Influence in everyday life occurs in social contexts marked by group memberships and group identities. This is an obvious point in mass persuasion; for example, in politics, an electorate identified by political party membership or ideology (e.g., conservative, libertarian) receives information from elected representatives in government and other party officials, who similarly belong to or represent political groups. This point holds also in dyadic influence in close relationships. For example, married couples and family members may exert influence through reminders of relationship norms and standards (e.g., when children are told, "We don't use that kind of language in this house"). Even nonpartisan news coverage of current events is often grounded in discussion of the implications for international relations and the domestic groups likely to suffer or benefit.

The present chapter considers how acceptance of influence from others is regulated by social groups. In particular, the chapter considers how the social group identity of the source of an appeal and that of the recipient affect the influence process. I will argue that social group identity is important to the extent that it establishes particular motivations for recipients to agree or disagree with the source.

TYPES OF GROUPS AND TYPES OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE

Social groups have wide-ranging impact, extending beyond those people holding formal group membership. Hyman (1942, 1960) proposed the idea of reference groups to represent this broad impact—specifically, to explain how the values and standards of other people and of reference groups are, through evaluation and through self-appraisal processes, adopted as a comparative frame of reference.

Reference groups proved useful in early studies of group attitudes, especially explanations of soldiers' attitudes during World War II. Soldiers apparently relied on a variety of reference groups as personal standards of comparison when interpreting their experiences (Merton, 1957), including "actual groups" (defined as those who interact with each other in accord with established patterns, who label themselves as a group, and who are labeled as such by others), "collectivities" (defined as "people who have a sense of solidarity by virtue of sharing common values and who have acquired an attendant sense of moral obligation to fulfill role-expectations," p. 299), and "social categories" (defined as "aggregates of social statuses, the occupants"
of which are not in social interaction," p. 297.) For example, ambitious soldiers appeared to reject the values and attitudes of those of similar rank (i.e., their current membership group) in favor of the standards advocated by the social category of senior officer. Following Newcomb (1950), Merton (1957) did not limit his discussion to positively valued groups, but also included as reference groups those negatively viewed, derogated groups that motivate rejection and development of counternorms (e.g., the prototypic adolescent rebellion).

Reference groups exert influence because they provide comparison standards for self-evaluation and because they provide valued outcomes (e.g., group acceptance). These motives for agreement were formalized in Kelley’s (1952) distinction between the “social comparison” function of reference groups, in which group members’ responses provide an informational standard or comparison for evaluating people’s own attitudes and behavior, and the “normative” function, in which group members’ responses represent social norms with which people comply in order to gain or maintain group acceptance.

Comparative and normative motives for agreeing or disagreeing with groups reflect Deutsch and Gerard’s (1955) more general distinction between “informational” needs and “normative” needs. People who are influenced for informational reasons are motivated by validity concerns and accept information obtained from others as evidence about reality (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Informational influence is independent of the target’s social relationship to the source and derives solely from the validity of the information. Normative influence, such as the logic of the arguments in the appeal, people who are influenced for normative reasons are motivated to conform with the positive expectations of another (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). The other can be a group, another person, or the self. Supposedly, fulfilling others’ positive expectations presents a positive self-esteem and to solidarity rather than alienation. When conforming to self-esteem, people feel self-esteem and approval, and avoid feeling anxiety and guilt. Thus Deutsch and Gerard’s definition of normative influence specifies a broadly conceived set of social motives and goals that excludes only informational reasons for agreement. (See similar-dissimilar people’s “motivations to evaluate social reality vs. the motive to promote group locomotion toward a goal.” Jones and Gerard’s [1967] information-dependence vs. effect dependence, and Abrams and Hogg’s [1990] reasons to agree vs. pressures to comply.)

The usefulness of Deutsch and Gerard’s (1955) distinction between normative and informational motives is apparent in its having provided an organizing framework for the field for the past 40 years. This perspective has been adapted to explain social influence phenomena ranging from individuals’ agreement with groups, as in minority group influence (Moscovici, 1985a), to group-level shifts in attitude, as in group polarization (Iseberg, 1986). Across these various lines of investigation, Deutsch and Gerard’s dual-motive view is typically interpreted as specifying not only separate goals or motives for influence, but also unique influence outcomes tied to these motives.

In general, social influence researchers have assumed that agreement with others for informational, validity-seeking reasons generates enduring change that is apparent in publicly as well as privately expressed attitudes. In the typical social influence experiment, enduring change is demonstrated through shifts in recipients’ attitudes that are maintained in private assessment settings, outside the social context in which the appeal was delivered. Enduring change is also captured on “indirect” measures of agreement—measures that are not, from the recipients’ perspective, directly linked to the position advocated by the source. The processes through which this dual-motive view of social influence is operationalized involve informational mechanisms, including attention to and evaluation of the content of the appeal and other information about the issue or object under consideration. In contrast, agreement for normative reasons is thought to generate superficial public but not private conformity that is relatively unstable across time and context and that arises from people’s analysis of the social implications of their attitudes. In the typical social influence experiment, this transitory change is demonstrated by comparing recipients’ attitude statements in public settings. When the analysis draws heavily on research in the area of minority and majority group influence, this work provides an especially complete representation of the range of social and informational goals that can directly influence with social groups. Furthermore, the theoretical model of influence outlined in this chapter was originally developed to explain the findings in the research literature (Wood, Lundgren, Odutime, Bucemec, & Blackstone, 1994; Wood, Pool, Leck, & Purvis, 1996).

It is important to note that researchers’ definitions of normative motives have varied somewhat over the years, beginning with Deutsch and Gerard’s (1955) highly inclusive construct covering a wide range of outcomes associated with self and other. Normative motives are now often limited to concerns with evaluation by others or with the outcomes provided by others (e.g., group acceptance, rejection); self-definition aspects of social pressures, especially the motive to align one’s attitudes with valued reference groups, are excluded (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Turner, 1991). Self-related motives are excluded in part because these pressures supposedly direct influence through unique processes that differ from those instigated by impression-related goals. In the present chapter, I revert to Deutsch and Gerard’s (1955) inclusive definition, in which normative motives arise from (1) the outcomes provided by others, including both the influence source and those who have surveillance over the opinion expressed by recipients; and (2) the implications of agreement or disagreement for recipients’ own self-evaluation and self-integrity. The resulting tripartite model of goals in social influence contexts thus differentiates among normative motives grounded in concern for self, normative motives stemming from concern with others, and informational motives reflecting concern for the status of the object or issue (see similar distinctions by Chafkin, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996; Johnson & Eagly, 1989).

The idea that a general set of needs or motives energizes and directs attitudinal functioning has been a central component of classic theories of attitudinal functioning. The set of motives overlaps to some extent with these earlier schemes. For example, many important outcomes provided by others have been considered in terms of the social adjustment function of attitudes (Smith, Bruner, & White, 1956) and, in Greengross and Breckler’s (1985) self-concept theory, as the public face of the self. Self-defining reasons
for holding attitudes have been included in ego-defensive functions (Katz, 1960) and are part of the collective concept of the self (Greenwald & Breckler, 1985). Validity seeking incorporates aspects of knowledge (Katz, 1960) and conforms to the principle of self-consistency (Smith et al., 1956) of attitudes, and it overlaps with the private facet of the self (Greenwald & Breckler, 1985). I do not claim that the present tripartite model represents a comprehensive list of potential motives. It does, however, identify three aspects of social influence that are likely to be made salient by group identity in a wide variety of settings.

NORMATIVE MOTIVES TO AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH MINORITY AND MAJORITY GROUPS

A "majority" source group has typically been defined as one that advocates the numerically most frequent or consensual position within a larger group. A "minority" source group is one proposing a low-frequency, nonconsensual position, and may also be a nonmainstream social group (e.g., environmental issues, a minority group may consist of Greenpeace members). Minority sources have also been defined more broadly in terms of their legitimacy to influence others (Perer, Papastamos, & Magru, 1991). In this view, minority influence occurs when recipients of an appeal are in an ascendant relation to the appeal's source. They possess the legitimate right to exert influence over the source, but instead are influenced by the source's position.

Moscovici's (1950, 1985a, 1985b) theory of minority influence can be understood in terms of the distinction between normative and informational motives. He argued that minorities exert influence through a "comparison" process. That is, people publicly agree with opinions or make a normative decision stemming from the outcomes they can provide (attaining social position and other rewards, and avoiding rejection and other punishments). However, Moscovici maintained that agreement with minorities is not reflected in private assessments, because people wish to maintain their personal integrity and sense of control. From the present perspective, the lack of private agreement also emerges from normative pressures. The wish to maintain one's individuality represents a self-defensive motive to differentiate from the source. In contrast, minority influence based on consensus without compromise are thought to instigate conflict and a "validation" process (Smith et al., 1956). Similar to the processes involved in informational influence, people evaluate the minority view to determine how the source could advocate such a deviant idea; they reevaluate the bases for their own position; and they change their judgments on private and on indirect measures that appear to them to be unrelated to the appeal. Agreement with minorities is not apparent on public, direct measures. From the present perspective, this resistance occurs because of the negative normative motivations associated with the source's deviant identity; people do not want to be aligned with a minority source group.

A meta-analytic synthesis (Wood et al., 1984) of past research on minority influence revealed distinct patterns of influence associated with minority and majority source groups. However, little support emerged for the idea that minorities exert influence primarily on public measures of agreement and minorities on private measures. Instead, minorities had greater influence than minorities on public measures as well as private measures that directly tapped agreement with the issue in the appeal.

Even more troubling for Moscovici's perspective is the equivocal support that emerged for the prediction that minority sources foster a validation process that generates change in people's underlying beliefs and attitudes. This informationally based change should have been reflected in private, indirect agreement. However, we (Wood et al., 1994) found that minorities were not overall more influential than majorities on indirect measures. Minorities' indirect influence emerged only inconsistently.

It appears, then, that responses to minority appeals are more typically directed by normative motives than by validation. The negative normative motives established by the source's deviant identity inhibit influence. When we (Wood et al., 1994) compared the impact of minority sources to that of no-message control conditions, minority sources generated less influence on private and public direct measures than on private, indirect measures, on which recipients were unaware that agreement aligned them with the minority source. This pattern suggests that recipients suppressed agreement with minority sources on direct measures in order to differentiate themselves from the deviant source group. To account for these patterns of influence effects associated with opinion majority and minority groups, it is useful to consider in detail the normative and informational motives established by group membership.

NORMATIVE MOTIVES: OUTCOMES PROVIDED BY OTHERS

The idea that influence is regulated by the reward and punishment outcomes provided by others was an important component of early typologies of social influence (Kelman, 1958; French & Raven, 1959; French, 1956). Social groups were thought to exert influence through their control over such outcomes: People align their attitudes with groups in order to receive rewards and avoid punishments. Even social norms such as reciprocity may directly influence through instrumental means, so that people tend to express greater agreement with those who have agreed with them in the past than with those who have resisted their past influence attempts (Cialdini, Green, & Ruscio, 1992).

Being influenced by valued groups also yields less tangible, more affective outcomes, such as being accepted as a group member and avoiding social rejection. Although these goals are typically associated with an alternate form of normative pressure, involving personal identification with the source (i.e., Kelman's [1958] "identification" and French and Raven's [1959] "referent power"); acceptance and approval outcomes may function like other instrumental reasons for agreement with reference groups. Hogg and Turner (1987) take this position, suggesting that "since reference groups are implicitly defined in terms of a status attachment on the basis of liking and admiration, with such groups for instrumental reasons, such as "avoidance of punishment, censure, or rejection for deviation, or in order to cultivate social approval and acceptance" (p. 142).

To what extent do the outcomes provided by others motivate direct agreement with majority and minority sources? My colleagues and I (Wood et al., 1994) suggested that this can be detected by comparing recipients' stated attitudes in public settings, in which a source can potentially deliver rewards and punishments, with attitudes given in private settings, in which interpersonal consequences should be less apparent. Because in the meta-analytic synthesis the influence of majority sources proved comparable across public and private direct measures of agreement, as did the influence of minority sources, we (Wood et al., 1994) concluded that recipients' attitude judgments in this research paradigm were not simply a function of the rewards and punishments present in the immediate influence setting. These findings, then, contradict Moscovici's (1980) argument that majority advocacy yields a social agreement designed to attain immediate social rewards, and that this agreement does not extend to private measures.

The general idea that influence can be controlled by the specific interpersonal outcomes of fear of others' rejection and desire for others' approval has formed the basis for theories of impression motivation (Schlenker, 1980; Tetlock & Manstead, 1983). Impression-based expectations wish to convey particular impressions to the source of the influence attempt or to others, who may have surveillance over their responses (Chuken, Siner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996; see also Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, Chapter 11, this volume). This desire to project a particular impression orients people to consider the social consequences of their attitude judgments. Recipients are likely to adopt the social position to the extent that by so doing, they can convey the desired social identity.

The outcomes provided by others motivate agreement by focusing recipients on the positive and negative consequences of their opinion judgments. When recipients perceive outcomes as not being highly important, recipients are likely to use efficient strategies to determine the best position to take. They may, for example, on the heuristic rule "Go along to get along" and align their opinions with those of others in a relatively superficial manner. Considerable empirical evidence suggests that outcomes provided by others can instigate limited processing and transitory shifts in atti-
tudes while recipients are under surveillance and their judgments can yield the desired re-
ward and prevent punishments. For example, forewarning participants that their atti-
udes will be challenged by a discussion paradigm has been found to generate strategic
shifts toward mundane positions that are eas-
ily defended and unlikely to offend the part-
ner. When participants are then informed that
the discussion is canceled, they revert to their
original position, suggesting that the original
judgment change represented an “elastic shift” (Cialdini & Petty, 1981; Babcock &
When other-provided outcomes are im-
portant and people are highly motivated to
acquire them, they are likely to conduct a
careful, systematic analysis of the relevant in-
formation when deciding what position to
take, and this analysis is likely to yield rela-
tively enduring change in opinion. For example,
Higgins's (1992) research on the “communi-
cation game” suggests that communicators are
influenced by their own statements as they
try to achieve a shared understanding with
their audience. In this research, people's goal
of conveying an interpretable reasonable posi-
tion affected their understanding of the issue
under discussion. The impression motivations
instigated in forewarning paradigms can also
yield systematic processing and enduring
change in attitudes. For example, Chen,
Schechter, and Chaiken (1996, Study 2) had
some participants read passages that primed
the need to tailor thought and behavior to
social demands. When subsequently informed
of the opinions of their partners in an im-
pending discussion, these participants eval-
uated a set of persuasive arguments on the
basis of offering arguments to their partners’
positions. Further suggesting that impression
gains can result from thoughtful, careful analysis
of the issue, these attitudes were main-
tained across a span of several weeks (see
Chen & Chaiken, Chapter 4, this volume).
Given that the outcomes provided by
others can motivate not only superficial
change in people’s attitudes that is apparent
primarily in the influence context, but also
more enduring change that is apparent
across contexts, comparisons between pub-
licly and privately expressed attitudes may
not be a reliable strategy to identify these
motives for agreement. That is, recipients’
publicly expressed outcomes could yield superficial processing of relevant infor-
mation and attitude change observable pri-
mary or more extensive analyses and
enduring attitude judgments that emerge in
both public and private contexts. Baldwin
and Holmes (1987) nicely demonstrated the
effects of others’ approval and disapproval
on attitudes expressed privately. In this
study, female college students read a sexu-
ally explicit passage after they had engaged
in a directed-imagery procedure in which
they imagined their elderly relatives or their
campus friends. Ratings of how much they
liked the passage conformed to what would
be acceptable to the previously imagined
group; those who thought about older peo-
ple rated it as significantly less enjoyable
than those who thought about peers.
The often-used strategy, then, of compar-
ing attitude change in public contexts under
others’ surveillance with attitude change ex-
pressed privately, can identify certain kinds of
other-related motives—ones made salient by
others’ surveillance. The strategy is less use-
ful, however, for detecting the effects of other-
related attitudes that do not depend on surveil-
nance. For example, some issues (e.g., caffeine
consumption) can chronically elicit other-
related motives (i.e., for Mormons, concerns
about Church disapproval). In the domain of
minority and majority influence, then, the
comparable source impact across public and
private measures (Wood et al., 1994) provides
suggestive but not definitive evidence that
participants in the original studies were not
highly motivated by other-related goals. As I
explain in the next section, clearer evidence
of the kind of normative motives directing influ-
ence in these studies emerged in Wood et al.’s
(1994) analyses that considered the extent to
which the minority source was socially devi-
ant.

NORMATIVE MOTIVES: SELF AND IDENTITY

The idea that influence can arise from a moti-
vation to align the self with personally valued
reference groups and to defend the self
against alliance with derogated groups is ana-
gonous to a central assumption of social
and self-categorization theory (Turner, 1991;
Turner & Oakes, 1989). Tajfel argued that
people are driven by the need for a positive
identity, which can be met through social
comparison with other individuals or with
relevant reference groups. When a social
group or category is evaluated favorably or
unfavorably, people engage in social compar-
ison on relevant dimensions and achieve a pos-
itive identity through alignment with posi-
tively valued ingroups or categories and
differentiation from negatively valued out-
groups.
In general, the motives to align with posi-
tive groups and to differentiate from negative
groups can be considered manifestations of a
defensive orientation that emerges from the
desire to achieve a valued, coherent self-
identity (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen,
1996; Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996). Most
experimental tests of this idea have examined
the effects of group membership on the eval-
uating components of people’s self-images
(Tajfel, 1978; Tesser, 1988). However, self-
related goals in addition to self-esteem may
direct agreement with groups, including the
desire for an optimally distinctive identity
(Brewer, 1991), and consistency-related mo-
tives in which people strive to be true to
themselves, achieve a coherent self-view, and
reduce uncertainty about the world (Abras &
Hogg, 1989; Hogg & Abrams, 1993; Swann,
1990).
Direct evidence of the role of recipients’
self-esteem in group influence was provided in
a recent experiment (Pool, Wood, & Leck,
1998). In this work, social groups exerted
normative pressure by advocating positions
that threatened recipients’ self-definitional
goals. In an initial session of the study, partici-
pants rated their self-esteem on Rosenberg’s (1965)
self-esteem scale. In the experimental session,
participants indicated their attitudes on a so-
cial issue, learned the attitudes supposedly
held by a social group, and then rated their
self-esteem a second time. For some partici-
pants, the social group represented a majority
(either their university or residents of their
state), and the attitudes supposedly
held by the group on the target social issue
differed from participants’ own. For other
participants, the social group was a minority
(either a gay and lesbian student organization
or a lesbian feminist group), and the position
advocated was similar to participants’ own. It
was argued that participants’ self-esteem
would be threatened when the valued self-
esteem group held a contrasting position to their
own or the derogated minority held a position
similar to their own.
To determine the extent to which the tar-
group was self-relevant and thus likely to
exert normative pressure, we had participants
complete a questionnaire that assessed the ex-
tent to which they defined themselves as being
similar to (for a majority) or dissimilar from
(for a minority) the group. On the basis of
their responses, participants were categorized
as those for whom the group was highly rele-
vant and those for whom it was less relevant.
As anticipated, self-esteem decreased from
the initial session to the experiment only for those
participants rating groups as highly self-
relevant. This decrease was approximately
equal in magnitude for disagreement with ma-
jority groups and agreement with minority
groups.
To further clarify the type of normative
threat posed by the group’s attitude, we evalua-
ted whether the decrease in self-esteem oc-
curred when participants’ attitudes were dis-
played publicly versus privately. In the public
condition, participants were led to believe
that others present in the experimental session
would receive information on the group’s
evaluation and the participants’ attitude (i.e.,
their disagreement with the majority or their
agreement with the minority). In the private con-
dition, only a participant was informed of his or
her own and the group’s attitude. Self-
definitional motives should be present in both
public and private contexts; they emerged from
failures to conform to self-standards (Deutsch
& Gerard, 1955) and were not necessarily tied
to surveillance by others and the rewards or
punishments they can provide (e.g., rejection
for deviant positions). Indeed, the decrease in
self-esteem was uniform across public and
private conditions (Pool et al., 1998).

Influence and Self-Related

Normative Pressures

The idea that personally relevant social
groups can motivate influence emerged early
in the history of communication and persuasion research, and was evident in the program of research on influence of coworkers at Yale (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). Groups were found to regulate attitudes to the extent that a group was consciously and voluntarily important and salient. For example, Boy Scouts who reported valuing their troop membership were more resistant to a message criticizing wood- "Activating" forces that were used to regulate the group's views of an issue.

Similarly, Catholic high school students who had been reminded about their religious identity proved more resistant to anti-Catholic po- sitions (e.g., involving censorship of books and movies) than students who were not reminded of their Catholic identity (Kelley, 1955).

The influence of minority and majority source groups can also be understood in terms of their implications for recipients' personal identities. In the Wood et al. (1994) review, recipients' motivation to align themselves in judgment with the consensus represented by majority sources was apparent in the greater impact of majorities than of minor- ities on recipients' public and private di- rect agreement. In addition, recipients' desire to differentiate themselves from the deviant views of minorities was apparent in the greater agreement that emerged on private, indirect measures of attitudes (on which rec- ipients were not aware that their judgments had implications for agreement with the ap- pearal) than on public or private mea- sures of attitudes. Additional evidence that identity-related normative motives inhibit- ed agreement with minorities was obtained in analyses that compared minority sources who had a deviant social identity (e.g., members of a radical political group) to those who lacked a clear social identity and were instead identified through, for example, a statistical designation producing the "minority" position (as supposedly had been endorsed by 12% of prior subjects). Specifically, the characteristic patterns of support or influence, as perceived by the recipients that had an influence on the social group identity; other types of minorities did not give any clear pattern of agreement, and the range of normative pres- sures to adopt majority views and to disown minority views regulated both public and pri- vate measures of agreement in our (Wood et al., 1994) review.

**Normative Motives and Information Processing**

In general, self-relevant groups motivate in- fluence by focusing people on the implications of their attitudes for adopting positively val- ued group identities and rejecting negatively val- ued identities. When people are highly mo- tivated to align with or to differentiate from a source group, they are likely to consider a careful, systematic analysis of the relevant in- formation when deciding what position to take. When group identities are less important or people are unable to conduct a detailed analysis (e.g., they are distracted), they are likely to use more efficient strategies, relying on peripheral or heuristic rules to identify the position they should hold (e.g., for political issues, "Vote the party line").

These various information-processing strategies are acted upon by self-referent normative pressures are apparent in earlier research find- ings, although it should be kept in mind that these studies were not designed to be unpre- served from this perspective. For example, in the hostile-media phenomenon, partisan group members have been found to judge "balanced" media presentations in a directed manner, perceiving them as biased in favor of the opposing side (Valone, Ross, & Lepore, 1985). Process-oriented research has found that judgments of bias arise from heuristic processing in which people base their evalua- tions of a specific presentation on their gen- eral beliefs that the media is biased against their group (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994). In addition, simple perceptual processes were suggested by social judgment theory's ac- counts of group membership effects. In this research paradigm, membership in a self- defining group was sometimes used as an in- dicator of ego involvement (Sherif & Hovland, 1961). Ego-involved people, generally are supposedly more resistant to counterattitudi- nal messages than less involved ones, be- cause they have a personal stake in the attitude of re- jection (i.e., the range of unacceptable positions) and narrows their latitude of accep- tance. These factors suggest that normative pres- sures to adopt majority views and to disown minority views regulated both public and private measures of agreement in our (Wood et al., 1994) review.

**Turner's (1982) self-categorization analy- sis of influence (initially called "referent informa- tional cues") derives from Kelman's (1961) idea that influence can arise from iden- tification with socially valued sources, and from French and Raven's (1959) argu- ment that a source's power to influence others can derive from his or her role as a social referent. Consistent with these perspectives, self-categorization-based agreement is sup- posed to be apparent on both public and pri- vate judgments. Change is maintained as long as the source group remains salient and re- tains its positive or negative value. It is impor- tant to note, however, that Turner (1982) did not conceive of this mode of influence as an al- ternative to normative bases for agreement (which he defined narrowly as "influence by other-provided social outcomes; see also Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Hogg & Abrams, 1993) and not, as in the present analysis, treating it here, as a type of normative motive.

In addition to the relatively efficient pro- cess in self-categorization theory, evaluation of information on issues related to group membership can also arise from a relatively thoughtful, cognitive demanding analysis of information. For example, Asch's (1940, 1948) Gestalt approach to social influence suggested that influence appeals do not di- rectly affect recipients' attitudes, but instead change their interpretations of the object or issue referenced in the appeal. In one of Asch's (1940) experiments, participants were ex- posed to others' favorable evaluations of the attitude object, "politicians," appeared to as- sume that this referred to "statesmen," be- cause of this interpretation, participants re- ported relatively favorable views themselves. In contrast, participants exposed to others unfavorable judgments apparently inferred that "political" referred to the "more offen- sive forms" of the political animal (means), back then, Tammany Hall, low politics, en- derlings), and they expressed relatively nega- tive evaluations. Apparent agreement on issue positions "imputed to congenial groups produced changes in the meaning of the objects of judg- ment" (Asch, 1940, p. 46). Similar ideas emerged, although in slightly different form, in other theoretical analyses within the Gestalt tradition (Festinger, 1950; Heider, 1958). More recently, Allen and Wilder (1980) ex- tended Asch's ideas into a multitude process of meaning change, in which (1) recipients modify their interpretations of an issue in light of the position advocated by a majority group; (2) the new interpretation of the issue makes the source's position seem more plausible and acceptable; and (3) recipients then agree with the (new) interpretation of the advoc- ated position.

My colleagues and I conducted process-oriented research to test whether self-defining normative motives can affect interpretation of positions held by minority and majority groups (Wood et al., 1996). Participi-
The group source in this second study was presented as holding a position that recipients endorsed. Alligood and respondents allowed us to examine the extent to which recipients shifted their own positions away from that of the majority group. Conceptually, this effect parallels the negative normative pressure that appeared to attenuate direct and indirect influence from majority group sources in the Wood et al. (1994) review.

Participants in this second study were thus told that a derogated minority group (e.g., the Ku Klux Klan) agreed with them about an ambiguously phrased attitude issue, such as “In the United States, anyone who is willing and able to work hard has a good chance of succeeding.” Pretesting had established that the attitude statements were open to multiple interpretations: The phrase “anyone who is willing and able” could be interpreted in absolute terms, suggesting that success is attainable by anyone, regardless of race or sex; or it could be given the more qualified interpretation that although not all people can succeed if they work hard, women and minorities have it tougher than others because of discrimination.

As predicted, the negative normative pressure to differentiate from the minority group affected recipients’ interpretations and attitudes. When faced with agreement from the KKK, participants adopted a quiet interpretation of the attitude statement, recognizing the barriers for women and minorities, and as a result were able to shift their attitudes away from the minority group’s position. Again, however, not all subjects evinced this shift. Only those who indicated on a separate questionnaire that the Ku Klux Klan was negatively self-relevant (i.e., they defined themselves as not being members of this group) experienced the normative pressure and altered their attitudes (i.e., they aligned their attitudes with majority opinion). Those judging it as less self-relevant were not influenced.

The study (Wood et al., 1996) examined whether the normative pressures instigated by negatively self-relevant minority groups similarly affect influence through directed interpretation of appeals.

When groups do not provide congenial interpretations, people may be able to achieve their processing goals with strategies that are less effortless than generating their own interpretations of an attitude position (see Atkinson, 1959, for the extensive variety of strategies people use to achieve cognitive consistency). One possibility is to reassess the self-relevance of the source group, reducing normative pressure by judging that the group is not especially important for their self-definition. However, in our treatment (Wood et al., 1996), this strategy was not used by high-relevance participants; their ratings of the negative self-relevance of the minority sources remained high from pre- to postexperimental change (unfortunately, change in relevance ratings was not assessed in the study of majority influence).

In the current paradigm, participants were asked to achieve high levels of self-definition normative pressure but are not sufficiently motivated or able to reinterpret the advocated position simply to misrecall the group view. We (Pool, Wood, & Leck, 1997), using a paradigm similar to that used in the Wood et al. (1996) research, informed participants that a majority social group (e.g., residents of their state) had taken a position on an issue that diverged from participants’ own. However, half of the participants were not given the cue about how to reinterpret the group’s position (by completing the interpretation rating scales). After participants had engaged in a 20-minute interrelated task, their recall of the advocated position was assessed. Participants who had earlier indicated that the group was highly self-relevant demonstrated the greatest error in recall; they misremembered the valued majority group as advocating a position closer to their own than the group actually had. In addition, we administered the interpretation measure to the remaining participants and, after 20 minutes, assessed their recall of the group position. In this condition, participants who indicated that the group was highly self-relevant interpreted the source position to be congruent with their own and revealed minimal recall of the discrepant message. Thus, misrecall altogether eliminated the normative processing strategy to reinterpretation; the negative correlation between misrecall and reinterpretation in this condition confirmed that participants misremembered the message of the sources (i.e., remembering valued majority positions as similar to their own and derogated minority positions as divergent from their own) to the extent that they had
APPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS OF DUAL-PROCESS THEORIZING

not initially reinterpreted the source group position when given the opportunity on the intervention. In general, our findings (Pool et al., 1997) suggest that normative pressures instigated by the district majority groups have a variety of effects on recipients' processing of influence appeals. Reinterpretation of the advocated position to be congruent with participants' own appears to be a relatively effortless strategy that recipients are unable or unwilling to implement without a structured guide in the form of the interpretation rating scales. Distortions in recall appear to be a less effortless strategy that research participants spontaneously adopt to meet the normative goals of aligning with valued majorities and differentiating from derogated minorities.

One striking finding from this research paradigm is that the negative and positive self-definitional normative pressures exerted by social groups appear to be mirror images of each other; the motivation to align with positively self-relevant majorities differed only in direction from the motivation to differentiate from negatively self-relevant minorities. However, positive and negative normative pressures may not mirror each other in all respects. The effects for the majority source in the Wood et al. (1996) research proved to be slightly larger in magnitude than those for the minority source, despite our attempts to identify minority groups that were strongly self-relevant for at least some participants. It may be that negative normative pressures are typically less strong than positive pressures.

Supporting the idea of asymmetry in self-relevant normative pressures, research on the self-concept has found that people are more likely to focus on attributes that they possess and groups they belong to (e.g., "I am a Texan") than on attributes that they lack (e.g., "I am not a New Yorker"; see Meertens & McGuire's, 1992, 1996 cognitive-positive bias). Indeed, affirmations of personal attributes plausibly hold more information value that can influence recipients and should more effectively meet the self-relevant goals of a coherent identity (e.g., Swann, 1990) and a positive self-view (e.g., Tesser, 1988). An important exception to this generalization occurs when groups are in conflict with each other; self-definition as "not the adversary group" may be highly salient and meaningful for members of rival groups. However, in nonconflict situations, people may experience pressures to align with positively valued self-relevant groups more often and perhaps more intensely than pressures to differentiate from negatively valued self-relevant groups.

INFORMATIONAL MOTIVES ESTABLISHED BY GROUP IDENTITY

When motivated by informational concerns, people wish to adopt the most valid, correct position on an issue at stake (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1986; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Research on message-based persuasion has typically established validity-seeking motives by highlighting the personal relevance of message topics for recipients (however, see Liberman & Chaiken, 1986). When recipients are highly motivated to identify an accurate, valid position on a topic, they carefully consider persuasive arguments and other issue-relevant information. When they are only moderately motivated by such concerns or are limited in their ability to evaluate information critically, recipients are likely to rely on heuristic cues and other less cognitively demanding strategies; an example is agreeing more with majorities than with minorities, using the heuristic "Consensus is correct" (see Petty & Wegener, Chapter 3, this volume).

Informationally based agreement was a central feature of Moscovici's (1955a, 1955b) account of minority group influence. As I have noted in the introductory section of this chapter, minorities that consistently advocated a counterattitudinal position were thought to instigate a validation process. Recipients do not experience the normative pressures to comply that constrain their responses to majority groups, and instead experience informational conflict as they try to understand why a minority is advocating such a deviant position. However, our review (Wood et al., 1994) did not find an overall pattern suggesting that minorities elicit responses from recipients than majority messages. That is, in the overall analysis, minority sources were not more influential than majorities on recipients' private behaviors. Instead, recipients did not wish to align directly with a deviant minority, attitude measures that were indirect and did not appear to be linked to the influence appeal should have been more likely to reveal shifts toward the source position than public or direct measures. A greater informativeness of minority was not proposed by only a minority of not well-understood moderating factors" (Wood et al., 1994, p. 316).

One possible explanation for this inconsistency is that minorities in past research have not been presented uniformly strong, valid arguments, and people who are highly motivated to identify an accurate position are unlikely to shift their attitudes in the absence of cogent evidence. In the conformity paradigm in which most research on minority influence has been conducted, appeals typically consist of a stated position, and people motivated to engage in critical evaluation of such a message need to generate their own interpretation of the message position and reasons for supporting it or opposing it. If the advocated position appears arbitrary or is not easily understood, it may, like "weak" messages in research on message-based persuasion, fail to be influential for informationally motivated people.

It is also possible that minority group identity alone is not sufficient to motivate validity seeking. In the information-rich environment provided by modern communication technology, people are likely to be exposed to divergent views from a variety of groups on a daily basis. Even consistently advocated minority group positions may not be sufficient to engage validity seeking (see a similar point by De Vries, De Dreu, Gordijn, & Schuurman, 1996). Indeed, process-oriented research evaluating the extent to which minorities instigate careful analysis of persuasive messages has yielded inconsistent effects. Although minority messages have been found to attract more attention than majority messages (Tesser, Campbell, & Mickle, 1983), majority messages have sometimes been found to elicit greater thought from recipients than minority messages (e.g., Mackie, 1987), and still others suggest no overall difference in amount of effort or response to majority versus minority sources (e.g., Martin, 1996; Maass & Clark, 1983; Trost, Maass, & Kenrick, 1990).

Minority group identity probably combines with other factors to instigate informational motives. In particular, more extensive processing is elicited by unexpected positions. Given that people expect that others will share a majority of others, majorities that violate this expectation and advocate counterattitudinal positions may even be more useful, extensive thought (Mackie, 1987). Incongruity between source group and message position can also explain instances of minority influence. Baker and Petty (1994) presented participants with expected source-position pairings, in which majority sources advocated consensual positions and minorities advocated deviant ones, or with unexpected pairings, in which majorities advocated deviant positions and minorities advocated consensual ones. Unexpected pairings were surprising and evoked curiosity; consequently, recipients were more likely to systematically process unexpected (vs. expected) appeals, and were more likely to be influenced by (unexpected) appeals supported by cognizant than by spurious arguments. Expected pairings of source and message were processed at a more superficial level and suggested use of a consensus heuristic, in which majorities' positions were more influential than minorities' positions.

Instead of informational motives, minority influence may sometimes stem from the normative motivations associated with pressures to innovate. When social norms support innovation, people are likely to favorably evaluate unique, creative ideas (Moscovici, 1985). Especially in decision-making contexts, minority task solutions and strategies are likely to appear innovative and to pose minimal threat to recipients' understanding of social reality or to valued social identities. Similarly, in social influence contexts in which people expect a range and diversity of opinions, being in the minority may be evaluated positively, as with exclusive tastes in clothing or the arts (Maass, Volpato, & Micucci-Faina, 1995). These innovative contexts in which minorities possess a positive identity, can be contrasted to the standard social influence experiment, in which recipients tend to be concerned with validating their views and minority positions seem deviant and unacceptable (Wood et al., 1994).

The idea that minorities can stimulate innovation formed the basis for Nemeth's (1986) work on group decision making and
Minorities are likely to instigate creative analysis and problem generation to the extent that they model “courage” and innovation in problem solution (Cranor, 1991; Nemeth & Chiles, 1986). Innovative minorities in their analysis and problem generation are especially likely to increase consideration of a wide range of positions and perspectives, although they may have little effect on the overall level of message-relevant thought (Maass, West, & Caldwell, 1987; Nemeth, 1986). Whether innovative appearing minorities generate shifts toward the advocated position is less clear. Moscovici and Lage (1978) provided participants with (false) feedback indicating that they were creative, thereby presumably enhancing the extent to which they valued innovation; as a result, participants demonstrated significant direct agreement with minority sources. However, creative minorities are likely to be motivated to be innovative and creative in their own judgments, judgment shifts will not necessarily be in the direction of the minority position, and minority views may be rejected as invalid, especially if reviewers are not represented in the minority appeal (Nemeth, 1986).

Some group identities do appear to be linked to informational motives. In task-performing groups, in which members are motivated to achieve group goals, influence may be regulated by members’ beliefs about how they compare to the best group-level outcomes. This idea has been used to explain Bales’s (1953) research findings on participation rates and influence in small ad hoc discussion groups. Bales noted that even though his groups were composed of highly similar members, steady status hierarchies emerged, with some members reliably contributing to the group task and influencing others at an especially high rate. These status hierarchies are thought to develop from the performance expectations members form about their own and others’ likely value to the group, based on initial task contributions, presentional style, and personal attributes (Berger, Fiske, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977; Ridgway, 1984; Webster & Foschi, 1988).

Although normative goals such as acquisition of personal status may also regulate influence in task groups (e.g., Ridgway & Diekmann, 1989), it is thought to be in the rational self-interest of each member to defer to others on the basis of relative expectations for performance, so that the group may generate higher rewards for all members through greater success at the task (Berger et al., 1977). As a result, the task contributions of high-expectations group members receive more careful consideration and attention from others, are evaluated more favorably, and are more influential than the ideas of less competent members. I suspect that the processes through which influence occurs in task groups vary with the extent to which members adopt validity-seeking motives. In real-world group interactions, a large amount of information is available about other group members, intergroup interaction procedures and possible task solutions. When group members are only moderately motivated by group goals, or when the task is especially ambiguous or difficult, the members will not be motivated or able to verify the accuracy of solutions. They are then likely to rely on relatively efficient strategies, using others’ and their own performance expectations as a guide to accepting influence. However, when group members are highly motivated to achieve the best performance outcome, and when solution accuracy can be verified, the members will be more willing to conduct more effortful, cognitively demanding analyses of relevant information in order to identify others’ highly motivated, highly validated sources. 

Empirical evidence of the effects of accuracy motivation on social influence was recently provided by Baron, Vandeloo, and Brunstman’s (1996) adaptation of Ashby’s (1952) classical line-judging conformity paradigm. Although Baron et al. (1996) manipulated individual and group accuracy motivation, their study provides insight into the effects of validity seeking in group contexts. Participants estimated the length of a series of lines after hearing other participants, who were actually experimental confederates, give wrong answers to the task. Participants’ accuracy motivation was increased in some conditions by stressing the importance of the task and offering monetary incentives to participants for correct answers. The results replicated those of Ashby’s earlier research. Participants who were not highly motivated to perform well were moderately influenced by confederates’ incorrect estimates, regardless of whether participants had the opportunity to inspect the lines and determine the correct answer themselves. In contrast, participants who were strongly motivated to be accurate processed others’ responses more carefully. When they had an extensive opportunity to view the stimuli and could verify the correct solution, they were relatively unaffected by others’ judgments. When judgments were presented too briefly for them to identify the correct answer clearly, they conformed markedly to others’ suggestions. Surprisingly, however, groups members are not easily able to verify the quality of suggestions. Consequently, when others’ judgments are the best solution, and when valid information, they are likely to have a strong impact even when the group task is highly important. This high motivation to achieve the best performance answer should encourage group members to rely on all available information about
solution validity, including others’ suggestions and their own analysis of the issue, to decide whether to accept or reject the solutions others propose.

INFORMATIONAL VERSUS NORMATIVE MOTIVATIONS ESTABLISHED BY GROUP IDENTITY

According to social identity theory, informational and normative motives instigated by group identity are not separable, but are intricably linked aspects of the search for a valid understanding of reality congruent with one’s social identity (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1991; Turner et al., 1994). In this view, people use the normative standards of relevant reference groups to determine the validity and cogency of information. Consequently, validity-seeking and normative motives are interdependent. In a strong statement of this position, Turner (1991) argued that for self-categorization theory, “the distinction between normative and informational influence is replaced by the idea that the basic influence process is one where the normative influence of people categorized as similar to self tends to be subjectively accepted as valid” (p. 171).

It would be difficult to argue with the conclusion that assessments of the validity of information ultimately rest on social consensus. This insightful insight has often been overlooked in research on message-based persuasion, which has treated validity as an intrinsic attribute of information that can be evaluated outside of social norms (see a related criticism by Moscovici, 1980). The social identity perspective, in conjunction with theories of individual information processing, provides a useful framework for identifying the social determinants of validity. Specifically, assertions supported by consensus are more likely to be perceived as valid to the extent that (1) people value the relevant social group or collective ideology; (2) the consensus was established through the convergence of independent rather than dependent views; and (3) the consensus position is validated by an individual’s own cognitive processing (Mackie & Skelly, 1994; Asch, 1952) similarly stressed individual information processing in his analysis of the contingencies under which consensus suggests validity (see Levine, 1996). In his words, a consensus response is valid only if “each individual has the opportunity to question the veracity of their attitude statements and can yield unstable, transitory judgments. From this perspective of predicting and understanding social influence, however, there is good reason to maintain the distinction between informational and normative influences. Quite simply, in everyday influence contexts, people’s responses vary as they are motivated by social groups to achieve the informational goal of a valid or normative opinion or the normative goal of receiving a valued outcome or establishing a desired identity. To the extent that groups instigate these different motives, theories of social influence must also differentiate between these orientations.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INFLUENCE

The present perspective counters the popular assumption in social influence research that normative and informational shifts in attitudes that are apparent primarily on public measures of change, and that informational shifts are more enduring than those that are apparent on both public and private measures. Indeed, one of the striking findings from the literature on minority influence is that the normative motivations to agree with positively valued majorities and to disagree with negatively valued majorities affect both public attitude statements and private attitude judgments (Wood et al., 1994). Uniformity across public and private measures of agreement is also anticipated by self-categorization approaches to social influence (Turner, 1991).

Maintenance of attitude judgments across settings and types of attitude measures is most likely to emerge when recipients are sufficiently motivated to conduct a careful, thoughtful analysis of the (self-, others-, or issue-related) information relevant to the motivational goal, and when the goal continues to hold value across settings and measures. Stability in attitude judgments across public and private settings also can emerge from a variety of other processes, including people’s after-the-fact interpretation of their publicly expressed attitudes. For example, people may internalize and privately accept their public-stated views through self-perception (Bem, 1972) and through cognitive-dissonance processes (Festinger, 1957). However, after-the-fact interpretations can also lead people to question the veracity of their attitude statements and can yield unstable, transitory judgments.

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INFORMATION PROCESSING

The overarching theme of this chapter is that a variety of motivations can be instigated by social groups to direct attitude processes. The group identities of source and recipients direct social influence by motivating recipients to be concerned with the outcomes provided by others; with their own self-definitions; and
with the adoption of accurate, valid positions. People hold self-motivated attitudes because these judgments help them achieve desired interpersonal outcomes in a given social context. They hold self-defining attitudes because these views are consistent with material self-interests or with important aspects of their self-definition. People hold accuracy-motivated attitudes because these judgments reflect the "objective" truth on an issue or the most valid approach to a problem. Understanding the motivations instigated by social groups is important because it provides insight into the manner in which people process relevant information. When people are only moderately motivated by one of these goals, their processing strategies are likely to be governed by efficacy concerns, and they may use heuristic rules or other economical strategies to evaluate the influence appeal (Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996; Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996). As a result, the expressed attitudes are likely to be transitory and tied to specific contexts, interaction partners, or short-term social identities. To the extent that any motivation increases the desired levels of judgmental confidence or decreases actual judgmental confidence, it should increase the effectiveness of information processing (Chaiken et al., 1989). When desired confidence is especially high, people presumably conduct a more careful, thoughtful analysis of the relevant information. Moreover, any shifts in confidence and judgment are likely to be relatively stable, reflecting enduring change. Note that these various types of processing are not necessary or mutually exclusive; when individuals are motivated to conduct a careful, thoughtful analysis, they are also likely to simultaneously pursue more efficient strategies, such as heuristic rules. The conclusions reached through one type of judgment or decision are likely to influence the conclusions reached through other analyses, or they may have no impact on each other (Chaiken et al., 1989). Understanding the motivations instigated by groups is important because people's motivations focus their processing on goal-relevant thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. People motivated to attain positive and avoid negative outcomes provided by others are likely to focus on the social consequences of their attitudes and to adopt positions most likely to yield the desired result (e.g., more favorably evaluating potential spouses than yielding punishment). People motivated by self-related concerns to identify with positively valued social groups and to differentiate themselves from derogated groups are likely to process information in a manner that allows them to achieve these normative goals (e.g., more favorably evaluating positions taken by valued than by derogated groups). People motivated by validity seeking are likely to process information in a way that they believe will yield an accurate judgment (e.g., more favorably evaluating cogent than spurious positions). I speculate also that normative and information-motivational affects how judgments are represented in memory. When normative concerns based on interpersonal outcomes are salient, and attitudes are generated in response to the rewards and punishments that a group can deliver, attitudes are likely to be represented in memory as part of achieving interpersonal goals and to be endorsed as long as these outcomes remain salient and retain their value. When self-related normative concerns are salient, and attitudes are generated in response to the implications of social group positions for recipients' identity, attitudes are likely to be represented in memory as part of the self-concept and to be endorsed as long as this self-view is salient and valued. In contrast, when a validity-seeking motivation is primary, and attitudes are generated in response to the cogency of information, attitudes are more likely to be embedded in cognitive structures related to the attitude object itself or the broader values tied to it, and maintenance of the relevant attitude will depend on the accessibility of these structures. 

relevance paradigms

The single motivational theme of accuracy seeking has predominated in the history of message-based persuasion research. Persuasion researchers have devised a variety of measures to identify the extent to which participants are motivated by accuracy concerns, and they have elegantly documented the effects of this motive on information processing (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Social influence paradigms have the advantage of considering a broader range of possible motivations, including (self- and other-related) normative concerns along with validity seeking. Unfortunately, the research methods in social influence paradigms typically have not matched the sophistication of this dual-motive scheme. The central variables of interest have usually not been assessed directly; only rarely have researchers assessed the motives instigated in the influence setting or the information-processing mechanisms through which these motives yield influence and resistance.

A call for measures to distinguish among the variety of motives established by source group identity seems like yet another tiresome reminder of the need for manipulation checks in experimental research. The lack of standard procedures to assess the meaning of source group identity is, however, a real problem that hinders cumulative integration of social influence research findings (see also Leventhal & Russo, 1985). Indeed, to explain the outcomes of a number of studies, I have often been forced in the present review to speculate about the motivation established by source groups.

It may be argued that measures of the goals established by source group identity are not always necessary to predict influence and other group behaviors. In Tajfel's minimal-group paradigm, for example, the generic perception of oneness-as-group-member emerges with the categorization processes involved in differentiating people into groups. In this research, ingroup and outgroup identities can be formed from merely dividing people into groups based on trivial criteria or random assignment (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel & Billig, 1974; Rubie & Howitt, 1969). Tajfel (1982) maintained, however, that group identity involves more than simple categorization. Supposedly it depends on personal identification with the group (i.e., knowledge of group membership, along with the value and emotional significance of that membership) and on the external, social definition of the group or category. In support, research that has obtained participants' ratings of their identification with a group has revealed the usefulness of such ratings, demonstrating, for example, that discrimination toward outgroups occurs primarily among participants who personally identify with their ingroup (e.g., Gagnon & Bourhis, 1996).

In research on minority influence, the assumption that a source's minority status elicits a standard cognitive representation for recipients has similarly discouraged checks on the motivations established by the minority identity. Moskovitz (1996) makes a similar point, arguing that the standard definition of a "minority" in numerical terms (e.g., the percentage of a population that holds a deviant opinion) has led researchers to ignore the prior expectancies, attributional bases, and needs for a positive social identity that guide processing of appeals from minority social groups. Whatever the reason for disregarding the nature of minority identity, it is now clear that "minority" refers to a heterogeneous category. Indeed, the Wood et al. (1994) review revealed that different types of minorities yielded characteristically different influence effects. Studies in which the source was a member of a minority social group (e.g., civil libertarians) appeared to generate the standard pattern of greater impact for direct agreement, presumably because recipients were motivated to differentiate themselves from the source on direct and indirect grounds. However, studies in which the minority source held positions endorsed by a small percentage of the population yielded no systematic influence effects, presumably because this source identity established no clear motivation for recipients.
A variety of strategies can be used to assess group-related motivations, although most of them have been designed to help resolve the task of identifying self-related normative motives established by groups. Ratings of the extent to which respondents identify with a group have proved to be effective measures of a group's self-related importance (e.g., Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Hogg & Hains, 1996; Pool et al., 1998; Wood et al., 1996). The self-related impact of a group potentially can also be assessed through more objective measures, such as the frequency with which participants engage in group activities. Similarly, in research on other-related motives, assessments of the extent to which participants are concerned about attaining positive outcomes and avoiding negative outcomes should be useful in predicting the extent to which the groups that deliver these outcomes are likely to exert influence. Direct assessment or manipulation of the group attributes that instigate these motives may also be useful, such as the actual abilities of the group to deliver rewards and punishments (e.g., group resources and immediate). It is unlikely, however, that validity-seeking motives instigated by groups can be assessed through self-report measures of the importance of achieving a valid, accurate judgment. Most people believe that their judgments are valid, regardless of the extent to which they are motivated by validity-seeking (or other concerns), and such ratings may be uniformly high. Instead, researchers may want to manipulate a feature of the group that instigates valid motives, and to assess perceptions of that feature. For example, validity-seeking motives may be enhanced through incentives for accurate group performance.

CONCLUSION
The approach to social influence taken in this chapter builds on the informational mechanisms described earlier in the book: models of persuasion (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and includes the broad range of informational and social motives instigated by group identity (Kelley, 1952). When motivated by normative concern, individuals may choose to obtain favorable outcomes provided by others and to avoid unfavorable ones, and they try to maintain and bolster a coherent, positive self-view. When motivated to achieve informational goals, people try to identify a valid, accurate position. These motives affect people's judgments about the source and the influence appeal. Motives direct attention to relevant information, instigate favorable evaluation of information that meets people's goals, and direct the organization and retrieval of judgment-relevant information in memory.

Given the content of the appeal in social influence paradigms is typically less rich and provides less information than that in persuasion studies, information processing has unique features in influence contexts. In addition to attention, evaluation, organization, and retrieval, groups direct interpretation of attitude issues. In daily life, the interpretative framework provided by valued groups determines, for example, whether abortion is murder or a woman's right to choose, and whether capital punishment represents justified retribution or a crime deterrent, or inhumane treatment. The other-provided outcomes, social identity concerns, or informational goals that motivate people to adopt or reject a group's position work by guiding people about the issue, including the way they interpret what the issue means.

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NOTES
1. Indirect measures assess change in attitudes without recipients' awareness of their responses' indication or rejection of the advocated position. For example, the source may advocate that corporations are primarily responsible for pollution, and an indirect measure of acceptance of this position may be recipients' disagreement with the idea that individuals are primarily responsible for pollution.
2. Presumably, members accord heightened performance expectations typically provide better-quality, more accurate suggestions than lower-expectation members, and for suggesting that measures serve as a reliable heuristic to the relative validity of each member's contributions. However, performance expectations are not guaranteed of the group's quality of social influence or of any member's ideas. For example, expectations that are based on group norms or social desirability that are not tied to actual task competence (e.g., social stereotypes that a member's performance at many tasks above women's are likely to be poor indicators of members' actual task contributions, and reliance on such expectations will not maximize group performance.

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The Social Contingency Model

IDENTIFYING EMPIRICAL AND NORMATIVE BOUNDARY CONDITIONS ON THE ERROR-AND-BIAS PORTRAIT OF HUMAN NATURE

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About 20 years ago, the first author of this chapter began his first study of accountability—although he did not categorize it as such at the time. Levi and Tetlock (1980) were interested in constructing cognitive maps of the Japanese decision to go to war with the United States in 1941. They quite accidentally discovered that the cognitive maps of Japanese decision making looked different, depending on whether they constructed those maps from the verbatim deliberations of the Liaison conferences (at which military leaders actually made policy decisions) or from the Imperial conferences (at which those same leaders justified their decisions before the Emperor and his advisors). By the fall of 1941, there was relatively little tolerance in the Liaison conferences for dissenters who wanted to avoid military confrontation with the United States; there was accordingly little need to anticipate such objections and to incorporate them into the group’s shared assessment of Japan’s geopolitical predicament. The Emperor and his key advisors, however, were known to be skeptical about the wisdom of attacking a country with a vastly larger economy. When the military leaders came before this high-status audience, they went to considerable lengths to demonstrate that they had thought through all the alternatives, weighed the pertinent tradeoffs, and worked through the necessary contingency plans. As a result, the cognitive maps in the Imperial conferences were considerably more complex—with more references to interactive causation and tradeoffs—than were the cognitive maps derived from the Liaison conferences. In the spirit of this volume, we might say that a dual-process model fits these two levels of the Japanese decision-making process.

This chapter examines the evolution of research on the impact of accountability on judgment and choice over the last 20 years. The story to be told is one of progressive “complexification,” in which temptingly parsimonious hypotheses have been repeatedly confounded by recalcitrant complex patterns of evidence. One example is the pure-impression-management model of how people cope with accountability. This model gained empirical sustenance from findings that people often respond to pressures to justify their