Social Influence in Attitudes and Attitude Change

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SOCIAL INFLUENCE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CONSENSUS IN ATTITUDES AND ATTITUDE CHANGE

“For the individual, his actions and the beliefs guiding them are either an endorsement of his group, and therefore a bond of social unity, or an expression of conflict with it. This conclusion... stands in contrast to those formulations that deal with attitudes in individualistic terms, in terms of their persistence or intensity or stereotypes. Attitudes are not only causally connected with group-conditions, they are also part of the mutually shared field. Therefore the investigation of attitudes brings us to the center of the person’s social relations and to the heart of the dynamics of group process.”

—Solomon Asch (1952a, p. 577)

In 1935, Theodore Newcomb, a young social psychologist at the newly founded Bennington College for women, assessed the attitudes of the entering class and other students toward a number of social issues. His research findings would hardly surprise anyone familiar with his students: These daughters from economically privileged families in the 1930s arrived at college endowed not only with their families’ means to pay for higher education but also with their families’ political conservatism. Undeterred by the obviousness of these results, Newcomb continued his research, assessing the attitudes of each class just before they graduated.

Reasoning that attitudes form and change with social context, Newcomb hypothesized that his students’ attitudes might shift with their adjustment to a new social milieu. Indeed, Bennington College provided a much different social environment than the one his students left behind. The Bennington College Faculty subscribed to John Dewey’s then-revolutionary ideas about education as experimentation and discovery. The unconventional curriculum rejected many entrenched traditions of academia, and social issues as well as the classics contributed to the educational discourse. Liberal was the College norm. After four years of intense social interaction in this environment, the majority of baccalaureates left not only with their diplomas but also with substantially less conservative attitudes (Newcomb, 1943). Moreover, true to their
The Bennington College study is a classic demonstration of how changes in people's social environments, especially the pattern and content of their social interactions, effect changes in social attitudes. The attitude changes were so profound that they were evident in the social networks that students created later in their lives. These networks tended to support the former students' liberal attitudes (Asch, 1952a; Guimond, 1959). In general, the Bennington study articulates the organizing theme of social influence research, which is that social relations create and are created by attitudes. From this perspective, all attitudes are social in the sense that they develop, function, and change in a reciprocal relation with a social context.

In this chapter, we consider the social nature of attitudes. Our focus differs from the other chapters in this book, which instead emphasize intrapersonal attitudes. Attitudes are beliefs about the likelihood of a behavior or outcome and the emotional reactions that follow from it. Social influence research examines how social factors shape these beliefs and reactions. We begin by considering the nature of social influence and its role in the formation and expression of attitudes.

A recurring theme throughout the chapter is the ways in which people use information provided by others, especially information about a consensus of others, in order to achieve social and informational goals. Social consensus refers to the agreement upon judgments, feelings, and actions of a significant group, typically a majority of others. The chapter is structured so that, after reviewing the motives in influence settings that orient people to consider consensus views, we then evaluate the information-processing mechanisms that underlie social influence. Then, as examples of how people respond to consensus, we consider research on group polarization and minority influence. We also consider the dynamics of influence processes, especially the determinants and consequences of changing consensus views within a group. A dynamic account of the give and take that occurs as group members exert influence on each other raises issues of larger-scale societal and cultural factors in social influence. Our discussion of these societal factors concludes with a critical analysis of contemporary research on social influence and its historical roots.

Early Theorizing and Research on Motives for Influence: The Surveillance Paradigm

According to Deutsch and Gerard's (1955) classic theorizing, people agree with others for normative or informational reasons. Normative influence occurs when people conform to the positive expectations of another, who could represent another person, a group, or one's self (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955, p. 629). Informational influence involves accepting the information obtained from others as evidence about reality.

To demonstrate these motives, Deutsch and Gerard (1955) adapted Asch's (1952a, 1952b) widely known line-judging paradigm. In this research setting, participants judge the length of lines after hearing the judgments of experimental confederates who have been trained to give an incorrect answer on some trials. Participants have been found to respond to these incorrect judgments by agreeing with the others on about a third of the trials and giving the incorrect judgment themselves. Perhaps because of the simplicity of the judgment task, this study is often interpreted in social psychology textbooks as an illustration of normative influence. What could be simpler than comparing, as participants did in one of the trials, a 7-inch long line, a 8-inch long line, and an 11-inch long line to the 8-inch standard and deciding which of the former three lines matches the standard in length? When performed individually, the task was boringly easy—as indicated by participants' virtually perfectly correct answers in individual judgment settings. However, when performed in the company of experimental confederates who consistently gave incorrect answers, the task became loaded with difficulty. Naïve participants confronted with consensus dissent not only made errors, they took longer to make their decisions and appeared less certain about their answers (Asch, 1952a).

Deutsch and Gerard (1955) clearly recognized that, with minor variations in procedure, the line-judging paradigm could establish informational as well as normative motives for agreeing. Normative reasons for agreement emerge because participants express their judgments to others who might form positive or negative impressions of them. Informational reasons arise because the task is to identify the correct solution. Deutsch and Gerard demonstrated normative pressures in their finding that participants agreed more with others' judgments when these others were group members in face-to-face interaction than when these others were anonymous individuals judging in private. Also, suggesting the impact of informational pressures, participants agreed with others more when the lines to be judged were displayed only for a few seconds and were removed before anyone gave their judgments than when the lines were displayed throughout the judgment process. Presumably, removing the lines increased participants' informational dependence on others. Thus, Deutsch and Gerard's (1955) study provided important experimental evidence of their dual-motive scheme.

If the popularity of a concept can be taken as an indicator of its value, then the distinction between normative and informational motives is an important one. For the past 50 years, researchers have used this and related distinctions to explain why people are influenced in social settings (see, e.g., effect dependence vs. information dependence, Jones & Gerard, 1967; normative vs. informational functions of reference groups, Kelly, 1952; promotion of group loyalties to a goal vs. evaluation of social reality, Festinger, 1950). Yet, the specific meaning of these and related constructs has narrowed somewhat over the years—at least when compared with the initially rich theorizing about how group members' normative motives channeled judgments toward uniformity and their informational motives enabled achievement of group goals (Festinger, 1950; Kelley, 1952). That is, normative motives are now sometimes limited to concern with the outcomes provided by others (e.g., social acceptance and rejection). This narrow definition of normative motives excludes self-related aspects of social pressure, especially the motive to align one's attitudes with valued reference groups (Abras & Hogg, 1990; Turner, 1991).

In addition to narrowing the definition of normative motives, Deutsch and Gerard's dual-motive scheme has been further simplified in some treatments so that each motive is linked to a particular type of attitude change and processing mechanism. The idea that motives are linked to unique attitude outcomes was preserved by Deutsch and Gerard's (1955) use of the label, "conforming," to refer to normatively-based change and "agreeing" to refer to informationally-based change. Social psychology textbooks in particular have promoted a narrow interpretation of normatively-based conformity as a temporary judgment bolstered by limited issue-relevant information in memory. Supposedly, normative influence is evident only in public settings and not maintained in private settings in which judgments do not have social consequences. In contrast, informationally-based agreement supposedly mitigates thoughtful processing of message content and other relevant information and thus yields enduring change in judgments. Such agreement is presumed to be evident when attitude change holds in private and in public settings. Thus, in this simplified interpretation of Deutsch and Gerard's scheme, motives for
attitude change can be diagnosed from the continuity of recipients' judgments across public and private settings.

In summary, over the years, convention has narrowed the meanings of informational and normative motives so that normative motives are now equated with concerns about others' surveillance. Furthermore, normative agreement typically is thought to involve minimal thought about the issue in the appeal and endures only as long as others have surveillance over judgments. In contrast, informational agreement supposedly does not depend on surveillance and is thoughtful and enduring. These simplifications of the dual-motive scheme have been widely promoted in undergraduate textbooks in social psychology, although similar ideas also can be found in some otherwise more advanced treatments of social influence.

Empirical findings, however, have posed a strong challenge to the idea that surveillance heightens normative concerns and thus agreement with others. This point was strikingly demonstrated in a meta-analytic synthesis by Bond and Smith (1996) of 97 studies using Asch's (1952, 1955b) line-judging paradigm. Contrary to Deutsch and Gerard's (1955) often-cited findings of greater agreement among face-to-face group members than anonymous individuals, the aggregated findings across multiple studies revealed comparable levels of agreement in public and private settings. That is, even though others' surveillance in public settings plausibly enhanced normative pressures to agree, the overall amount of attitude change in public was comparable to that obtained in private. The lack of a systematic difference between public and private expressions of judgment in Bond and Smith's review challenges the notion that normatively based influence is greatest when people are under public scrutiny.

The failure for surveillance to enhance normative pressures and thus influence is perhaps not surprising. At heart, manipulating social pressure through surveillance suggests an oversimplified view of social impact. Alport's (1965) famous definition of social psychology provided a considerably more differentiated view of social impact, in which the effects of others emerge whether their presence is "actual, imagined, or implied" (p. 3). Because others can be present in these various ways in both public and private contexts, others' effects on attitudes should be found in both contexts. In an inventive study that illustrates how social pressure holds across contexts, Bulbulian and Holmes (1987) instructed female participants to think about two of their older relatives or two of their campus peers. Later, when the women were given sexually explicit material to read in a supposedly unrelated context, the ones who had visualized their older relatives reported not liking the material as much as those who had visualized their peers. Presumably, each social group was associated with its own set of moral standards, and these standards continued to exert impact on the women's subsequent experiences. Thus, the normative influence of each group was apparent even when participants gave their judgments privately.

Another reason to anticipate few normatively based differences between public and private settings is that the informational consequences of normative motives can endure even when the motives themselves are no longer potent (Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Ruscher & Dovidio, 1998; Zajonc, 1960). Especially in influence studies that assess participants' attitudes publicly before they assess them privately, people might retrieve the initial, publicly-influenced judgment or they might retrieve the information on which the judgment was based. When earlier judgments and information are accessible, the effects of social motives transcend contexts, and positions given in public will be maintained in private.

Finally, normative motives might arise from a variety of features of influence contexts in addition to others' surveillance. Following Deutsch and Gerard's (1955) original theorizing, normative influence can be designated in ways other than by others' surveillance. People can react to public opinion in a way that successfully regulates the rewards and punishments they can provide, and informational concern for (c) understanding the entity or issue featured in influence appeals (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996; Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Johnson & Eagly, 1989; Wood, 1999, 2000). Elements of this framework were evident early on in Keltman's (1962, 1965) processes of social influence and in French and Raven's (1959) theorizing about sources of power. Although each of these more fine-grained analyses possesses unique features, at core they all distinguish between aspects of the need to be: the need to relate to others, and the need to understand.

shift their attitudes toward the impending position—even when their attitudes are assessed privately before the appeal is delivered (Wood & Quinn, 2003). By shifting a little bit initially, people can induce the apparent impact of the appeal when it is delivered and thereby avoid their own culpability. Given that these preparatory shifts occurred regardless of whether participants expected to indicate their attitudes after the appeal privately or publicly to the source and others, it appears that this particular normative influence involved a desire not to be culpable rather than a desire not to seem to others. Apparently, influence is regulated by normative pressures that include comparisons to personal standards as well as to others' reactions. In general, then, normative influence cannot be diagnosed by evaluating whether attitude change occurs in private as opposed to in public.

There is, however, an exception to the rule that normative pressures cannot be diagnosed from public versus private attitude expressions. One specific type of normative motivation—invoking a superficial, strategic attempt to impress others, is likely to be associated with surveillance. Strategic attempts to impress others that involve minimal thought are likely to emerge only in public, to be easily forgotten, and to not maintain into private contexts. For example, despite the overall pattern in forewarning research indicating little effect of surveillance, greater warning impact in public than private has been found in a narrowly circumscribed setting—when people expected an immediate discussion on an uninteresting topic with a person who held opposing views (Wood & Quinn, 2003; see also Cialdini, Levy, Herman, & Enkeben, 1973; Cialdini, Levy, Herman, Koziolowski, & Petty, 1976). Apparently, the immediacy of the interaction and the low importance of the topic momentarily focused people on the benefits to be gained from a relatively neutral position (i.e., one that is defensible and minimally offensive to the partner). Thus, those expecting to share their attitudes with their partner shifted toward moderation. Attitudes given privately were not subject to these strategic concerns.

In summary, normatively motivated agreement persists across settings because social motives or their informational consequences carry over into private contexts and because normative motives involve the self as well as other people. Yet, one specific aspect of normative pressure can be diagnosed from comparisons between public and private settings. Relatively thoughtless, strategic statements meant only to impress others are made primarily in public, where they are most likely to accomplish their intended goal. These superficial attempts to impress others yield elastic shifts in judgment that "snap back" when the interaction has ended (Cialdini et al., 1973; Cialdini et al., 1976).

Tripartite Analyses of Motives: Being, Relating, and Understanding

The simplified view of normative and informational motives promoted by social psychology textbooks is slowly giving way to more sophisticated analyses of motives in influence settings. These more fine-grained perspectives recognize distinctions among normative motives, specifically between concerns with the self and concerns with relating to others. The result is a trio of motives that differentiate between normative concerns for (a) being oneself as a coherent and favorably evaluated entity and (b) relating to others in a way that successfully regulates the rewards and punishments they can provide, and informational concern for (c) understanding the entity or issue featured in influence appeals (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996; Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Johnson & Eagly, 1989; Wood, 1999, 2000). Elements of this framework were evident early on in Keltman's (1962, 1965) processes of social influence and in French and Raven's (1959) theorizing about sources of power. Although each of these more fine-grained analyses possesses unique features, at core they all distinguish between aspects of the need to be: the need to relate to others, and the need to understand.
The additional complexity of postulating three motives instead of two is well justified by the resulting empirical and theoretical gains. Empirical evidence clearly indicates that people respond to influence appeals in unique ways to satisfy each of these motives. In a particularly informative study, Lundgren and Prisin (1998, Study 1) experimentally instigated each motive and examined the effects on information processing and attitudes (see also Chen, Slechter, & Chills, 1994; Nysveen, Manstead, & Spears, 2001). Participants in the study were expected to discuss an attitude issue with a partner. Some participants initially were sensitized to their relations with others, and were told the study focused on agreeableness and rapport skills. When these participants were given a choice of material to read, they selected information that was congruent with the view ostensibly held by their partner, their thoughts about the information tended to support their partner’s position, and the attitudes they expressed to their partner were relatively congenial with their partner’s view. Other participants were initially informed that the study provided an opportunity to defend their own position on the topic. They selected material to read that supported their own view, generated thoughts supportive of their position, and indicated relatively polarized attitudes. Finally, other participants who initially were told that the study concerned accuracy of understanding about issues selected material to read on both sides of the issue (i.e., pro and con), generated thoughts that were relatively balanced in evaluation of both sides, and indicated relatively neutral attitudes. In summary, participants processed the available information so as to meet whatever goal was salient. When focused on establishing rapport, participants favored information congenial to their partner. When focused on defending their judgments, participants bolstered their own views. Finally, when focused on understanding the issue, participants considered a relatively unbiased sample of information.

In addition to demonstrating the unique effects of the trio of motives, Lundgren and Prisin’s findings nicely demonstrate that normative change is not always temporary and evident only under supervision. Instead, regardless of motive, the attitudes participants expressed to their partners persisted when they subsequently indicated their judgments privately. Especially impressive is the persistence of attitudes designating an accountable strategy. That is, attitudes directed by the normative motive of conveying a positive impression were no more “elastic” than were attitudes directed by informational motives. This persistence of normatively-based attitudes makes the glaringly obvious point that people are just as willing to devote extensive thought to themselves and their relations with others as they are to informational concerns of determining the truth about an issue. This persistence also might seem to challenge earlier studies of forewarning in which normative concerns yielded primarily temporary judgment shifts (Cialdini et al., 1973; Cialdini et al., 1976; Haus & Mann, 1979). However, as we have argued in this chapter, the temporary nature of cognitive strategies apparent in early research plausibly reflects a fleeting desire to align with others’ views. In contrast, the normative pressures in Lundgren and Prisin’s experiment were apparently strong enough to yield enduring attitude shifts that were evident in private.

In summary, it appears that each of the goals to understand reality, relate to others, and be oneself can be addressed through careful thought and analysis and can yield attitude change that endures across settings and time (Chen et al., 1996; Lundgren & Prisin, 1998). However, when these goals clash, people are likely to integrate with the information that they are motivated to use. The appropriate strategy of integrating attitudes is the primary cognitive strategy that people use to process information—whether this is the case when people are motivated to use normative or informational motives. Thus, the understanding that can be drawn from this research is that the underlying processing mechanism is a cognitive strategy of integrating attitudes, regardless of the motives that prompt this strategy.
whether objects are to be evaluated with some degree of favor or disfavor (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).

The helpful role of attitudes in structuring the world was recognized in early theory (Allport, 1935; James, 1890) and later formalized as attitudes' knowledge function (Katz, 1960) and object appraisal function (Smith, Bruner, & White, 1956). In these early approaches, knowing was one of several important functions an attitude could serve. Some researchers have argued that knowing is the central function of attitudes, given that the primary purpose of most attitudes is to understand and orient to the world (Fazio, 1986; Shafir, 1990; Zanna & Rempel, 1988). Without attitudes, every object and situation, however frequently encountered, would require evaluation anew, making us all lead characters in a perpetual "Groundhog Day" movie.

Attitudes as knowledge can effectively guide people and facilitate their interactions with the environment to the extent that the knowledge is relevant and valid. Social consensus is an important indicator of the apparent validity of information (Asch, 1952a; Dewey, 1922; 1930; Festinger, 1954; Sherif, 1937). Judgments acquire truth value through being shared with others (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). As Turner and Oakes (1997) argued, consensus judgments are more rationally more likely to reflect a deeper truth about the world, not because agreement alone indicates accuracy, but because they have emerged from, and survived, processes of discussion, argument, and collective testing (p. 369).

All social consensus, however, is not equivalent in terms of truth value. The positions held by disliked groups or ones with limited ability aren't likely to seem especially valid. Thus, people seeking to understand the correct position to take on an issue are likely to reject the positions of derogated groups (Wood, Pool, Leck, & Purvis, 1996). People who are seen as similar or slightly better (e.g., more competent at some task) are most likely to appear to provide valued information (Festinger, 1954). Also, consensus is likely to have more impact when it represents the positions of greater numbers of people (Darke et al., 1998). That is, people who are motivated to understand an issue appear to be sensitive to the law-of-large numbers, and they tend to be influenced more by the consensus positions of larger than smaller groups. Furthermore, consensus seems to be more significant for some issues than for others, presumably because ingroup consensus implies subjective validity more strongly for some issues than for others. For example, majority consensus has greater impact on judgments of personal preference than judgments of objective stimuli, presumably because consensus is especially informative about preferences likely to be shared with similar others (Crand & Mamula, 1994; Wood et al., 1992).

In addition, the way that social consensus develops can affect its apparent validity. Consensus is that is established through convergence of independent views and through validation by an individual's own, private cognitive processing should be most effective at establishing truth about an issue (Mackie & Skelly, 1994; Wilder, 1973). In Asch's (1952a) words, "Consensus is valid only to the extent to which each individual asserts his own relation to facts and retains his individuality...the meaning of consensus collapses once individuals act like mirrors that reflect each other." (pp. 493-495). Consensus therefore conveys validity when it represents agreement among thinking rather than yielding individuals.

Muzaffer Sherif's (1935, 1936) pioneering research on norm formation demonstrates how the apparent truth about the environment can emerge as people exchange their independent views. Sherif studied consensus development with a perceptual illusion called the autokinetic effect. This phenomenon has been known to astronomers who find that, when fixating on a bright stationary star in the dark sky, the star appears to move. Anecdotal evidence that people agree about a star's movement comes from casual observers of the event. Some lift their heads to admire a star, and see-a UFO! The autokinetic effect is easy to create in a laboratory. All it requires is a completely dark room and a pinpoint of light. When judging the movement of the light, individual participants in Sherif's research initially gave a range of estimates. When successively giving estimates in small groups, each participant gradually converged with the rest of their group toward a consensus estimate of the movement.

Sherif's research with the autokinetic effect demonstrates that, when faced with a new and uncertain task, the result was not chaos. Instead, people impose structure and make sense out of the situation by developing a common norm. The norm emerged gradually through the exchange of individual judgments as each participant offered his seemingly independent observations of an identical situation. Sherif concluded that this norm formation reflected a rational, accuracy-motivated assessment of the situation (Hood & Sherif, 1962). Interestingly, this consensus response norm endured in new settings, including when participants joined a new group and when they were retarded individually—e.g., as much as a year after the initial exposure to others' judgments (Hood & Sherif, 1962; Rohrader, Baron, Hoffman, & Swanson, 1954).

The idea that people agree in order to understand reality also can account for some of the influence pressure in Asch's (1952a, 1952b) line-judging experiments that we mentioned earlier in our discussion of normative and informational influence. As we noted, this paradigm likely established a variety of reasons for agreeing. Participants' understanding was presumably challenged when other group members consensually gave an obviously incorrect estimate of line length. This challenge turned Asch's laboratory into "Rashomonic," with participants trying to be as desperately as viewers of Kurosawa's movie to understand whose version of reality was correct.

Support for the idea that participants in Asch's research were motivated to understand the task comes from evidence that others' dissent was discounted when it could be attributed to external, situation-independent factors (Ross, Bierbrauer, & Hoffman, 1976). When participants believed that others were being rewarded for making certain judgments, they could explain others' seemingly erroneous answers, and this external attribution stripped away the information value from consensus. Then participants remained independent in their judgments of line length. Although Ross et al. (1976) maintained that others' apparent motives compromised the information value of their judgments, we believe that knowledge of others' motives also can affect normative pressures. If others' responses were tailored to obtain rewards available only to them, then participants would not expect social rejection for disagreeing. In general, attributing others' judgments to external factors plausibly alleviates both informational and social pressures to conform.

Additional evidence that social consensus has information value comes from research that increased motives to understand in an Asch-type line-judging task by providing monetary and psychological incentives for correct answers (Baron, Vandello, & Brunsma, 1996). In this research, strengthening motives for accuracy increased agreement with others' judgments about ambiguous stimuli. In contrast, incentives for accuracy decreased the impact of others' judgments when truth was self-evident because the stimuli were unambiguous. With easy to judge stimuli, participants relied more on their own assessments. It is interesting that this research also suggested that social motives are a component of agreement in this setting, given that accuracy incentives never completely eliminated the impact of others' judgments on easy stimuli.

In summary, research from a variety of influence paradigms suggests that people adopt consensus views in order to understand reality. When so motivated, people are likely to focus on processes that promote to maximize understanding and to provide the most objective, meaningful interpretation of the attitude issue. As we explain in the next section, social consensus also provides a guide to address social goals in influence settings.

**Social Influence and Social Control**

Consensual attitudes derive their power in part from people's need to belong and to form relationships with others. The need to relate can take a variety of forms (Bowbly, 1973;
Brewer, 1991; Fromm, 1955; Moslow, 1968). In economic models of human behavior (e.g., social exchange theory, Hornsby, 1974; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), people are motivated to form relationships with others in order to achieve goals that they could not accomplish as individuals. An alternative view is that people are intrinsically social creatures and relationships are rewarding in themselves (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). These opposing conceptualizations echo a philosophical discourse on the nature of the human society that underlies relationships. One perspective emphasizes the instrumentality of human relationships. For example, Thomas Hobbes (1651/1957) argued that a social contract is important to protect people from each other. In the opposing view, illustrated by the perspective of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762/1978), sociality is inherently rewarding as a vehicle for people to express their innate sympathy for one another.

Reflecting the instrumentality idea, one of the functions of attitudes is to obtain valued rewards and avoid punishments (Katz, 1960). From this perspective, consensus guides attitudinal responses not because of concerns about relationships with others but rather because of concerns about the benefits others can provide. Contrastin with this "relate-for-benefit" conceptualization is the idea of an inherent motivation to relate to others because of the intrinsic value of relationships. This motive is aligned with the social adjustment function of attitudes (Smith et al., 1956). Thus, benefits from relating to others by endorsing consensual views might come from tangible and intangible rewards that others control or from the value of the relationship per se. Of course, these functions need not be mutually exclusive—others can provide material benefits along with social acceptance (see Herek, 1986; Shaw, 1990).

Classic theories of power and influence also addressed these two relational motives for agreeing with others (French & Raven, 1959; Kelman, 1965). In this one hand, people go along with others in order to obtain rewards and avoid punishments that others control. These incentives are reflected in sources' reward and coercion power (French & Raven, 1959) and in their capacity to elicit compliance (Kelman, 1965). Compliant attitudinal responses supposedly emerge under a highly circumscribed set of conditions that involve surveillance by the controlling source. In this view, only with surveillance do people receive rewards and avoid punishments for agreeing. On the other hand, people go along with others in order to establish a relationship with them or to identify with them. Relationship incentives are reflected in sources' referent power (French & Raven, 1959) and in their capacity to elicit identification (Kelman, 1965). Identifying attitude responses supposedly do not depend on surveillance—they are thought to hold as long as the referent other is salient and valued. Kelman (1965) provided some preliminary support for the idea that compliance, but not identification, requires surveillance of the source. Thus, instrumentally motivated attitude change in this paradigm emerged in superficial, strategic shifts when under others' surveillance. However, in general, persistent attitudes are not the province of any particular motive for change (see Chen et al., 1996; Lindgren & Pyszko, 1998).

Striking evidence of the instrumental outcomes that regulate attitudes was provided by Schachter's (1951) pioneering study on opinion deviance. In this research, groups of five to seven naive participants and three confederates discussed an opinion topic. One confederate, the "mode," consistently agreed with the modal group position. Another confederate, the "slider," shifted from an initial extreme opposition to the modal position. The final confederate in each group, the "deviate," consistently advocated an extremely unpopular position. After enduring intense social pressure, the unyielding deviate was rejected by the group of naive participants, whereas the mode and the slider were rewarded with similar levels of group acceptance. Subsequent research provided ample evidence that ingroup members who opposed group consensus, especially on group-defining issues, are liked less than those who supported consensual positions (Marques, Abrams, & Serdoña, 2001; see Levine, 1989, for a review).

In general, attitudinal dissent can be met with group disapproval ranging from disliking to derogation to eventual rejection from the group (see Levine & Moreland, 2002, for a review; also Williams, 2001, for research on ostracism).

Impression Management. The idea that influence can be motivated by fear of others' rejection and desire for others' approval is central to research on impression motivation (Mets & Groeben, 2003; Schlenker, 2003). Impression-motivated recipients are oriented to consider the social consequences of their attitudes. They desire to form or maintain a particular relationship with the source of influence or others who might have surveillance over their responses, and they perceive that their attitudes are instrumental for achieving this goal (Chen et al., 1996; Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999). The process of impression construction involves choosing the kind of impression to create and finding the most efficient way of creating it (Leary & Kowalski, 1990). Thus, the hallmark of impression motivation is strategic control of attitudinal responses to convey certain impressions to others. Although impression motives are strategic, they are not necessarily intentional and may be activated outside of awareness. Especially when the desired impression can be conveyed with already existing attitudes, people generate strategic responses relatively effortlessly without conscious monitoring (see Pontari & Schlenker, 2000). However, greater deliberation might be required to construct impressions that are inconsistent with those in people's existing repertoires.

Often the best response to promote a favorable impression is to agree with others. Greater liking for those who agree than disagree has been demonstrated repeatedly in psychological research (Pilkinson & Lydon, 1987; Shaw & Kaneatk, 1994). Additional benefits to agreement emerge with the reciprocity norm. When applied to influence, this norm suggests that people will yield to the influence attempts of others who previously yielded to them. The power of this dictum was evident in a series of studies showing that people changed their attitudes more to align with those who had agreed with them in the past (Cialdini, Green, & Rusch, 1992). Moreover, the tendency to reciprocate social influence in this research appeared to be so fundamental that it was unaffected by idiosyncratic characteristics of the source, the quality of arguments used in the persuasive appeal, or the relevance of the target of the topic under consideration. This process of attitude adjustment through reciprocal yielding is particularly likely in the context of negotiation of social conflict (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).

Agreeing with others, however, is not always the best strategy to promote a favorable impression. When uniqueness or independence rather than conformity is the desired impression, attitudes are moved strategically to the appropriate position, even if these reported attitudes differ from those held privately (Schlenker & Wintgeld, 1960). For example, men have been found to disagree publicly with fellow members of small discussion groups to a greater extent than do women—and to a greater extent than do men who state their attitudes privately (Eagly, Wood, & Tischbrug, 1981). Presumably, men challenged group consensus in this research in order to establish their independence and their unique stance and potentially to exert influence over others. Thus, impression motives can orient people to disagree with others as well as to agree.

In summary, consensual views can be important in promoting desired relations with others. Although it will be the case that people agree with others in order to attain the tangible and effective rewards they can provide, sometimes disagreement or independence from consensual positions can best meet people's relational needs.

Being oneself and social consensus. The self is a powerful motivator of attitudes and can drive people's responses to social consensus. People tend to respond defensively to information that doesn't "fit" with their important attitudes and self-views and to react more favorably to information that fits. This selectivity in
responding is especially likely with attitudes and beliefs that are closely tied to the self in the sense that they reference important values, implicate gender, religion, race, and other social identities, and involve material self-interests (Chen et al., 1996). Self-related motives are represented in functional theories in terms of Katz’s (1960) ego-defense function, in which attitudes are formed, held, and changed to preserve existing self-views (see also Smith, Bruner, & White, 1956, externalizing function). They also are represented in Katz’s value-expressive function, in which attitudes are oriented to express personal values and core aspects of the self-concept.

What determines whether social consensus and other information fits with important aspects of the self? In some self-theories, “fit” represents consistency with existing self-defining attitudes and other self-views. That is, people strive to hold attitudes that yield a coherent self-view and reduce uncertainty about the world (Heider, 1958; Hogg, 2000; Swann, 1990). The cohesive motive is a conservative orientation to maintain and protect existing self-identities and self-views. In other perspectives, “fit” represents self-enhancement. People strive to hold attitudes that promote a favorable self-evaluation and deflect an unfavorable one (Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Tajfel, 1978; Tesser, 2000). With this motivation, people are oriented to maximize the pleasure and minimize the pain of self-evaluation (see also, Brewer, 1991, needs for assimilation and differentiation).

Motives for coherence and enhancement will often coincide. For example, people with high self-esteem accomplish both goals when a consensus of valued others support their cherished attitudes and self-views. However, for people with lower self-worth, consensual support can generate motivational conflict by enhancing the self but challenging existing negative self-views. The potential to separate these motives has spurred researchers to identify which motive reigns supreme. Despite the efforts of important programs of research, no clear answer has emerged. The research evidence favoring coherence (Swann, 1990; Swann, Rentfrow, & Guinn, 2002) has been criticized for minimizing people’s needs to self-enhance by, for example, addressing peripheral aspects of the self-concept and relying on general assessments of positive or negative self-views instead of participants’ own beliefs about what is self-enhancing (see critique by Sedikides & Green, 2004). Yet, research evidence favoring self-enhancement can be faulted for minimizing coherence pressures by including few participants with truly negative self-views whose coherence needs might lead them to self-deprecate instead of enhance (Sedikides & Green, 2004). Thus, no clear conclusion has emerged about the supremacy of one self-motive over another.

In social influence research, the question of whether attitudes are guided by self-coherence versus self-enhancement motives has surfaced in research on intergroup behavior and group influence. Self-enhancement is a key motive in the classic paradigm of social identity (Tajfel, 1978, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In this approach, people meet their needs for a positive identity by comparing their attitudes and other attitudes with those held by other individuals or by groups. People can achieve a positive social identity by aligning themselves with positively valued in-groups or social categories and differentiating themselves from negatively valued out-groups or social categories. Thus, people with liberal political attitudes can identify with progressive organizations and feel good about their identity by comparing their own group’s positions with those of more conservative, establishment-oriented groups. From a social identity view, then, people identify with groups and adopt group attitudes to the extent that doing so meets their needs for a positive self-concept.

Although research has provided only limited support for the broad claim that self-esteem generally motivates group identification (Hogg, 2003), the self-protective and self-evaluative concerns appear to underlie identification with and influence of important social reference groups. In particular, positions of valued social groups on issues relevant to the group identity can threaten people’s sense of self-worth and motivate them to change their attitudes to reduce the threat. In a demonstration of this effect, Pool, Wood, and Leck (1998) informed some participants that a valued majority group (e.g., residents of their state) held attitudes on a relevant issue (e.g., state politics) that differed from participants’ own. Other participants learned that a derogated minority group (e.g., a gay and lesbian student organization) held attitudes on an issue (e.g., individual freedom of expression) that were similar to participants’ own. Participants who defined themselves as similar to the majority or dissimilar from the minority showed reduced self-esteem on learning the group’s position. In contrast, participants who did not define themselves in terms of the group identity were unaffected by the group view. Furthermore, these decreases in self-esteem were alleviated when participants were able to shift their attitudes to align with the valued majority or move away from the derogated minority. Thus, people were influenced by positively or negatively evaluated reference groups in ways that promoted a favorable self-view.

Group influence also can originate in people’s needs to hold attitudes consistent with their social identities. According to Turner’s (1982, 1991) idea of referential informational influence, people categorize themselves as group members in part to maximize their own positive distinctiveness and then they adopt group positions in order to reduce subjective uncertainty. That is, agreement with others categorized as similar to the self enhances people’s subjective certainty and conveys a coherence by suggesting that the shared attitudes reflect external reality and the objective truth of the issue. Disagreement from similarly categorized others yields subjective uncertainty and motivates people to address the discrepancy through, for example, mutual social influence or attribution reasoning to explain the disagreement.

Empirical support for the idea that people are motivated by uncertainty to accept ingroup influence comes from research demonstrating that agreement from others on a judgment task increases people’s confidence in their own judgments, whereas disagreement decreases their confidence (McCarty, Turner, Oakes, & Haslam, 1993). By locating the determinants of attitude change primarily in people’s construction of group identity and only secondarily in their understanding of attitude issues, self-categorization approaches emphasize normative over informational reasons for agreement. That is, people supposedly adopt the positions of ingroups independent of their understanding of how or why the positions are correct.

Some support for the self-categorization idea that influence stems from construction of group identity is provided by findings that influence varies with the perceived group membership. For example, Haslam, Oakes, McCarty, Turner, and Onorato (1995) reported that, when group membership was salient, outgroup members holding extreme attitudes not only were considered more representative (prototypes) of the outgroup than were moderate outgroup members, but also generated less agreement than moderate outgroup members. Furthermore, when group membership was less salient, extreme and moderate outgroup members were viewed more similarly, and they both generated modest levels of agreement. Thus, influence varied with the apparent position of the source group.

Another source of evidence that has been cited in support of self-categorization predictions is the finding that ingroup influence does not depend on recipients’ learning the content of the influence appeal (see McCarty, Haslam, Hutchinson, & Turner, 1992). Conversely, presented also in Haslam, McCarty, & Turner, 1990). In a different context, Haslam et al. (1996) argued that such learning can occur independently of influence, as people try to understand the group view in order to be an effective group member. That is, as part of categorizing self as a group member, people change their attitudes to align with or differentiate from valued groups, and then they adopt the message. However, empirical tests do not support the idea that ingroup influence necessarily emerges through a self-categorization process that is separate from thought about the appeal or use of heuristic cues (see van Knippenberg, 1999). For example, research that has used manipulation designs to test whether the impact of group identity on attitudes is mediated through thought about the appeal has found evidence of such mediation when the identity of the source
group is relevant to recipients' own self-definitions (Wood et al., 1996) and when the issue in the appeal is relevant to recipients' membership groups (Mackie, Worth., & Asuncion, 1990). In general, these mediation analyses indicate that the social identity of important reference groups motivates careful scrutiny of the group position and, ultimately, adoption or rejection of the group views.

In summary, the consensus opinions of important reference groups can be influential as people strive to meet self-enhancement and self-coherence goals. These motives generate influence through careful scrutiny of reference group positions as well as through less thoughtful reactions involving self-categorization processes and heuristic rules (van Knippenberg, 1999). The next challenge for theories of group influence will be to identify the circumstances under which enhancement versus coherence motives direct social influence outcomes.

**Consistency Motives in Social Influence**

The careful reader will notice that our trinitive scheme involves a more limited set of motives than proposed in the other chapters in this book (see Brinol & Petty, chap. 14; this volume; Wyer & Albarracin, chap. 7, this volume). Unlike these other chapters, we have not separated the motive to achieve and maintain cognitive consistency from the three motives we consider. Yet, the idea that people seek to establish and maintain a psychologically consistent world-view has spurred considerable attitude research. The majority of this work builds on the perspective of cognitive dissonance theory (see Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999; Olson & Stone, chap. 6, this volume).

Cognitive dissonance is thought to be a negative tension state similar to hunger that occurs when one cognition (i.e., belief, attitude, behavior) does not follow from another (Festinger, 1957). Thus, people experience dissonance when, for example, their actions do not reflect their attitudes. Although researchers have focused primarily on such interpersonal sources of cognitive consistency, Festinger (1957) argued that dissonance also arises from interpersonal factors, especially dissonance from others in a group. Specifically, “the open expression of disagreement in a group leads to the existence of cognitive dissonance in the members. The knowledge that some other person, generally like oneself, holds one opinion is dissonant with holding a contrary opinion” (Festinger, 1957, pp. 261–262). As Cooper and Stone (2000) point out, the first published study on dissonance addressed the reactions of members of a doomsday group when their group's predictions of the apocalypse failed (Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter, 1956).

Evidence that group disagreement generates dissonance was provided in a series of studies by Matz and Wood (in press). In this research, participants in a discussion group reported heightened dissonance on a self-report measure of dissonance when group members supposedly held opposing positions. In addition, this dissonance caused by group disagreement functioned much like the dissonance that arises from inconsistency in individual cognitions (see Olson & Stone, chap. 6, this volume). That is, participants reported minimal dissonance discomfort when they had little choice about what position to take and the experimenter assigned them to a position that opposed others in the group. Dissonance also was reduced when participants were given the opportunity to “self-affirm” and to reduce the threat to their self-concept by focusing on positive self-attributions. In addition, the research indicated that the motive to establish and maintain consistency in groups guides influence processes in social interaction. Participants’ discomfort in disagreeing groups was alleviated when they were able to resolve the inconsistency by changing their own attitudes to align with the rest of their group, by influencing others to agree with them, or by joining a new, more attitude-congruent group.

On the one hand, Matz and Wood’s research could suggest that it is appropriate to treat consistency as a “master” motive guiding social influence, much like the motives to understand, to relate to others, and to be oneself. The idea that people are partly motivated to achieve and maintain cognitive consistency would be congenial with Festinger’s (1957) initial theorizing about cognitive dissonance. On the other hand, cognitive inconsistency could be motivating for other reasons, perhaps because it challenges understanding, relating, or being oneself. For example, people might become concerned about maintaining a consistent understanding of the world when their attitudes are opposed by a consensus of others who presumably hold valid positions. This inconsistency would then be motivating to the extent that people wished to understand the issue. In this later interpretation, the need for a coherent, consistent world-view arises from other motives. Congenial with this latter view, a number of consistency theories have proposed reasons why dissonant experiences such as disagreement from others generate inconsistency, including that they are associated with social sanctions, threaten judgment validity, and threaten a favored self-view (see Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999; Olson & Stone, chap. 6, this volume).

Regardless of whether consistency motives are considered to be independent of the three motives we cover in this chapter, cognitive dissonance provides useful insight into social influence processes. Cognitive dissonance theory exemplifies the “hot” motivational mechanisms that underlie much influence. It also provides a common framework to encompass the seemingly disparate strategies that people use to meet their attitudinal goals, including influencing others and joining attitude-congruent groups. However, compared with other influence theories we consider in this chapter, consistency theories have not addressed to any great extent the informational mechanisms through which influence occurs. In the next section of the chapter, we discuss these various mechanisms in more detail.

**Motives Direct Processing of Contrasted Views**

People can process information about social consensuses in a variety of ways. Serious cognitive weight lifting to evaluate the merits of consensual views can be spurred by any of the motives that we discussed so far. In general, people who are highly motivated to understand, to relate to others, or to be themselves will have a heightened need to be confident about their attitudes (Chaffin et al., 1989). To achieve sufficient confidence, people are likely to carefully scrutinize information relevant to their goals (Albarracin, 2002; Chen et al., 1996; Lindgren & Prislin, 1998), and they may fail to respond evasively to information unrelated to these goals (Brendt, Markman, & Messner, 2003). Thus, people keenly concerned about understanding should carefully evaluate the merits of consensual positions along with other information that appears to be objectively valid. People concerned about relating to others or conveying a particular impression should carefully consider consensual views along with other information about what is socially normative and desirable. People oriented to ensuring a favorable or coherent self-view should carefully consider social consensus along with other information that is relevant to their desired self-views.

Investigations of influence processing have not been tailored to the variety of goals in influence settings but instead have examined primarily scrutiny of message-relevant information. Such measures are useful in studies of message-based persuasion, given that recipients’ primary goal in this setting is understanding of an issue and that this goal can be met through evaluation of message content. However, motives to relate to others and to be oneself sensitize people to aspects of influence settings in addition to message content. Thus, measures of message processing may not be successful at capturing recipients’ thinking when it is instigated by motives other than understanding.

In one of the few exceptions to the predominant focus on message-based processing, Chen et al. (1998) Study 2) examined impression-relevant thinking with respect to social influence. Impression concerns were made salient for some participants in this research by having them...
imagine themselves in contexts that would require social sensitivity. Subsequently, when expecting to discuss an issue with a partner, participants primed in this way, with impression goals expressed marginally more thoughts about their partner and the impending discussion than did participants with accuracy goals (i.e., who had been primed with accuracy motives by imagining others' behavior and by imagining others' behavior and by imagining others' behavior and by imagining others' behavior and by imagining others' behavior and by imagining others' behavior). When motivated by a need to understand, interpersonal issues can capture the interpersonal processing that emerges with impression goals. In addition, even though Chen et al. found that accuracy versus impression goals had little effect on how extensively participants thought about the message topic, the direction of their thought varied with specific impression goals. Impression-motivated participants with partners favorable to the issue expressed a predominance of favorable thoughts to the issue; those with unfavorable partners expressed more unfavorable issue thoughts in general. Measures of thinking in influence paradigms could be broadened to capture more effectively the variety of information relevant to participants' goals.

Measures in social influence paradigms also could be broadened to address the specific kinds of thinking found in complex social settings, Aisch (1940) argued early on that the primary process in influence is not change in attitudes toward an object but rather change in the definition and meaning of the object. Specifically, social consensus can affect people's interpretation of framing of an issue. For example, in one of Aisch's (1940) experiments, participants were exposed to others' favorable evaluative attitudes toward a political issue. It is, apparently, assumed that this word was referred to statesmen. Presumably because of this interpretation, participants reported relatively favorable views toward politicians themselves. In contrast, participants exposed to others' unfavorable judgments apparently inferred that "politician" referred to the "more offensive forms" of the political animal, and they expressed relatively negative evaluations.

Apparent, the positions "imputed to congenial groups produced changes in the meaning of the objects of judgment" (Aisch, 1940, p. 462). Although such interpretations are consistent with a number of theoretical perspectives (e.g., Tajfel's 1972, social identity theory), few studies have directly assessed the interpretations that moderate influence. Allen and Wider (1980) provided direct evidence for Aisch's change-of-meaning hypothesis through detailed measures of people's construal of attitude issues in conformity contexts. These researchers documented a multi-stage process of meaning change, in which participants modify their interpretation of an issue in light of the position advocated by a majority group. In this new interpretation makes the source's position seem reasonable and acceptable; and (c) recipients then agree with the interpretation of the advocated position. These changes also occur in different orders. For example, subjective changes in meaning have been found to emerge following recipients' decisions to conform, presumably to justify that conformity (Beuehler & Griffin, 1994; Griffin & Beuehler, 1993). Changes in meaning in social influence settings potentially emerge as people try to understand, relate to others, and be themselves. Word et al. (1996) demonstrated that meaning construals can be spurred by self-evaluative motives, especially the desire to align with valued reference groups and differentiate from devalued ones. That is, college students who defined themselves as different from the Ken Koch Klans, upon learning that their attitudes on an issue of discrimination coincided with Klan positions, reinterpreted the issue so that they could shift away from the group's position. Students whose self-definition was not tied to the Klan did not undertake this reinterpretation. Because the changed meaning occurred only when participants were approached by people with similar attitudes, they were highly motivated to differentiate from the Klan. This kind of reinterpretation appears to require considerable capacity and motivation (Word et al., 1996). Additional research might profitably examine the effects of understanding and being motives on interpretations of influence appeals. Despite these evidences, conclusions are sometimes closely examined that people's attitudes, and interpret them in motivated ways, they do not always do so. When motives are not especially

powerful, recipients will not have a strong desire to be confident in the attitudes that they are about to express to satisfy those motives (Chaiken et al., 1989). As a result, they might not travel the cognitive highway exploring positions to determine the best one to take instead stop at whatever position is indicated by various low-effort processes. For example, they might use a simple, motive-relevant heuristic to make an attitude or position choice. When motivated by a need to understand, people might reason, "consensus is correct." When motivated by relationships, people might think, "go along to get along." When motivated by self-concerns, they might decide, "safety in numbers." Using these heuristics, people can meet their goals by accepting or rejecting others' positions in a relatively effortless manner. In a demonstration of this process, participants in Mahevarana and Chakien's (1991) study who were not highly motivated to consider a consumer product readily accepted a consensus-supported evaluation of the product. In contrast, highly motivated participants who could not reach their desired judgmental confidence by relying solely on consensual information engaged in a more elaborate processing of information about the product.

Although the present chapter considers how people use consensus information to meet their processing goals, consensus is similar to other features of the persuasion context in that it can serve a variety of functions (Petty & Wegener, 1998). In particular, when the position taken by a consensus of others is unexpected, the surprise can itself instigate information processing (Baker & Petty, 1994). That is, when a majority of others advocate an unpopular position that is not held by recipients of the appeal, social consensus violates recipients' expectancies. Such positions can spur a thoughtful, systematic analysis of the relevant issue or object to assess the validity of the discrepant views. In a mirror image of this effect, minority sources can engender surprise and thoughtful message processing when they advocate popular positions that also endorse (Baker & Petty, 1994; De Vrees, De Groot, Dijkstra, & Schraman, 1996). In summary, when people are motivated to understand, their information processing will likely address the validity of consensual information. When they are motivated to belong, information processing will likely address the implications for social relations. Finally, when they are motivated to be themselves, processing will likely address implications for the desired self-view. When these various motives for influence are strong, they instigate thorough, careful processing of the relevant information, as evident in cognitive responses and subjective construals. Less intense desires will likely be met through more efficient processing strategies, including following heuristic rules.

GROUP CATEGORIZATION

The tendency for social consensus to engender influence gives credence to John Sturt Mill's (1859/1956) admonition to fear a "tyranny of the majority." (p. 7). We have argued that a pattern of seeming tyranny can arise for multiple reasons, as people strive to understand, relate to others, and be themselves. For these various reasons, people may adopt others' attitudes and join group consensus. Interestingly, when people share their judgments with like-minded others, not only does social consensus become stronger in number but also it changes to "radicalize" itself (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969), so that judgments become more polarized and consensus more extreme (Isenberg, 1986; Stone's study, as cited in Margolis, 1960).

There are several reasons why people's attitudes polarize during discussion with others who share their beliefs. In one account, often referred to as the theory of argumentation, people who agree have an evaluatively consistent set of arguments to share on the judgment topic (Burnstein & Vinsk, 1977; Hirt & Davis, 1984). If they discuss the issue and exchange arguments, each individual is likely to learn novel reasons for holding the consensus view, and each individual's attitude then becomes more extreme. When the discussion gives each person an opportunity to repeat their own views, and simple repetition
can shift people’s judgments to be more extreme (Brauer, Judd, & Gilner, 1985). The result of this information sharing is not just polarization in individual positions but also in the overall position that characterizes a discussion group.

Another reason for polarization is that people try to achieve favorable self-views, as they exchange opinions with others. According to this normative, social comparison explanation for group polarization, people self-enhance by espousing judgments that are more extreme than the consensual view. In so doing, they polarize the consensual position (Goethals & Zanna, 1979; Myers & Lamm, 1976). As Brown (1974) opined, “to be virtuous...is to be different from the mean—in the right direction and to the right degree” (p. 469).

Hundreds of studies over several decades have produced impressive evidence in support of persuasive arguments and social comparison explanations but no critical experimental test that would lead an impartial reader to prefer one over the other (see Ijzerman, 1980). Failure to find decisive evidence supporting one explanation over another reflects the multifaceted nature of the motives behind group polarization. In spite of solid evidence for the conceptual independence of argument exchange and comparison processes, they appear to work in tandem in producing group polarization (Ijzerman, 1986; Kapitan & Miller, 1987). As demonstrated in Asch’s (1952a, 1952b) early conformity studies, people are influenced by others’ judgments in group contexts because these judgments help them not only to understand reality but also to meet normative needs; such as ensuring a favorable self-view. In summary, the motivational bases of group polarization appear to be a complex combination of understanding issues via exchange of persuasive arguments and achievement of a favorable self-view via social comparison.

Minority Influence

Despite the apparent power of social consensus, history provides many examples of opinion minorities that wielded considerable influence, including the civil rights movement and the women’s movement in the United States. These groups eventually swayed majority views so that many of their central tenets became commonplace, mainstream positions.

The idea that opinion minorities have a uniquely powerful impact formed the core of Moscovici’s (1980, 1985) theory of minority influence. In his view, minorities who consistently and unanimously express their dissenting views instigate a validation process in which recipients experience the minority position as a challenge to their understanding of the issue and respond by carefully reevaluating their own views. The result is a presumed to be enduring, private change. However, because of the social negative consequences of aligning the self with a deviant minority, attitude change might not be apparent on the exact issue in the appeal but instead emerge on related issues. In contrast, opposition from a majority is thought to create social conflict and to instigate a conversion process in which people are oriented to go along in order to belong. As a result, recipients supposedly respond to majority appeals with immediate, public yielding on the issue under consideration.

The innovative postulates of minority influence theory had an invigorating effect on the field of social influence (De Vries & De Dreu, 2001; Kruglanski & Mackie, 1990; Maas, West, & Cialdini, 1987; Mugny & Perez, 1991), but they received only partial support in empirical tests. A meta-analytic synthesis by Wood et al. (1994) evaluated studies in which minority sources attempted to influence recipient holding majority, consensual positions. Many of these studies compared minority impact with that of a majority source, and the modal finding was greater influence of minorities on both public and private measures of agreement. In addition, minority sources did not exert greater impact in private than in public. In fact, the characteristic effect of minorities evident in the review was to diminish influence: Recipients who evidenced little agreement with minorities when their attitudes were assessed directly on the issue in the appeal and it was apparent that their (public or private) judgments could align them with the source’s position. However, minority impact was greater when attitudes were assessed indirectly on, for example, issues tangentially related to the appeal. And it was less apparent to recipients their judgments could align them with the source. Yet, even this indirect effect of minority sources was no greater than the indirect influence of opinion majorities. In general, then, minority influence was inhibited on direct public and private measures of agreement, presumably by recipients’ concerns about linking themselves with a deviant minority source.

It is perhaps not surprising that existing research has provided minimal support for the presumed minority-inspired validation process. The minority influence literature has used a wide range of operations of minority and majority source status and has used an equally heterogeneous set of measures to assess influence. Minorities with different identities have different effects, and understanding minority influence requires understanding recipients’ motives with respect to a minority source (Wood et al., 1994; Wood, 2000). Unless the minority is positively valued in some way (e.g., as an innovator or an advocate of choices reflective of the Zeitgeist, see Erb, Bolster, & Hilton, 2003), the minority identity likely provides simple decision rules that hinder influence (e.g., deviant social identity, low-consensus position; see De Vries et al., 1996). Even when minorities advocate a strong, cogent position, the deviant identity is not likely to encourage careful attention to and evaluation of their appeals. Instead, careful processing of minority appeals occurs primarily when other factors are present to instigate scrutiny (De Vries et al., 1996; De Vries & De Dreu, 2001). For example, repetition and consistency in minority appeals may be necessary to attract recipients’ attention (Wood et al., 1994). In addition, recipients tend to think carefully about minority appeals that advocate prototypical positions and thereby imply, somewhat surprisingly, that the recipient is in the minority (Baker & Petty, 1994). However, even when people attend to and process minority appeals, the low consensus, deviant position can lead them to adopt a negatively biased processing orientation that inhibits appreciation of the minority view (De Vries & De Dreu, 2001).

Minority deviance, however, does not inevitably impede influence. Crano and his colleagues (Alvaro & Crano, 1998, 1997; Crano, 2001; Crano & Alvaro, 1998; Crano & Chen, 1998) have demonstrated the beneficial effects of an ingroup minority identity (see also David & Turner, 1996). Ingroup minorities can exert influence because of the tenent open-minded evaluation that is accorded to ingroup members who advocate minority, counterraditional positions, and the distinctiveness of the minority position that serves to attract attention and instigate systematic analysis. Although the dissimilarities of the minority view attenuates acceptance on direct attitude measures, the relatively open-minded message elaboration creates pressure for change on related attitudes and beliefs. As a result, group members change their attitudes and the minority view on measures indirectly related to the appeal. Over time, consistency pressures serve to change attitudes on the original issue. Thus, Moscovici’s original notion that minorities would exert greater indirect than direct influence appears to hold only for certain types of minority sources—those who are members of an ingroup.

Mixed evidence also has been found for Moscovici’s idea that agreement with a minority emerges from thought about the issue in the appeal, whereas agreement with a majority emerges from recipients’ concern with interpersonal outcomes. Instead, it appears that majorities and minorities both can exert influence by affecting how recipients think about the issue in the appeal. Moreover, the focus of thought varies according to source identity (Nemeth, 1986). Because majorities generally are assumed to be correct, disagreement with them is stressful. Recipients’ focus of attention is limited to the majority view, and thought is convergent on the position of the appeal. In contrast, because minorities are initially believed to be incorrect, disagreement with them evokes minimal stress. When minorities advocate their positions with consistency and certainty, recipients experience conflict, which motivates them to carefully
evaluate the issue. Recipients think about the issue in a divergent manner and consider novel ideas and solution strategies (Nemeth & Rogers, 1996; Peterson & Nemeth, 1998). Although this kind of open-minded processing orientation may seem unlikely given the typically negative, rejecting orientation toward deviant minority sources found in social influence research (Wood et al., 1994), such an orientation is plausibly more likely in problem-solving contexts. When attempting to solve a problem, challenging, minority viewpoints might appear innovative and creative rather than threatening and deviant. To the extent that recipients are motivated to adopt an innovative minority identity, they should be motivated to generate novel ideas and solution strategies themselves.

In summary, the generally limited influence of opinion minorities can be understood in terms of the motivational and processing principles that we have outlined in this chapter. Overall, such sources are unlikely to meet recipients' motives to understand, relate to others, or be themselves. Thus, recipients typically will not be highly motivated to process minority positions and when they do, they are likely to possess a negative bias to reject the minority identity. However, minorities can exert influence when they argue an especially cogent position that recipients are motivated to evaluate in an open-minded manner—perhaps because the minority is an ingroup member or because the appeal is presented in a problem-solving context. In general, a challenge for theories of minority influence is the variety of ways that researchers have defined minority sources. Research findings are unlikely to cumulate until minorities are defined systematically in ways that establish clear motives for recipients.

Dynamic Changes in Social Consensus

In everyday life, social influence occurs as a dynamic process that changes systematically across social interactions and periods of time. For example, as minority and majority source influence each other, social consensus changes and minority positions can become majority ones and vice versa. However, the influence theories and experimental paradigms that we have discussed to this point are not configured to capture such dynamic features of influence (with notable exceptions, such as Caldwell et al., 1992, research on reciprocal influences). Instead, they are tailored to predict and explain simple appeals given at discrete places and times.

Dynamic models of changing consensuses have addressed the determinants and consequences of changing distributions of minority and majority positions in groups. Dynamic social impact theory is one of the best-known models of the determinants of opinion distributions (Latané, 1996; Latané & Nowak, 1997). In this analysis, attitude change among group members proceeds according to the following principles: (a) sources and recipients are close in proximity, (b) sources hold and convey views with greater strength than do recipients, and (c) sources’ positions are supported by people in communication proximity to the recipients.

To test the dynamic implications of the model, Latané and Nowak (1997) conducted mathematical simulations, typically beginning with systems in which a group of people’s attitudes were assumed to be distributed relatively randomly (see also Latané & Bourgeois, 2001). Attitudes then were allowed to change according to the dynamic social influence principles, and the results indicated that the system ultimately settled into a stable pattern of overall influence in judgment in conjunction with some clustering of subgroups of people holding minority positions (see also Asch’s, 1997, cultural dissemination model). Experimental tests also have been conducted of dynamic influence of participants who interacted via computerized messaging (Latané & Bourgeois, 1996; Latané & El-Herro, 1990). In these tests, each participant was allowed to communicate with only a small number of others in a given spatial structure (i.e., following the proximity principle). As a result, "local majorities" were created of clusters of people sharing the same views, and these clusters remained unchanged even with repeated information exchange.

Dynamic systems models address a seeming paradox that exists between individual- and group-level influence outcomes. How can influence processes that yield local convergence in judgments among interacting individuals not lead to convergence at a macrosocial level? The rather surprising evidence of continuing diversity stems from the tendency for influence in dynamic systems to follow nonlinear change rules and to occur primarily among people close in social space. According to Latané (1996), people’s responses, at least on important issues, change in catastrophic-like shifts, which render change unlikely until some threshold value of opposition is experienced. In clusters of minority opinions, people resist the influence of the surrounding majority because the proximity of other minority views reduces the likelihood of any single member of the minority reaching his or her own threshold for change.

Dynamic social impact theory is broadly conceived and has successfully modeled a number of antituitional phenomena, including group polarization (Liu & Latané, 1988) and the development and structure of public opinion (Lavine & Latané, 1996). However, the lack of specificity in the model’s content and process makes it difficult to map the findings of model simulations onto the psychological mechanisms that presumably account for the effects. For example, Liu and Latané’s (1998) attempt to track influence as it emerged in the transfer of information between group members revealed instead that attitude shifts occurred when members thought and wrote about their positions with the intent of conveying them to others. This finding is reminiscent of explanations for group polarization as a product of individuals’ repetition of their own positions (Brauer, Judd, & Olson, 1995). However, these attitude change mechanisms differ from the acceptance of influence mechanisms typically invoked to explain the simulation effects. Also making it difficult to link model outcomes with real-world influence phenomena, the simulation outcomes appear to vary according to important extramodel assumptions, including people’s motivations (e.g., to imitate others, to deviate from others) and the type of issue being discussed (Latané & Bourgeois, 2001). A challenge for these kinds of predictive models is to provide sufficient specificity to identify the motives that spur influence and the psychological mechanisms through which influence occurs.

Along with addressing the determinants of opinion distributions, dynamic theories have examined the consequences of changing consensus in groups, especially the effects of changing opinion majority and minority status. According to Prisin and her colleagues’ dynamic gain-loss asymmetry model (Prisin, Lumbert, & Bauer, 2000; Prisin, Brewer, & Wilson, 2002; Prisin & Christensen, 2002), decreases in numerical status that change a positively-valued minority into a majority are experienced as losses and increases in numerical status that change a negatively-valued minority into a majority are experienced as gains. These changes have implications for influence because people’s responses to losses and gains are not symmetrical. The former are generally more intense than the latter, reflecting the loss-aversion effect whereby losses loom larger than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Thus, people’s negative reactions to the loss of a majority position should be stronger than their positive reactions to the gain of a majority position.

Tests of this dynamic model of change have used an experimental paradigm in which members of a small group supposedly exchange views on important social issues in face-to-face interactions (Prisin et al., 2000; Prisin et al., 2002). During the interaction, other group members (actuually experimental confederates) apparently change their positions so that participants who initially believed they were in the majority are transformed into minorities and participants who believed they were in the minority are transformed into majorities. Asymmetry in reactions to losses and gain have been apparent in that participants who became a minority dramatically decreased their perceptions of group-self similarity, group attraction, and expectations for positive group interaction. In contrast, participants who became a majority have failed to appreciate the gains and continued to receive the group as dissimilar from themselves and to evaluate it relatively negatively.
Prisin and her colleagues also found that attitudes varied as a function of the shifts in status. The new minorities tended to agree with the newly emerging attitudinal consensus (Prisín et al., 2000. Study 1) and to interpret the attitudinal differences among group members as diversity rather than deviance (Prisín et al., 2002). These perceptions likely justified their new minority status. In contrast, new majorities strengthened their attitudes by enhancing attitudinal importance, broadening the scope of the positions they considered unacceptable, and expressing less tolerance of opposing views. If these findings can be generalized to a societal level, it seems that immediately following a rise to majority status, the new majority is in need of regulatory mechanisms to channel social influence processes away from destructive norms involving intolerance and toward more constructive ones (e.g., interpreting attitudinal differences as diversity rather than deviance).

Dynamic changes in minority size also can affect influence power. In particular, minorities are more successful at influencing the majority when other majority members are seen to defect to the minority position than when the minority does not gain converts (Clark, 1998). As might be anticipated, defections from the consensual majority are not well liked by the majority. Those who defect (e.g., Kerr, 1981; Levine, Steck, & Snyder, 1977; Marges, Zeylitt, & Leyens, 1988). Yet, these minority converts appear to be highly influential. They seem to be more influential at winning over others to their newly endorsed minority views than are members of the original minority (Clark, 2001). Thus, once minorities succeed at converting a few members of the majority to their side, they are likely to further grow in size if they let converts exert social influence by advocating their newly adopted minority position.

The increased power of minorities to exert social influence as they expand in size could be due to targets responding based on a "let's join the bandwagon" heuristic. Alternatively, minorities growing in size might motivate elaboration of their appeal as targets try to understand what draws others to the minority position. Support for the increased elaboration explanation was obtained in a series of studies showing that expanding minorities elicited more issue-relevant thought than shrinking minorities (Gould, De Vries, & De Dreu, 2002). If the minority appeal consists of sound, cogent arguments, this increased systematic processing apparently leads to more attitude change, although not on the issue in the appeal but on indirectly related issues.

Thus, the greatest change for a minority initially might be to win over a few highly conspicuous members of the majority. Once the minority gains in size, the likelihood of changing influential further increases. Interestingly, this rule of success (in influence) breeding further success in influence does not seem to apply to expanding majorities. If anything, the expanding majority seems to lose its ability to influence, apparently triggering resistance to targets who resist the majority in an attempt to maintain or restore freedom of thought (Godin et al., 2002). This research nicely illustrates the dynamic nature of social influence, with minorities becoming more influential and majorities becoming less influential as they grow in size.

In summary, the complexity of dynamic models corresponds to the complexity of influence processes in real life. People assume minority or majority positions in groups and the broader society in part due to exposure to others holding particular views. As a result, people have histories of being a majority or a minority, and they respond to current influence attempts from the perspective of this historical background. A challenge for dynamic models will be to understand the motives for agreeing or disagreeing that are imposed with these histories and the ways in which information-processing mediators of influence are channeled over time.

1. Historical Analysis of Motives in Social Influence and Persuasion

The research reviewed in this chapter illustrates how the traditions of group-focused social influence research and individual-focused persuasion research can inform and enrich each other. Although these two traditions are often treated as European (group) and North American (individual) approaches to the study of attitudes, the developments on each continent have been affected as much by transatlantic exchanges as by local circumstances (Collier, Minton, & Reynolds, 1991; Farr, 1996; Goffman, 1998). The founders of the individual-focused orientation currently prevalent in North America were European immigrants or were mentored by Europeans. Once stowed in the American melting pot, these influences returned back to Europe after World War II to help fill the intellectual and academic void caused by fascism. Moreover, the beginnings of social psychology in the United States were marked by a focus on social groups (Greenwood, 2000). The collective concepts of Peirce (1903/1967), Dewey (1922/1930), Mead (1934) and other American pragmatists were evident in early research on attitudes, which were almost invariably conceptualized in reference to group-shared norms (Paris, 1925; Herskovits, 1936; Young, 1933).

The location of attitudes within groups sharply contrasted with Gordon Allport's (1935) individualistic definition of an attitude as "a mental and neural state of readiness to respond, organized through experience, exerting a directive and/or local influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related" (p. 810). Gordon Allport's individualistic conceptualization reflected efforts, led by his older brother Floyd Allport (1919), to establish social psychology as a science that, by definition, could not include such vague, non-locatable concepts as "group-mindedness" and "social instinct" (see McDougall, 1920). Social psychology became a science of understanding the individual as a unit of analysis, behaviorism as a theoretical orientation, and experimentation as a method of inquiry. This orientation resonated well with the Zeitgeist in American society (Collier et al., 1991), and the pendulum swung toward individualism and away from group-focused social influence research. The Yale communication and persuasion program exemplified this individual approach (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953).

An individual orientation and experimental methodology have persisted as hallmarks of American social psychology in general and the study of attitudes in particular, despite the fact that behaviorism proved to be short-lived. Largely because of the Gestalt orientation of an influential group of European, the study of individual behavior was replaced with the study of the social mind. This orientation paired the way for the social psychologists who immigrated to the United States to flee Nazism, including Lewin, Scheffler, Koffka, and Wertheimer. Their students' legacy, the study of social cognition, soon became a dominant orientation in American social psychology. The continued focus on the individual as the object of study stems from a variety of factors that range from abstract, metaphorical ideas to more mundane, but nonetheless consequential, ones of avoiding commonplace or "obvious" findings (Kelley, 1992), securing resources from granting agencies impressed with reductionistic approaches, and increasing publishing productivity (Herkowitz, 1999).

The group-oriented social influence orientation that prevails in Europe developed in part as a backlash against the post-WWII dominance of American ideas. What "originally was much needed and gratefully received reconstruction and reorientation of science with American aid" (Graumann, 1998, p. 160) came to be perceived as the "Americanization" of European social psychology. The turbulent 1960s, when American social psychology faced serious crises of confidence, proved ripe times to claim a European identity to social psychology. Israel & Tajfel, 1972; Jaques, Moscovici, Schonbuch, & Tajfel, 1974. Although Western Europe in that period had few social psychologists, it had a rich intellectual heritage on which to draw. For example, Moscovici (1980) derived his concept of social representations from Darwin's (1895-1914/1972) collective approach to social behavior, which, in turn, was influenced by Wundt's Volkerpsychologie (see Danzinger, 1983). In addition, Tajfel (1978) based his theory of social identity on a combination of Gestalt principles of perception and sociological conceptions of identity (see Hogg & Williams, 2000).
A defining characteristic of the European orientation became an emphasis on the social dimension of human psychological functioning (Tajfel, 1978). This emphasis likely was driven not only by the social conflict in the 1960s but also by the fact that Europe more than the United States has historically been socially and geopolitically complex. It is interesting that the European emphasis on social forces did not imply any less an individualistic orientation than found in North American social psychology (Farr, 1996). Instead, the unique European contribution was to identify the social and cultural context for individual responses. As Scherer (1993) noted, "whereas the individual and its functioning is... the paramount object of study in North American social psychology, with the "social" being part of the information to be processed, much of European social psychology, while studying individuals, is more interested in the social and cultural determinants of cognition and behavior" (p. 250; see also Hogg & Williams, 2000).

The single most important contribution of the European social influence paradigm was a more complete insight into the motivational complexities that drive attitudinal reactions. Theories of minority influence and social identity theory place central focus on the social meaning and patterning of attitude judgments. This emphasis is an important counterpart to the more individually oriented message-based persuasion research that dominated the field during the 1980s and 1990s (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; Petty & Wegener, 1996). Yet, persuasion research also has contributed to the study of social influence. Persuasion paradigms offer an elaborate measurement apparatus to document the motivation to understand reality and to track the effects of this motive on processing of persuasive information (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In contrast, beyond the manipulations of surveillance that we discussed at the beginning of the chapter, the reviewed research rarely distinguished among the various motives for agreeing or disagreeing with others.

We believe that this failure to document the range of motives established in social influence paradigms has hindered cumulative integration of knowledge in this area. Our interpretation of social influence findings as reflecting particular motivational orientations necessarily remained speculative given the lack of documentation in the original research. The benefits of examining the motives for social agreement and disagreement are readily apparent. For example, influence studies that measured identification with a group in order to test the predictions of social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982) not only were able to provide support for the theoretical rationale but also were able to rule out possible alternative motives (Miron & Bourhis, 1996). Research measures of motives also forge new areas for investigation. For example, Tajfel (1982) postulated two components of identification with groups, involving the knowledge of group membership and the value or emotional significance of that membership. Thus, self-related normative concerns could affect reactions to social influence through two processes. Only recently has it been demonstrated that both processes function as mediators of the effects of social influence. For example, Prislin and Christensen (in press) demonstrated that minority influence that successfully reversed the majority and minority positions within a group also changed people's preferences to exit versus remain in a group by affecting both categorization and evaluation processes.

The lack of direct measures of recipients' motives in social influence settings is perhaps understandable given the limited systematic procedures available to assess them. Generally, three types of assessment tools are possible, although all three are not equally useful to assess the two processes. First, researchers could conduct standard self-report measures. For example, a number of measures have been developed to assess self-related normative motives (see Haslam, 2001, for a review of self-report measures of social identification). Of course, self-reports are useful only to the extent that people are aware of these motives and are willing to report on them. Furthermore, even when people are able and willing to report accurately about their motives and current concerns, they rarely will be able to report accurately on the consequences of their motives for attitude judgments (see Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996). Most people will claim that they hold a particular position because it is true. This belief in the accuracy of one's judgments is likely to be a functional response. Motives of relating to others and being oneself can easily be served by the belief that the position that meets these needs also is the most valid one. Thus, even when people report accurately on their motives, their abiding belief that their judgments reflect the truth will typically render reports of motive effects unreliable.

Self-report measures of motives can be supplemented by less-controllable, implicit measures (Coates, Smith, Claypool, & Banner's, 2000; implicit measure of identification). Implicit measures are useful when participants are unaware of their motives or reluctant to report on them accurately. Additionally, more "objective" behavior-based measures of motives can be useful, such as indexes of identification from participation in group-defining activities (Phinney, 1990). Similar measures could be devised to assess understanding and relating. For example, based on the logic behind implicit measures, when people are motivated to relate to others, stimuli concerning others' impressions might trigger faster reactions than nondiagnostic stimuli. Also, behavior-based measures could be devised to tap motives of understanding and relating. For example, behavioral indicators of the motives to understand and relate could be forged using effort and time spent analyzing the information relevant to the issue and to others' positions, respectively.

In summary, the focus on social influence in the present chapter is most closely aligned with the European approach to the study of attitudes. Although this approach, like its American cousin, is highly individualistic, European theories of influence tend to ground individuals in social and cultural contexts. As a result, such theories tend to consider a wider range of motivations than the standard American message-based persuasion research. However, social influence research—as it is executed anywhere, has generally not assessed motives for influence. Measures of motives provide insight into why experimental manipulations have the effects that they do and thereby facilitate cumulative knowledge across individual social influence studies.

CULTURE AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE

Our analysis of social and group influences on attitudes inevitably raises the issue of large-scale societal and cultural effects. Of course, researchers work within cultures themselves, and as members of those cultures they hold assumptions about the relationship between individuals and their social environment. One prevailing assumption is the principle of individualism that underlies contemporary social influence theorizing and research within European and American traditions. In psychological theorizing, this principle means that each human constructs a sense of self that is separate and independent from others. As a result, individualism might sound to the Euro-American ear, it does not represent the prevailing, much less uniformly shared, notion of the self in world cultures (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998). An alternative to the construal of the self as independent, unique, and separate from others is the communalism of the self as interdependent, shared, and related to others.

Understanding the self-concepts of people of different cultures has been an organizing theme for most social psychological investigations of culture (Horstede, 1980; Kitayama & Markus, 1994; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In general, an independent sense of self is thought to be typical of individuals in individualistic cultures, defined as ones in which people are oriented to develop a positive, unique sense of self, express emotions and attain personal goals, reason socially about individuals rather than situations, and engage in permanent, nonsensitive social relations (Cybserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). In contrast, an interdependent sense of self is thought to be typical of collectivist cultures, defined as ones in which people are oriented to develop their identity as group members, achieve satisfaction in carrying out social...
roles and obligations, restrain emotional expression, reason socially about contexts rather than individuals, and engage in fixed, stable group memberships. Much psychological research on culture has followed the logic that, because selves develop differently in individualistic and collectivistic societies, a useful way to examine cultural differences is to study relevant aspects of the self. Thus, crosscultural research in psychology has often equated the cultural dimensions of individualism-collectivism with individual differences in the self-concept related to independence-interdependence (although see Bond, 2002; Miller, 2002).

The extent to which people within a culture tend to be individualistic or collectivistic is of considerable interest for social influence researchers because these clusters of attributes have important implications for influence. Specifically, accepting the attitudes of valued others is more likely to be congenial for people with a collectivistic, rather than individualistic, orientation. In support of this idea, Bond and Smith’s (1996) meta-analytic synthesis of research using Asch’s line-judging paradigm revealed greater acceptance of others’ judgments in collectivistic than in individualistic cultures. Moreover, the impact of culture was substantially greater than that of any other moderator of group influence, including the size of the majority. Similarly, consensus that serves as “social proof” and thus validates understanding has been found to be more impactful in collectivistic than individualistic cultures (Gaillant, Wason, Barret, Baner, & Gotink, 2001). Suggesting that this effect of culture was mediated through individual differences in social interdependence and collectiveness, for that the effect of culture, operationalized as country, disappeared once individual interdependence scores were entered into analysis.

Although the dimension of individualism-collectivism appears to be a highly generative framework to understand social influence across cultures, the framework may prove to be a shaky one. Research on individualism-collectivism has been criticized for its overly broad conceptual definition as well as for its measurement operations of poor validity (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). More troubling is a tendency for researchers to define individualism-collectivism in terms of its consequences and then to examine the same consequences—a practice that yields conclusions bordering on tautology (Oyserman et al., 2002). Social influence research is especially open to this latter criticism. Poorly designed studies risk finding that people from collectivistic cultures, defined in terms of sensitivity to social influence, are more likely than those from individualistic cultures to rely on social consensus. In keeping with the orientation of the present chapter, we suggest that cultural research on social influence could profitably extend beyond individualism-collectivism and other trait-like measures to examine the cultural foundations of the motives for influence and the informational mechanisms through which these motives guide reactions. As Bond and Smith (1996) suggested, differences among cultures in reactions to group influence may well be qualitative as well as quantitative. That is, stronger alignment with group consensus might not result in a reversal of the same but more intense motive in collectivistic than in individualistic cultures. Instead, cultural differences in core ideas about what is good, moral, and the essence of the self might incite different sets of motives in seemingly identical influence situations (see Kitayama & Markus, 1994). Thus, motives may best be understood in a cultural context.

Cultural influences also might emerge in information processing, given that “systems of thought exist in homeostasis with the social practices that surround them” (Nisbett, Peng, Inglehart, & Norois, 1991, p. 303). In general, Western thought is considered to be more analytic, categorical, focused on the object, and regulated by the rules of formal logic (see Nisbett et al., 2001; Peng & Nisbett, 1999). In contrast, Eastern/Asian thought is holistic, non-categorical, focused on the entire field, and regulated by the rules of dialectics. These culture-specific styles of thought might affect reactions to influence through the aspects of the environment that are salient and the way that information is interpreted (see Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002). Ceteris paribus, holistic thinkers should attend to greater amounts of information than analytic thinkers. The holistic belief that “everything is related to everything” should increase the likelihood that any specific piece of information is considered relevant when examining an issue (Choi, Dalal, Kim-Prieto, & Park, 2003). Also, to the extent that holistic thinking is intuitive, it might be less accessible to consciousness than analytic, more formal thinking. Finally, holistic and analytic styles of thought might dispose people to polarize or moderate attitude judgments. The holistic principle of contradiction, according to which opposites coexist in everything, implies acceptance of the co-existence of consensual and non-consensual information via an additive processing strategy (see Aaker & Sengupta, 2000). As a result, holistic thinkers might be oriented toward attitude shifts toward moderation over polarization. In contrast, analytic thinkers might follow formal logic rules, such as the rule of noncontradiction, according to which only one of the two opposites is valid. If analytic thinkers search for the correct position between consensual and non-consensual views, they might be predisposed to polarization over moderation.

Conceptualizing culture in terms of the interdependence of processes and contents holds promise for better understanding of social influence not only in comparisons between Western and Eastern/Asian cultures but also across a broad range of other cultures. Although specific motives and components of holistic and analytic thought may not be applicable to other cultures, the general principle of culture affecting reactions to social influence by evoking culture-specific motives and cognition should apply. We guess that progress in understanding the variety of culturally embedded motives and information processing styles will be achieved when the field of social influence itself is characterized by researchers who possess a broad set of cultural backgrounds and experiences.

Summary and Conclusion

In summary, the study of social influence provides a much-needed balance to the research addressed in the other chapters in this book by promoting the central theme that social relations create and are created by attitudes. All attitudes are social in the sense that they develop, function, and change in reciprocal relation with the social context. When influence is social, people not only are interested in understanding reality—the prominent motive addressed in most of the other chapters in this book—but also are oriented to relate to others and to promote their sense of self.

A recurring theme throughout the chapter is the ways in which people use information provided by others, especially information from a consensus of others, in order to achieve their social and informational goals. We argued that social goals are complex in that they involve self and others, and they influence responses in public as well as private. Specifically, people evaluate consensus views in order to understand reality, relate to others and convey desired impressions, and achieve a favorable and coherent self-concept. These motives direct responses to social consensus through a variety of information-processing mechanisms. For example, highly motivated individuals might carefully scrutinize and interpret consensus views and other relevant information. Less strongly motivated people might rely on less effortful heuristic rules ("go along to get along").

In the chapter, we considered how the triad of motives could account for findings in studies on polarization of group attitudes and the influence of opinion minorities. We also considered several models of social influence that identify the determinants and consequences of changing opinion distributions in groups. Dynamic features are intrinsic to social influence in everyday life but until recently have not been a central focus of most attitude theories. We then provided a historical analysis of the development of social influence research over time, especially highlighting the contribution of European social psychologists to our understanding of the social motives that yield influence. Finally, we considered how influence processes depend
on culture, especially cultural variation in social and informational motives for influence and in characteristic styles of information processing.

In general, we found a thriving, flourishing research literature addressing a multitude of aspects of social influence. Despite this vigorous social influence research is somewhat disappointing in that it has not yielded a stronger set of cumulative findings. We believe that researchers can promote cumulative work with more systematic study paradigms, especially ones that directly assess the motives that drive message recipients to accept or reject an influence appeal.

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should be a decrease in valuation and ultimately descriptification from the group. By the same token, individuals who express opinions initially rejected by others should be less likely to adopt the group as a social identity. As a result, initial minorities should consider others' reactions, including others' subsequent conversion to supporters, less consequential than if they had originally identified with them.


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Attitude Theory and Research: Intradisciplinary and Interdisciplinary Connections

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INTRODUCTION

Attitudes according to Allport (1935) is his landmark chapter in the Handbook of Social Psychology, are probably the most distinctive and indispensable concept in contemporary American social psychology (p. 798). Even a casual survey of current textbooks, conference proceedings and journals reveals that the study of attitudes is a predominant theme of contemporary social psychology. The attitude concept affords linkages with a wide range of topics that interest social psychological theorists, researchers, and practitioners. The present chapter attempts to illuminate how these topics are infused with and connected to fundamental attitudinal concepts and processes. Two distinguishable approaches can be taken when illuminating linkages between the attitude literature and related disciplines: the interdisciplinary approach that addresses social problems by combining the social psychology of attitudes with perspectives from disciplines outside of social psychology (e.g., health care, education, politics, law) and the intradisciplinary approach that focuses on linkages between attitude research and other fundamental topics within the field of social psychology (e.g., impression formation, interpersonal attraction, close relationships, group performance, group decision making).

INTERDISCIPLINARY CONTEXTS

An obvious approach to forging connections between attitudes and related disciplines involves interdisciplinary applications that are designed to understand and solve social problems. Indeed the emphasis upon understanding and solving social problems is what distinguishes applied from basic research (Oskamp & Schulz, 1998). Certainly it is easy to identify social problems to which principles about the nature origins and consequences of attitudes are intrinsically relevant. All one needs to do is consult the daily news sources to learn about the latest episodes of prejudice, crime, war, failing schools, corruption, poverty, environmental degradation, disease, substance abuse, mental illness, and other forms of human tragedy. People's attitudes markedly affect and are affected by these issues and problems. Out