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THE CANADIAN NATIONAL ENERGY PROGRAM AND ITS AFTERMATH: PERSPECTIVES ON AN ERA OF CONFRONTATION

Patrick James and Robert Michelin

Almost a decade ago, the Liberal government proposed one of the most controversial policies in Canadian history, the National Energy Program (NEP). The Program occupied a central position in the budget presented to the House of Commons by Finance Minister Alan MacEachen on 28 October 1980. Consisting of a series of proposals directed toward the energy sector of the economy, the NEP quickly became the focus of a bitter political debate. It is not difficult to understand why. The politics of energy incorporate economic and social issues which fundamentally affect society. "Those who control a scarce and necessary resource," as Hooker (1981: 6) observed, "control the society which depends on it." In fact, energy politics ultimately raised constitutional issues and focused attention on competing visions of the future of Canada.

Although the literature generated by the NEP and its aftermath is vast, certain aspects of this important public policy remain unexplored. Specifically, the phase of confrontation from October 1980 to the 1981 Canada-Alberta Agreement might be dealt with in more rigorous terms, in order to obtain greater understanding of the policy process. Thus the overall purpose of this study is to identify the essential character of the intense conflict over energy policy at the outset of the decade.

How Public Policy Is Made: Three Schools of Thought

Theories of the state have power . . . they can be used to interpret the causes and potential consequences of political, legislative or administrative acts." Put forth by Alford and Friedland (1985: 388), this observation implies that the origin, development and implementation of public policy depend on the role of the state in civil society. Theories differ on how the authoritative actions of the state, which are manifested through public policy decisions, should be interpreted. These frameworks of analysis also posit different causal mechanisms for decisions, actions and the overall political process in a given environment.

Students of comparative politics have developed a wide range of analytical approaches toward the exercise and distribution of power in the contemporary polity. With respect to Canadian public policy, it is possible to identify at least three such perspectives: pluralism, state autonomy and Marxism. These theories can be described as different functionalist approaches toward the interpretation of public policy. In functional terms, policy outcomes represent causal structures which tend to maintain some pattern of social interaction. The three options to
be considered are relatively exhaustive in that sense: pluralism interprets the emergence of policy as a response to an extensive variety of groups. Marxism regards public policy as reinforcement of a power configuration favoring a single group within capitalist society, the bourgeois class. Finally, state autonomy considers policy to be a product of the state as an organization, expecting outcomes to reflect the preferences of government officials, as opposed to a process of bargaining among societal groups or the dictates of any one group.

It might be argued that other approaches should be incorporated in studying the state, society and public policy. For example, Hall (1986: 8-13, 17-20) has identified cultural analysis, rational choice and the institutionalist approach as further paradigms for political analysis. However, these perspectives are not excluded from the approaches that will be considered. Cultural factors naturally arise in the discussion of pluralism, given that the configuration of interest groups is different from one polity to the next, while rational choice is not logically inconsistent with either a group- or a state-centered analysis of public policy.* As for the last approach, dealing effectively with bargaining among state and societal actors entails a grasp of the institutional context.

Pluralism, Marxism and state autonomy—the conventional options among students of comparative politics—will be applied to what has been described as a crisis phase of decision making in the field of energy policy. This objective will entail an initial description of the crisis era, from the NEP to the Canada-Alberta Agreement of 1981.

The NEP and Its Aftermath

Although it raised constitutional, regional and other issues, the initial version of the NEP in 1980 consisted of three superficially straightforward priorities. First, the Liberal government announced that it intended to ensure a safe supply of energy by eventually making Canada independent from oil imports. Against the backdrop of the Iranian revolution and other international tensions, this item found a natural position on the policy agenda. Second, and also consistent with concerns about national autonomy, the Program aimed at increasing the opportunity for Canadian participation in the petroleum industry. The third priority was to establish a reasonable degree of fairness in energy costs and benefits for all Canadians through adequate pricing and revenue-sharing arrangements. According to the Program, “the government of Canada has a legitimate claim to a share of the energy revenues, to support its energy initiatives, and its broad economic management responsibilities—to cushion individual Canadians from the adverse economic effects, to facilitate industrial adjustment, and to see that fair play is done” (Energy, Mines and Resources, 1980: 14).

Specific provisions within the NEP reveal the interconnectedness of the preceding objectives. The Program proposed that the production of oil and natural gas be at least 50% Canadian-owned by 1990, that Canada control a significant number of the larger oil and gas firms, and that there be an early increase in the proportion of the oil and gas sector owned by the federal government. Through these initiatives, the federal government believed it could ensure a self-sufficient energy supply for Canada in a world which had seen the
price of oil skyrocket due to the machinations of the international oil cartel, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In 1980 the price of a barrel of imported crude oil reached $38, representing an increase of approximately 1200% over the 1970 price. Furthermore, every western, industrialized government believed that the trend would continue and that, by the end of the 1980s, a barrel of oil would cost $80 or $90 (Waverman, 1986: 45). Thus the NEP was meant to enable Canada to avoid the grave economic and social problems that such price increases could produce.

Security, “Canadianization” and distributive justice are brought together in the text of the Program:

The government of Canada believes that energy should not be a problem. On the contrary, it can be a major factor in the solution to our broader challenges, if Canada has a program to provide Canadians with energy security, the opportunity to participate in energy development and fairness in the manner in which the benefits of the nation’s rich resources are shared.

The NEP is designed to achieve these goals. (Energy, Mines and Resources, 1980: 22)

The components of the NEP clearly amounted to more than a broad outline for policy in one sector of the economy. The Program had serious implications for how the Canadian state would interact with other elements of civil society. In the words of one observer, the NEP constituted the “most significant act of governmental intervention in the Canadian economy since the Second World War” (Laxer, 1983: 74).

Viewed in economic terms, the NEP included a series of comprehensive and detailed measures concerning the pricing of oil and natural gas, incentives for producers, revenue-sharing among provinces and taxation of energy firms. The specifics of these aspects of the NEP made it a very controversial proposal; for Alberta and the other producing provinces the NEP entailed more than government intervention, no matter how significant. To Alberta in particular, the federal budget represented a blatant effort by Ottawa to seize control of a sector of the economy over which the provinces had presumed constitutional jurisdiction. Alberta Energy Minister Mervin Leitch described the budget as “a massive and discriminatory attack on Alberta” and asserted that it had “created a confrontation between the federal government and ourselves” (Globe and Mail, 30 October 1980: 1). Premier Peter Lougheed labelled the new Liberal budget an “outright attempt to take over the resources of this province” (Globe and Mail, 1 November 1980: 14).

Alberta’s response reflected supreme displeasure with, if not surprise at, the path of economic development chosen by Ottawa. Premier Lougheed had warned in April that such action by Ottawa would have serious consequences: “Any unilateral action taken by the federal government—particularly one by a federal government that’s been rejected by Western Canada—will be resisted by our citizens in the strongest and most determined ways” (Doern and Toner, 1985: 266).

On 30 October 1980, Lougheed announced Alberta’s practical response to the NEP, a three-pronged retaliation against the perceived highhandedness of the federal Liberals. First, Alberta vowed to reduce conventional oil shipments to
eastern Canada, envisioning a series of three 5% cutbacks in production (i.e., a total of 180,000 barrels of oil per day) over a nine-month period. Scheduled to begin on 1 March 1981, the cutbacks would continue until Ottawa had acknowledged Alberta’s position and promised to resume negotiations for a more equitable arrangement on energy-pricing and revenue-sharing. The Alberta government also promised to cancel the cutbacks if shortages occurred in other Canadian provinces, but warned that shortages created artificially by the federal government would be ignored (Globe and Mail, 1 November 1980: 14).

Alberta’s second form of retaliation meant withholding provincial approval for the Alsands and Cold Lake oil sands projects. Alberta saw this as important leverage, because the federal government’s drive for Canadianization required these projects to supply 20% of Canada’s oil by 1990 (Doern and Toner, 1985: 272).

Challenging the NEP in the courts constituted the third phase of retaliation. Alberta disputed the constitutionality of the Natural Gas and Gas Liquids Tax (NGGLT) included in the Program. The provincial government saw this tax on exports of provincially owned natural gas and others (such as the Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax or PGRT) as amounting to federal royalties on its resources (Pollard, 1986: 166). Thus the Lougheed regime believed that it had a strong court case which would see the federal taxation scheme declared unconstitutional.

Speaking more generally, Alberta wanted to portray the federal energy policy as an illegitimate attempt to subvert the political autonomy and undermine the economic development of the energy-producing provinces. This effort involved linking the budget and the NEP with the constitutional proposals of the Trudeau government, depicting these initiatives within a larger scheme to seize control of provincial resources. Thus Alberta hoped to rally the producing provinces against the federal government, accusing the latter of attempting to use the Program to transform permanently—and unilaterally—Canadian federalism.

Commentaries following the announcement of the Program verified the severity of Alberta’s response. While describing Ottawa as the architect of the situation, an editorial in the Globe and Mail (31 October 1980: 9) asserted that Alberta’s retaliation had “created the expected political and constitutional crisis which says to the federal government you cannot ignore us anymore.” But the intensity of the response did not guarantee its effectiveness; in fact, Pollard (1986: 166) has argued that the intergovernmental dispute created domestic instability during a soft period in the international market. Canada remained well supplied with oil and the economy did not suffer unduly because of Alberta’s cutbacks. Furthermore, the federal government scored propaganda points at Alberta’s expense by imposing the so-called “Lougheed Levy” on consumers to pay for additional oil imports (Doern and Toner, 1985: 273).

According to Helliwell and McRae (1981: 20), the province of Alberta gradually suffered more from the stalemate. Production cutbacks and delays in the oil sands projects led to reduced revenues and employment. Through the spring and summer of 1981, the federal government seemed to be coping quite well with the situation while the economy of Alberta floundered. Thus the
Alberta premier eventually went back to the bargaining table to seek an end to the impasse.

After a six-day, marathon negotiating session, on 1 September 1981 representatives of the two governments unveiled a new energy accord. The Canada-Alberta Agreement recognized the need for a stable energy policy and, in the words of one observer, amounted to an "agreement formed out of necessity" (Pollard, 1986: 167). The accord substantially revised the energy-pricing and revenue-sharing regimes established by the NEP. "If the main concession on the part of the federal government was pricing," according to one research team, "the main concession on the part of the producing provinces was the implicit recognition of Ottawa's right to its special energy taxes" (Helliwell et al., 1986: 344).

With respect to energy pricing, the Agreement created a two-tiered system to govern oil prices through 31 December 1986. One price schedule pertained to conventionally produced oil from existing fields (oil recovered from sources discovered before 1 January 1981) and another covered production from conventional fields, enhanced recovery schemes, oil sands plants and frontier oil from 1 January 1981 onward. According to the Agreement, the price of conventional, "old" oil would not be allowed to exceed 75% of the international price, while "new" oil would be priced according to its full world market value. The pricing changes would come into effect through regularly scheduled increases in the price of oil up to anticipated ceilings. Natural gas pricing also changed; every six months, beginning 1 February 1982, the price would increase by $0.25/mcf.

In the realm of revenue-sharing, the federal government agreed to withdraw its contentious NGGLT on 1 October 1981. Alberta, in return, agreed to an increase in the federal PGRT from 8% to 16% and the introduction of a 50% federal tax on incremental oil revenues (IORT). Both sides also agreed to work for the immediate start-up of oil sands projects and Alberta obtained jurisdiction over the funding and administration of the Petroleum Incentive Program (PIP) within its borders. Alberta thus maintained provincial control over exploration in the province (Doern and Toner, 1985: 274).

With the 1981 accord, the confrontation phase of federal-Alberta relations over energy policy drew to a close. Both sides made concessions in order to allow the province to protect its jurisdiction over resources and the federal government to extend Canadianization and establish a claim to some input into resource management. A Globe and Mail editorial (25 September 1981: 6) described this point of termination: "The country itself, as a federal system, is the clear winner in the case of the principles set by this Agreement and underlined by Mr. Lougheed, that energy policy in Canada is not the concern of Ottawa alone, but must be worked out with the full participation, by right, of the producing provinces."

Having described the crisis phase in Canadian energy politics, one may evaluate that period in the context of the three models of public policy. What follows is an examination of the NEP and its aftermath along the lines established by pluralism, state autonomy and Marxism, respectively.
Three Perspectives on a Phase of Confrontation

Pluralism

According to this approach, policy outcomes result from competition among interests attempting to have their demands responded to by the state. Thus the role of the state is that of an umpire, regulating the activities of interest groups through the creation and safeguarding of formal rules. Such an environment, consisting of state-monitored bargaining among interests, has been described as “polyarchy” by Dahl and Lindblom (cited in Manley, 1983: 369). According to Dahl and Lindblom, a successful polyarchical system will tame power and minimize coercion by the state. These traits suggest that, in the long run, the consent of all citizens is promoted, along with the peaceful settlement of conflicts to the benefit of most contending parties (Dahl, 1967: 24). To Dahl and Lindblom, among others (including most politicians), pluralism is beneficial to the polity because it emphasizes consensus within a system characterized by evolutionary change. The most salient alternative—intense conflict among interests competing to implement radical, fast-paced reforms—is far less attractive.

For pluralists, the behavior of individuals is important only as manifested in aggregate form. The primacy of groups in pluralist philosophy originated with Bentley's (1967, 1907) answer to and critique of Marx’s class-based analysis. He argued that, even when the proletariat did seem to unite, it did so on the basis of shared interests that were not class-oriented. Truman (1951) complemented his arguments, claiming that, although some groups possess class characteristics, political attitudes generally do not coincide with class divisions. Truman argued that interests enter the political arena when individuals coalesce around a given issue and combine resources in group form in order to maximize the likelihood of having their demands met.

Pluralists believe that just about everyone has resources which can be combined with those of others in order to obtain some degree of access to the demand-bargaining process. This notion elicited a considerable amount of criticism in the 1960s and 1970s. For many citizens, the reality of economic and political life in the United States, where pluralist thought had developed and flourished, did not adhere to the basic tenets of the doctrine. Critics argued that a well-established hierarchy of groups effectively denied access to the political system by groups which had lower levels of the resources (such as financing and organization) needed to achieve their goals (Lowi, 1979: 57).

Manley (1983), to cite one example, has attempted to answer the critics of pluralist theory. He suggested that a new and fundamentally different type of pluralism has developed. Manley’s Pluralism II or neo-pluralism, as opposed to Pluralism I or naive pluralism, responds to the severe criticism of the system’s performance and the need for major structural changes in the economic order, such as more government control. At the same time, it advocates social pluralism as necessary for democracy and denies the special importance of class (Manley, 1983: 377).

Pluralism II asserts the public nature of the economy and redefines the private enterprise system to include substantial redistribution of income without
replacing the primacy of groups with class. It recognizes that, under Pluralism I, economic inequality often led to political inequality. Furthermore, although the right to participate in the system may exist *de jure*, the opportunity is not present *de facto* for everyone. Pluralism II therefore stands as an acknowledgement that, although groups are still the structure by which interests are presented in the political arena, not all groups are equal. Different capabilities adversely affect the potential for symmetry among those who seek to participate in the system; hence the need for government intervention (Manley, 1983: 378). Of course, a further criticism might be that the state will not play the role of an impartial adjudicator of interests.

According to the pluralist perspective, the NEP emerged as a direct result of demands presented in the political arena by concerned groups. These aggregations, by inference, had enough interest in the issues in question to attempt to mobilize support. The government, therefore, responded to demands for recognition by different groups in society.

Pluralism also happens to form the basis of the argument put forth by the federal government in support of its policy. The government asserted that the goals outlined in the NEP responded to the demands of the overwhelming majority of the Canadian public and certain poll data from the period in which the Program was articulated support that claim. According to polls conducted just after announcement of the NEP in the budget of October 1980, 84% of Canadians favored an increase in the Canadianization of the energy industry, one of the major thrusts of the new energy policy. Stronger measures than those included in the new policy found favor with 61% of Canadians and 70% believed that the new policy would result in an increased number of jobs for Canadians (Foster, 1982: 32).

From a pluralist standpoint, it does not matter that no *formal* groups had organized to present demands. Since interests obviously had been recognized, resulting in demands being met, groups must have been there to present them. This view of the Program is supported by a top official of Petro-Canada: “The Canadian government, reflecting a mood of the Canadian people which has been concerned about foreign ownership for a long time, has expressed this concern in measures such as the Foreign Investment Review Agency and through the creation of Petro-Canada” (McNicholas, 1981: 121). Although FIRA and Petro-Canada had not been created under the auspices of the NEP, the proposed Program logically entailed use of these agencies (and others within the federal bureaucracy) in order to attain Canadianization.

Based on its overall goals, there is evidence to support the pluralist view that the Program emerged as a result of demands placed before the government by interests in Canadian society. What also can be argued is that, in actual initiatives suggested to attain those overall objectives, there is much less evidence that the NEP resulted from demands by societal interests. Even in the context of Pluralism II or neo-Pluralism, the NEP would be expected to emerge as a result of demands from a select, hierarchically arranged collection of groups. In the realm of energy politics these groups would include the major oil companies (multinational and Canadian) and other Canadian firms in the energy sector. Yet the existing process “excluded input from interested parties other than the
governments involved and, as a result, concerns of such groups have not been
adequately considered" (Carmichael and Stewart, 1983: 3).

According to Doern and Toner (1985: 206), the interests which would have
dominated the policy-making process under Pluralism II, while not necessarily
against the overall thrust of the NEP's objectives, completely opposed the
specific proposals designed to realize those goals. The multinationals, both as
individual firms and as a group represented by the Canadian Petroleum
Association (CPA), regarded the 25% Crown interest on energy revenues from
the Canada Lands as confiscatory. Doern and Toner (1985: 206) also have
claimed that the PIP, designed to provide incentives for exploration by using
federal revenues from oil and gas (but without the negative features of depletion
allowances), was considered discriminatory by the multinational firms. The latter
argued that the PIP favored Canadian companies. Furthermore, the
multinationals believed the goal of energy self-sufficiency to be impossible due
to the combination of increased taxes and controlled prices. Under such
conditions, the firms argued, no company could be expected to raise enough
capital for the exploration that self-sufficiency would demand.

Major Canadian companies also opposed the pricing and taxation features
of the NEP. Although in favor of increased Canadianization, they opposed the
features designed to implement that idea, such as changes in pricing, taxation and
administration of energy policy in the Canada Lands (Doern and Toner, 1985:
221). These changes included legislation designed to increase Canadian
involvement in development of the Canada Lands for energy purposes, a 10%
royalty to the federal government on revenue produced from those Lands and
a 25% Crown interest on every right leased in the Canada Lands. These policies
proved so upsetting to the president of Dome Petroleum, the largest of the
Canadian majors, that he described them as "Confiscation without
compensation" (Doern and Toner, 1985: 221).

Second-line Canadian firms and the Canadian juniors, the primary intended
beneficiaries of the NEP, expressed the same sentiments: favorable to the general
idea, but against specific measures. The second-line firms, as demarcated by
Doern and Toner, are those ranking below the Canadian majors in terms of
assets but large enough to make them significant actors in the energy sector. The
juniors are the hundreds of small, independent, Canadian-owned exploration
and production companies involved in the energy sector (Doern and Toner, 1985:
244).

Most of these firms disliked either the rigidity of the pricing system, or what
they considered excessive bureaucracy, or both. In the latter sense, the NEP
created a maze of organizations and programs. The COGLA (Canadian Oil and
Gas Lands Administration), the PIB (Petroleum Incentives Board), designed to
administer the PIP, and the NGB (Natural Gas Bank, the crown corporation set
up to finance Canadian companies which would benefit from the new pricing and
taxation changes) greatly complicated the operating environment. The new
agencies invaded domains in the economy that had been largely untouched by the
federal government. This tended not to threaten the areas of interest of more
established bureaucracies, which in the latter sense could have provoked the
interagency competition invariably associated with pluralism. In sum, the
massive influx of regulation generated hostility among the smaller firms. Doern
and Toner (1985: 241) concluded that "the reaction of the Canadian juniors surprised the federal government and perhaps did more than anything else initially to tarnish the credibility of the NEP."

Neither form of pluralism appears to provide an adequate explanation for the formulation and implementation of the energy program by the Liberal government in 1980. Pluralism I interprets support for the NEP as an indication that the policy emerged directly as a result of the government reacting to societal demands, in other words, to interests presented in group form. While some evidence seems to support that claim—providing that the causal arrow presumed by pluralism is the correct one—the overall thrust of the NEP does not. It is difficult to connect the measures within the NEP to societal demands. The attitudes toward these measures held by the most important groups suggests that policy options within the NEP did not emerge due to demands by special interests. Furthermore, Pluralism II, which claims that interest groups dominate policy making, fails to explain adequately the process which resulted in the NEP.

Perhaps even more striking in its implications for pluralism is the year of confrontation following institution of the NEP. The only response to the NEP that required federal attention emerged from another center of government. Interest groups looked on as a redistributive game within the state unfolded before them. A federal government intent on centralization confronted a provincial government fighting for control over resource-based revenues, with the latter retaliating against a perceived provocation in just two days. Even prominent interest groups, so central to Pluralism II, cannot be credited with affecting policy in such a short span of time. Furthermore, the two levels of government negotiated the eventual Agreement; evidence of other parties entering into the bargaining is scarce. In sum, the apparent lack of impact from interest groups in the aftermath of the NEP does not favor an interpretation based on pluralism.

State Autonomy

Unlike pluralism, which posits control over agencies by interest groups with resulting interagency conflict, state autonomy emphasizes the hierarchical ordering of state over society. In other words, agencies manipulate groups, not the reverse. Public policy can be seen as the result of the state acting as an autonomous entity which translates its preferences into authoritative actions (Nordlinger, 1981: 1). State autonomy collides directly with those who believe, as pluralists do, that elected and bureaucratic officials are constantly courting societal actors. Government officials are not seen as continuously looking for support from different institutions and elements in society before making decisions about public policy.

State autonomy emerged in response to certain perceived flaws in society-centered models. One of these presumed shortcomings is the unwillingness of the latter to acknowledge that the authoritative offices which make up the state are able and willing to act on their preferences. Another is the inability to recognize the potential weakness of even important societal actors, such as trade unions or business interests, when dealing with the inherent (i.e., legally sanctioned) powers of the democratic state (Nordlinger, 1981: 205).
Following exponents of the state autonomy model, the state is defined as the elected and appointed public officials who have the sole responsibility and authority to implement and administer public policy. According to Cairns (1986: 54) the primary task of the state is:

the creation and maintenance of internal order and the protection of its own territorial integrity in the international system. A related task is the integration of the regions, classes, lifestyles, generations and genders and other cleavages that always threaten to pull society apart, erode the sense of community and weaken the capacity for effective collective action.

Thus the state has a vested interest in reducing the centrifugal effects of multiple cleavages in society. The state autonomist approach asserts that a state goes about satisfying this interest by acting independently.

Autonomy is not to be inferred merely because a state has acted in its own interest; all states do that. For instance, a state may provide funding for a military establishment in order to protect itself from external threats and internal instability. Such a policy is seen as evidence of autonomous public policy making only under certain conditions. If a policy is formulated and implemented because it is preferred by public officials, despite the fact that the policy may run counter to the preferences of powerful societal groups, then that constitutes state autonomy. This latter term, to be more precise, refers to the translation of state preferences—the preference orderings of the individual public office holders in the various interacting organizations that make up the democratic state—into authoritative actions.

Nordlinger has distinguished among several types of state autonomy. His taxonomy is based upon the correspondence between state and societal preferences. When societal and state preferences diverge, Type I exists. This divergence may occur for several reasons. Public officials often have different criteria from those of societal actors when deciding on policy options. Politicians and civil servants are more likely to consider the practical aspects of the implementation and administration of a given policy in terms of economic and human resources.

Public officials also will be more inclined to think about the bureaucratic politics entailed by policy, along with the alternatives which must be rejected in order to implement the preferred option. This constraint is less salient to those outside of government. Those within the state also will be influenced by their social background, political socialization, education and training, all of which may vary from the societal norm.

Perhaps the most obvious source of divergence is the quest for security and influence within the machinery of government. As Anderson (1978: 35) has observed, "... the latent functions of politics are the capture and maintenance of power, the protection and advancement of self-interest, the preservation and expansion of institutions and offices." These private concerns are largely outside the realm of societal actors and the brokerage politics associated with pluralism.

When state and societal preferences diverge, public officials are neither pressured to translate the melange of societal preferences into public policy nor dissuaded by the threat of societal sanctions from acting on their own.
Consequently, under Type I conditions, elected and appointed officials will act according to their preferences. Along those lines, Skocpol (1985: 15) has observed that "autonomous state actions will regularly take forms that attempt to reinforce the authority, political longevity, and social control of state organizations whose incumbents generated the relevant policies or policy ideas."

Type II state autonomy describes those situations in which state and societal preferences diverge initially. Public officials then attempt to change societal preferences and, once successful, to translate the now-similar preferences into public policy (Nordlinger, 1981: 29).

In Type III state autonomy, state and societal preferences converge. However, it still is possible to argue that public officials act according to their preferences. Societal actors permit the state to assume a considerable amount of power through indifference, thus creating the opportunity for independent action by officials. Furthermore, deference and delegation of authority also facilitate autonomous formulation and implementation of policy. Societal actors may presume that public officials have expertise in a given area or at the very least are working towards the 'national interest.'

Naturally, those within the state work to reinforce such attitudes through what Nordlinger (1981: 74, 76) refers to as "autonomy-enhancing opportunities." These measures include limiting available information, making ambiguous or contradictory statements, publicizing successes, relating their decisions to the good of society, labelling divergent preferences as extremist or unpatriotic, exaggerating the seriousness of a situation, and reorganizing in order to give the impression of diligent, rational decision-making. In sum, Type III is intrinsic to the overall state autonomist approach because it suggests that, even when it appears that societal groups are directing the policy making process, in reality it still is controlled by actors within the state.

Some would suggest that not only the basic goals of the NEP, but also its specific measures, reflected the preferences of the state. To begin, the NEP constituted a set of policy decisions prepared by a small circle of policy makers. These individuals designed its provisions within a broad direction of policy set forth by Energy Minister Marc Lalonde. According to this line of reasoning, public officials responsible for energy policy provided the impetus for the NEP. Its policies did not respond to societal demands, but instead resulted from a bureaucratic consensus at the federal level that Ottawa had to regain the preeminent position in the energy debate vis-à-vis the producing provinces.

Doern and Toner (1985: 43) have commented on this aspect of the decision-making process which surrounded the NEP:

At the bureaucratic level there can be little doubt that E.M.R.'s [Energy, Mines, and Resources'] senior players, and senior Finance officials as well, were exasperated at the continuing deadlock with Alberta. This deadlock had already lasted well over a year and thus, given the deteriorating federal financial position on energy matters, some kind of decisive action was necessary.

Federal administrators, according to Doern and Toner, wanted policies which would establish Ottawa's primary position in energy policy and help regain some
of the authority and power lost to the provinces in that and other areas during the prior two decades. In support of that argument, Doern and Toner (1985: 487, 472) cite the high degree of concentration within the Cabinet on the matter of energy policy. Only three key Cabinet ministers participated to any degree in formulating the proposals contained in the NEP and no consultation occurred with the energy industry.

For the society-centered models, that is precisely the group expected to have input into the policy making process. The energy program of the Liberal government, however, took virtually no notice of the demands of energy-producing corporations. The NEP emerged almost entirely from within the government and the bureaucracy.

One of the tenets of the state autonomist perspective is that, in acting on their preferences, public officials reinterpret the role of the state in civil society in order to further their purposes. According to Carmichael and Stewart (1983: 46), this is exactly what occurred in the realm of energy politics under the Liberal government. They observed that the late 1970s “marked the ascendance of senior officials in EMR who believed expanded federal intervention in the energy sector was essential to the attainment of Ottawa's economic and political objectives.” Put differently, the NEP resulted from attitudes held by public officials in the federal bureaucracy toward the role of the government in civil society.

Foster (1982: 45), in a journalistic account, has further described how the NEP represented a reinterpretation of the rules governing the relationship of the state with other elements in civil society and a reevaluation of the role of public officials in that linkage:

Trudeau's new men were very different from the classical bureaucrat, a disinterested specialist operating from within a strict hierarchy and steering clear of political involvement; a man who received his policy mandate from above and then faithfully worked out the program for its implementation. The new elite were involved. They were innovative, they took risks, they bent the rules.

The NEP therefore must be viewed as the creation of public officials who worked according to certain beliefs about how policy should be formulated and implemented. Foster (1982: 46) sees that as a logical result of the incredible increase in the range and scope of government activity in the modern state: “Eventually, in an attempt to respond to so many demands, the government machine begins to develop an internal logic of its own.”

If the sheer number of bureaucratic agencies can be regarded as evidence about the state's capacity to act, then there is considerable evidence contained in the NEP to suggest that Ottawa wanted to increase its power. In order to Canadianize the energy industry, the NEP created a number of new agencies and expanded the role of several others. To administer the PIP, the NEP set up the PIB in order to help Canadian firms take advantage of inducements for exploration. Similarly, the NGB was established to help finance small Canadian firms. The National Energy Board obtained a broader mandate to regulate activity in the energy sector and protect Canadianization efforts, while FIRA received more leeway in protecting Canadian ownership of energy firms.
Other changes included a new agency to administer the development of the Canada Lands according to the legislation contained in the NEP. The role of Petro-Canada as a policy instrument of the federal government also increased. Finally, the Petroleum Monitoring Agency was created to advise Parliament and the Department of Energy, Mines, and Resources Parliament on the size, financial position and ownership of oil companies.

Ottawa designed all of these agencies to facilitate its activities. There is very little evidence to suggest that such bureaucracies had been desired by groups in civil society. In fact, the most well-organized and powerful interests in society opposed the role envisioned by the federal government for most of the new agencies. Thus it is not difficult to infer that the federal government acted according to its preferences in formulating and implementing the NEP.

Even the overall goal to Canadianize the energy industry, a part of the NEP supported by many among the Canadian public and to a certain extent by the groups representing the energy firms, indicated state autonomist policy making. According to Dobson (1981: 29), the apparent haste to Canadianize the energy industry suggested by the NEP did not reflect energy realities. She noted that, according to estimates from the Department of Energy, Mines, and Resources, Canadians already owned almost 40% of the assets of the petroleum industry in 1979. Dobson also asserted that the proportion had increased 10% since 1971 and, from 1975 to 1979, Canadian firms accounted for more than 50% of net capital outflow. Furthermore, in the late 1970s, the outflow of capital from foreign investment in the energy sector actually had diminished.

These figures led Dobson to conclude that the federal government “imposed” the NEP in lieu of an agreement between Ottawa and the producing provinces (Dobson, 1981: 12). It is a view shared by Doern and Toner (1985: 40): “When the Liberals took office, Marc Lalonde brought with him the basic features of the NEP.” These observations are consistent with the opinion of Premier Lougheed, who claimed after the NEP had been announced that the “Ottawa government has, without negotiation, without agreement, simply walked into our home and occupied the living room” (quoted in Toner and Bregha, 1984: 1).

Ottawa had on its side both legal precedent and the capacity to act. More specifically, a Supreme Court decision reached in 1978 had favorable implications for federal control over resources intended for export. The Court ruled against the province of Saskatchewan, which had tried to impose a marketing scheme for potash. According to Bushnell (1980: 314), the ruling meant that “provincial power did not extend to the control or regulation of the marketing of products in interprovincial or export trade, a proposition which has never been doubted since 1867.” With regard to implementation, Moore (1981: 239) made the following observations about Ottawa’s position: “the federal government now possesses all the constitutional powers it needs to win any contest with the provinces if negotiation and persuasion failed. Besides the general powers of disallowance of provincial government legislation, it has the very powerful weapon of the unrestricted power to tax.” The NEP therefore may be regarded as the product of a federal government with the motive and opportunity to act.
These arguments provide evidence for what has been described as Type I state autonomy. The preferences of Ottawa and prominent interest groups diverged and, without pressure to translate societal wishes into policy, public officials acted according to their preferences. It is difficult to find any evidence that the NEP emerged as the result of Type II state autonomy; there does not seem to have been much effort by Ottawa to change diverging preferences of groups prior to implementing policy. In short, Ottawa’s preferences and those of prominent groups still diverged over the NEP at the time of its announcement.

With regard to Type III state autonomy, there is some evidence that the federal government took advantage of autonomy-enhancing opportunities in the formulation of its energy program. For example, a good deal of societal support existed for the Canadianization aspects of the NEP. It could be argued that the federal government expanded that support by linking the NEP to the constitutional issue and, specifically, to popular aspects such as the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As Laxer (1983: 71) has suggested, for the “resurgent Liberals, the issue of energy policy could not be separated from the constitutional battle, which was nearing its climax.” The federal government, according to Laxer, coupled a controversial set of policies with some very popular initiatives. This is the very sort of strategy that is entailed by Type III state autonomy; the state uses its inherent powers to reinforce societal support for its preferences. The proposed policy thus gains legitimacy because it appears to have emerged as a result of societal pressure when, in fact, it resulted from a state-centered policy making process.

With regard to the year that followed announcement of the NEP, the evidence clearly favors state autonomy. Collective action by the oil and gas industries, consumers and other groups does not explain the subsequent process of bargaining. Instead, acting alone, Alberta retaliated against the federal government almost immediately, creating a deadlock that lasted nearly a full year. With its program of province-building in disarray, the Lougheed government eventually approached its federal rival and entered into bilateral negotiations. As indicated previously, these prominent events entailed action by governments, as opposed to logrolling among interest groups.10

**Marxonism**

Although there are seemingly infinite variations on Marxism, it is possible to identify some basic points of agreement. Marxists invariably assert that the exercise and distribution of power in capitalist societies are inherently linked to control over private property. Thus the basic unit of analysis is class and the only effective demand group is the economically dominant class. Individual behavior is important only insofar as individuals act as agents of conflicting classes. It is the adversarial relationship between these social classes upon which society is organized.

Marxists contend that the state is controlled by the dominant class in order to maintain the status quo: “the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Marx and Engels, quoted in Panitch, 1977: 3). Mahon (1977: 166), a theorist of Marxian political economy, has elaborated on this definition, asserting that the state acts as the
organizer of the hegemony of the bourgeoisie. On a similar note, Panitch (1977) outlined three functions of the state in capitalist society: maintain or create conditions under which profitable capital accumulation is possible, use force to help one class accumulate capital at the expense of others, and cloak its actions and maintain legitimacy.

One element of Marxism which merits special attention is its treatment of corporatism, the relationship among business, labor and government. To a pluralist, corporatist structures are evidence of ongoing bargaining among competing interests. By contrast, from the Marxist perspective, corporatism is merely a strategy pursued by capitalists when they cannot adequately subdue labor by preventing its combination and thereby allowing market processes to work (Crouch, 1979: 19). Thus business interests control capitalist society by coming to terms with autonomous elements and organizations in society which will never be dominated ideologically.

Marxists also point out that the dominant role of one class is enhanced by the fact that the elements working together to control society—the business community and public officials—possess shared values. These similar outlooks are explained by common backgrounds and experiences. Along the same lines, it is inevitable that interests also will be shared by those within the dominant class. For example, there are close ties between the elites of both business and government, manifested by interaction in terms of roles and jobs (Mahon, 1977: 174). This connection—it may even be called interchange—is an important factor in the ability of one class to make public policy and remain dominant in a capitalist society.

From a Marxist perspective, the NEP could be interpreted as a series of measures to enhance the power of the dominant class. The Program, in that sense, was designed to maintain control over the state by capitalists. Thus the ability of the elite to accumulate capital at the expense of other classes in civil society would be facilitated in an important sector of the economy. This interpretation of the NEP is verified by the extraordinary degree of government intervention entailed by the Program. Marxists would argue that, at any given time, the dominant economic class and the state are so closely connected that any involvement by the latter in the economy is intended solely to increase the power and influence of the former. Panitch (1977: 13) has described this relationship in the Canadian context as an "ideological hegemony emanating from both the bourgeoisie and the state which is awesome, which is reflected in the sheer pervasiveness of the view that the national interest and business interests are at one, and which certainly ensures the smooth functioning of the relationship between the state and the capitalist class." Thus he argues that the Canadian state is characterized by the "sheer depth of its commitment to private capital" (Panitch, 1977: 16). Panitch also suggests that there is a regional bias to the relationship between the state and the dominant class, because a long-term, quasi-colonial relationship exists between different regions of the country: "The guiding ideology and function of the Canadian state remained that of providing the basis for capital accumulation to facilitate national economic development with some discrimination in favour of central Canada in terms of the location of investment" (Panitch, 1977: 18).
For proponents of Marxist analysis, such as Panitch, the NEP must be seen as an effort to reinforce control of society by a dominant class. Pratt (1982: 29), for example, referred to the Program as “a major intervention by the Canadian state on behalf of Canadian capital as a whole.” He viewed it as a “regression” which pre-empted native land claims and placed too much power in the hands of a small group of civil servants.

There are, however, several problems with the Marxian perspective on the NEP. Marxists claim that the policies of the state are formulated in order to enhance the power of the dominant class, which primarily includes the interests of business. But the initiatives put forth by the Program directly contradicted those interests. In fact, the energy sector especially detested the policies of the Program and felt left out of the process leading up to its announcement. It is difficult to see how Marxist analysis can explain the emergence of the NEP in light of these stridently expressed attitudes on the part of the business community in the energy sector.

One way, perhaps, in which the Marxist perspective would attempt to cope with this paradoxical development is to suggest that, through the NEP, the government had favored the business interests of central Canada at the expense of those in the west (Pratt, 1982: 50). This explanation would fit neatly with the notion of a colonial relationship between the manufacturing-based economy of the center and the resource-based economy of the periphery. (Of course, such an argument also would undermine the assertion that business exists as a monolithic class.) However, the apparent bias can be explained more effectively. Several factors which have little to do with a quasi-colonial, exploitive relationship between the center and the periphery of Canada are relevant. The first is electoral politics. In 1980 the Liberal government achieved a majority government without winning any seats in the western, energy-producing provinces. The key to the victory had been the province of Ontario. Thus it is naive to expect that the Liberals deliberately would have formulated economic policies with the potential to alienate that region.\textsuperscript{12}

A more viable explanation for the apparent bias of the NEP towards central Canada focuses on the federal-provincial politics of the period, as opposed to regional economic relationships. For the federal government, the intransigence of the energy-producing provinces in general and Alberta in particular challenged the very nature of Canadian federalism. The NEP counteracted a trend that had seen the federal government lose power to the provinces in the 1960s and 1970s. It was one of a series of attempts at nation-building, with the more precise objective being to restore Ottawa's preeminent status in federal-provincial relations regarding energy policy. As Laxer (1983: 71) has observed: "In the Canada of René Lévesque and Peter Lougheed, Joe Clark's notion of the country as a 'community of communities' meant the end of federal paramountcy."

An alternative explanation for the NEP, following a Marxist line of argument, would be that the Liberals had tried to implement a policy with long-term value for Canadian capitalism, as opposed to short-range benefits for a specific group of entrepreneurs. If that scenario held true, enlightened business interests (however defined) would be expected to support the Program either at the time of its announcement or upon reflection at a later date. However,
criticism of the NEP came from all segments of the private sector, both in 1980 and years later.

As opposed to focusing on class interests, Harrison (1981: 65) argued that Canadian energy policy cannot be discussed "without considering its federal-provincial component." Several tacit but significant intergovernmental objectives appear in the NEP. These included a restructuring of political power between Ottawa on one hand and the energy industry and producing provinces on the other, a reassertion of federal powers over the economy and a heightening of Ottawa's visibility in the eyes of Canadians. As Norrie (1984: 88) has suggested, the NEP indicated that "Ottawa was quite prepared to oppose the province-building aspirations of one specific region in order to fulfill its own conception of the 'national interest.'" Doern and Toner (1985: 465) make a similar argument, suggesting that the Liberal government believed that, throughout the 1970s, energy development "had resulted in an overall shift of responsibility and activity to the provincial level, with a corresponding weakening of federal authority and power." The NEP altered that situation and reasserted the previously declining power of the federal government.

Each side in the federal-provincial battle over energy policy claimed that it had constitutional justification. The federal government argued that it had the right to restrict the exercise of provincial control over resources in the larger market of the national economy. The federal argument is based on certain clauses found in Section 91 of the British North America (BNA) Act of 1867. Section 91.2 states that Parliament will act on all aspects of interprovincial and international trade and commerce. This obviously includes a number of important aspects of the energy industry, such as oil exports to other provinces and the United States. Under Section 91.2 these transactions would fall under federal jurisdiction. Also, Section 91.10 (c) (declaratory power) and 91.3 (taxation power) suggest federal control over energy resources (Toner and Bregha, 1984: 4).

Oil-producing provinces, however, argued that the NEP infringed upon their basic constitutional powers regarding control and management of resources. They cited Section 109 of the BNA Act, which states that "all lands, mines, minerals and royalties belong to the Several Provinces of Canada." It is a guarantee of provincial ownership and control over their own natural resources (Harrison, 1981: 67). This argument is strengthened by the 1930 amendment to the Act, which granted Alberta and Saskatchewan the same rights enjoyed by other provinces with regard to resources. Finally, Section 92.5 of the BNA Act provides the provincial governments with legislative authority over "the management and sale of the Public lands belonging to the province." Taken together, these claims provide a strong counter to the federal arguments and make the debate over energy resources one which strikes at the very essence of Canadian federalism.

Given the significance of the constitutional battle over control of energy resources in Canada, the economic rationale for such a debate proposed by Marxist analysis is not of preeminent importance. It is much easier to interpret the NEP as an attempt to alter the trend toward decentralization that had characterized federal-provincial relations in the 1960s and 1970s and to reassert
the primacy of Ottawa. The Program reflected nation-building on the part of the federal government much more than exploitation by central Canada of the resource-producing peripheral regions, as a Marxist analysis would suggest.

Subsequent revision of the NEP also reflected the competition between centers of government, as opposed to a class struggle over the means of production. Like pluralism, Marxism cannot readily explain the political process leading up to the Agreement. Focusing on an agenda with constitutional implications, intergovernmental bargaining did not include consultation with business interests. In sum, the NEP and its aftermath appear to transcend the Marxist framework of analysis.

A Comparative Assessment

Each of the perspectives on public policy has been evaluated on an individual basis. It therefore is appropriate to compare these functional explanations for the phase of confrontation in energy politics. A natural point of departure is the assertion by Doern and Toner (1985: 466) that the NEP “must be understood as first and foremost a political act which was intended to enhance federal power vis-à-vis provincial and industry power.” This is an accurate assessment of the overall purpose of the NEP. Through its articulated goals of self-sufficiency, fairness and opportunity the NEP was meant to Canadianize the energy industry, which then could contribute actively to the strategy of nation-building. The policies set forth in the NEP would regain for the federal government the preeminent position in the management of energy resources that had been lost to the provinces.

Any assessment of the formulation and articulation of the NEP must be able to explain it in terms of that overall purpose. With this as the criterion for judging effectiveness, only state autonomy provides an adequate explanation for the emergence of and reaction to the NEP in 1980 and 1981.

Regarding the pluralist model, there is some evidence of support from the Canadian public for the overall goals of the NEP. The problem with this approach, however, is that the presumed sequence of public policy—interest demand (in group form) followed by policy output—finds little direct confirmation and cannot be tested readily. Pluralism also does not provide an adequate explanation in its refined form. According to Pluralism II, policy results from bargaining among the most well-endowed, organized interests in society. The NEP, however, emerged only after the bargaining process had failed. The Trudeau government announced its energy program when it had become clear that no agreement could be reached with the producing provinces. The most powerful interests in civil society—those in the oil and gas industries—had no input into the policy-making process. These interests had a primarily Tory orientation, providing evidence that the Liberal government acted on its interests and not those of societal actors in developing and implementing the Program.

Marxism also falls short of providing an adequate interpretation of the NEP and its aftermath. The Marxist analysis of the NEP cannot explain why policies meant to enhance the power of the dominant interests in society met opposition from those interests. This perspective also is rendered less credible because better explanations exist for the apparently exploitive (to use the Marxist term)
relationship between central Canada and the resource-producing peripheral regions in the context of the Program. Simple electoral arithmetic and the federal-provincial situation combined to establish Ottawa's focus on nation-building. Although that objective had its economic aspects—Ottawa acknowledged its need to control economic development in order to facilitate paramountcy in federal-provincial relations—economics merely fit into a larger whole. "During the 1970s," as Dobson (1981: 10) summarized it, "energy policy became increasingly entwined in the constitutional debate over resource ownership and over the division of responsibilities between the federal and provincial governments."

Aside from the inadequacies of the society-centered models, there are other reasons to assess the state autonomist approach as most effective in explaining public policies in the energy realm. Available evidence suggests that the only interests considered during the development of the NEP were those of state actors. For example, imposition of taxes (including Canada Lands) had to lower the present value (i.e., stock price) of private oil ventures. That would tend to lower the cost of takeovers by Petro-Canada, thereby extending Ottawa's influence in the energy sector.

Furthermore, the specific provisions of the NEP appear to aggrandize the power of the federal bureaucracy. This increased influence probably had been an ideological goal of a number of public servants involved in the formulation and administration of the policies contained in the NEP. Later revisions to the Program in the Agreement reflected the priorities of another center of government, the province of Alberta.

Perhaps most important of all, the state autonomist approach is the only one which adequately assesses the NEP as a function of the changing nature of federal-provincial politics. It is the only analytical scheme which can provide a clear interpretation of the NEP as a device to reverse the trend towards decentralization in Canadian federalism: an idea very much on the minds of those who developed and formulated the Liberal energy policies of 1980.

Conclusion

Among the most salient approaches toward the explanation of public policy, it is apparent that state autonomy provides the most convincing account of the Canadian NEP and its aftermath. In terms of Hall's (1986) demarcation of approaches toward political analysis, it becomes interesting to consider a research agenda based upon rational choice and institutions. The state autonomist version of the NEP and its aftermath reveals strategic interaction within the political institutions of Canada. Thus a game-theoretic analysis of the institutional battle between Ottawa and Alberta might help to explain the outcome. Although that analysis lies beyond the scope of this investigation, the structure of such a game can be identified already, based on the state autonomy model. Ultimately, it is hoped, such an approach may lead to greater understanding of policy outcomes and federal-provincial relations in Canada.

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NOTES

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1 For a detailed explanation of functional causal imagery, see Stinchcombe (1968).

2 Hall (1986: 13-17) sees Marxism and pluralism as “group” theories, while state autonomy is designated as “state-centric.”

3 The following description of the Agreement is taken from the Globe and Mail, 2 September 1981, page 1.

The federal government insisted (in writing) that such a tax could be levied, but established 0% as the initial level. Of course, the adversaries also set boundaries for any taxation changes during the life of the Agreement.

4 More extreme critiques of pluralist ideology have suggested that, even if adequate resources could be obtained by those on the periphery, the groups at the top of the hierarchy would not permit legitimate competition. Through their control of the basic institutions of the state, the established interests would stifle the intergroup bargaining that is necessary for a capitalist, liberal democracy to function (Lowi, 1979: 60).

5 Certainly, it is naive to expect that the term “Canadianization” would not introduce some bias into responses obtained by the polls. Many of those surveyed may have been influenced by nationalist sentiments, without actually approving of the specific process of Canadianization entailed by the NEP. However, it is likely that, given the disorderly state of the world energy market in 1980, most members of the public wanted more protection from new shocks that might arise; at the very least that would tend to favor a greater degree of Canadian control over the energy sector.

6 Further indications that the policies articulated in the Program had a constituency can be found in Canadian attitudes toward the energy issue prior to the NEP. For a summary of an informative 1977 poll, consult Foster and Jacobs (1977: 66).

7 According to Nordlinger (1981: 11), it is all of “those individuals who occupy offices that authorize them, and them alone, to make and apply decisions that are binding upon any and all segments of society.” Individual behavior therefore is best understood in terms of positions held within the organizations which make up the authoritative state; it is through the interaction of these entities that public policy is made.

8 In the Canadian context, such actions may proliferate over time. As Banting (1986: 2) has pointed out, with the scope of government activity so much greater than in the past, efforts to facilitate autonomous behavior are likely to be on the rise.

9 Although Jenkins (1986: 157-158) described the provincial government and multinational corporations (MNCs) as allies, it also is implied that the coalition had a clear hierarchy during the phase of confrontation: “Alberta provided considerable bargaining leverage to the MNCs’ opposition to the NEP simply because it was a political actor whose views could not be ignored by a federal government trying desperately to fight western alienation within the confederation.”

10 For an extensive treatment of corporatism and Marxist theory see Panitch (1980).

11 Of course, it could be suggested that governments always anticipate—and therefore fulfill—the wishes of central Canada. But this raises the problem of inference associated with rule by anticipated reactions. Nagel (1975: 22) observed that if “B does X because she
thinks A wants X, when in fact A wants not-X, then it is undesirable to credit A with power over B's selection." Consider, for example, the budget which led to the fall of the short-lived Clark government. The contents of that document did not sit well with central Canada. It therefore would be inappropriate to argue that Ontario—which voted Liberal overwhelmingly in the election that followed—had "caused" the Conservatives to present their budget to the House of Commons in an attempt to please central Canada. In a more general sense, the assumption that governments always correctly anticipate and respond to class or regional interests is problematic at best.

It might be observed that civil servants also existed during the time of Clark's government; why, then, did they not propose something like the NEP? The fundamental reason is that the overall purpose of such a program would have been anathema to the Clark Cabinet. The NEP's specific provisions increased federal control over the energy sector. Under Conservative rule, EMR had no such mandate.

An example of rational choice as applied to Canadian energy politics is Uslaner's (1988) analysis of voting in the federal election of 1980.

The basic dimensions of the game, described in detail by James (1989) and James and Michelin (1989), are (1) the number and nature of the participants; (2) zero versus non-zero-sum payoffs; (3) cooperative versus non-cooperative play; and (4) relevant solution concepts, or expectations concerning outcome.

References


