domestically. This research also supports Peter Gourevitch's theory of the "second image reversed". This is the idea that politics at the

\(^2\) "India Sets Up Military Base in Tajikistan," *The India Times*, 16 August 2003.


\(^4\) Ibid. p. 96
international level can influence those at the domestic level. For this study, the decision to host allied forces made at the international level can have political consequences domestically in the form of a negative reaction to the deployment.

**Hypothesis**

To determine what motivates and encourages negative domestic reactions to the deployment of military forces into an allied state this paper identifies four aspects of a military deployment into an allied country which increase the likelihood of a negative reaction. The first is the threat incurred by hosting the forces. The greater the security threat the forces are perceived to present to the host state the greater the likelihood of a negative reaction. Second, the level of mistrust and anti-ally sentiment is considered. The greater the level of mistrust or anti-ally sentiment present, the more likely a negative reaction will occur. The third is the level of control which the host state will have over the forces deployed in their country. The less control the host state maintains over the visiting forces the greater the likelihood of a negative reaction. The final aspect is the protestability of the deploying forces. The greater the level of protestability (location, visibility, accessibility) of the visiting forces the more likely a negative reaction. To assist in analyzing these four aspects ordinal scales are described in the methods section.

Additionally, there are some aspects of the deployment of forces into an allied state which may influence a negative domestic reaction, but are outside the scope of this paper. One example is criminal activity committed by the deployed forces, as in the
rapes committed in Okinawa by US Marines which led to stronger calls for the removal of US forces there. The crime aspect of basing forces in an allied state is not analyzed as this paper is concerned with variables that can be measured before the forces deploy. Also not considered are those things particular to a state which might lead to the rejection of allied forces by the host population. Consider the predominantly Christian US troops in Saudi Arabia where much of the Muslims population reacted negatively to their presence in a holy land. State-specific aspects were not considered as this paper deals with variables which are transferable and universally applicable. Although the four variables presented in this paper provide substantial understanding of negative domestic reactions, they are not the only aspects to consider.

US Cruise missiles in the United Kingdom

To analyze the research question and the hypothesis, this paper studies the deployment of US cruise missile forces to the United Kingdom in the early 1980's. As will be described in greater detail in the background section, when NATO's plans to deploy cruise missiles to Britain were made public intense domestic opposition was sparked and grew rapidly. The cruise missile situation was selected because the factors which motivated negative reactions in this case would be more transferable to other cases. Additionally, as will be described in the methods section, it would seem unlikely for a negative reaction to US forces to occur in Britain. This gives more weight to the motivating factors found.
Literature Review

Existing published work does little to answer the question of this study, and for the most part it remains on the periphery of the relevant literature. Current literature can be separated into three categories: 1. general work on military forces in allied states, 2. country-specific literature, and 3. international relations theory literature. While existing studies do contribute to the ideas advanced in this paper, they do not answer or even directly engage the research question.

General Work on Military Forces in Allied States

The first category of relevant published material deals generally with military forces based inside allied states. As with most of the literature, it focuses almost exclusively on the US military's network of overseas bases. The majority of the works in this category are historical accounts which do not offer in-depth analysis on specific issues such as that studied in this thesis. There are a few writings which look deeper into particular issues, such as basing agreement negotiations, but none which analyze the question or the variables presented in this paper. Within this category of work, negative domestic reactions were recognized to be relevant in many case studies, thus acknowledging the importance of the research question.

The best example of a historical account of forces in allied states is C.T. Sandars' America's Overseas Garrisons, published in 2000. In this work Sandars broadly
discusses the establishment and evolution of US bases in different regions throughout the world. Occasionally he notices domestic "sensitivities" which become problems for the visiting forces. Sandars explains one instance in the Middle East where "the Arabs, particularly the Saudis, remained acutely sensitive to the prospect of American forces permanently based on their territory." He took note of similar sensitivities in Europe and Asia as well. Though he does recognize the importance of domestic reactions to visiting forces, Sandars does not offer further analysis of the issue.

John Macdonald and Diane Bendahmane edited US Bases Overseas: Negotiations with Spain, Greece and the Philippines, an excellent example of work in this category, critically assesses the negotiations for base rights in Spain, Greece and the Philippines. The importance of domestic politics and reactions to the potential presence of visiting forces is occasionally mentioned but not analyzed. In one instance it describes how the Spanish were particularly sensitive to public opinion on the issue. Although the importance of domestic reactions to visiting forces is acknowledged, there is little analysis of the issue to be found in this or similar works.

Country Specific Literature

The second category of relevant published material deals with the issue of visiting forces within a single state. Similar to the previous category most of these works are historical accounts which occasionally make note of domestic reactions but do little to

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6 Ibid. pgs. 322-324
analyze or explore them. Within this category there is also literature relevant to the more specific issues of visiting forces in the UK and the cruise missile case used in this study. As these works generally discuss domestic politics, the issues of visiting forces in the UK and the cruise missile case are considered only for their role in the domestic political landscape. Again, there is little exploration on what may cause negative reactions to the visiting forces.

Daniel Nelson's *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* is an example of a country specific historical account. It describes the progression of the US military presence in Germany from the end of the Second World War to the time of its publication in 1987. It discusses the different issues and events that arose in Germany as a result of the US military presence, including crimes committed by soldiers and questions of race relations. This may explain some anti-US sentiment, but this would be only a shallow consideration of the research question. The deeper issues behind what may lead to a negative domestic reaction are still not addressed.

Another good example of a country specific historical account is William Berry's *U.S. Bases in the Philippines: the evolution of the special relationship*. Although the Philippines are a former colonized state, this work is particularly relevant to this study. One example is Berry's recognition that anti-Americanism complicated the acceptance of US use of Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Station in the Philippines. However, this is only one aspect of what might cause a negative reaction and is not deeply analyzed. As historical accounts, neither of these works is dedicated to analysis of specific issues. The question of what might motivate negative domestic reactions to visiting allied forces remains essentially unaddressed and unanswered.
Some of the work in this category is more relevant to the issue of US forces in the UK and to the cruise missile case of the early 1980's. Simon Duke's US Defence Bases in the United Kingdom: A matter for joint decision? is the most thorough work to be found on US forces in the United Kingdom. Through a chronological survey from the establishment of US bases in 1948 to its publication in 1986, it attempts to redress the lack of understanding and knowledge of their history and effects. In this work Duke concentrates on the evolution of the US-UK agreements which established the rules for the US forces.

In focusing on the agreements, Duke's main concern is the level of control the United Kingdom has over the US forces (variable 1 of this study). He discusses the apparent ambiguity within the arrangements and describes the implications this has on UK control over US forces within its territory. Duke sees this ambiguity and lack of control as especially dangerous with the presence of US nuclear forces in Britain.

With its focus on the control variable Duke's work is very useful to this study, but does not fully address its research question. Duke makes little mention of domestic responses to US forces stationed in Britain. Further, it does not connect the one variable it recognizes (control over visiting forces) to domestic opinion or action. So, although Duke comes closest of all the literature in addressing the research question it remains unanalyzed and not directly engaged.

Some literature regarding US-UK relations mentions US bases in Britain but does little to discuss their relation to domestic politics. Wm Roger Louis' and Hedley Bull's The Special Relationship, which describes the beginnings and progression of the close post-war relations between the United States and the United Kingdom, is characteristic of
this work. While US forces are mentioned in the context of US-UK interaction their relation to domestic politics is not considered. This group of work deals primarily with issues at the international level so the research question lies on the periphery of its focus.

While there is much relevant work which deals with issues at the international level there is also a significant amount of literature which focuses on the national or domestic level. The work dealing with defense and British politics, in particular, is closely related to this study's topic. Lawrence Freedman's *Politics of British Defence* dedicates several pages to discussing the domestic political activities surrounding the deployment of US cruise missiles in Britain. Freedman even notices that hosting the cruise missiles played on people's existing fears from cold war tension, thus recognizing this study's second variable (perceived threat to security incurred by hosting the allied forces). He does not, however, attempt to analyze what influence the second variable might have on any domestic reaction to the US cruise missiles.

Bruce George's *The British Labour Party and Defense* is another example. This work discusses the relation between US nuclear bases and Labour's evolving security policy. In the text, US bases like the Polaris submarine base at Holy Loch, are brought up in relation to the Labour's proposed "non-nuclear defense policy". George goes on to examine the relation between the anti-nuclear/peace movement and Labour's adoption of unilateral disarmament during the 1983 general election as its proposed defence policy. He does not, however, consider the relation between visiting US forces and the anti-nuclear/peace movement, or any other group focused on opposing the presence of US bases in the UK.

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Paul Byrne's *The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament* is a good example of literature that deals with activism in Britain's domestic politics. It provides information relevant to this study's topic in its relation of the history of Britain's CND, but does not directly engage the research question. Byrne notes the CND's opposition to US bases but does little to explore why this opposition exists. Published at the height of the CND's popularity, this work's primary focus is to provide a history of Britain's largest anti-nuclear movement. Analyzing what may be behind the CND's opposition to a particular issue is not within its scope. This work is, however, an excellent source for this paper as it contains information which provides insight into the motivation of the CND membership.

**International Relations Theory Literature**

The third category of literature deals with relevant international relations theories. This study derives much of its theoretical basis from Peter Gourevitch's *The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics*. In this article Gourevitch advanced the idea that not only do domestic politics impact international politics, but international politics influence domestic politics as well. He describes the latter as the "second image reversed". Most of Gourevitch's attention was on international economics, the state system and how different world perspectives view their influence. He mentions the involvement of foreign forces in domestic politics, but only in the context of military invasion.

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Robert Putnam's *Double Edged Diplomacy* provides further structure to this paper's theoretical foundation. In his chapter Putnam takes Gourevitch's second image reversed and relates it to the two level game theory.\(^{11}\) He brings together two ideas which are at the core of this paper: 1. that a decision made at the international level can influence politics at the domestic level and 2. that a move made in a two level game may make sense on the international board but may not be politic on the domestic board. Additionally relevant to this paper is Putnam's argument that when analyzing a case for the second image reversed actors other than governments must be studied. He believes that parties, classes, interest groups, public opinion, and elections must be taken into account.\(^{12}\)

The work included in each of the three categories make some contributions to the ideas advanced by this paper. However, they provide too little attention on the research question to produce a satisfactory answer. The question of what motivates negative domestic reactions to the presence of visiting allied forces itself lies on the periphery of the existing literature's focus and so is not adequately addressed.


\(^{12}\) Ibid. pg 433
Research Structure and Method

Research Methods

This study is a least-likely single case study which uses primarily qualitative methods. The majority of the analysis will be done on what was said and done by the government, the opposition parties, their politicians, activist groups, and their organizers. Additionally, a limited amount of quantitative data, such as national public opinion polls and activist group membership surveys, is used to buttress the study's findings. As most of the variables analyzed in this paper are difficult to subject to quantitative measurement, ordinal scales have been created to describe the levels at which the variables exist in this case and others.

Attempting to use quantitative methods would have risked loss of contact to the actual events, people and decisions. The many dynamics present in widespread public antipathy requires a "more comprehensive and more detailed contact with concrete instances of the events and behavior."\(^\text{13}\) Having a closer connection to the actual issues in the case with qualitative methods allows for "greater confidence in the validity of the hypothesis."\(^\text{14}\)

This paper uses a least-likely case study to provide further confidence in its findings. This method establishes an "extreme case that is highly unlikely to confirm, and finds that even this case does so."\(^\text{15}\) In this study, it would seem unlikely that US

\(^{14}\) Ibid.
\(^{15}\) Ibid.
forces deployed to the United Kingdom, its closest ally, to deter an attack against Britain and at the behest of Britain's leaders, would cause much protest. This paper shows, that even here the four variables were influential enough to cause widespread public outcry.

Though a qualitative least-likely case study is more appropriate there are some reservations. Despite presenting a convincing case, these methods will not be able to prove the thesis. This limitation is acceptable as this paper only intends to explore the subject of domestic reactions to visiting allied forces, and to introduce a useful hypothesis. Additionally, qualitative methods "provide lesser precision in their descriptions."\(^{16}\) This acceptable because this study is more concerned with the precision in its explanation of causes than with measuring exactly how much of something existed.

Finally, case study methods may present a hypothesis that is not transferable as the "cases studied could be atypical."\(^{17}\) To mitigate this possibility a case was selected which provided greatest transferability. Though every case is unique, analysis of the cruise missile case offers results which can be easily transferred to other cases. This is partially because it is a least-likely case study, and partially due to the fact that there are fewer intervening variables to interfere with the results.

The Variables and Their Ordinal Scales

Five variables must be considered in order to determine what causes a negative domestic reaction to visiting allied forces. The first, the dependent variable, is simply the occurrence of a negative domestic reaction. The four remaining are the independent or

\(^{16}\) Ibid.
\(^{17}\) Ibid.
causal variables: 1. the perceived level of threat incurred by hosting the allied forces, 2. the level of control the host state maintains over the visiting forces, 3. the level of mistrust and anti-ally sentiment present, 4. the level of protestability of the forces. All of the above variables can occur at varying degrees. Negative reactions can range from a handful of residents from one town writing letters to local leaders to a national campaign that organizes demonstrations attended by hundreds of thousands of participants, or even violent attacks on the forces. The following section will provide definitions and ordinal scales for each of the variables to assist with analysis and transferability to other cases.

Dependant Variable: Negative Domestic Reaction

A negative domestic reaction for this study is defined as actions by citizens of the host state expressing opposition to the deployment or presence of visiting allied forces. The ordinal scale created for this variable considers the size and seriousness of a domestic reaction and places it into one of four categories: 1. extreme, 2. high, 3. medium, and 3. low. A low domestic reaction would consist of a numerically small locally based opposition (less than 10,000). The tactics used at this level would be harmless and legal such as letter writing and possibly small protests. A medium domestic reaction would consist of a more sizable regional opposition (less than 100,000). The tactics used at this level are still, for the most part, harmless and legal, although minor illegal tactics may appear. A high domestic reaction would consist of a numerically strong national opposition (more than 100,000). Tactics at this level are still generally harmless but also include illegal but non-violent civil disobedience. Some low-level violence may exist at this level as well. An extreme domestic reaction would consist of a
numerically strong nationwide opposition (more than 100,000) whose tactics include violent and illegal acts.

Independent Variable 1: The Perceived Level of Threat Incurred by Hosting the Allied Forces

For the purposes of this study, a threat is defined as the physical and political endangerment of the host state. The perceived level of threat present has a direct relationship with the level of negative domestic reaction, that is, the greater the threat perceived the higher the negative reaction. The ordinal scale created for this variable takes into account the seriousness of the danger presented by the threat and places it into one of four categories: 1. extreme, 2. high, 3. medium, 4. low. A low threat would be nothing more than the possibility of a minor strain in relations with neighboring states. There would be little or no possibility of physical harm at this level. A medium level of threat would include the probability of a strain in relations with neighboring states and possibly with others worldwide. The potential for physical harm at this level would be from isolated technical malfunctions and human errors by the deployed troops which might result in a limited amount of damage and death. A high level threat is one which has the probability of a serious strain on relations with states worldwide. The danger of physical harm at this level is much higher with the possibility of provoking attacks that could result in the deaths of hundreds and millions of dollars in damage. An extreme threat would almost certainly place a serious strain on relations with other states worldwide. At this level, physical harm would potentially mean the deaths of millions and inestimable damage.
Independent Variable 2: The Level of Control the Host State Maintains Over the Visiting Forces

The level of control for this study is defined as the amount of say the host state has in the use of the visiting forces. The level of control variable has an inverse relationship with the level of domestic reaction, that is, the more control the less negative domestic reaction. The ordinal scale set up for this variable considers the amount and type of power the host state maintains over the visiting forces, as allocated by understanding and agreement between the two states. The level of control can be placed into one of four categories: 1. total, 2. high, 3. medium, 4. low. A low level of control would consist only of consultation without the actual ability to prevent any particular action by the visiting forces. A medium level of control would again include consultation but would additionally involve the power to influence the actions of the visiting forces. A high level of control is the ability to veto any action the visiting forces may be considering. Total control is just that, the ability of the host state to determine any or all actions of the visiting forces.

Independent Variable 3: The Level of Mistrust and Anti-ally Sentiment Present

For this paper the level of mistrust and anti-ally sentiment is the degree to which the host population dislikes the ally and disbelieves their statements or promises. This variable has a direct relationship with the level of domestic reaction. Thus, the greater the mistrust and anti-ally sentiment the greater the negative domestic reaction. The ordinal scale created for this variable takes into account the percentage of the population
that distrusts/dislikes the ally as well as the type and tone of statements made by leading figures regarding the ally. The level of mistrust/anti-ally sentiment can be placed into one of four categories: 1. pervasive, 2. high, 3. medium, 4. low. A low level of mistrust and anti-ally sentiment would exist when less than 10% of the population expressed mistrust or dislike toward the ally. The statements made by leading figures would have a friendly tone toward the ally and would generally be amicable. A medium level would indicate that more than 10% but less than 30% of the population expressed a dislike or mistrust of the ally. The statements of some leading figures would tend to question the ally’s statements or actions. A high degree of mistrust or anti-ally sentiment would reflect that more than 30% but less than 50% of the population held this dislike and distrust. The statements of many prominent figures would clearly question the ally’s actions and words as well as advocate action upon this mistrust. When the level is pervasive then more than half the population dislikes the ally and considers it to be untrustworthy.

Independent Variable 4: The Level of Protestability of the Forces

The word protestability was created especially for this study. It refers to the degree to which the visiting forces are visible to the general public, the forces are discussed in the domestic mass media, the forces are near population centers, and the degree to which the forces make an easy target of protest. The ordinal scale for protestability considers all of the above aspects and again consists of four categories: 1. extreme, 2. high, 3. medium, 4. low. A low level of protestability would indicate that the
visiting forces keep a low profile. They are located far away from population centers, are rarely mentioned in the media, and maintain tight security thus discouraging would-be protesters. A medium level would mean that the visiting forces attempt to keep a low profile but they are noticeable by the public and in the media. Additionally, they are located more than 2 hours drive from population centers and security is relatively tight but weaknesses are apparent when looked for. A high level would exist when the visiting forces are noticed often by the public and media. They are located more than an hours drive from a population center and security has noticeable weaknesses which protesters can exploit. An extreme degree of protestability would indicate that the visiting forces are obvious to the public and are discussed in the media often. Further, they would be located within an hours drive from a population center and would have obvious deficiencies in security which would be easily exploited by protesters.
Case Background

"If nuclear deterrence is the doctrinal centerpiece of contemporary strategy, Europe is its geopolitical focus"  
- Laurence Martin, BBC Reith Lectures, 1981

Cruise Missiles and NATO's Strategy

Throughout the cold war the arsenal disparities between the two super-powers and their allies was often the most critical issue in their relations. Toward the end of the 1970's a widening asymmetry in US and Soviet theatre nuclear forces, which are limited in geographical range, led to "more attention being paid to long and medium range components." Europe was easily within range of the Soviet Union's theatre nuclear forces and after the removal of Thor and Jupiter intermediate range missiles from Europe; NATO was left only with long range tactical nuclear forces (LRTN). These manned Vulcan and F-111 bombers were considered inadequate as they were "old and vulnerable to pre-emptive attack, and would have difficulty penetrating Russian air defenses."  

As NATO was eliminating its intermediate range nuclear arsenal, the Soviet Union was bolstering its intermediate range nuclear forces. In addition to the existing numbers of SS-4 and SS-5 intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) stationed in Europe, the Soviet arsenal was "gradually being complemented by the more advanced SS-20 IRBM." Further, many feared that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) process, with their focus only on strategic parity, would lock in this lower level disparity.

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19 Ibid. p. 170
20 Ibid. p. 173
21 Ibid. p. 171
This situation led to widespread uneasiness, particularly in Europe precisely where the arsenal shifts were occurring and where hundreds of Soviet missiles were targeted.

NATO feared that the growing disparity would result in the greater vulnerability of its members. The US was especially concerned that, based on the flexible response strategy, the existing NATO arsenal would no longer deter a Soviet attack at the intermediate level.\(^{22}\) It was reasoned that "the Soviets would be more surely deterred" from striking Europe "if they knew that they could be defeated 'in theatre'."\(^{23}\) Europeans feared that "there was a real danger of decoupling European and American security."\(^{24}\) Without an in-theatre counter to Soviet LRTN forces, only the Soviet assumption that the US would retaliate for an attack on Europe, using its home based inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICMB), gave credibility to deterrence. A US attack on behalf of Europe with its ICBM's would most certainly precipitate a retaliatory strike on the US from the USSR.

This catastrophic consequence for the US forced Europeans to re-evaluate the US commitment to European security. Many questioned the US's willingness to "risk its own cities in defence of Europe".\(^{25}\) This fear was most vocally expressed by the West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. In his October 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture to the London based International Institute for Strategic Studies he called for

\(^{22}\) The flexible response strategy was officially adopted by NATO in 1967, but only with pressure from the United States. It focused on the ability to deter the Soviet union with nuclear weapons at any level: intermediate range (within a theatre like Europe) or long range. In addition to deterring, it was hoped that this strategy could limit nuclear escalation should the nuclear threshold be crossed. Many Europeans were uncomfortable with a strategy that accepted the possibility of a limited nuclear engagement in Europe.


\(^{25}\) Ibid. p. 239
"flexible response to be strengthened by redressing the balance of forces in Europe which had been upset by the SALT process."26

With these concerns in mind and European pressure building, NATO's Nuclear Planning Group created a High Level Group (HLG) to assess "NATO's requirements for theatre nuclear forces."27 The HLG began work in December of 1977 and decided that a modernization of NATO's LRTN forces was required to offset the SS-20 capability.28 It was further suggested that this modernization should be a measured evolution and not a drastic immediate change. Cruise Missiles, it was thought, provided an excellent option as "they were relatively cheap, promised to be highly accurate, capable of avoiding air defences when used in substantial numbers, and could be fired from a variety of different platforms."29

At the NATO conference of foreign and defense ministers in December of 1979, the HLG's modernization plan was approved and a "dual track" strategy was adopted. The first track of this strategy was to prepare for the deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles (a mobile intermediate range ballistic missile) to Europe. The second was to "seek an arms control agreement with the Soviets that would make a Pershing II and GLCM deployment unnecessary."30 NATO ministers believed that with the impending deployment of NATO's modernized LRTN forces, now renamed intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), the Soviet Union would feel pressure to negotiate for the elimination of all INF in Europe. The modernization itself would consist of 572 new

27 Duke, Simon. p. 171
28 Ibid. p. 173
29 Ruston, Roger. p. 181-182
30 Smoke, Richard. p. 191
nuclear weapons, 108 Pershing II and 464 ground launched cruise missiles (96 in West Germany, 112 in Italy, 48 in Belgium, 48 in Holland, and 160 in Britain).\textsuperscript{31}

The US, however, was not eager to send its Cruise and Pershing II missiles to Europe, especially after the Reagan administration came to power. Denis Healey, a prominent Labour MP and former British Defence Secretary (1964-1970), recalled that Reagan was not "attracted by the idea of putting Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe," and that, "he reluctantly agreed to uphold the decision when the British and German governments protested that they would be politically damaged if he cancelled it, after they had spent so much effort in trying to get public support for it."\textsuperscript{32} The British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, noticed that the decision to bring Cruise to Europe was made "under pressure from the Europeans" anxious to prevent any decoupling of the American and European wings of NATO.\textsuperscript{33} Thatcher herself played "a leading part in encouraging alliance governments to finalise the agreement on modernizing intermediate-range nuclear forces, by stationing Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe."\textsuperscript{34}

Without progress on the negotiation track of the dual-track strategy, preparations for the deployment of Cruise missiles to the United Kingdom began. On 17 June 1980 in the House of Commons the British Defence Secretary, Francis Pym, announced that the missiles were to be stationed at "the United States Air Force standby base at RAF Greenham Common, in Berkshire, and RAF Molesworth, a disused airfield in Cambridgeshire."\textsuperscript{35} Pym announced the first missiles should be expected to arrive "at

\textsuperscript{33} Thatcher, Margaret. p. 268
Greenham Common in 1983. As planned, the first cruise missiles were delivered to RAF Greenham Common on 14 November 1983 to a largely unenthusiastic British public.

The Domestic Reaction in Britain

NATO's December 1979 announcement that it planned to base cruise missiles in Britain sparked immediate opposition. Within only a couple of years the anti-cruise movement had grown to include mass demonstrations, peace camps at the proposed bases, and many anti-cruise civil action organizations. Public opinion against the cruise missile deployment paralleled the movement and quickly grew to a majority in Britain. This sentiment was reflected by increasingly vocal opposition within Parliament itself.

British public opinion against the cruise missile deployment was substantial to begin with, but it increased quickly to consist of a majority of Britons. A Marplan poll conducted in September of 1980 revealed that 43% of the UK was opposed to US cruise missiles being stationed in the UK. By November it had risen to 53%. This majority was sustained well beyond the initial period. A national poll conducted for the Sunday Times in January of 1983 showed that 54% were against Britain allowing "cruise missiles to be based in Britain."

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36 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
RAF Greenham Common, the first deployment site, became the focus of much of the opposition. During the summer of 1981 a group of 40 women, called Women for Life on Earth, marched 120 miles from Cardiff, Wales to Greenham Common in protest of stationing cruise missiles there.\(^{41}\) Upon their arrival to Greenham the marchers demanded a public debate on the issue with the Ministry of Defence. The debate was denied and they "spontaneously set up a camp outside the US Air Force Base."\(^{42}\) Thus began the Greenham Women's Peace Camp that was to exist for 19 years.

What began with a 40-woman march drew national attention and support. In the south of England alone there were 47 women's groups involved with the Greenham protest by April of 1983.\(^ {43}\) Before the deployment of cruise missiles began, the Greenham camp aimed to "seriously disrupt all the work being done there in preparation."\(^ {44}\) In December of 1982 more than 30,000 women gathered to join hands around the base in what was called the "Embrace the Base" event. Other disruptive tactics were more overt such as those used on 29 October 1983 when 1000 women "cut down four and a half miles of fence surrounding the air base."\(^ {45}\) Before and after the deployment, members of the peace camp were a constant disruption to Greenham operations.

The Greenham Peace Campers were not alone either. There were many other anti-cruise missile groups created with the same goal. Joan Ruddock, then chair of CND, noticed that "outrage at the secret NATO decision, revealed in December of 1979, to


\(^{42}\) Ibid.


\(^{44}\) Greenham Southwest. "International Blockade at Greenham to Stop Cruise." From the archives of Sarah Meyer, Commonweal Collection, University of Bradford.

\(^{45}\) "Cruise Off! Greenham Women Tear Down Fence." Outwrite. Nov. 1983: 1
deploy American cruise missiles in Britain... led to the formation of dozens of new anti-missile groups."\textsuperscript{46} At RAF Molesworth, the second cruise missile site, a similar but not gender-specific peace camp was created to protest and impede preparation for deployment. One unique group, called Cruisewatch, had the objective of monitoring "cruise missile convoys when they are deployed on exercise, in order to demonstrate that their movement cannot be kept secret."\textsuperscript{47} Cruisewatch reasoned that if the general public could monitor their whereabouts they were obviously vulnerable to the Soviets, thus demonstrating their uselessness. The creation of these groups involved people from every position in society and occurred at both the national and local levels.

With the cruise missile issue as a primary impetus, the national movement against nuclear weapons, led by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), began to experience a strong revival.\textsuperscript{48} While CND had a membership of 2000 in early 1980 it quickly grew to more than 17,000 by April of 1981.\textsuperscript{49} Bruce Kent, CND's General Secretary at the time, realized that cruise missiles were "influencing most people coming" to CND. This growth continued and the membership reached 85,000 by 1986.\textsuperscript{50} Kent noted that "week by week arrived more letters, more membership applications, more callers, more journalists, more requests for speakers, more orders for badges and leaflets."\textsuperscript{51} At the top of the list of reasons why the revival occurred was "the decision to deploy cruise missiles."\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{46} Ruddock, Joan. \textit{CND Scrapbook}. London: Macdonald Optima, 1987, p. 48
\textsuperscript{47} Byrne, Paul. p. 162
\textsuperscript{48} CND had been dormant since the 1960's.
\textsuperscript{49} Freedman, Laurence. p. 119
\textsuperscript{50} Byrne, Paul. \textit{The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament}. London: Routledge, 1988, p. 55
\textsuperscript{51} Kent, Bruce. \textit{Bruce Kent: Undiscovered Ends}. London: Fount, 1992, p. 171
With the majority of Britons (according to national opinion polls) objecting to the deployment of US cruise missiles in the UK, CND enjoyed massive national support for its activities. Even Bruce Kent thought their 26 October 1980 rally in Trafalgar Square "was over ambitious," but it went on to attract some 80,000 participants.\textsuperscript{53} The accelerated membership growth was reflected by the participation in CND demonstrations. From Trafalgar Square the annual CND rally was moved to Hyde Park to accommodate the surge in popularity. In 1981 the participants numbered some 250,000 and in 1982 it increased to 400,000 participants.\textsuperscript{54} It was no coincidence that "all the speakers on the platform criticized Britain's recent acceptance of 160 American cruise missiles."\textsuperscript{55} Serving as a conduit of this sentiment, CND's support and membership grew alongside the anti-cruise reaction.

\textbf{ december 12 1984}  
\textbf{refuse cruise} 
\textbf{assemble 6 pm in trafalgar square} 

Trafalgar Square Protest Flyer\textsuperscript{56}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{53} Ibid. and Byrne, Paul. p. 151
\item \textsuperscript{54} Byrne, Paul. p. 152.
\item \textsuperscript{55} Ballantyne, Aileen. "Rally in the Rain for a World of Peace
\item \textsuperscript{56} From a flyer encouraging participation in an anti-cruise protest in Trafalgar Square in 1984.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Britain’s political parties were soon mired in the cruise missile controversy. Labour, which had long-existing connections to CND, was buttressed by this wave of sentiment. The party explicitly “rejected the deployment of US cruise missiles in Britain.” Labour’s leader Michael Foot, speaking at CND’s 1981 Hyde Park rally, expressed the new party policy of “no cruise missiles on British soil.” Labour was not the only one to feel the influence, however. In 1981 the Liberal party assembly “demanded a campaign against NATO’s deployment of cruise missiles,” and in 1984 it supported “calls for the immediate withdrawal of cruise missiles.” The opposition to cruise missiles within Britain’s political parties grew in response to that of the public.

Parliament itself became another forum for voicing disapproval over cruise missiles being based in the UK. During parliamentary question times, it became a common task for the Defence Secretary to defend the government’s acceptance of deployment against severe and constant criticism. Statements against the cruise missile deployment such as, “it is utterly unacceptable both to CND and Labour,” and, “the vast majority of people in Britain do not want cruise missiles anywhere,” were common. Additionally, petitions with hundreds of thousands of signatories were presented by MP’s on the floor of the House of Commons.

The details of NATO’s decision to deploy cruise missiles to Britain are inconsistent with the domestic response it evoked and provokes several questions. Why would the cruise missile plan, devised by NATO for European security be protested by Europeans? Why would a policy European leaders (particularly the British and German
leaders) pressured the United States so heavily for be so heavily criticized domestically?

Finally, why would the deployment of US cruise missile forces to its closest ally evoke such a fiercely negative reaction?
Perceived Level of Threat

"Your petitioners pray that your honourable House will call upon Her Majesty's Government to refuse the cruise missiles and to start genuine steps to survival so that we can have a future without fear."61

-Petition presented to the House of Commons from South Islington and Finsbury 11 November 1983, signed by 65,000.

The level of threat, both in degree of possible harm and in likelihood, incurred by the United Kingdom by hosting US cruise missiles was perceived by the public to be extreme. Questions regarding the weapon's reliability and potential for mishap left many uneasy about its deployment to the English countryside. The issue of whether the missiles were secure or not added to this anxiety. However, the most disconcerting issue by far was whether hosting cruise missiles brought the UK closer to a nuclear strike from the Soviet Union. John Grigg, coordinator of West London CND, recognized that what drove the surge in support for CND “was a fear from many other people that they were in danger and US nuclear weapons on our soil increased that danger.”62

The reliability of the cruise missiles and their potential for accidents was widely questioned and reports of faulty missile guidance systems found their way to the national papers. In June of 1980 The Observer reported that "of the 20 tests so far … eight have failed, some badly: Cruise missiles have veered off course and crashed into the California countryside to the alarm of the local inhabitants."63 No doubt this alarmed the local inhabitants around proposed sites who were now threatened directly from their own soil. In the House of Commons this issue was discussed during several sessions. Tam

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Dalyell, MP for Linlithgow, asked for a team to visit the United States to verify any technical downfall to the cruise missiles. This request was sparked by a report in *Electronic Times* which alleged that "the guidance system in cruise were defective and had not been properly tested and that there were various other listed technical teething troubles."  

Others feared mishaps involving the nuclear material in the cruise missile warheads. Several MP's and their constituents expressed concern over the possibility of escaping radioactive material. This issue led Bob Cryer, MP for Keighley, to ask "what precautions will be taken to prevent radioactive leakage." It also brought Michael McNair-Wilson, MP for Newbury (the town located next to RAF Greenham Common), to ask the Defence Secretary to reassure his constituents "about the storage of nuclear warheads? Can he [the Defence Secretary] say that, as far as humanly possible, the danger of a radioactive leak or accident can be ruled out?"

The possibility of an accidental firing of a cruise missile brought even greater distress. If a cruise missile was unintentionally launched and struck a Soviet target, it would certainly bring a devastating retaliation from the Soviet Union. Several MP's demanded to know "what controls against accidental launch will be fitted to the cruise missile system." Martin Flannery, MP for Hillsborough, expressed this uneasiness stating that "many millions of people throughout the world are deeply concerned and afraid that an accident could now precipitate us all into a nuclear war."

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There were also questions regarding the security of the missiles. Members of the Greenham Women's Peace Camp, who would often cut through the perimeter fences and intrude on the base, gave immediate credibility to this concern. MP Ronald Boyes noted that the "women at Greenham common have brought to our attention a further reason for concern--that missiles or missile heads cannot be protected all the time and could fall into the hands of our enemies or terrorists." He further added that it was wrong "to believe that the military can defend such bases 24 hours a day, 365 days a year." The planned dispersal of the cruise missiles outside the base and across the countryside caused more unease. The intention of the ground launched cruise missile strategy was "to deploy the weapons in moments of crisis to secret sites within about 50 miles of the storage positions." Members of Parliament began to express concern over the security of the missiles during transit. If the security of on-base cruise missiles remained uncertain, the security of dispersed off-site missiles added a new dimension for concern.

Even more alarming than the security issue was the belief that the cruise missiles represented "a dangerous escalation of the nuclear arms race." This escalation magnified existing fears over the possibility of a nuclear attack on Britain. John West, a CND organizer at the time, noted that the public knew "that Russian retaliation meant annihilation and that the installation of cruise missiles, against which the Russians had no defence, must increase tension to a degree where a misjudgment on either side would bring holocaust." This thought alone encouraged much of the opposition to the deployment of cruise missiles. A petition submitted to the House of Commons in

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November of 1983, regarding the decision to accept cruise missiles in Britain, stated that, "such decisions will only bring us closer to nuclear war." MP Bob Cryer noted that "millions of people in Holland, Belgium, West Germany, and Britain rejected the potential escalation in nuclear weaponry."  

The concept of a limited nuclear war, which cruise missiles represented, further fueled fears of a nuclear attack on Britain. NATO’s flexible response strategy envisioned situations where a nuclear war, should it occur, could be contained within Europe (limited nuclear war). Cruise missiles, as theatre nuclear weapons, were part of this strategy. Those opposing cruise missiles in the UK believed that "the very concept of a limited nuclear war made it more likely that there will be a nuclear war." Bob Cryer expressed this view in the House of Commons in 1980 saying that, "the installation of cruise missiles represents the implementation of the Pentagon’s limited nuclear war strategy" and that "a limited nuclear war as envisaged by the Pentagon would be a radioactive cinder heap for the United Kingdom."  

Moreover, those who opposed cruise missiles saw them as inviting a particularly disturbing type of nuclear attack. Many believed that cruise missiles were, or appeared to be, offensive first strike weapons. The cruise missile’s low flight altitude and advanced guidance system gave it the capability to fly undetected into the Soviet Union, and to accurately destroy a portion of the Soviet nuclear arsenal before it could be launched in retaliation. This counter-force potential was thought to invite a pre-emptive strike on the United Kingdom in a time of tension to eliminate the possibility of a first strike from  

74 Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. 11 November 1983: 520  
77 Cryer, Bob. Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. 2 December 1980: 115
NATO. This type of thinking led many in Britain to “believe that these are essentially offensive weapons which invite a pre-emptive strike and that they are, therefore, very dangerous indeed.”\textsuperscript{78} Bob Cryer, speaking in the House of Commons in April of 1980, noted that cruise missiles were “a potential first strike weapon, and ... the people of East Anglia are becoming increasingly aware of the dangers that potential sites in East Anglia represent to them and to this country.”\textsuperscript{79}

Dispersing missiles throughout the countryside posed another disturbing problem. As Dafydd Wigley, MP for Caernarvon, noticed, “if an enemy thought there was no way of knowing from where cruise missiles would be fired, the logical response would be to hit Britain with everything at once, as a pre-emptive strike, and by multiple overkill to ensure that everything was knocked out.”\textsuperscript{80} This thought was echoed by David Polden, coordinator for CND’s non-violent resistance network, when he realized that “since they in theory might turn up anywhere, we were all potential nuclear targets.”\textsuperscript{81} The thought of hosting a weapon system which could provoke a pre-emptive nuclear attack and one that would “make the whole of the United Kingdom a target” did not sit well with many in Britain.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{81} Polden, David. Personal interview: 15 August 2003
Level of Control

"the deepest concern alluded to the assumption of many UK and other European nuclear activists and politicians that the key decisions regarding peace and war were in the hands of a US president, not their own governments"\textsuperscript{83}

-Dan Keohane, Security in British Politics, 1945-99

According to the ordinal scale created for host state control, the UK maintained a low level of control over the cruise missile forces. Although the British government was ensured consultation, actual control over the launch of the missiles remained ambiguous. The lack of control alone encouraged tremendous opposition. As Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher later admitted, the "ultimate control of cruise missiles was the most tricky issue."\textsuperscript{84}

There was historical and contractual precedent for joint control. The 1951 Attlee-Truman agreement, an arrangement made between Prime Minister Clement Attlee and President Harry Truman, stated that the use of US bases in the UK "would be a matter for joint decision between the two governments in the light of the circumstances at the time."\textsuperscript{85} Although this gave Margaret Thatcher's government a basis for their claims of joint control, it also left an uncomfortable ambiguity when applied to possible real world situations. The phrase "in light of the circumstances at the time" was particularly worrisome. Despite the Attlee-Truman agreement there was still, amongst many, a "deep feeling that the people who will decide to fire those missiles are not in this country but in the Pentagon."\textsuperscript{86}

There were several factors which contributed to UK fears. Statements made by officials in the US and UK strengthened the impression of a lack of British control. Speaking in the House of Commons in 1980, MP John Farr expressed concern regarding a comment from the US Secretary of Defense that "the firing of the missiles [would] be an American responsibility alone." A similar statement made by US Rear Admiral Gene La Rocque made it onto the 1983 British television program called "The Truth Game," widening the scope of awareness. The day after its broadcast MPs discussed in Parliament Admiral La Rocque's comment that "nobody in Europe could stop the United States of America firing its nuclear weapons system from [Britain]." A report regarding the Attlee-Truman agreement and US nuclear weapons, presented to the US Senate's Committee on International Relations in 1975, seemed to further justify fears over a lack of British control of cruise missiles. It stated that "...such consultation procedures does not imply any actual inhibition on the capacity of the United States to operate the systems." From the view of the United States, who held the ability to fire the cruise missiles, it seemed to the British that even the requirement of consultation might be disregarded. Francis Pym's (UK Secretary for Defence) statement in the House of Commons that the United Kingdom would "have a degree of say in the authorization for the use of the new systems," provided little reassurance.

These fears seemed to be confirmed when in 1983 the United States invaded Grenada, a member of the British Commonwealth, without consulting the UK. Margaret

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Thatcher recognized the popular apprehension stating that "if the Americans had not consulted us about Grenada, why should they do so as regards the use of cruise missiles?" It also heightened concern over the possibility of the US sacrificing Britain for its own interests. As MP Stan Newens stated in the House of Commons, "the United States, on many occasions, particularly recently, has made it clear that it is prepared to put the United States' interests before those of Britain where it suits it, how on earth can the deployment of American owned and controlled cruise missiles in this country be justified?"

Then a NATO exercise showed that the US was all too eager to cross the nuclear threshold in Europe. The war game, codenamed WINTEX, simulated the escalation of a cold-war conflict in Europe. The scenarios included requests to fire nuclear weapons to prevent the loss of an endangered European battlefield. In nearly all situations "the decision ended up on the desk of the President of the United States." The senior military official playing the President often decided "quickly to go nuclear" in Europe. This exercise proved even more disconcerting to the British when it was noticed that "not once had 'the President' moved toward that button that would have launched Titan or Minuteman rockets from their US bases into the Soviet Union." It appeared that Britain was expendable to the US.

The perceived lack of control of the British government over the cruise missiles did much to build the opposition. In Parliament, the Secretary for Defence was constantly faced with questions of whether he was "aware that what most perturbs the

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91 Thatcher, Margaret. p. 268.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
majority of the British people ... is the issue of who is really in charge."96 Inside and outside Whitehall the British were clearly "anxious at the prospect of such a deterrent, based on British soil, not being under sovereign British control."97 As Polly Woolly, the public affairs officer for Cruisewatch, noted, "crucial decisions were being taken with regard to our security that we had no power at all to control. Even if the entire country opposed them, we had no chance of reversing them - nor did our democratically elected government have any say."98

The denial by the British government of a dual-key option further accentuated the perceived lack of control. In December of 1979, when the NATO conference met to decide on placing cruise missiles in Europe, the US offered a dual-key control option to all of the proposed host governments. This would have required "active participation ... to activate the weapon."99 The dual-key system is one that had been used previously in Britain when US Thor missiles were stationed there in 1959. The problem, as Margaret Thatcher noted, was that "to exercise that option we would have had to buy the weapons ourselves, which would have been hugely expensive."100 In fact, "the estimate for a force of 160 GLCM's would be in the order of £1 billion."101 This proved to be too large a price tag for complicity and the dual-key option was refused.

The refusal of dual-key became a major factor in creating opposition to cruise missiles. As MP Dr. David Owen, leader of Britain's Social Democratic Party, stated in the House of Commons in March of 1983, "opinion polls demonstrate that, were there to

99 Duke, Simon. p. XX.
100 Thatcher, Margaret. p. 268
be a dual key, the majority of the people of this country would be ready to accept.\textsuperscript{102} A poll conducted for \textit{The Sunday Times} in January of 1983 showed that the British public wanted "dual control of American missiles", citing 93\% in favor of the 'dual key' approach.\textsuperscript{103} A similar article entitled "Dual Key Demand" in a November issue of the \textit{Daily Mail}, reported that 94\% of Britain wanted "dual control of cruise missiles."\textsuperscript{104} It was clear that the government's decision to accept US cruise missiles had "the support of only 6 percent of the population ... without dual key."\textsuperscript{105}

Without the reassurance of the dual-key option ideas began to circulate about how to ensure UK control over the launch of cruise missiles. Proposals in the House of Commons often considered some type of "physical bar on the use of cruise missiles."\textsuperscript{106} Ministers desired an "effective blocking device which would prevent the use of cruise missiles on sites in the United Kingdom until authorization for their use has been given by Her Majesty's Government."\textsuperscript{107} One article in \textit{The Sun} even suggested that "in the event of cruise missiles leaving the base without British permission, British service men [would] have permission to fire on the Americans."\textsuperscript{108}

The issue of British control was key in creating opposition to the deployment of US cruise missiles in Britain. The official Attlee-Truman agreement which was supposed to ensure a "joint decision" seemed too ambiguous to provide any reassuring certainty. Statements by US and UK officials and the refusal of the dual-key option accentuated the seeming lack of British control. Considering that the launch of cruise missiles would

\textsuperscript{104} "Dual Key Demand by 94 pc." \textit{Daily Mail}. 13 November 1983. 1+.
have probably meant the destruction of much of the United Kingdom, it is easy to understand why control was such an influential issue in this case.
Level of Mistrust/Anti- Ally Sentiment

"He should order United States commanders
to collect their forces and missiles together
and get the hell out of Britain."

-Roland Boyes, MP for Houghton and Washington,
speaking in the House of Commons on 5 December 1983.109

Mistrust of the United States in Britain was evident even prior to the December 1979 announcement that cruise missiles would be stationed in the UK. Dan Keohane noticed in his book Security in British Politics that "as British confidence in USA leadership declined quite sharply from the late 1970’s, opposition to US controlled systems increased."110 Deep mistrust and anti-American sentiment was expressed by many of those who opposed cruise missiles. As will be discussed shortly, the level of national mistrust was consistently polled at between 25% and 30% before and after the cruise missile announcement. Because of this, according to the ordinal scale, the mistrust/anti-ally sentiment would be graded at a medium level for this case. As Simon Duke noticed in US Defence Bases in the United Kingdom:

The visibility of the missiles was designed to boost confidence amongst Europeans in the US nuclear guarantee. Instead the missiles became ... the focus of anti-American sentiment.111

Margaret Thatcher believed that the opposition to cruise missiles was based heavily on feelings of anti-Americanism.112 Although this may be an exaggerated claim it was an undeniable, if latent, factor.

110 Keohane Dan. p. 158
111 Duke, Simon. p. 177
112 Thatcher, Margaret. pg. 268.
National public opinion polls indicate that much of the British population did not trust the United States and its leadership during the cold war. In researching his 1983 Chatham House Paper, Defence and Public Opinion, David Capitanichk found “that over the years something between a quarter and a third of the population has regularly exhibited a degree of distrust or a lack of confidence in the United States.”

He additionally found that “for many years … over 50% of the respondents in any opinion poll have regularly expressed little or no confidence in the ability of the United States to deal wisely with current world problems.”

A January 1983 Gallup poll revealed that as many as 70% of Britons had little or no confidence in the United States. Regarding more specific issues the mistrust was higher still. A Mori poll conducted for the Sunday Times in October of 1983, shortly before the arrival of the first cruise missiles, showed that 73% of the public believed that “if the American government wanted to fire the missiles and the British government objected … America would fire them anyway.”

Mistrust and anti-American sentiment were rampant among those who opposed the cruise missile deployment. A 1985 national membership survey of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament showed that half of CND members believed the United States was solely responsible for the arms race, while none believed the Soviet Union held sole responsibility. Additionally, over 90% desired “to reduce Britain’s defence and foreign policy links with the United States.” It is no surprise that demonstrations of anti-Americanism were common at many anti-cruise protests. Even the son of Geoffrey

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114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
117 Byrne, Paul. p. 73.
118 Ibid. p. 75.
Howe (Chancellor of the exchequer and later Foreign Minister) participated, dressing up like President-elect Ronald Reagan and leading a female student dressed and made up as Margaret Thatcher through the streets of York by a noose tied around her neck.\(^{119}\)

The mistrust and anti-Americanism was exacerbated by the belief that the United States was keeping much of its activities in Britain hidden from the public. An October 1980 article in *The Sunday Times* shocked many when it reported that the United Kingdom was host to at least “one hundred American bases.”\(^{120}\) The widespread frustration amongst many in the UK was captured by a question posed by MP Martin Flannery in the House of Commons who asked:

> why we almost never see an American in Uniform in this country? Is it being concealed from the British people just how many there are here?\(^{121}\)

Many in Britain felt as though they were “living in an occupied country.”\(^{122}\)

The suspicion that the United States was hiding its activities in Britain from the public transferred to the cruise missile issue. A 1983 publication entitled “Women in Action” by the World Women’s Action Campaign for Peace and Disarmament reported that “the United States is engaged in secret moves to smuggle cruise missiles with nuclear warheads into Western European countries even before their governments have officially approved their deployment.”\(^{123}\) The belief that the US conducted secret activities without host government knowledge fed into the worst assumptions.


\(^{121}\) Flannery, Martin. Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. 1 March 1981: 126


Interviews with previous leaders of CND provide further insight into this sentiment. Bruce Kent, chair of CND during the cruise missile debate, said that he believed that there was a sense among the British of "being pulled in two directions."\textsuperscript{124} One direction was to be sympathetic to the US. The other was to reject the US and its militant stance which thought it possible to fight and win a nuclear war in Europe. He believed that the crassness of US generals and President Reagan towards the issue of nuclear war alienated the British public. According to Janet Bloomfield, former chair of CND, many believed President Reagan to be an "ex-movie star buffoon" who knew little about what he was doing.\textsuperscript{125} Many of those who opposed cruise missiles did so partially because they did "not trust President Reagan's finger on the nuclear trigger."\textsuperscript{126}

The mistrust/anti-ally sentiment variable intersects with the control variable here. A lack of trust in the United States made many Britons nervous about US controlled cruise missiles being stationed in their country. This is evidenced by several of the questions directed to the Defence Secretary during question time in the House of Commons. Many of these focused on the ability of the British military personnel stationed with the US Airmen at cruise missile bases, to "prevent a unilateral firing of cruise by the United States."\textsuperscript{127} It requires a high degree of trust to allow a foreign military to base nuclear weapons in your country, especially with an ambiguous control arrangement. Many in Britain did not hold so high a faith in their American allies. Between the lack of control over a potentially dubious ally and the possibly catastrophic consequences, deep seated opposition was inevitable.

\textsuperscript{124} Kent, Bruce. Personal Interview. 13 October 2003. By Telephone.
\textsuperscript{125} Bloomfield, Janet. Personal Interview. 13 October 2003. By Telephone.
\textsuperscript{126} Kettle, Martin.
Protestability of the Forces

"They also constituted excellent objects of protest - they could be followed around, discovered, blockaded, graffitied etc."

-David Polden, coordinator of CND's non-violent resistance network.\(^{128}\)

The Protestability of the cruise missile sites encouraged an active and numerous opposition. According to the ordinal scale for this variable, the cruise missile issue had an extreme level of protestability. The two sites, RAF Greenham Common and RAF Molesworth, were highly visible, close to population centers and had obvious vulnerabilities which protestors could exploit.

The impending cruise missile deployment was common knowledge throughout Britain years before their arrival. The NATO decision to deploy, the government's acceptance, the decision on location, and their physical arrival all made the front pages of the major British newspapers. This was no accident: encouraging concentrated media attention to the cruise missile deployment was part of NATO's strategy. The publicity "was designed to boost confidence amongst Europeans in the US nuclear guarantee."\(^{129}\)

The further attention from the Greenham Common women's peace camp and other protests made the controversy a fixture in newspapers and on television. In addition to their media presence the missiles themselves had a tremendous physical presence, especially for those who lived in the south of England. John West, Secretary of Southend CND (near RAF Molesworth), noted that seeing cruise missiles on the road was

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\(^{129}\) Duke, Simon. p. 177.
"a constant reminder of their presence." The high and constant level of attention that the cruise missiles garnered ensured that greater numbers of people would be reassured or, conversely, threatened - but there would be no doubt as to their existence and details.

The proximity of the two cruise missile sites to large population centers made them a convenient target of protest. Janet Bloomfield, former chair of CND, stated it was only 30-40 minutes from London, which increased accessibility from the nation's most populous and politically active metropolis. More people could "go see it or even live there," as many of the women of the Greenham Common peace camp decided to do. The Greenham peace activists encouraged participation and day trippers with pamphlets that advertised: "trains hourly from Paddington Station and the single fare £5." Easy access to the sites allowed the opposition, many of whom might not have wandered into deeper parts, to easily raise their level of involvement and turn the bases into weekend protest camps for anti-cruise Londoners.

The vulnerability of the cruise missile sites added to their attractiveness as a target of protest. At Greenham Common, with miles of perimeter fence that were difficult to guard effectively, protestors could easily snip through an unwatched section of fence, sneak onto the base, and vandalize buildings or equipment. One press release by the peace campers claimed that they had actually "entered the flight control tower" and looked over sensitive material. On other occasions protestors cut down "several miles

\[130\] West, John. Personal Interview. 8 August 2003.
\[132\] Ibid.
of fence around the air force base." The second cruise site, RAF Molesworth, was initially even more vulnerable in this regard as it did not even have a fence to destroy. A "Greenfield" site, it was undeveloped and required significant building and construction. This offered "considerable scope for disruption and passive resistance." The placement of the bases themselves also increased vulnerability. RAF Greenham Common is surrounded by common land, which is publicly owned and generally accessible to all. This made the site even more alluring to day-activists who wanted to protest without involving themselves in legal entanglements from trespassing and vandalize. It also allowed the Greenham women to legally set up a permanent peace camp around the base and use it for their operations. Though the USAF was prepped for nuclear strikes it had not planned on attacks based in the field next door.

A peace camp set up on common land outside RAF Greenham Common

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136 Byrne, Paul. p. 160.
With these local operations centers the protesters could easily make a direct attack using a front-door approach. Instead of sneaking onto an armed military installation, protesters could simply sit down at the gates, effectively blocking the cruise convoys from exiting and preventing their dispersal. This strategy later became more prominent as protesters met to blockade the base gates at a designated time. They would offer passive resistance for as long as possible, thus grinding most base activity to a halt until they were eventually removed. By not escalating from civil disobedience, large numbers of the protesters could block operations without risking serious punishment, lowering the level of required commitment.

![Protestors Blockade RAF Greenham Common](image)

The cruise convoys themselves were easy and inviting targets for protest. Cruisewatch, a cruise missile specific protest group, was created to take advantage of the vulnerabilities of the cruise convoys. One Cruisewatch participant recalled his activities:

"We bought citizen band radios and each night cars went to Greenham and waited at the exits. Our job, if the convoy came out, was to report by phone from a call box to a contact (CB radios had

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137 From *End Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament*. Feb/Mar, 1983.
a limited range) who then arranged for the cruise missile convoy on exercise to be followed and harassed.”

Janet Bloomfield mentioned that one of the more enticing *protestable* features of cruise missiles was that you could “play tag with the convoys.” To assist and encourage protest of this kind, *Cruisewatch* created handouts containing directions on identifying and tracking cruise missile convoys (see figure at end of this section). Meant to keep the missiles safe in case of a Soviet attack the dispersals in fact made them more vulnerable to domestic attack.

The cruise missile deployment had an *extreme* level of *protestability*. The media coverage for the missiles, even years before they arrived in England, ensured that their existence was common knowledge. Their proximity to population centers and the obvious vulnerability of the two missile sites allowed those in opposition to cruise easy methods of disruption and protest. Additionally, sending cruise missiles out in exercise convoys made them even more open and interesting targets. In the words of Bruce Kent, “they invited a quite heroic and colorful type of protest.”

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139 Bloomfield, Janet.
140 Ibid.
141 Kent, Bruce.
What does the convoy look like?

Am I likely to see it?

Areas of UK over which GLCM's might be dispersed

Cruise missile convoy tracking instructions

142 Published in a pamphlet created for Cruisewatch
Implications of a Negative Domestic Reaction

For the Host State:

Though the effects will vary in accordance with the intensity and type of negative reaction, there are some demonstrated here which are applicable to other situations. The most obvious consequence is that creates serious political challenges for the host government. A negative reaction can fuel a rise in support for groups which contest the deployment, such as peace activist, nationalist organizations or opposition political parties. If intense enough, a negative reaction can also result in large protests which may necessitate a substantial pull of resources to maintain security.

Those in opposition to the current government of the host state may be enticed to involve themselves within a protest group for political gain. In a party democracy it is usually opposition political parties which use this support to oppose the governing party. During the cruise missile case it was Britain's Conservative Party led by Margaret Thatcher who held control in Parliament. The main opposition parties during this time (Labour, Social Democrat and Liberal) all opposed the government's decision to allow the cruise deployment.

The Labour party in particular attempted to use the opposition to the cruise deployment to gain support for a non-nuclear defense policy. With such a high level of opposition it was hoped that Labour's non-nuclear defense would be a more appealing alternative to the Conservative's moves toward "the nuclear abyss."¹⁴³ Labour's manifesto for the 1983 general election stated that the most pressing objective was "to prevent the

¹⁴³ 1983 Labour General Election Manifesto.
deployment ...of Cruise or Pershing missiles." Though the non-nuclear defense strategy was unpopular with voters in the 1983 election, Labour did gain support for challenging the government on the more specific issue of cruise missiles.

Peace activist groups may also gain support as an outlet for a negative reaction. Before the cruise missile issue peace groups in Britain counted their membership in hundreds. The cruise missile deployment led to a revival in existing peace groups and the creation of new ones. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in particular grew from 3,000 members in 1980 to over 100,000 in 1983. Former chair of CND Janet Bloomfield, who joined because of the cruise missile campaign, realized that their most effective strategy was simply to act as a vehicle for peoples' concerns about cruise. Groups like CND were successful in translating a negative feeling to the cruise deployment into protests of hundreds of thousands and other forms of civil resistance.

Today, with the advances in communication and travel, this type of translation would be far easier. Websites, email and wireless phones combined with cheaper and faster travel has made it far less difficult to become an activist. Protests during the 1980's were announced by handing out flyers such as the one pictured in the background section. Today activists are able to send mass emails to hundreds of thousands to inform each other of upcoming events world-wide. Faster and cheaper travel enables large numbers of protestors to gather relatively easily from virtually anywhere in the world. Negative domestic reactions are likely to reach higher levels of intensity more quickly than was possible in the past.

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144 Ibid.
Inside government buildings and out, a host government will be forced to deal with the challenges presented by those who oppose the deployment of the allied forces. Though the opposition parties and the peace movement may not have been able to change the mind of Margaret Thatcher who was notoriously “not for turning,” they did force the government on the defensive. In order to maintain credibility the Thatcher government had to publicize and defend its policies. This became so important for the government that it was the main reason for the appointment of Michael Heseltine as Secretary for Defence in 1983. Mr. Heseltine recalled in his memoirs a letter he received from Joan Ruddock, then chair of CND:

> It has been reported that you have been appointed largely because of your 'oratorial capacity' and your 'popular appeal'. It is, of course, a great compliment to CND and the peace movement that a senior Cabinet appointment should be made with anti-CND propaganda as the primary concern. On our side, we feel that our campaign against cruise and trident have the support of the majority of the nation – hence the recent government concern over the growth of the peace movement.

The Thatcher government did survive the political challenges brought about by the negative reaction to the cruise deployment. However, this might not be the situation in other cases. To argue the point counter-factually, the challenges for the conservatives in this case might have been far more difficult had not the Labour Party and CND attempted to transfer anti-cruise support into support for unilateral nuclear disarmament, a politically less popular issue.

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147 Thatcher, Margaret. p. 463
148 Byrne, Paul. p. 172.
149 Heseltine, Michael. Life in the Jungle. p. 244-5
For the Deploying State:

The deploying state could run into several problems should there be negative reaction to the deployment of their forces. Depending on the intensity of the reaction, their forces might be delayed or even face attacks in the allied country. Further, a negative reaction in one state it might encourage the same in other states. The complications brought on by a negative domestic reaction can interfere with the deploying state’s security strategy.

As can be drawn from this and other cases of negative reactions, disruption of and attacks on the deployed forces can occur. Both cruise missile sites (RAF Greenham Common and RAF Molesworth) suffered from intrusions, blockades, harassment and various other tactics which disrupted base operations. In other cases the forces may actually come under fire. This is the case in Saudi Arabia where US aircraft endure sporadic gunfire as they take-off and land.

A negative reaction in one state may also encourage the same in other host states creating a sort of protest domino effect. The original NATO plan for cruise missiles called for deployment in Britain, Italy (Sicily), Belgium and the Netherlands. When Belgium and the Netherlands had negative reactions that successfully prevented their arrival, many in Britain hoped that the same could be accomplished there. This, combined with the disruption of the missiles that were able to be deployed in Europe, weakened the strategy of deterrence as envisioned by the US and NATO.
At the International Level:

At the international level a negative domestic reaction can have adverse affects on the alliance. It can bring into question the efficacy of the alliance. After all, how effective can an alliance be when its members are unequally committed to the declared strategy? Additionally, it may push the host and deploying states further apart. CND’s Janet Bloomfield believed that one of the lasting effects of the cruise missile issue was that it linked the UK more closely with the rest of Europe and less with the US.\textsuperscript{150} It is the connection and alliance between the host and deploying states which probably suffers the most from a negative domestic reaction.

Theoretical:

Negative domestic reactions to visiting forces and, more specifically, the case used in this paper intersect with two current international relations theories - Two level game theory and the Second Image Reversed.

The cruise missile case adds additional support to Robert Putnam’s two level game theory: the idea that when conducting negotiations states must consider what will be accepted at both the international and domestic levels. Putnam uses the term \textit{win-set} to describe results of negotiations that are accepted at each level. In this case the NATO decision to deploy cruise missiles in Europe was accepted at the international level with NATO but became complicated at the domestic level in the UK. Clearly, with the

\textsuperscript{150} Bloomfield, Janet. Personal Interview. 13 October 2003.
refusal of cruise missiles by two out of the four designated European hosts (Belgium and
the Netherlands), the negotiators at the 1979 NATO conference miscalculated the win-set
at the domestic level. By analyzing a post-bargaining situation this case study has given
further support to the two-level game theory.

This case also casts a new light on Peter Gourevitch’s theory of the
Second Image Reversed: the idea that politics at the international level can influence
those at the domestic level. It is a variation on Kenneth Waltz’s work on the levels of
analysis of international relations which he divided into three images: 1st
image=individual, 2nd image=state/domestic, 3rd image= international system.\(^{131}\)

Regarding the cruise missile case, it was a decision made at the international level
(NATO decision to deploy cruise missiles in Europe) which led to the negative domestic
reaction and its influence on British politics.

In the article which first described the Second Image Reversed, Gourevitch
chooses to ignore the influence the deployment of forces into another state has on the
host’s domestic politics. His focus is only on deployment through invasion into a hostile
state, not the deployment of forces into an allied state such as that presented in this paper.
He states that this international source of domestic politics does not “require much
investigation” as:

We need not look very far to find examples of regimes
altered by the arrival of foreign troops: Germany after both
world wars, Italy in 1943, Austria-Hungary in 1918,
Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968.\(^{132}\)

\(^{131}\) Waltz, Kenneth.
By considering the deployment of forces into an allied state, this paper has widened the scope of the Second Image Reversed theory.
Conclusion

When Can We Expect a Negative Domestic Reaction?

Some degree of negative reaction can be expected with nearly all deployments into allied states. This paper and the ordinal scales it sets up attempt to analyze what increases the chance of serious domestic reactions. In addition to the threat incurred, level of control, mistrust/anti-ally sentiment, and protestability, the type of government the host state has should also be considered. Further, there are also some aspects of the deployment of forces into an allied state which may encourage a negative reaction but were not considered here as they were outside the scope of this paper.

In attempting to determine the possibility of a negative domestic reaction one should consider the four variables presented in this paper. The ordinal scales provide a framework to help judge the degree to which each of the variables is present. This in turn helps to judge what degree of negative reaction to expect. As can be seen in the table below, three of the four variables were at their highest level for the cruise missile case. Only the mistrust/anti-ally sentiment was below its extreme ordinal level. Accordingly, the negative domestic reaction is ordinarily rated at high, indicating a substantial reaction consisting of well over 100,000 active participants who use legal and illegal tactics.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat Incurred</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Mistrust/Anti-ally sentiment</th>
<th>Protestability</th>
<th>Negative Domestic Reaction</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extreme</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
<td>High</td>
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To determine the level of negative domestic reaction in other cases it would be necessary to determine the ordinal level each of the four variables. If they register generally in the moderate range one would probably expect a correspondingly moderate reaction. If generally more extreme the reaction would most likely be more substantial, and so on.

An additional consideration should be the government of the host state. It would be reasonable to believe that a greater negative reaction is more possible within democracies which allow greater freedoms of opposition. Within less democratic and free states people may find it difficult to express or organize opposition to government decisions. Thousands of protestors would be more likely to descend on Trafalgar Square than Tiananmen Square.

The question of what motivates and encourages negative domestic reactions to the deployment of military forces into an allied state is one that has importance to the practical application of international relations as well as existing IR theory. Several states maintain a military presence within allied states and many more play host to allied forces. Additionally, as the world’s security situation is in constant evolution, it would be reasonable to expect that there will be future deployments of allied forces into host states. The Foreign Affairs article mentioned in the introduction, which describes the Pentagon’s plans to “shift people and assets from safe, secure, and comfortable rear-echelon facilities to jumping-off points closer to the flame,” is evidence to this.153

Both current and future host states as well as deploying states would do well to consider what factors might lead to a negative domestic reaction to their decisions to host or deploy allied forces. Theoretically, analyzing negative domestic reactions to allied

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forces adds further support to and opens up a new perspective with which to view Robert
Putnam's Two Level Game Theory and Peter Gourevitch's Second Image Reversed.

Realizing that threat, control, mistrust, and protestability are the factors which encourage
and motivate negative domestic reactions would benefit world leaders as well as
international relations theorists.
I owe much gratitude to those without whose assistance this thesis could not have been accomplished.

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