This class provides a review of international relations in Europe since the Second World War with a particular focus on Western Europe and the foreign policies of Britain, France and Germany. Although the course is on "contemporary" European relations, the foundation for modern international relations on the Continent was laid in the immediate postwar period, so we will spend a significant portion of the class on this era. The U.S. was intimately involved in this process. The history of postwar Europe therefore cannot be told without an understanding of the United States' abandonment of its traditional wariness towards involvement on the Continent.

The postwar period was one of unprecedented progress but also disappointment. While historical antagonists embarked on an ambitious process of cooperation and integration never before seen in international relations, the Cold War and the division of Europe doomed hopes for a new era of world peace. We will cover both the success of intra-European relations in both politics and economics and the role of Europe in the bipolar conflict between the U.S and the Soviet Union. The unique nature of the postwar period formed the basis for eventual Western victory in the Cold War, and following the fall of the Berlin Wall, European integration deepened and widened to include Eastern Europe. However, in recent years, the pillars of European success, NATO and EU, have entered into a period of crisis, raising the question about whether we might be witnessing the beginning of a new era in European politics and foreign policy.

We will keep in mind that the differences between the prewar and postwar periods were not foreordained, but rather a result of deliberate choices made by statesmen. Other options were present. For this reason, much of the reading for the course will be primary texts, pronouncements by officials or treaties ratified by governments committing them to different courses than those historically followed.

Course Assignments:
Your grade will be made up of the following components:
- 20% In-class midterm composed of short answer questions focusing on the first half of the course (February 17).
- 20% In-class midterm composed of short answer questions focusing on the first half of the course (April 5)
○ 30% Final exam composed of short answer questions and one essay focusing on
the second half of the course.
  ○ Both the midterm and final will involve identifying and analyzing
    passages from the reading. Not doing the reading is really not an option.

○ 20%: You will write two short papers, approximately 5 pages each, analyzing a
  selection of the readings in the course. Each paper will have a different due date,
  You will have a choice from five so as to best manage your schedule, but you must
do at least one of the first two papers. I will distribute the precise guidelines
  separately. Each is worth 10% of your grade.
   1. The Washington farewell address and Monroe Doctrine (January 20)
   2. Bevin’s memorandum, Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic
      Treaty (February 3)
   3. Mearsheimer and Van Evera on the post-Cold War period (due April 12)
   4. Kagan and Rathbun on transatlantic differences (April 19)
   5. Strategies of European integration (April 19)

○ 10% Participation: Participation will be assessed by speaking up in class, but also
  in on-line discussion forums connecting our class to contemporary events and
  larger themes. Stopping by office hours at least once for a mutual progress report
  is worth a “free” 2%. You tell me how the course is going for you and how to
  make it better; I give you guidance about how to improve. Postings due at
  midnight on:
   ○ The stubbornness of war (January 12)
   ○ The “empire by invitation” (February 7)
   ○ Anti-Americanism then and now (March 23)
   ○ Europeans from Mars, Americans from Venus (April 20)

Christina Faegri will be the grader for the course. She is available for appointments and
can be emailed at cfaegri@usc.edu.

Course Readings:
The “textbook” for this class will be Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945
(Penguin Press, 2005), available for purchase at the bookstore. All other readings will be
available online through Blackboard under “Course Documents.” Readings will be
separated into standard secondary sources and “primary” texts, such as personal
accounts, speeches, treaties, etc. Generally it is probably better to read the former first so
as to understand the context in which the latter were written but the choice is yours.
Many of the readings will have a description of the context embedded in the file as well
as discussion questions to consider and answer as you read.
**Course Style:** The class is unfortunately too large to be a genuine seminar, so I will spend significant time lecturing. However, I do so Socratically, asking for class input to move the topic forward. You can prepare for those questions by doing the reading and looking for answers to the discussion questions attached to the readings. I use Power Point slides, which I do not post online. Do not bother asking. Not all of the information you will need for the midterm and final will be on those slides, so it will be necessary to listen to me as well. Do not spend all your time trying to copy the slides verbatim.

**Communication:** I will hold office hours from 1-2 on MW in my office in VKC 304. If you have scheduling conflicts, we can make an appointment for another time on those days. I generally prefer face-to-face conversations to email, particularly if you have a complicated question. This also enables me to connect names with faces. I am a stickler for politeness if not formality. Please address your emails with a salutation, sign them with your name. I am happy to answer any questions, provided they are not on the syllabus, or are things you could not find out easily on your own.

**Course Schedule:** Class will not be held on January 18 (President’s Day) and February 15 (MLK Day). 1. Spring break is the week of March 15. The final exam is on Monday, May 10, 2-4 pm.

**Class rules:** Turn your cell phone off. Do not surf the web or check e-mail. No text messaging. If I catch you using any of these devices, I will ask you to leave the classroom, deduct one letter grade from your participation grade per infraction and forbid you from using your laptop in my class for the rest of the term. Remember that the course grader sits behind you. *Do not even think of plagiarizing.* We will always catch you, and you will fail this class.

**TIRP:** I give 1% extra credit for participating in TIRP, so that you will not have to worry about just missing a better grade.

**Course Outline:**

1. **The World War II Experience (January 11, 13, 20)**
   The distinctiveness of post-WWII Europe cannot be understood without an account of what preceded it. WWII marked a break with the nationalism, unilaterism and militarism of previous relations between France, Britain and Germany. Its sheer destructiveness, particularly in Germany, led to a dramatic revision of traditional foreign policy. WWII also ended differently, with Germany not just defeated but occupied. And the United States once again had to confront the relevance of its
traditional policy of isolationism in light of its participation in a second world war in a quarter century. We will review some of “myths” and “strategic culture” common to prewar European foreign policy. We will note the different wartime experiences of Britain and France and the lessons concerning appeasement and collaboration that would color their dealings with postwar Germany and the Soviet Union. We will discuss the lessons that the U.S. drew concerning the necessity of their presence in guaranteeing the postwar settlement.

- Judt, pp. 4-62

**Primary texts:**

- The Monroe Doctrine (1823)
- Washington’s Farewell Address (1796) (only highlighted excerpts)

**II. The Twin Problems: Germany and the Soviet Union (January 25, 27; February 1)**

Two interrelated problems bedevilled Western statesmen in the early post-WWII era: how to prevent a resurgent Germany and how to prevent Soviet expansion into Western Europe. The two issues were often at cross-purposes as a revived Germany was necessary to stem Soviet influence, yet undermined plans to keep the former permanently disarmed and weakened. Wartime cooperation quickly dissolved into Cold War stalemate as the four great powers could not come to an agreement on how to organize Germany, resulting in a de facto divided country. Despite its plans to return home, through the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, the U.S. became increasingly involved in forestalling the spread of communism through providing arms and aid to Western Europe.

- Judt, pp. 82-144

**Primary texts**

- Winston Churchill, “Sinews of Peace” (5 March 1946)
- Truman Doctrine (12 March 1947)
- Marshall Plan (5 June 1947)

**III. The Twin Solutions: European Integration and the Transatlantic Alliance (February 3, 8, 10)**

Western Europe and the United States ultimately settled on increased economic and even military integration as a solution to the twin problems. Further deterioration of
relations with Soviets in the form of the Czech crisis and Berlin blockade led to a focus on military, not just economic recovery. The North Atlantic Treaty marked a decisive break from American foreign policy tradition, involvement in the political affairs of European countries, the bipartisan foundation for which was carefully cultivated by the Truman administration. The Korean War propelled deeper integration through the formation of an integrated army. Germany, divided over the merits of alignment with the West and rearmament on the one hand and neutralism and disarmament on the other, ultimately chose the former. Sovereignty in West Germany was returned as a result. France broke with long-standing tradition, seeking security through joint European ownership and production of coal and steel, the first step in the long process of European integration.

- Judt, pp. 145-164, 241-256, 265-267

Primary texts
- Bevin memorandums
- Vandenberg Resolution
- North Atlantic Treaty (1949)
- The "Schuman Declaration" (1950)

MIDTERM ON FEBRUARY 17!!

IV. The Postwar Boom, Government Planning and Economic Integration (February 22, 24)
Free trade facilitated by economic integration fostered unprecedented economic growth and ties in Western Europe. The European Economic Community created a common market that supplemented transatlantic military integration, one, however, that left Britain out, with long-term implications. The political economies of Britain, France and Germany were marked by distinct patterns of government intervention and were uniquely related to the international economy. We will discuss the unique models of capitalism that drove the postwar boom.

- Judt, 63-77, 302-309, 324-337, 354-373
V. British, French and American Relations: Decolonization, NATO and De Gaulle
(March 1, 3, 8)
Beginning in the mid 1950s, with the Suez crisis, patterns began to form in Anglo-American and French-American relations. Britain traded its imperial role for a “special relationship” with the United States, easing more quickly out of its remaining colonies. The French, particularly in Algeria, held on more tightly, so much so that a constitutional crisis ensued that ended only with the creation of the Fifth Republic and the installation of De Gaulle as President. De Gaulle called into question the credibility of the NATO nuclear guarantee and resented NATO’s implications for French sovereignty, going so far as expel the organization from French soil. Multilateral negotiations over nuclear weapons in NATO was also highly contentious. De Gaulle took on the EEC as well, insisting on the preservation of national vetoes over vital interests during the “empty chair crisis.” Seeing the British as a Trojan horse for the US, the French President also denied British entry into the EEC.

- Judt, pp. 278-302

Primary text
- The “Luxembourg Compromise” (1966)
- John F. Kennedy’s Berlin Speech (26 June 1963)

VI: Stagflation, the Rise of the Market, and the Rebirth of Economic Integration
(March 10, 22)
By the 1970s, European integration had stalled and the Keynesian model came into question. Rising capital mobility inhibited European efforts to manage exchange rates and stagflation resisted traditional methods of government intervention to manage employment and inflation. Only when the European Community came to embrace the market did it get back on track. The Single Market marked the rebirth of European integration, and the European Monetary System of exchange rate coordination took shape in the mid-1980s. Both owe their inspiration to Thatcherite pro-market ideas. Even socialist governments began to turn away from government planning and intervention, which laid the groundwork for further steps in European integration.

- Judt, pp. 453-64, 535-58, 526-34

Primary text
VII. The New Left, Reagan and the Cold War (March 24, 29, 31)
While the right was leaving its mark on international economics, the left was having an impact on geopolitics. After years of conservative rule, the socialist government of Willy Brandt turned Germany towards normalization with eastern Germany that helped bring about a broader détente between East and West, symbolized by the Helsinki accords. A “new left” in Germany began to demand a public accounting for the Holocaust. As détente broke down in the early 1980s, personified by U.S. President’s tough line against the Soviet union, this new left in Europe responded sharply through peace movements that protested an escalation of the arms race on the continent. With deep roots in newly emergent Green parties, these movements for unilateral disarmament were strong enough to force NATO into a conciliatory bargaining posture that laid the foundation for the INF treaty and even the end of the Cold War.

- Judt, 484-503, 590-604

*Primary text*
- Reagan’s Berlin Speech (12 June 1987)

SECOND MIDTERM ON APRIL 5!

VIII. The Fall of the Berlin Wall: The Renewed German Problem and Victory for the EU and NATO (7, 12, 14)
The end of Soviet occupation and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union meant the end of the Cold War, symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Europe. But the German problem reasserted itself. The solution was similar to that of the early postwar period, to embed Germany in a strengthened European Union, this time with a common currency and a political union. Germany would reunify but be admitted into NATO to ensure the continuation of its postwar multilateralist path. The EU and NATO began a process of eastward expansion, even bringing in former Soviet republics. The changing nature of European integration, away from economics and towards greater political coordination, created great difficulties in Great Britain, which
had always stood somewhat aloof from the process. The Maastricht Treaty would make
the EU a lightning rod of criticism in British domestic politics, a fact which continues to
day.

- Judt, pp. 610-616, 637-643, 712-723.
- John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold
- Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War, International

Primary texts
- The "Two Plus Four" Treaty

IX: Transatlantic and European Tensions (April 19, 21, 26, 28)
The euphoria that greeted the Cold War was short-lived. The break-up of Yugoslavia
and the inability of Europe to quell the civil war in Bosnia exposed the difficulty of
creating a common EU foreign policy and also led a transatlantic rift about how best to
respond. The difficult process of reuniting Germany had implications for the rest of
Europe as German actions pulled the continent into recession and endangered the
common currency project. Its successful launch at the turn of the century, combined
with a more successful and collaborative European and transatlantic response to the
Kosovo crisis, seemed to indicate that NATO and the EU were back on track. However,
differences over the war on Iraq reflected what many regard as permanent rifts between
Europeans and Americans due to their different geopolitical positions and ways of
approaching international relations. NATO, initially sidelined by the US in Afghanistan,
is struggling to share the burden of fighting a resurgent Taliban. And the EU,
previously believed to command consensus at home, was dealt a striking blow in the
French defeat of its referendum on the European constitution. The cornerstones of
postwar European success, the transatlantic alliance and European integration, are
shaky.

- Judt, pp. 665-685, 723-36
- Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis
- Brian C. Rathbun, Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace

*Primary text*

- Joschka Fischer, “From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration” (2000).