EMANCIPATION IN THE CRITICAL-SECURITY-STUDIES PROJECT

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Freedom of speech
Freedom of worship
Freedom from want
Freedom from fear
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941

... I refuse to renounce the great classical discourse of emancipation. I believe that there is an enormous amount to do today for emancipation, in all domains and all the areas of the world and society.
Jacques Derrida, 1996

After a brief restatement of what Ken Booth has called the "critical-security-studies project,"1 I wish here to explore several relatively promising ways in which its emancipatory theme can be developed. The first is historical contextualizing: I shall suggest that an important ancestor of that project was expressed in and through Roosevelt's World War II leadership and his call for the realization of "The Four Freedoms" in that war. Just as emancipation has historically been associated with controversial Marxist claims concerning the emancipatory potential of lower/working class and anti-imperialist revolutions, this historical insight roots more recent, comprehensive concerns with individuals' security in a Western hegemonic project also requiring critical, but open-minded, scholarly discussion. Besides historically informed reanalyses of security-emancipation linkages, the basic concepts themselves need rethinking. Operationally, I suggest that one way of rethinking is to reframe our approach to identifying concrete threats to existential security might be cautiously linked, via its nonfoundationalist use of communicative rationality, to emancipatory concerns, in intra-cultural, cross-cultural, and trans-cultural ways. If "emancipation" points toward deeply held dispositions toward freedom, emancipation and redemption,
at individual and group levels, I shall then argue, with Fred Dallmayr and Jacques Derrida as allies, that these are genuinely universal concerns, although differently shaped in different contexts. With an attentive ear to pre-modern, modern, and post-modern security analysts, I shall next suggest epistemologically and ontologically sensitive ways in which the reshapings of collective memories and imagined futures can be emancipatory. Rather than confront contemporary ethnic conflicts directly, I shall raise the related issue of politically motivated, distorting and self-serving retellings of the past from a little greater historical distance. Focusing on ways in which the role of violence in inter-group and intra-community relationships can be transformed, I shall critically examine examples from recent retellings of Japanese and American history; hopefully, this review will be informed by the earlier discussion of Allied World War II aims. In conclusion, I suggest that culturally sensitive concepts of emancipation can be linked to concretely researchable, equally sensitive conceptions of existential security in a post-hegemonic fashion.

The Critical-Security-Studies Project

Critical Security Studies have roots in internationally-relevant critical theory, conventional and alternative strategic or security studies, security studies initiated within or oriented toward what was called “the Third World” during the Cold War period, peace research, the English School of International Relations, and recent post-positivist approaches to international politics and security. Their crystallization into a relatively coherent and visible group evident in diverse approaches to international security issues, is nonetheless, a post-Cold War phenomenon. Important milestones in this regard are a 1991 article by Ken Booth, and the publication of Krause and Williams’s book on the subject, principally the results of a York University conference and related BISA 1994 and ISA 1995 panels.

How are critical theory, security and emancipation related to each other? What project or projects lie within this nexus? In the past, revolutionary change has been
Justified in emancipatory terms; perhaps in the future it will be again, as when the American-led international order declines. For contemporary international relations scholars, however, talking about a "critical theory" immediately brings to mind the way in which Frankfurt School theorists, Gramscian political economists and others of a "critical or reflective" historiographic cast have linked emancipatory, or repression-reducing, projects to their theorizing of sociopolitical change. Just as Robert Cox criticizes alternative "problem-solving theories" as "serving particular national, sectional, or class interests, which are comfortable within the given order," Booth's perspective arises out of a personal effort to dissociate himself from the "Luttwak simplifier" -- "strategy as ethnocentrism writ large"; in this fundamental respect, then, the emancipatory focus of his work is clearly linked to the broader concerns of critical social and political theory.

Similarly, Booth is concerned generally with human well-being, in its many individual and social manifestations, and broadly reconceptualizes insecurity, war and emancipation in these terms. If security is characterized conventionally as "the absence of threats," the list of relevant threats is not defined in state-centric terms. Besides the occasional problem of "Napoleonic neighbors," for the most part "economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease" provide more serious threats to "the well-being of individuals and the interests of nations". More radically, "countless millions of people in the world? It is their own state, and not 'The Enemy' that is the primary security threat." Continuing, he identifies war prevention as part of a larger project of human betterment:

Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. Security
and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation [which he conceives of as a process], not power or order, produces true security.

Following Hedley Bull and the World Society School, Booth advocates considering the individual human's security as more fundamental than states' security, because individuals are the "ultimate units of the great society of all mankind." And with cites to critical international theorists like Held and Hoffman, plus Caroline Thomas's work on Third World and North/South security, he suggests that an egalitarian concept of liberty, reciprocity of rights, and the breaking down of barriers between domestic and foreign policy are all integral to, or derivable from, security thought of as a process of human emancipation. Through different lenses, these goals could be defined as liberal, enlightened, modern, cosmopolitan, social-democratic, or globally humanistic.

More cautiously, and more heterogeneously, Krause and Williams accept a non-ethnocentric, Coxtian concern to go beyond "problem solving theory" to address, both historically and philosophically, the changing and sometimes contingent subject-objects of conventional security studies, and its frameworks of situation analysis and (sometimes coercive) response recommendation. But they do not want their conception of "critical security studies" to be fully identified with any particular critical orthodoxy, Gramscian or otherwise, or an associated emancipatory project; hence their "small c" conception.

Although they do not want to follow an indeterminate, incoherence-generating approach to security studies, they also seem uncomfortable with the conventional focus on states and power taken by Walt and other contemporary neo-realists. While presenting Ayres's developmental view advocating security through the realist path of increasing state strength, they nicely problematize neo-realist perspectives by summarizing their associated, ahistorical world view of sovereign states in an anarchic world with the subtitle: "States Are the Subjects; Anarchy is the Condition; Contractarianism is the Solution."
They are evidently aware of the problematical nature of an exclusive focus on states and their “Others” in a way that ontologically and epistemologically excludes the life needs and concerns of their citizens. Thus they are well aware of, and sensitive to, feminist critiques of the domination relations within the “private” spheres generated by supposedly voluntaristic “public” economic and political contractual relations, as well as sustainability motivated ecological reconceptualizations of sovereignty and security concerns. “Critical security studies” in their senses, then, represent several projects overlapping with, but not necessarily identical with, Booth’s conception.

Although Critical Security Studies authors, with the exception of Booth, are not as clearly focussed on the emancipatory potential of “utopian realism,” can one discern some commonalities across all or most of these writers, especially concerning emancipatory concerns such as freedom from exploitation, repression or unjustifiable intervention? Evidently, they too are sympathetic with the concern of critical international theorists to reconnect security theorizing with ameliorative, if not emancipatory, ethical-political theories pointed toward greater human self-realization, autonomy, community, security and well being on a transnational, perhaps even a global, scale. Within limits, they support historical, constructivist accounts of security arrangements. At least implicitly, therefore, many of their contributors make a link from community building to security enhancement -- and thus freedom from threats or fear -- through the relevant international community building or state building activities.

A Return to the Interpretative Project of the Critical Security Studies Project

Is the “critical-security-studies project” a Western invention? Does it embody suspect or discredited Enlightenment, liberal or social democratic ideals? Does its comprehensive, universalistic character reflect to some extent hegemonic aspirations that we should be critically skeptical about, either in terms of the value concerns and loyalties embodied in that project, or from the perspectives of nonsupporters?
Recently, I returned with renewed admiration, but a more critical historical eye, to the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial in Washington, D.C. On reflection, that visit gives significant support for a cautionary, non-dismissive attitude toward such questions.

Located across from the Jefferson Memorial, the FDR Memorial is also not far from the moving Vietnam memorial; for those sensitive to the unequal treatment of Blacks in the United States, these neighbors provide mute testimonies to some of the broader societal contradictions associated with Jefferson's and Roosevelt's noble American ideals. The Roosevelt Memorial's stirring inscriptions, imposing stone courtyards and waterworks --linked to each of his 4 terms in office as President-- should, and will, appeal to many Americans besides myself, as well as to foreign visitors. Table 1 below lists the last 12 of the Memorial's 21 inscriptions, associated with his last two terms, including the war years.

Walking through the Memorial, reading the inscriptions, one relives in memorial awe, selected highlights of Roosevelt's Presidential life. Because it physically comes last in the narrative trajectory I followed, Inscription 19, concerning the "Four Freedoms," deserves special attention. In the context of the other internationally oriented inscriptions, and on the basis of a reading of the 1940 State of the Union speech and two associated documents made available at the Memorial bookshop as sources of FDR's words on this subject, I was struck by the commonalities of FDR's hegemonic vision of Allied/American war aims and the themes in the previously cited literature on the critical-security project. In the recent security studies literature of my acquaintance, Thomas C. Forsberg's writings resurrect as many of these themes, but in a more explicitly oriented fashion.

With the hindsight of more than 5 decades of world history, let me recall some of these originating, common themes. Clearly grounded in FDR's New Deal effort of active, planned, socio-economic, governmental responses to Depression crises, and his memorialized 1933 Inaugural claim that "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." (Inscription 5), the Four Freedoms did not actually appear in the partly
12. "We must scrupulously guard the civil rights and civil liberties of all our citizens, whatever their background. We must remember that any oppression, any injustice, any hatred, is a wedge designed to attack our civilization."

CREATING TO THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR PROTECTION OF FOREIGN BORN
WASHINGTON, D.C. 1/19/40

13. "We must be the great arsenal of Democracy."

FREDERICK CHIAT ON NATIONAL SECURITY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 1/29/40

14. "We have faith that future generations will know that here, in the middle of the twentieth century, there came a time when men of good will found a way to unite, and produce, and fight to destroy the forces of ignorance, and intolerance, and slavery, and war."

ADDRESS TO WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENTS ASSOC.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2/12/41

15. "They (who) seek to establish systems of governments based on the regimentation of all human beings by a handful of individual rulers...call this a new order. It is not new and it is not order."

ADDRESS AT ANNUAL DINNER OF WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENTS ASSOC.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 3/15/41

16. "I have seen war. I have seen war on land and sea. I have seen blood running from the wounded...I have seen the dead in the mud. I have seen cities destroyed...I have seen children starving. I have seen the agony of mothers and wives. I hate war."

ADDRESS AT CANANDAIGUA, NEW YORK 8/14/36

17. "More than an end to war, we want an end to the beginnings of all wars."

UNDELIVERED ADDRESS FOR
JEFFERSON DAY PREPARED FOR 4/13/45

18. "Unless the peace that follows recognizes that the whole world is one neighborhood and does justice to the whole human race, the germ of another world war will remain as a constant threat to mankind."

ADDRESS TO WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENTS ASSOC.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2/12/43

19. "Freedom of speech
Freedom of worship
Freedom from want
Freedom from fear"

ANNUAL MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 1/6/41

20. "The structure of world peace cannot be the work of one man, or one party, or one nation...it must be a peace which rests on the cooperative efforts of the whole world."

ADDRESS TO CONGRESS ON WASHING CONFERENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 3/7/45

21. "The only limit to our realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today. Let us move forward with strong and active faith."

UNDELIVERED ADDRESS FOR
JEFFERSON DAY PREPARED FOR 4/13/45

Quotations carved by master stone carver John Benson

decontexted forms that the Memorial presents. Such language evolves from Roosevelt’s earlier public remarks, appearing most succinctly and completely in a letter of acceptance to what appears to be an interdenominational churchmen group. As evidence for a global hegemonic perspective, the “everywhere [or “anywhere”] in the world” rhetoric of the first, State of the Union, presentation is particularly striking. It is repeated 4 times, as each freedom is introduced:

In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms.

The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world.

The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way—everywhere in the world.

The third is freedom from want—which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world.

The fourth is freedom from fear—which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.

That is no vision of a distant future. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and generation. In addition to a subsequent claim that “Freedom is the supremacy of human rights everywhere,” calls for the building of armaments to help our prewar allies, the treatment of our increasing military involvement as an act of defense, the mention of Napoleonic incursions in America, a commitment to realism, and increased efficiency in weapons production, the rejection of tyrannical, imposed world orders, and the need to
work in concert with others, there is a clear, processual commitment to the common
security of ordinary people (and nations, not states): "We believe that the men and
women of such nations, no matter what size, can, through the process of peace, serve
themselves and serve the world by protecting the common man’s security."26 That the
fourth freedom is associated with disarmament in our lifetime is also emphasized.
Many of these themes are reechoed in Inscriptions 12-18, 20, and 21; and in the
Critical-Security-Studies literature reviewed above.

If security and emancipation are seen to go together in Rooseveltian
projects, our skeptical reflections suggest that they need not always do so, for the same
people. Recall that before and during the Roosevelt era a freer future was linked in
controversial Marxist claims to the emancipatory potential of lower/working class and
anti-imperialist revolutions. The vast majority of international scholars today would
agree that an historically informed, multi-perspective approach of such claims is needed
and can be appropriate today, if not now.

Rooseveltian and Marxist claims to mass and individual
emancipation with the concrete objectives of the associated, multi-perspective
scholarly discourses, make it timely to debate such ideals in our own
contemporary world.

Many students and scholars in Critical-Security Studies feel
better defined, informed, and inspired to think about and engage
such ideals be critically, for the sake of the development of meaning of security
concerns to include individual men and women’s experiences of threat, as well as other
well-being aspirations, makes many students ask: Shouldn’t a workable scholarly
conception of common security be made more specific, practically helpful, yet still
criticizable in scholarly or policy-oriented ways?
An awareness of the pre-Cold War Western roots of many key ideas in "Critical Security Studies" makes others object that a genuinely cross-cultural, autonomy-respecting, critical approach to security concerns has yet to be established. Those hoping to achieve a scientific, international/global scholarly approach to international/world security issues in today's subnational/international/global world need to know how this goal might at least be approximated in an eventually post-hegemonic, difference-respecting, culturally specific, yet cross-cultural or trans-cultural fashion. Or, with less universalistic aspirations, they might suggest that a more productive focus would be on how projects claiming to enhance both security and emancipation could be operationally defined as relevant to the lives or existence of particular individuals, peoples, practices, organizations or countries in various parts of the world. And should not such projects be subjected as well to careful but serious criticism from a variety of Western normative, conceptual and empirical perspectives, including post-modern ones, on the meanings of freedom?

The rest of this paper suggests preliminary answers to these seemingly divergent questions. Of course, outside stirring可疑, good things are less likely always to go together. Taken together the answers given here will nonetheless argue for the possibility and actuality of definable linkings of emancipation to concretely researchable, yet cross-cultural variants of existential security.

To make progress toward this goal, I want first slightly to recast the individual level focus emphasized by Booth, Bull and Buzan above. If, as argued, individuals or families are the ultimate units of world society, I think it appropriate for specialists in international security studies to focus less exclusively on the considerations that larger entities -- e.g., minority groups, regimes, communities, sectoral practices or institutions, technologies, societies, economic-ecological arrangements, states or inter/transnational organizations -- provide for meeting their security concerns. When these larger entities represent collective agencies, they too can have security needs or objectives worth
studying, but not in isolation from the impact of these pursuits on their constituent members, and on outsiders.

**Recognizing security threats as constituted by securitization processes**

If we are to explore links of emancipation and security, we must know somehow which threats to which groups, practices or institutions — and ultimately their constituent individuals or families — deserve to be labeled “security” issues. As a way of giving coherence and focus to the security/emancipation relationship, secondly I suggest using an anti-essentialist “securitization” approach to defining security issues recently offered by Buzan, Waever and deWilde. As a kind of emergency breaking of the rules, securitization should be seen as extreme or abnormal politicization (more of it is not thus better), an “existential (life- or existence-challenging) threat [which] has to be argued” successfully to a relevant public as an inter-subjectively agreed upon threat/survival issue requiring such rule breaking (and possibly force-employing) practices for a certain more or less extended period of time.

Due principally to Ole Waever, the “securitization” approach to situation-specific characterizations of security issues/threats may be described as an anti-essentialist or post-structural attempt to (rejoin Hobbes to the English School of International Relations [Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, etc.]), rather than leave him to the misinterpretations of Hobbesian anarchy typically associated with neo-realist readings thereof: international relations usually do not occur within a “nasty, brutish and short,” pre-contract, domestic, anarchic wilderness, but within an international/world society of mutually recognized states reluctantly, unevenly, but increasingly recognizing individuals or households as their and its ultimate units. In that world, “security is about survival [about] an issue posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society).”
In recent world history, the religiously/aristocratically/ethnically structured character of certain regimes and the genocidal devastation of certain ethnic populations have surely justified describing their "defense" in such existential security terms as well. The extent to which identity-specific values or symbols are severely threatened enough within particular communities or societies to require "securitization" responses must be further researched. Retrospective policy justifications or critiques require cultural-specific discursive analyses in which all major viewpoints on an issue are given careful attention, as well as careful checking of such views through historical/scientific research. Accepting the relevance of such an analysis does not imply support for genocidal politics! At a time when ethnic conflicts are abundant, I also do not want to suggest that every secession is truly emancipatory, and I am very skeptical that any form of "ethnic cleansing" can adequately be justified in emancipatory terms.

It is key to Waever's conception that the securitizing speech act, which has traditionally legitimated the use of force, has also invoked the right of a "state to mobilize, or take special powers, to handle existential threats." As Buzan, Waever and De Wilde carefully illustrate, such invocations can be regarding political, economic, cultural, societal or environmental "sectors" of a domestic or international society; just as clearly, the mere invocation of the word "security" or "defense" or "survival" does not, by itself, make something a security/securitized issue or threat.

Previous case studies of security-enhancing successes, or breakdowns, need to be reanalyzed in these terms in order to derive more perspicuous and practically useful ways to prevent debilitating and/or unsuccessful securitization dynamics. And, the approach needs to be critically tied into the much richer existing literature on strategies for crossing thresholds of violent collective behavior in ways that effectively allow for relatively prompt returns. And when reliably generalizable ways of characterizing emancipation are available, we can develop and better defend empirical generalizations linking or delinking emancipation, securitization, and human well being.
The securitization approach is constructively and practically oriented towards the multi-leveled analysis of the variety of security-needing social entities I have just proposed.²⁹ It certainly does not discredit the evaluative study of their impacts on ordinary human lives!

It responds constructively, discursively, to the transnationalizing of concerns and the broadening of possibilities for reconceptualizing threats clearly present in, and encouraged by, critical security studies.³⁰ Moreover, I find this discursive, intersubjectively-oriented, community-linked, yet coherent approach suggestive of how to proceed in further "decentering" the statist bias of conventional security/strategic studies, without denying the relevance of states’ contributions to vital topics like nuclear arms control, Napoleonic neighbors, or civil wars. Refocusing critical security studies to point toward existential threats to important groups, nations, practices, organizations or technologies within particular transnational or international societies or places gives concrete meanings to freedom from fear. Whether or not securitization helps achieve that goal – at what price for discursive communal will formation – must be answered empirically, historically, discursively. The corresponding search within relevant societies or communities for remedial, preferably nonsecuritized or desecuritizing, emancipatory or redemptive practices, is based on the pacifist belief that peace is best waged by peaceful means, rather than the alternative maxim: to secure peace, prepare for war.³¹

Within Critical Security Studies, securitization is inherently an interrelated concept³²; importantly this linkage depends on the closely close relationship between self-realization, autonomy, self-determination and security for the community interested. Processes or threats which serve to demobilize or sidestep discursive community responses to them undermine the collective, rational, deliberative capacities of communities autonomously and freely to meet such threats.

For present purposes, it is important to recognize that there are a variety of things societies, groups and individuals can do to prevent doleful securitizations of their
lives. For example, consider the mobilization of existence enhancing (inter-) communal problem-solving practices, or, in a non-crisis mode, the writing and diffusing of balanced precedential histories. Easier to describe than actually to write, these histories would more clearly attribute responsibilities for past failures and be suggestive of how existentially threatening violence can be avoided. Such peace-building activities are not normally on the agendas of conventional security/strategic specialists trained on exemplary studies of extended deterrence or the less-than-peaceful proclivities of less-than-maturely-democratic states!

Using the securitization approach, recognizing the internal relations of community and desecuritizing practices, can the emancipatory thrust of critical security studies be further articulated? In my earlier work on emancipatory empirical peace research, I used a mixture of Habermas and Bhaskar to describe the emancipatory knowledge interest as "an attitude which is formed in the experience of suffering from something man-made, which can be abolished and should be abolished;" and I focussed on the "uncoupling [of] the present from the causality of the past," replacing 'depotentialising (disempowering, oppressive)' psychological, social and ecological structures by 'potentialising (empowering, enhancing)' ones. I suggested that practically achievable emancipation was a "special qualitative kind of becoming free" that 'consists in the self-directed transformation from an unwanted and unneeded to a wanted and needed source of determination." 33

Rather than continue to broaden the dimensions of freedom/liberty typically offered in Western social and political theory, 34 I would like to comment further on the tendency observed by Linklater in more recent work, in which writings tend to be careful these days about using the expression 'emancipation' beyond referents of biographical experiences" because "[n]either social collectivities nor society as a whole can be regarded as a subject write large." 35 It turns out that recognizing that the Enlightenment and modernity no longer come along with "a promise of happiness," Habermas is only secure in talking about a "history of political emancipation" defined in
terms of a political and constitutional point of view, of principles that were "achieved only over the course of centuries of struggles, and of the collective experience of social recognition that at the end were finally assimilated into our political culture." 47

Could it be that Habermas -- the late-modern, communicatively rational, critical Kantian democrat -- had rediscovered Eric Fromm's or Harold Lasswell's devastating, Freud-inspired, inditements of ideologically charged, irrational projections of domestic views onto the world scene? Less plausibly, one might even ask if Habermas, the former Marxist, has "got (evangelical) religion" and is calling for individual salvation rather than political efforts to change the world. 48 Ironically, his views also seem, in part, to converge with Samuel Huntington's claim that Western values are too unique and precious for us Westerners to expect or promote global collaborations based on them or their Eastern cousins. 49

Reading further, one finds Habermas to be a cautious modernist, but not a defeatist: If modernity "no longer comes with a promise of happiness," "a meaning that is foolproof against all misunderstanding" associates humanity with more independence, but not automatically more happiness. In critically discussing German unification's normative deficits, he appeals to emancipatory standards defined from a "political and constitutional point of view", "to principles that were achieved only over the course of centuries of struggles, and of the collective experience of social recognition that were finally assimilated into our political culture." 50 In defending an emancipatory standard with considerable cosmopolitan appeal, he nonetheless grounds it in Western history and culture.

**The challenge of non-Western and post-modern emancipatory concerns**

Having discussed how "security" might be better understood, we now turn to clarifying "emancipation" in ways allowing more adequately for the critical study and promotion of their linkage. I would suggest that we still need to achieve the fuller inclusion of multiple Western and non-Western perspectives on the meanings of
freedom, without giving up the distinctive and attractive appeal to human improvement and emancipatory development which is so central to the ethical/global concerns of the critical security studies project. I mention "West and non-West" together because the West/non-West opposition is often used in misleading and dangerous ways in security contexts. What about those many individuals who can be considered simultaneously to live in both worlds? The valid point of references to the "non-Western" is that it is often worthwhile to reinclude geoculturally excluded "non-Westerners" in globally-oriented intellectual or policy encounters. But it should be said, as well, that the United States (which has UN headquarters in its midst), Canada and the United Kingdom are still to be judged relatively open on such issues, compared to many other states/societies.

If we indeed find such existential threats to liberty in non-Western contexts, we have to allow that there may be metaphysical or cultural differences in how these notions are defined, applied and responded to. If the rootedness of most versions of the critical-security-studies project in Rooseveltian visions is granted, the character of that project as a hegemonic contender must be acknowledged and its appeal must be rethought. Indeed, the partial convergence of criticisms I want seriously to address combines both Western late modern, postmodern and non-Western contemporary perspectives. Of the several relevant sources on this subject that I can recommend, the most exciting for me has been Fred Dallmayr's exploration of new Western and non-Western voices from Islam and Buddhism.

The good news suggested by Dallmayr's review is that there are social movements in Islamic, Buddhist and "post-modern" societies that are promoting for changes under banners of freedom be recognized as participatory and social. The "bad news" for cosmopolitan utopian realists is that from an Islamic or Buddhist perspective — and there are various of these — liberty does not always mean the same thing that secular, modern Westerners take it to mean. A problem with critical security studies literatures or critical social theorists is that they usually cite exclusively
Western writers like Kant, Marx, Cox, Habermas or Bhaskar as their specialists on emancipation. One could do worse! But these are all secular rationalist thinkers, identified positively with key aspects of modernity that such "non-Western" writers (and some "post-Modernists") reject. An impressive contribution of Dallmayr’s cited chapter is the exploration of Buddhist and Islamic self-transcending meanings of freedom, emancipation and redemption with which "Western" writers must deal with if a globalizing search for inter-subjective, discursive agreements concerning existential survival threats is to proceed.  

Isaiah Berlin may have offered the best anti-historicist aphorism for opera lovers – history does not have a libretto – but postmodern and feminist thinkers are more generally identified with the rejection of liberal, progressive or emancipatory metanarratives as adequate for telling world historical stories about “mankind.” They have problematized as well the subject-object, public-private and self-other logocentric dichotomies in terms of which these accounts have been authored. The significant if partial convergence of thematics between feminist/postmodern Western critics of Enlightenment-inspired emancipation projects and the views of several of the Buddhist and Islamic writers in Dallmayr’s chapter is sufficient cause for taking both groups of critics more seriously. Happily, the emancipatory and redemptive language of the “non-Westerners” suggests that an appropriately cross-cultural or multicultural approach to security and emancipation may still be possible in such contexts. But one should expect partial convergences on moral or agreement on foundations.

In this regard, recent remarks by a leading postmodernist, J. Jacques Derrida, are particularly gratifying. They were made in an interview with Ernesto Laclau, Richard Rorty and Simon Critchley on remarkable overlaps between postmodern deconstruction and late-modern pragmatism. In response to remarks by Critchley and Rorty that his earlier writings falsely presented Derrida as much more of a “private ironist” than a Rortyan “public liberal,” Derrida reiterated and enlarged upon a commitment to “the great classical discourse of emancipation.”
I believe that there is an enormous amount to do today for emancipation, in all domains and all the areas of the world and society. Even if I would not wish to inscribe the discourse of emancipation into a teleology, a metaphysics, an eschatology, or even a classical messianism, I none the less believe that there is no ethico-political decision or gesture without what I would call a 'Yes' to emancipation, to the discourse of emancipation, and even, I would add, to some messianicity. (Derrida 1996, p. 82)

Although he doesn't think his messianism could easily be translated into Judaeo-Christian or Islamic terms, his explication sounds remarkably Habermasian, referring to a "messianic structure that belongs to all language[to] the performative dimension of the promise." Speaking for or against truth, even lying, invokes such a messianic, apriori "believe me" as soon as one opens one's mouth. And, "I do not see how one can pose the question of ethics if one renounces the motifs of emancipation and the messianic." (Ibid.)

(From these quotations, I find Derrida true to the postmodern critique of grand meta-narratives, in a way that any Egyptian, Turk, Iranian, Aztec or Indian (or both meanings) could share. As contemporary feminists have similarly argued about their gender biases, such a person would voice suspicion that the great, global, "emancipatory," and cosmopolitan movements - like Alexander's philosophical brotherhood of man, to Augustus's Stoic Roman rule, to late Roman and medieval and modern Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Liberalism and Marxism - have all been used to justify or obscure imperialistic or quasi-colonial practices. A Derridean postmodernist would obviously be allergic to neo-realist essentialism, but she would be readier than most pragmatically, non-foundationally, to engage in the situation-specific discourse of
emancipation, of freedom from oppression and other possibly existential threats to which the discursive concern with "securitization speech acts" is also oriented. Derrida recognizes as well both an emancipatory, self-transcending, potentially dramatic, pervasive redemption motif, not unlike those articulated by Dallmayr's Islamic and Buddhist thinkers.

My own hermeneutic explorations of Judeo-Christian and other retellings of hero/liberator/salvation stories similarly found trans-religiously or cross-culturally valid forms of highly motivating narrative accounts, whose "truths" could vary with the different individual readings of them, and which could be differentiated on just such a "world changing" versus "self-situation-transcending" axis. Self-transcending orientations were an important part of Sadat's going to Jerusalem in the name of peace; they should make many Jews and Christians resonate when they reinterpret such actions performatively in the terms of vocabularies and motivational appeals they are more familiar with. Pragmatically, Bartolomé de Las Casas was, arguably, more of a success in Machiavellian power terms than was Machiavelli himself, even though by the end of his life he was widely recognized as an originator of opposition to New World imperial conquests by "Christian" European powers on what we would now take to be human rights grounds. Similarly, contrary to the rationalistic, secular Cold War practice in much of the West which opposed Weberian to Marxian social science, Weber's "iron cage" critique of modern bureaucratic society reads a lot like a combination of Marx and the Hebrew prophets. A Habermasian reformulation of the Weberian perspective, in terms of Wittgensteinian language games, or truth discourses, sounds like Marx, but is in fact essentially quite close to the Derrida we have been discussing.

Hence I conclude that even though globalizing emancipatory discourses have to be looked upon with a certain skepticism, partial, performative, pragmatic convergences are possible on concrete security issues, which can reasonably be said to preserve or augment emancipatory concerns. Although I cannot predict where the most productive
domains for such discussions will be, perhaps they will include racially or religiously
based repressions of distinctive minorities living in several countries, conquest-oriented
military invasions across recognized boundaries, movements toward gender equality,
and the rights of organized, but underprivileged peoples to provide more of their own
economic sustenance.

Emancipatory restructurings of security-related collective memories and futures

I suppose that it is my Enlightenment ancestry as an educator that excites me
when I come across historically pregnant quotes like the following from Milan Kundera's
The Book of Laughter and Forgetting:

The struggle of man against power is the
Struggle of memory against forgetting.46

I certainly agree with the emancipatory import – concerning a potentially vital “apology
issue” in contemporary Japanese retellings of their World War II involvement – of
Howell's criticisms of particularistic, self-flattering, Japanese governmental and societal
conduct on this point47. And I agree with Dienstag's partial explanation for the success
for East European 1989 revolutions: “As much as the virtues of capitalism, it was the
memory of 1956 that threatened, and ultimately overwhelmed, communist rule [in
Hungary].”48 As an important piece of evidence for this claim, Dienstag recalls the
eyear 1989 debate in Hungary occasioned by a governmental historical committee
redescribing the 1956 revolt as “a popular uprising” rather than a “counter-
revolutionary” protest. Without such re legitimization efforts, the nationally emancipatory
policy of withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the anti-authoritarian, and hence,
emancipatory, move toward a multiparty system in Hungary would similarly be
considered “counter-revolutionary.”
But, as a respectful gesture toward the many youthful students of Nietzsche, Derrida and Foucault on such challenging subjects as power, truth and enlightenment, I want here briefly to explore some of the more complex aspects of memories concerning Japan, the rest of East Asia and the United States during the World War II period. In Dienstag's suggestive reading of Nietzsche, (re-)writing human histories can -- not surprisingly to the reader who has followed my story line so far -- create collective identity transformations, existential redemptions from the violence of the past.

Dienstag's performative, Nietzschean title -- "Dancing in Chains" -- connotes the Homer-like overcoming of the cognitive and causal constraints of a painful past as creatively as possible. His next to last footnote conveys his attitude towards freedom even better: he cites Hannah Arendt's rather anti-Heidiggerian account, in her Between Past and Future, "of freedom as 'the capacity to begin something new' [which account] captures as well as any I know the sense in which a concern for freedom and a concern for the future must coincide, as Nietzsche suggested." Perhaps contra Kundera, he has argued that: "Simply telling stories will not make us free; an inability to narrate, however, is an impediment that must be overcome on the path to freedom. It is a failure of imagination in the face of a singularly powerful memory [which has subordinated us]." He recognizes too that "Human beings fight over history because they conceive their pasts to be an essential part of who they are. And they are right." After a suggestive treatment of the ways human lives are defined in terms of their actions -- whose constitutive intentions are importantly shaped by their characters and relevant cultural narratives -- he has earlier introduced this Arendtian theme. The plan of his book is comparatively to review and assess the contributions of Locke, Hegel and Nietzsche as political theorists attempting "to design new plots for history" where both the dramatic and the interventionist sense of plotting is intended.

The link to redemption is a bit more complicated. As articulated in a powerful chapter entitled "The Future of Pain," both society and the permanence of forms in memory, according to Nietzsche, are established by acts of violence. Bodily understood,
consciousness, interpretations, morality, contracts, conscience and Christian meekness are all results of a continuing history of violence and cruelty. In this terrible world, where memories and identities are fused, character transformations are possible:

A new future is created by a rewriting of the past. It is a redemption of that past. It is the reshaping of the past to make a new value. Columbus, who had to reinterpret the globe before he could discover a new continent, is our modern-day Homer. If we enter this future of disciplined creativity, the past will stand redeemed as its necessary prehistory. The attraction is that of a ‘multi-stringed culture’ in place of the monotonous life of the Last Man. 53

The different ways that we can rewrite our pasts allows a multiplicity of related, possible, less violent futures. It is this redemptive possibility ‘that the philosophy of Nietzsche awakens us to in its audacious attempt to remake the future and redeem the past by retelling our history.’ 54

I want briefly to explore these notions, and extend them to contemporary US security policies, within the context of a beautifully nuanced, but profoundly critical account of Hiroshima’s recent efforts at urban renewal by Lisa Yoneyama. Her account occurs in a book full of ‘spatial remapping’. 55 Briefly, she argues that Hiroshima’s public sector is being spun by its urban planners and business leaders to encourage ‘brightness, comfort, and cleanliness.’ Unlike some other thought-provokers, however, the beautiful Peace Memorial Park is being preserved. But in Yoneyama’s eyes, the partly destroyed Atomic Bomb Dome is becoming museumised, in a history-cleansing fashion, almost like a Disney theme park. An imperial castle actually destroyed by the atomic bomb has been reconstructed and is presented as a cultural site, emphasising its romantic possibilities rather than its military past.
Having recently revisited the associated Museum myself, I too was struck by the ways the horror of the human suffering associated with the 1945 bombing had been less graphically displayed compared to my previous visit there. The history of its destruction, and its role as an Imperial command post from which Japanese armies were being shipped off toward the Asian theater of war is not obviously documented. As with the earlier, revisionist account of why the US proceeded with the bomb drop, no effort is made to treat the suffering of the Japanese civilians in Hiroshima as in any way related to the war they started in Asia with Japanese mainland invasions, the anti-civilian atrocities of the "Rape of Nanking," etc. No sense of the emancipatory concerns of the Rooseveltian coalition, as reviewed above, is presented. Even though Japanese ontological particularism may help explain their failure to make some -- to many Westerners obvious -- comparisons, one must ask: in the light of the painful accounts that Yoneyama evokes from Hiroshima's war-impacted citizens, whether the business goals of the "renewers" are consonant with these victims' need for recognition and renewal themselves? Is this truncated representation of Japanese history broadly contributive to a new era of trust-based international relations in East Asia? Without implying that US histories of World War II do not also deserve critical revisions, I must agree that Howell's previously cited suggestion that more realistic public accounts of Japanese past debts vis-à-vis its neighbors would help improve its continuing relations with its neighbors. That way the further securitization of regional international relations could be at least partly neutralized.

In the interests of critical reciprocity, these remarks on Japanese national practices lead me to reflect on those of my own country, our own state. I do so in the light of the previously established rootedness of the critical security project in the Rooseveltian hegemonic project, as revealed by a rereading of this Depression cum World War II American memorial. I am compelled to ask: are we living up to the ideals that so many of our fellow countrymen died for? Is the hatred of war emphasized in the FDR memorial a driving principal of contemporary American foreign policy? Agreed that
we do not like bodybags, and our military has now helped us with that desire, but do not we like high-tech killing of others just a little too much, especially if it produces good videos!

Are we as committed to multilateralism and human rights universalism as Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt were? Neither President Clinton nor Senator Helms, the current Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, have an unblemished record in this respect. Has our national sense of existential security threats changed away from widely appreciated New Deal ideals, more towards more internationally criticized, self-indulgent, self-righteous, deference demands?

And, given present security concerns, where is the commitment to step by step disarmament, and to economic development for the peoples of the world – not just their bankers – in our national budgets or planning priorities? Why are Saddam Hussein et al. blamed for the failure of the Cold War peace dividend to materialize? When Senators talk about “special interests,” why do they ever so rarely talk about defense industries and war profiteers, as Roosevelt used to do during peacetime, but much less often during the actual war period? What is the implication of the tendency of American military spending tending to approximate, as Figure 1 indicates, the non-fighting, non-Reagan years of the Cold War? Where is the call for budget savings, that might result from a more multilateralist reconsideration of the occulted past of the past contribution of our allies? Although futures are hazardous to predict, what effects on our needs calculations have the reduced strength of Iraq and Iran, the highly improbable, “worst case” force planning scenarios involving 2 wars? Why has the threat analysis and efficient force planning that Chuck planners like Charles Hitch, Robert McNamara, and William Kaufmann probably, and that Forsberg and a few others56 excel in, fallen into such misuse? Is it because of our “hollow” hegemonic pretensions, which we don’t like to fully admit unto ourselves, and which would be more sharply debated were they more fully and explicitly costed out.57
Back to the Cold War Norm

Source: Randal Forsberg, "Force Without Reason," Boston Review, summer '91
Used with permission.
Why do so few of us train our students in defense budgeting skills anymore? Although dollars are not adequate ways of measuring capabilities or threats, we may still ask why does the United States spend more than 5 times its closest competitor in contemporary military budgets? (Note that in Figure 2 above, Iraq doesn't even make the top 20 states in terms of its estimated defense budget) Where is the discussion of the substantial savings which would result if the United States were to reorient our forces in a defensive defense posture, and efficiently try to strengthen, rather than weaken, United Nations multilateral peace-keeping and peace-enforcement forces?

Why was NATO expansion undertaken when it so clearly served to unite all sides of the Russian political spectrum in favor of a remilitarization of U.S.-Russian relations? Are we seriously planning for and moving toward a less armed, multipolar, reasonably just and peaceful world order of the future, or do we just prefer to memorialize the "good old days" of World War II and the Cold War without being reminded of the extreme violence they contained? Ought not we involve ourselves and our students in the difficult but challenging research programs mentioned earlier in this paper? What do other peoples, societies, civilizations really want? What should be the international, transnational and (sub)national components of more collaborative efforts minimally to achieve the security components of such goals? In the interest of building a more stable and just world order which will survive the eventual decline in US hegemony, it would be good to start trying to start preparing our intellectual cushions now, by recalling more accurately the roots of Anglo-American and NATO security priorities.

Concluding Reflections

This chapter reflects on the crucial role that emancipation plays in the critical-security-studies project, one where security and emancipation are closely joined. In attempting to suggest a broad, focussed, constructively critical framework for such enquires - one where the possible connections of security and emancipation are recognized, but claims as to actual cooccurrences are critically investigated - I have
been especially heartened by the evidence presented by both non-Western and post-
modern writers for the seriousness and salience of the emancipation theme. Derrida's
commitment to the seriousness of argumentation, to dialogue, to (scientific)
propositional discourse, is equally emphatic and reassuring from the foundations-
avoiding, "pragmatic convergences perspective" suggested for identifying emancipation
trends above; it matches fairly well the Wever-inspired approach to identifying security
threats as constituted by securitization processes. I would like to conclude by
endorsing Derrida's language about such endeavors:

We are here in order to discuss, and in order to exchange arguments as clear,
univocal and communicable as possible. [In contexts like the present one
where the propositional form, a certain type of propositional form, governs, and
where a certain type of micrology is necessarily effaced, where the attention to
language is necessarily reduced [but of course not eliminated], argumentation is
clearly essential. [Deconstruction of oppositional dichotomies, etc.] rais[es] the
stakes of argumentation reconsidering the protocols and the contexts of
argumentation, the questions of competence, the language of discussion, etc. 58

The ironically return of what Toulmin would describe as Early Modern, skeptical,
humane, context-sensitive standards of reasonableness for scientific and practical
inquiry on international security questions. Context postmodern, hybrid, and a good
basis on which to reconstitute this hybrid at some later times.
Contributors to my thinking on this paper have come from Ken Booth, Ann Tickner, Neta Crawford, Randall Forsberg, Kimberly Nolan, Thomas Schmalberger, and Colin Wight; none should be held responsible for what I made of their ideas or suggestions, for which I am nonetheless most grateful.

1 Inscription, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial, Washington, D.C. Relevant sources are given in (Roosevelt, 1933-1942), sold at the FDR Memorial bookshop. See note 2 below.


4 Looking back to Johan Galtung's pioneering The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective (New York: The Free Press, 1980) suggests a much earlier date for full engagement with these issues, plus a critical determination to transcend differences between Cold War antagonists self-labelled as "The Free World" and "Socialism" or "Anti-Imperialism." In that respect, it is interesting to note that "freedom" and "liberation" are used sparingly in that volume, pointed more towards enhanced diversity and unpressed political participation, and against structural violence or domination; and violence is conceived as any avoidable impediment to self-realisation." (pp. xxiv, 1, 48f., and 66-9). Galtung's was a perspective that few scholars in either of the first Two Worlds were willing or able to embrace or emulate at that time.


6 The locus classicus for Galtung and many others is Albert Cook's essay "Social forces, state and society in a transnational political research theory," originally published in the Quarterly Journal of International Studies, 1966, 2, pp. 125-34. The main points have been restated in other American, British, and European work. Emphasized is the view that for us as social scientists, theoretical conceptions of our social relations, including our own, are to be generated from the interviews and observations on which we account of society and our own social world. My 1988 essay is Humanistic Marxism and International Politics (Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

The labeling of a tradition of "Reflective" or 'Critical' historiography goes back at least to the beginning of the present century, and is doubtless connected to Kantian and even broader intellectual currents; see my "Rescuing reason from the rationalists: Reading Vico, Marx and Weber as reflective institutionalists," ibid., pp. 207-237, especially p. 220.

8 The quoted remarks in this paragraph are from Booth, "Security and Emancipation," especially pp. 318-23.


10 In the terminology of Galtung's peace research (see note 4 above), "human self-realization" would be the more appropriate term at this point than "security as a process" or "human emancipation," but Galtung would describe the diminution of such obstacles as "violence" reduction.

11 Kraus and Williams, *Critical Security Studies*, p. xii.


14 This theme has been previously well developed in Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War World*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), and by many of the contributors to the Kraus and Williams volume.


19 In the American context, the rediscovery of social constructivism is now treated as a "challenger to the continuing dominance of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism"

Seen through the broader lenses of the international literature on the philosophy of social inquiry, many constructivist themes can be associated with both the "realist," the linguistic, the phenomenological, and the "dialectical-hermeneutical" traditions of sociopolitical investigation. Less precisely, these epistemological orientations go back at least to Vico in the West and to many classical figures within European, Middle Eastern and Asian traditions. Drawing on these roots, Galtung, The True Worlds, p. 30, repeats in 1980 his earlier, dialectical (or "post-positivist") argument that equates Science with "Empiricism + Criticism + Constructivism."

20 This line of thought is well developed in Linklater's chapter on "Political Community and Human Security" in the present volume. I was also struck by the way community building, or international integration (in the sense of Karl Deutsch or Ernst Haas) links and transforms the connections of security-seeking and emancipatory overcomings while hearing Jef Huysmans' 1998 ISA-ECPR paper: "The Question of the Limit: The Name of the Migrant, De-securitization and the Aesthetics of Rupture in Political Realism," a revised version of which is forthcoming in Millenium.


23 See the sources cited in footnote 21 above.


26 Roosevelt, "Address at the Annual Dinner of the White House Correspondents Association," p.28.
28 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, pp. 21-29. In the next several paragraphs, these pages are the principal source of direct quotations.

29 In the above list, perhaps the most difficult entity to conceptualize in securitization terms is a "technology," which I think of as embedded within specific social practices. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde convincingly suggest that the "dikes" in Holland are a nonstate object/technology-in-place of clear existential importance.


32 See Linklater's discussion of "Political Community and Human Security" elsewhere in this volume. The discussion below of Habermasian linkages between community, society and emancipation has been stimulated by that chapter as well.


37 A similar view is expressed in Russell Hardin's recent discussion of the future of ethnic nationalism: "Hobsbawm thinks nationalism is no longer a main agent for global progress and emancipation as it once arguably was. Moynihan thinks it the dominant issue of our era...Nationalism and ethnic mobilization today bring more degradation

38 See Alker, Rediscoveries and Reformulations, p. 140ff. and p. 250ff. for relevant elaborations and citations.


42 Neumann presents a remarkably similar Sorkhout quote: "The [spiritually racked and dejected] West has summed more than its fill of every kind of freedom, including intellectual freedom. And this is not all. The political exercise of freedom in itself is quite inadequate to save the intellectual freedom in its entirety and, more, to move beyond it. It is conditional, not intrinsic to, the exercise of freedom. Freedom is another and higher goal." See Iver B. Neumann, In the Wake of Nordenflycht: Sovereignty in Identity and International Relations (London and New York: Routledge, 1997).

47 Howell, "The Inheritance of War."


50 Dienstag, p. 196f.

51 Dienstag, p. 206.

52 Dienstag, p. 19.

53 Dienstag, p. 135f.

54 Dienstag, p. 189.


58 (Derrida 1996, p. 78)