April 16, 2013
While the widespread use of the centrifugal pump in the decades following WWII has rendered the ever-declining levels of the Ogallala aquifer more susceptible to contamination, hydraulic fracturing and potential oil pipelines put undue pressure on groundwater resources throughout the United States. And what are being placed within the relatively narrow frame of environmental debates, accelerated pollution of the Ogallala comes at the worst time possible: a nation-wide drought.
Hydraulic fracturing is a process in which fracturing fluid is injected under great pressure deep into wells and then horizontally through shale rock. This is done with the aim of fracturing the shale rock in which the methane is trapped and then collecting said natural gas. The controversy with hydraulic fracturing arises from the long and incredibly toxic list of chemicals that are mixed with salt water and then pumped into the ground.
A study of the Ogallala aquifer released by the EPA on 11/09/11 found very elevated levels of a chemical commonly found in the mixture of hydraulic fracturing fluid. MSNBC reported on the study of the Pavillion, Wyoming area. The EPA testing came a year after the agency had warned local residents to avoid drinking, cooking and showering with the water and found “the wells also contained benzene at 50 times the level that is considered safe for people, as well as phenols — another dangerous human carcinogen — acetone, toluene, naphthalene and traces of diesel fuel” (Lustgarten). This confirmed the fears of Pavillion residents who had previously complained that the water smelled of gasoline, turned black. The residents also associate nerve pain and neurological issues to exposure to the pollution. While Canadian drilling company Encana has denied responsibility for the pollution, they have supplied fresh water to affected residents, which may seem like an admission of sorts to some.
This news does not come as a shock to many who saw similar results from hydraulic fracturing exposed in the academy award-winning documentary, Gasland. In fact, the horrendous mix of chemicals used in ‘fracking’ has gained national attention and turned public opinion against the natural gas industry. However, this news may have come too late in the case of the Ogallala aquifer as hydraulic fracturing is already established. Once the nasty chemicals have infiltrated the ground water and made their way into such a vast aquifer as the Ogallala, pollution can spread and have devastating health effects.
The region’s agricultural industries experience near-total reliance on the Aquifer’s resources. These farming communities are hundreds of miles from rivers and thousands of miles from the hope of silver-bullet desalination proposals. Their watery predicament is only being exacerbated by their continued pumping. Human exposure to these fracking chemicals, along with pollutants from large-scale agriculture and potentially oil spills from to-be-announced pipeline routes, increases as more of the water is drained. The concentration of the contaminants is equal to the mass of the pollutant molecules, divided by the volume of water remaining.
Hopeless as it may seem, a handful of opportunities have been suggested for water in this regions. For example, a 2009 paper by the Bureau of Reclamation recommended large-scale reverse osmosis treatment of water in separate aquifers below the Ogallala. In their recommendation these would be integrated with wind power production facilities. The authors note that RO is prohibited by relatively high electricity prices from grids. They foresee strong co-benefits between energy and water production in High Plains regions that experience persistent high winds. They created a small demonstration plant. Among the final recommendations are measurements for additional contaminants, especially arsenic, as well as a large-scale demonstration to estimate capital and operation costs. Since then, many advances are being made in reverse osmosis technology. Two major questions for future market relevancy include: what is the price of water Ogallala recipients are willing to pay, and what the lowest cost RO firms would be willing and able to offer. Indeed, market relevancy will be a vital question to any and all future Ogallala substitutes or restrictions.
With half of all US counties designated as natural disaster areas by Department of Agriculture, the regions that rely on the Aquifer have been some of the driest. For fracking, water is often trucked in for hundreds of miles to open up new methane wells horizontally. As mentioned, the increasing rate is increasing exposure to all of its contaminants. It is an open question whether the climate change benefits of natural gas harvesting might yield some long-term benefit to Ogallala’s replenishment, but evidence presently suggests that drought, depletion, fracking and pesticides offer significant incentives to consider out-of-box solutions.
By Kyle Ferree & Sean Hernandez
Beltran, J. Martinez. Koo-Oshua, S. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. “Water desalination for agricultural applications.” Land and Water Discussion Paper 5. Web. 2006.
“EPA Pavillion Groundwater Investigation.” EPA.gov. N.p., 9 Nov. 2011. Web. 10 Apr. 2013. <http://www.epa.gov/region8/superfund/wy/pavillion/Nov9-2011_2010
Gasson, Christopher. Global Water Intelligence. “What Is In America’s Drought for the Water Industry?” 02 Aug 2012. Web. 04 Apr 2013.
Lustgarten, Abrahm. “‘Fracking’ Chemical Found in Town’s Aquifer.” Msnbc.com.
NBCNews, 11 Oct. 2011. Web. 09 Apr. 2013.
Swift, Andy. Et al. “Desalination and Water Purification Research and Development Program Report No. 146. Wind Power and Water Desalination Technology Integration. Web. Department of Interior – Bureau of Reclamation. July 2008. Web. 14 Apr 2013.
Why the Teton Dam was Built
The Teton Dam, in Eastern Idaho, was built after a back-to-back drought and flood between 1961 and 1962 (Reisner). The Teton Dam was designed to function as a means for water storage, as well as a tool for flood control. Furthermore, the dam served the purposes of irrigation, power generation, and recreation. The plan for the dam was proposed in 1963 and passed in 1964, with an Environmental Impact Statement being released in 1971; however, this EIS did not account for the possibility of collapse.
Construction of the Teton Dam
The dam was designed by the Office of Design and Construction of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and was built by Morrison-Knudsen-Kiewit in December of 1972 (Delatte). The total cost of construction was $100 million (Reisner). The foundation of the dam was the first defense against the unsuitable geology of the region. The foundation “consisted of four basic elements: 21-m deep, steep-sided key trenches on the abutments above the elevation of 1,550 m; a cutoff trench to rock below the elevation of 1,550 m; a continuous grout curtain along the entire foundation; and the excavation of rock under the abutments(Delatte).The actual dam was built in five zones. Zone 1: impervious center core. In other words, a core impenetrable by water. Zone 2: atop and downstream of zone 1, allowed for controlled water seepage through foundation. Zone 3: downstream and provided structural stability. Zone 4: storage areas downstream from the control structure, temporary enclosures built to permit the work to be done. Zone 5: rockfill in the outer parts of the embankment After construction the dam was:93m above the riverbed, and held 356m2 of water (Delatte).
The Teton Dam Failure
On June 3rd, 1976, inspectors found the first minor leaks in the Teton Dam. As a result, the Bureau of Reclamation had the dam inspected daily (Delatte). The following day, June 4th,The right abutment had small but visible springs. The first major leak began on June 5th. The dam was leaking from the right abutment, and seepage was noticed 40m from the top of the dam (Delatte). A whirlpool formed upstream of the dam. In an effort to stop the leak, bulldozers attempted to push debris into the hole, but this failed, and two bulldozers were swallowed by the leak. On the 5th, around 10am, the dam failed. By 8pm the reservoir, which held approximately 300,000 acre-feet of water, was completely empty, and only two thirds of the dam wall remained. Approximately 200 families from the towns of Wilford, Rexburg, Sugar City, and Roberts lost their homes. Tragically the failure caused the loss of 14 lives, and $400 million, to $1 billion dollars of property damage (Delatte).
The failure of the Teton Dam destroyed the lower part of the river, reducing canyon walls and washing away the riparian zones. This damaged stream ecology, endangering the native cutthroat trout population. The force of the rushing water also damaged the stream habitat in the Snake River and some of its tributaries (Reisner).
Why the Teton Dam Failed
The site of the Teton Dam proved to be unsuitable long before the actual start of construction. For example, the soil made of basalt and rhyolite had high permeability (Reisner). Furthermore, test holes absorbed water at a high rate, indicating serious leakage (Reisner). Tests also showed that the rock was highly fissurable and unstable. The largest fissures found were actually enterable caves (Reisner). Lastly, according to the U.S. Geologic Survey, the dam’s proposed location was an area of high seismic activity. Schleicher, a geologist, wrote a memorandum voicing his concerns about the seismic activity, but this part was never forwarded to the Bureau of Reclamation (Boffey). However, a report signed by Schleicher and three other geologists was forwarded in June of 1973, discussing the seismic hazards but leaving out his “melodramatic” paragraph about anticipated catastrophic flooding (Boffey). After the failure, an independent panel of experts analyzed the failure. The panel came to fourteen conclusions:
” 1. The predesign site and geological studies were “appropriate and extensive.” 2. The design followed well-established USBR practices but without sufficient attention to the varied and unusual geological conditions of the site. 3. The volcanic rocks of the site are “highly permeable and moderately to intensely jointed.” 4. The fill soils used, “wind-deposited nonplastic to slightly plastic clayey silts,” are highly erodible. The soil classification was ML, low plasticity silt. 5. The construction was carried out properly and conformed to the design, except for scheduling. 6. The rapid rate of filling of the dam did not contribute to the failure. If the dam had been filled more slowly, “a similar failure would have occurred at some later date.” 7. Considerable effort was used to construct a grout curtain of high quality, but the rock under the grout cap was not geometry caused arching that reduced stresses in some areas and increased them in others and “favored the development of cracks that would open channels through the erodible fill.” 8. The dam’s combination of geological factors and design decisions that, taken together, permitted the failure to develop.”9. Finite element calculations suggested that hydraulic fracturing was possible. 10. There was no evidence of differential foundation settlement contributing to the failure. 11. Seismicity was not a factor. 12. There were not enough instruments in the dam to provide adequate information about changing conditions of the embankment and abutments. 13. The panel had quickly identified piping as the most probable cause of the failure, then focused its efforts on determining how the piping started. Two mechanisms were possible. The first was the flow of water under highly erodible and unprotected fill through joints in unsealed rock beneath the grout cap and thus development of an erosion tunnel. The second was “cracking caused by differential strains or hydraulic fracturing of the core material.” The panel was unable to determine whether one or the other mechanism occurred, or a combination of the two. 14. “The fundamental cause of failure may be regarded as a adequately sealed. The curtain was nevertheless subject to piping; “too much was expected of the grout curtain, and . . . the design should have provided measures to render the inevitable leakage” (Dellate).
Future Preventative Measures
As a result of the dam’s failure, analyses were completed to determine the potential causes. Also, peer review of dams and frequent visits during construction of dams by the design engineer were institutionalized. Additionally, special treatment was given to fractured rock foundations and redundant measures were encouraged to control seepage, and prevent piping. Moreover, a national dam safety program with annual dam inspections and instruments to monitor dams was implemented. Lastly, the Reclamation Safety of Dams Act of 1978 was created to analyze and modify existing structures that were determined to be potentially unsafe (Dellate).
By Casey Frost & Carolin Meier
Boffey, Philip M. “Teton Dam Collapse: Was It a Predictable Disaster?” Science ns 193.4247 (1976):
Boffey, Philip M. “Teton Dam Verdict: A Foul-up by the Engineers.” Science ns 195.4275 (1977):
Delatte, Norbert J. Beyond Failure. Reston: American Society of Civil Engineers, 2008. Print.
“Teton Dam Failure Case Study.” MATDL. NSDL, 9 July 2012. Web. 27 Mar. 2013. <http://matdl.org/
Failure of Teton Dam. Bureau of Reclamation, 18 Apr. 2011. Web. 27 Mar. 2013.
Reisner, Marc. Cadillac Desert. New York: Penguin, 1993. Print
Teton Dam Failure. UCSB, n.d. Web. 27 Mar. 2013. <http://www.geol.ucsb.edu/faculty/sylvester/
“Teton Dam Failure Case Study.” MATDL. NSDL, 9 July 2012. Web. 27 Mar. 2013. <http://matdl.org/
California may be famous for its San Francisco counterculture or the Los Angeles entertainment industry, but one of the state’s most important contributions is agriculture. California is the most agriculturally productive state in the U.S. and contains 9 of the country’s 10 most productive counties. The San Joaquin Valley, located in the southern half of California’s Central Valley, is the world’s most productive agricultural region. However, the sustainability of productive agriculture in this region is threatened by salt build-up, known as salinization. Salt accumulates in groundwater and soils naturally due to evaporation and transpiration. However, if the water table is high and drainage is exceptionally poor, accumulating salts may persist in an area, threatening the ability of crops to take up water. Essentially, excess salt buildup as a result of over-irrigation, poor drainage, and high evaporation rates, all of which occur in the San Joaquin Valley, has deleterious effects on agricultural productivity and sustainability.
Schoups et al. devised a model to help understand historic changes in and predict future levels of groundwater and soil salinization, especially in the western part of the San Joaquin Valley. Irrigation in the valley began with gravity-driven diversions of surface water from the San Joaquin River in the early 19th century, and extensive groundwater pumping to meet higher irrigation demands began in the 1920s. The Central Valley Project of 1953 and the State Water Project of 1967 provided farmers greater access to surface water, so groundwater pumping declined. This decrease in groundwater pumping coupled with continued irrigation contributed to a relative rise in the water table which in turn encouraged salinization. The Corcoran clay layer in the western San Joaquin Valley posed and continues to pose particular problems with salinity in the area. The lack of permeability in the soil causes drainage problems and thus a buildup of salts as well as dangerous chemicals like selenium.
The ongoing soil salinization caused by agriculture and irrigation in arid lands like the Great Central Valley leads to a chain reaction of problems that are hard to fix. According to a 2006 report by the Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board, an estimated 700 thousand tons of salt are imported from the San Francisco Bay and San Joaquin River to a majority of the state’s water supply projects, water basins in the region receive at least 2 million tons of salt annually by state and federal water projects, 400 thousand tons of salt are added to the aquifer in the San Joaquin Basin, 113 thousand acres of retired land, and 400 thousand acres of saline-sodic soil in the region. The report lists several major issues caused by soil salinization that affect the Central Valley’s economy, agricultural production, land-use, and health risk for people. Although it may seem that the problem persists and may keep plaguing the region, there are efforts to mitigate and regulate salinization to avoid these issues.
The current solutions to the problem, as stated by Schoups et al., are to increase irrigation efficiency, grow salt-tolerant crops, drainage-water reuse, land retirement, and increase groundwater pumping. The Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board has developed a management plant to ensure that salts and other nutrients in irrigation water are kept to a minimum, and for every region to develop a salt management plan by the year 2014. There is also the Central Valley-Salinity Alternatives for Long-Term Sustainability (CV-SALTS) initiative managed by stakeholders “to develop sustainable salinity and nitrate management in the Central Valley.” There are also other resources, especially ones online, provided by Aquafornia that gives tips on what people at home can do to reduce salt contamination. Some of the tips include use less or low salt detergents, and conserving water that will not be contaminated by salts. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) also provides information on how to manage salinization problems. Techniques include maintaining a low water table, irrigation to maintain salts below the root zone, reducing deep tillage, installing artificial drainage systems, and eliminating seepage from canals, dugouts, and ponds. These tips and techniques are currently the best and most feasible approach to mitigate salts in agriculture from irrigation. There is really no way of preventing since salts are inevitable in irrigating in arid lands. But taking the effort to reduce water consumption and water use to reduce salts and increase efficient agricultural production will, at least, improve current conditions in the Central Valley for agricultural production and avoid further land degradation and risks to human health.
By Amanda Alvarez and Sergio Avelar
The Kesterson National Wildlife Refuge, established by the Bureau of Reclamation in 1970, is a 10,621-acre artificial wetland environment created using runoff from California’s Central Valley (Zahm). The Refuge saw a decrease in species diversity and an increase in deformity unusual for a marsh environment, prompting the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to conduct tests on minerals in the soil (Vencil). The studies ranged from analyzing the effects on plants, aquatic invertebrates and fish in the reservoir, and their subsequent effects on aquatic birds as well as bird eggs and tissues, to determining the chemicals’ effects on the birds’ reproductive systems (Ohlendorf). They found unusually high levels of selenium in mosquito fish (Vencil). This was also the chemical with high enough concentrations to affect the Kesterson birds.
In hindsight, selenium was a foreseeable problem. The mineral originates in the pyrite of the Cretaceous marine sandstone and siltstone shale deposits in the coast range and under valley soils (Vencil). Because rainfall is light, the deposits remain in the soil. Weathering, erosion and irrigation leach minerals such as selenium but because western soil and water are alkaline, leached selenium takes the form of selenate. Selenate tends to accumulate in estuaries and be easily taken up into the foodchain.
The San Joaquin Valley soil had poor drainage because it was underlain by the Corcoran Formation, an impermeable clay layer (Garone). The land needed subsurface drains to collect the saline groundwater and carry it away from the irrigated areas. The Bureau of Reclamation and the Department of Water Resources (DWP) planned the development of a master drain, but since the DWP pulled out of the project (because Reagan, Governor of California, didn’t support it), it didn’t get built. Consequently, in the early 1970s, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) started to build the San Luis Drain on its own to provide irrigation water to farmers in the Westlands Water District (Garone). Federal budget constraints and effective political opposition prevented completion of the all of the drain; hence the drain ended at the Kesterson Reservoir with the purpose of providing habitat for wildlife and cleaning the water. As a result, the Bureau changed Kesterson’s status from a regulating reservoir to a terminal holding reservoir, which would store and concentrate drainage water (Garone).
The California State Water Resources Control Board was concerned about the potential effects on wildlife from the chemicals in the drainwater, so it proposed that the USBR conduct studies at the Kesterson Reservoir. However, because the USBR was not obligated to study wildlife, it didn’t fund the studies, leaving the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services to fund the studies on its own. The initial focus of environmental impact testing was on salinity and boron, followed by nitrates and, later, pesticide residues. Ultimately, there were very high levels of selenium in the water of the Kesterson Reservoir. Although selenium is a trace element and is necessary for the basic functioning of organisms, it can be extremely toxic at higher concentrations. The U.S. EPA has set levels for maximum selenium in water at 10 parts per billion (p.p.b) and in soil, 4 p.p.b. Kesterson had selenium levels as high as 3,000 p.p.b. in water and 250 p.p.b in soil (Maugh II)!
The bioaccumulation of selenium in the water concentrated in the algae, roots of plants, plankton, aquatic insects, and mosquito fish. When the aquatic birds would eat the selenium in concentrated substances, they would naturally have higher levels of selenium through biomagnification. 347 nests from the Kesterson aquatic birds, such as eared grebes, American coots, stilts, avocets, and many duck species were followed in order to examine their eggs (Ohlendorf). 40% of the nests had one or more dead embryos and 20% had embryos and chicks with severe abnormalities, which “ranged from missing or abnormal eyes, missing, crossed or reduced beaks, micromelia and amelia in their legs and wings, clubfoot and ectrodactyly in their feet and exencephaly and hydrocephaly in their brains” (Ohlendorf). Cattails were dying, algal blooms were occurring, fewer waterfowl were present, and all but one species of fish had been destroyed (Garone).
From the beginning, the directors of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and Bureau of Reclamation that had collectively created Kesterson National Wildlife Refuge were unwilling to acknowledge the nature or magnitude of the selenium threat and dismissed the “Concern Alert” (Garone). Citing the results of tests on birds collected at Kesterson by the CA Department of Fish and Game, in October 1984 the California Department of Health Services issued the first of many notices limiting waterfowl consumption from the area around Kesterson. The USFWS ultimately closed Kesterson’s ponds to public access. On February 5, 1985, the State Water Resources Control Board ordered the Department of Interior to resolve the problem at Kesterson (Garone). It ordered the Bureau of Reclamation to submit a cleanup and abatement plan within five months, and to implement the cleanup plan within three years (Garone).
The Bureau examined five options in the final environmental impact statement: a no-action alternative, a flexible response plan, an immobilization plan, a wetland restoration/onsite disposal plan, and an offsite disposal plan (Garone). The Bureau chose the phased approach, incorporating three of these remediation options, which would be implemented in succession if the previous option proved unsatisfactory. On March 19, 1987, the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) rejected the phased approach and ordered the Bureau to clean up Kesterson Reservoir by August 19, 1988, using the onsite disposal plan (Garone). However, new evidence showed this would not be effective. Instead, the SWRCB ordered the Bureau to fill all areas where it expected ephemeral pools to form and to fill all areas to six inches above the expected seasonal rise in groundwater level by January 1, 1989 (Garone). They thought this would solve the problem forever. However, in June of 1999, the Sacramento consulting firm CH2M Hill released to the press the results of its most recent studies of mice and voles at Kesterson: “the firm’s report revealed that up to twenty-nine of eighty-seven house mice, deer mice, western harvest mice, and voles collected during 1998 were hermaphroditic” (Garone). Because 1998 was a particularly wet year, water pooled for months at Kesterson, possibly remobilizing the selenium, returning it to the food chain, and causing these new cases of development of malformed organisms or growths. The aftermath of poor planning are lingering for much longer than anticipated.
This post was written by Carolin Meier & Daria Sarraf.
Garone, Philip. “The Tragedy at Kesterson Reservoir: A Case Study in Environmental History and a Lesson in Ecological Complexity.” Environs: Environmental Law and Policy Journal 22.2 (1999): 107-44. Print.
Maugh II, Thomas H. “Microbes Clean Soil Polluted With Selenium.” Los Angeles Times. N.p., n.d. Web. 10 Apr. 2013. <http://articles.latimes.com/1992-04-10/news/mn-180_1_kesterson-reservoir>.
Ohlendorf, Harry M. “The Birds of Kesterson Reservoir: A Historical Perspective.” Aquatic toxicology (Amsterdam, Netherlands) 57.1-2 (2002): 1-10. Print.
Taylor, Ronald B. “Wetland Considered Proving Ground for Toxics Cleanup Plan.” Los Angeles. N.p., 17 Jan. 1987. Web. 11 Apr. 2013. <http://articles.latimes.com/1987-01-18/news/mn-5705_1_proving-ground>.
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Bruce Waddell. Selenium can cause deformities in birds. The ducks on the left were exposed to high concentrations of selenium in the Middle Green River Basin in Utah. Great Lakes Echo. N.p., 12 Dec. 1990. Web. 11 Apr. 2013. http://greatlakesecho.org/2009/12/17/few-great-lakes-power-plants-even-look-for-this-toxic-contaminant-in-their-waste/.
Vencil, Betsy. “The Migratory Bird Treaty Act – Protecting Wildlife on our National Refuges – California’s Kesterson Reservoir, a Case in Point.” Natural Resources Journal 26.3 (1986): 609. Print.
Zahm, Gary. “Stop: Kesterson NWR.” Invisible 5. N.p., n.d. Web. 11 Apr. 2013.
Author of Cadillac Desert, Marc Reisner, described the Los Angeles River perfectly when he wrote, “ Before its character was significantly altered by human activity, it was really two different waterways –a small, gentle stream flowing through a broad, sandy bed most of the year and a large turbulent unpredictable river for a few days every winter.” (Reisner 12) Unfortunately, it is the unpredictable characteristic of the river that has devastated human settlements in the past, and caused a public desire to contain the river with the cement channels we have today.
The Los Angeles River is an alluvial river with a shallow riverbed and an extensive floodplain. Before human settlement the river flowed freely, both above and below ground, and the course changed often emptying into the ocean anywhere between the Ballona Wetlands and San Pedro Bay. The river course was thick with vegetation and supported a wide range of species of animals. Cottonwoods, willows, and sycamore trees grew very large near the river, and alder, hackberry, California rose and numerous other shrubs grew thick in the understory. Animals supported by the river’s waters and the surrounding forests include everything from bears to birds. Over a hundred species of birds have been identified through egg collection, which only began several years after the arrival of European settlers, indicating that prior to their arrival even more species inhabited the area.
The Native American people of the Tongva and Chumash tribes were the first inhabitants of the Los Angeles River area. They relied on the river as a source of food and water, and knew the river’s tendency to overflow its channels. To combat this problem the Tongva people invented mobile villages called Yangnas. (History of the River 2013) When the river was low, as it was most of the year, the village would be located on the banks of the river. When a flood occurred the tribe would move the village to drier land until the water receded and they could return to the riverbank.
Drawn by the abundant water supply and fertile soil of the Los Angeles River, European settlers would eventually displace he Native Americans living along the Los Angeles River. Between 1769 and 1777, Spain had established several missions and presidios along the California coast to help secure territory for the Spanish crown; however, their inability to supply themselves with sufficient food led to the establishment of three agricultural villages, referred to at that time as pueblos (Gumprecht 41). One of these villages was the first European settlement along the Los Angeles River and was called El Pueblo de la Reina de Los Angeles (Gumprecht 39). Established in 1781, the pueblo would use the river’s water to grow and transform into the preeminent city in the West now known as Los Angeles. Such a transformation would ultimately devastate the river and the surrounding land, but not before turning Los Angeles into one of America’s richest agricultural regions.
The settlement was originally only twenty-eight square miles in size and was occupied by less than ten families (Gumprecht 43). The settlers’ primary concern was constructing a water delivery system. The settlers constructed a distribution system of crude dams, water wheels, and ditches through which the river water was channeled to meet both irrigation and domestic needs. By use of this system, the pueblo became self sufficient by 1786 and within the next few years it was the second greatest producer of grain out of all the California missions (Gumprecht 46).
With the help of Indian labor, by the early 1800s Los Angeles had become the most important agricultural settlement on the West Coast (Gumprecht 46). Initially, the pueblo produced mainly barley, what, corn, and beans, but the ample supply of water from the river allowed farmers to diversify their crops; the most significant addition was oranges, which were introduced in 1815 (Gumprecht 51). By the mid-1800s, nearly every householder in the settlement had a garden (and eventually a small orchard or vineyard) next to his home. This was all made possible by the Los Angeles River, which historian J. Gregg Layne called “the blood of life” to Los Angeles (Gumprecht 53).
For almost a century after its establishment, Los Angeles remained primarily an agricultural village, and the local economy continued to depend on farming even in the 1900s (Gumprecht 47). Few travelers were drawn to Los Angeles in its early years, but those who did stop by Los Angeles in the early-to-mid-1880s wrote about the lush gardens and orchards that filled the city, giving it a reputation as a garden paradise. Unfortunately, these romanticized depictions of the once-tiny pueblo would help guarantee its ultimate failure and the eventual destruction of the river that supported it (Gumprecht 54). After California became a state in 1850, Los Angeles’ population began to grow rapidly, and the simple conditions characteristic of the pueblo were too primitive for many of the newcomers, bringing about changes to the city, such as the expansion of the irrigation system, that would precipitate the beginning of the decline of the Los Angeles River.
This post was authored by Alice Bitzer and Katherine Moreno
Gumprecht, Blake. The Los Angeles River: Its Life, Death, and Possible Rebirth. Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A.: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999. Print.
“History of the River: Re-connecting L.A. to Its River.” History of the River. Los Angeles River Revitalization Corporation, n.d. Web. 10 Apr. 2013.
Reisner, Marc. Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water. New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Viking, 1986. Print.
The Delta Smelt is a small endemic fish of the Sacramento-San Joaquin estuary. Maturity is reached when the fish are 55-70 mm in length and most die after a year. They mainly live in areas where salt and fresh water mix and they can find an abundance of zooplankton to feed on. Spawning, however, occurs in fresh water areas just upstream of the mixing zone. These little fish are very susceptible to changes in population size because of their short life cycle (1 year) and their low fecundity. Because of these two factors, environmental changes have a great impact on the survival of the species. When there is sufficient water in the estuary, the mixing zone moves into the Suisun Bay, which lies to the west of the Sacramento-San Joaquin river delta. This is better for the fish because the zone expands over a larger area and there are more available food sources for the fish (Moyle, 1992). When water is diverted for agricultural use, the water level is lowered and mixing occurs in the narrow delta channels, an ill suited habitat for delta smelt spawning (Moyle, 1992). There have been declines in the population of this endemic species since the 1980s, and many blame the increasing diversion of estuary water for irrigation (Moyle, 1992).
In an effort to stabilize the species, the delta smelt has been categorized as an endangered species, and therefore is under the protection of the Endangered Species Act. This act limits the amount of water that can be pumped from the delta waters, especially during the spawning period, March through May. The impacts of this protection burden the Central Valley farmers who rely heavily on the waters from the estuary to irrigate their fields.
The Central Valley, one of California’s most productive agricultural areas, relies on this irrigation water because of the lack of natural rainfall that actually occurs in the area. Originally, the Central Valley farmers relied on an underground aquifer to irrigate their croplands, leaving the estuary undisturbed. When agriculture expansion occurred, however, water had to be diverted from the Sacramento-San Joaquin delta region in order to decrease pressure on the aquifer. In 2007, limits were imposed on the amount of water that could be pumped from the delta in order to protect the endangered delta smelt, forcing the irrigation pumps to be shut off. Without access to freshwater from the north, the land in the Central Valley becomes arid and unsuitable for agricultural use. This loss of agricultural land has left thousands in the Central Valley without jobs (Howitt et al., 2009).
Central Valley farmers have been pressuring politicians to return their irrigation water, outraged at the prospect of losing their livelihoods to save a tiny, seemingly insignificant fish. The H.R.1837 bill, with the promise of turning the irrigation pumps back on, offered a positive outlook for struggling farmers when it passed House in 2012 (H.R. 1837, 2011). This hope, however, was snuffed out with its failure to pass in the Senate, and a promised veto from President Obama should it pass (Statement of Administration Policy, 2012). With little progress made in the way of protection of the delta, it is not likely that the restrictions will be lifted any time soon. By February of 2013, 232 delta smelt were killed as a result of pumping stations approaching the annual limit of 302 allowed by the Endangered Species Act at a dangerously high rate (Quinton, 2013).
As of now, the pumps remain off but tensions remain high. With these two opposing needs in mind, the California Department of Water Resources has suggested a new system that aims to appease both parties; a $14 billion twin tunnel system. This project would channel the water from beneath the delta to pumping stations in Tracy, California, which lies South of the Delta (Woodard, 2012). Though the proposal offers benefits for both conservation and irrigation, many are opposed to its large price tag (Woodard, 2012). Until a better solution is found, it is not likely that restrictions will be lifted.
This post was authored by Alice Bitzer and Jana Matsuuchi
Howitt, Richard, Josue Medellin-Azuara, Duncan MacEwan. “Measuring the
Employment Impact of Water Reductions” Department of Agriculture and
Resource Economics and Center for Watershed Sciences, UC Davis (2009): 1-10.
“H.R. 1837–112th Congress: Sacramento-San Joaquin Valley Water Reliability Act.”
Moyle, Peter B., Bruce Herbold, Donald E. Stevens, and Lee W. Miller. “Life History
and Status of Delta Smelt in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Estuary, California.”
Transactions of the American Fisheries Society 121.1 (1992): 67-77. Print.
Quinton, Amy. “Delta Smelt Deaths Means Less Water for Central and
Southern California.” KPBS. Capital Public Radio, Feb. 2013. Web. Mar. 2013.
Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 1837 – Sacramento-San Joaquin Valley Water
Reliability Act (2012) (testimony of Rep. Nunes, R-California, and 2 Cosponsors).
Woodard, Niki. “California Water: The Muddy Issue of the Delta Twin
Tunnels.”California Forward. N.p., Aug. 2012. Web. Mar. 2013.
March 19, 2013
Los Angeles. The land of sandy beaches, beautiful people, and most importantly beautiful weather. A city whose only worry is whether or not winter will be too warm, or too cool (a chilling 60 degrees)–or so most people think. The Los Angeles that is remembered is one of a picture perfect city, whose environmental policy is at the forefront of the nation. Yet, what many disregard is the role that politics played at the turn of the century, which forged a much different Los Angeles than what we imagine today.
As a growing major metropolis, the city’s demographic and economic growth boomed at the beginning of the 20th century, which played key factors in the degradation of the beautiful environment. Yet, the powerful politicians driving this LA political machine set aside environmental pollution controls to further their personal gain and loyalty toward corporation and utility companies (Sabin, 96). As a result, the state of the city’s environment took a back seat and became increasingly degraded by continued demographic expansion and industrialization. Because of this, air pollution from smokestacks created by industrial entities and health hazards from limited municipal garbage collection began to negatively affect many of the Los Angelinos. Unlike decision makers, who tended to be middle class Angelinos with high stakes in meeting the needs of businesses, those most affected were blue collar workers and lower middle class citizens. These citizens had high stakes in the values of their homes which were being polluted and lowered in value by the high level of pollution (Sabin, 103). Yet, even when the well-being of its people were at risk, “adverse decisions by governing agencies on how to proceed with regulation [of these pollutants] occurred in a business-oriented, technocratic, non-democratic fashion redirected at delegitimizing or even crushing counter-proposal and opposing agendas” (Keil, 308). The political power of Los Angeles emerging into a diverse metropolitan city thus took precedence time and time again over the health of its people and its environment. This further extended into the largest economic boost of Los Angeles’ history: oil production.
The political machine that existed in Los Angeles played a significant role in the development of the oil and gas industry in the city. In the early 1900s pollution was particularly bad due to the conversion of coal and petroleum into a gas. This process created pollution in the form of tar and soot, and the ever-increasing pollution severely angered homeowners in the region. At the time, the LA Gas and Electric Company had an extremely close relationship with the local government. In fact, many “ward representatives often depended on the company to provide the money, patronage, and campaign workers to retain their power” (Sabin 83). And, in return, the government helped LA Gas and Electric gain a monopoly by shutting out competitors, and did nothing to address the complaints of the local residents about the intense pollution due to the company’s work. Thus, the government was in the pocket of the gas company, and paid little to no attention to the needs of the residents and homeowners.
In 1936 Standard Oil supported a ballot proposal that would allow it to access oil underwater by drilling diagonally from land. The oil giant gained to support of the parks department and the government by convincing them that the drilling royalties could easily be used to improve state parks. Voters in LA County were strongly opposed to the proposition, but there was little they could do against the powerful lobbyists of Standard Oil, and the proposition easily passed (Elkind 87). In 1931 Standard Oil lobbied Governor Rolph to veto a bill that would transfer tidelands to the city of Huntington Beach (Sabin 104). Drilling in Huntington Beach was contributing to overproduction, which was lowering the price of oil overall. Thus, they wanted to reduce oil output in order to increase prices. Once again, Standard Oil used its economic might to lobby and convince the government to act in its favor, regardless of what was in the best interest of the environment and local residents.
As the health and environment of Los Angeles continued to fail, businesses eventually echoed their concerns for the sake of the city as a whole, primarily from deteriorating property values in the real estate trade. Simultaneously, the structure of politics within the city shifted as machine politicians were replaced by progressive reformers who were less controlled by the influence of big corporations and oil companies. As the residents of Los Angeles fought to protect their homes and the value of their environment, the political machine of Los Angeles shifted towards an agenda that demanded the protection of their coastal waters and their air from industrial pollution.
By Sophie Cottle & Victoria Chu
Elkind, Sarah S. “Oil in the City: The Fall and Rise of Oil Drilling in Los Angeles.” Journal of
American History 99.1 (2012): 82-90. Print.
Keil, Roger and Gene Desfor. “Making local environmental policy in Los Angeles.” Elsevier
(1993):Vol. 13, No. 5 pp 303-313. Print
Sabin, Paul. LAnd of Sunshine: An Environmental History of Metropolitan Los Angeles (2005):
Los Angeles is naturally a very dry county. You wouldn’t really know this about LA, because it has tons of lakes, rivers, and lush landscapes, right? However, it all really goes back to the late 1800s, when city officials realized that Los Angeles would not be able to supply water to its constituents at the rate of its growing population. Los Angeles had been rapidly using up its water resources and city officials were desperate to find more.
Fred Eaton, the city mayor, and William Mulholland, the head of the predecessor to the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP), were two major players in what became a water scandal. They looked to the north-eastern part of California, namely at the Owens River and its surrounding tributaries, and strategically bought land to assume the water rights of the region (Elliot-Fisk 1995). Marc Reisner, in his book Cadillac Desert, described their political moves as “chicanery, subterfuge … and a strategy of lies.” They diverted the Owens River water and consequently created the Los Angeles Aqueduct. However, all this water still wasn’t enough. So, by 1941, city officials decided to divert water from the Owen’s River that would be supplying Mono Lake.
Mono Lake, located in Mono County, California, is at least 760,000 years old. It is a terminal lake, which means that it has no outlet of water to the ocean. In fact, in some parts of the lake, it is more than twice as salty as the ocean. Regardless, it has an extremely productive ecosystem of brine shrimp, algae, and alkali flies. It also houses a nesting habitat of a huge migratory bird population of 2 million every year. So when the Angelinos diverted four out of the five tributaries that supplied the lake, the rate of evaporation from the lake exceeded the influx of water. In 41 years, Mono lake lost over half of its water and its salt concentration doubled. The lake lost 45 feet of water depth! This is why the tufa towers are visible on the lake to this day. The brine shrimp and alkali fly populations diminished as a result of the increased salinit and they were important food sources for the migratory birds that passed through Mono Lake (Elliot-Fisk 1995). Additionally, many of the wetland and woodland areas around the lake were threatened by the decreases in runoff.
Because of the various environmental problems that slowly began to degrade Mono Lake, several citizens of Mono County formed the Mono Lake Committee (MLC) in 1978 to ensure its protection from future degradation. A year later, the committee, along with the National Audubon Society (NAS), took LADWP to court on a Public Trust Suit, stating that water diversion of the lake’s tributaries were a violation of the Public Trust Doctrine, an ancient legal doctrine established since the time of Roman law that protects navigable bodies of water for the public’s benefit and use. This suit opened the way to a series of legal battles with MLC against LADWP for not only violating the Public Trust Doctrine, but several other California environmental regulations, including violations of the California Environmental Quality Act and California Fish and Game Codes. The suits brought up to the California Supreme Court required that LADWP release certain amounts of water flow to the tributaries that fed into Mono Lake and amended some of its Water Licenses. The series of suits eventually led the State Water Resources Control Board to make a landmark decision in 1994, D.1631, to amend LADWP’s water licenses to the Mono Lake tributaries because of its violations of the California Fish and Game Codes and to protect the lake’s public trust values. This decision limited how much water LADWP could divert from the lake and would hold it accountable for the restoration of the lake’s ecosystem.
Since the Water Board’s decision in 1994, Mono Lake is showing some signs of improvement that seems to resonate outside the area. For instance, LADWP and the MLC are working together for the continued restoration of the lake; the partnership between the two committees, however, still needs to develop more. In Los Angeles, the cause for less water diversion has caused for people in the city to use less water and to conserve it more. Since the Water Board’s decision in 1994, the lake’s level has slowly risen to about 10 feet higher than what it was before 1994. Although the future may seem bright, the current threat of climate change may influence how much water enters the lake in a few years. A recent study on projected changes in climate may affect the hydrology of the Owens Valley and Mono Basin watersheds which could affect how much runoff from precipitation in the Sierra Nevadas could enter the watersheds and ultimately affect how much water may be available to people in California, especially in Los Angeles, in the future. While the study shows the uncertainty on whether climate change in Mono Lake’s region will produce more or less rain and snow precipitation, what is clear is that the amount of water will certainly change and is causing people, especially state legislators, to consider the future regarding water management. Needless to say, the near future for Mono Lake is headed into the right direction, but its long-term future may change if climate change has anything to say about it.
By Sergio Avelar & Daria Sarraf
Costa-Cabral, M. (2012). snowpack and runoff response to climate change in the owens valley and mono lake watersheds. Climatic Change, 116(1), 97-109. doi: 10.1007/s10584-012-0529-y
Elliott-Fisk D. 1995. Sidebar: Mono Lake compromise: A model for conflict resolution. Calif Agr 49(6):15-16. DOI: 10.3733/ca.v049n06p15
According to the California Department of Fish and Wildlife, a Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are “discrete geographic marine or estuarine areas designed to protect or conserve marine life and habitat.” Like the definition implies, these areas are protected by special laws limiting certain types of human activity. In California, this is done through the use of three distinct types of MPAs that restrict different kinds of human activity: State Marine Reserves, State Marine Parks, and State Marine Conservation Areas.
State Marine Reserves are the least limiting of the three designations, and are generally open to the public for recreational and commercial purposes, though efforts are taken to preserve the Reserve in an “undisturbed and unpolluted state” (“Definitions”). According to the California Department of Fish and Wildlife, State Marine Reserves are usually established for a few reasons: to protect rare or threatened native plants and animals; to protect or restore marine species, habitats, and ecosystems; to protect or restore important sources of gene pool diversity such as large populations of a species; and to provide areas for marine scientific research.
The next type of area, the State Marine Park, also attempts to maintain a natural marine ecosystem, though this type of area also places limits on human activity for “commercial exploitation purposes” (“Definitions”). While these areas may be established for any of the same reasons as a State Marine Reserve, State Marine Parks may also be established for “spiritual, scientific, educational, and recreational opportunities,” as well as to protect certain geological features that are considered important (“Definitions”). These areas are marine parks in the same way that some forests are terrestrial parks; they are intended for human recreation rather than commercial exploitation.
The final type of Marine Protected Area in California is the State Marine Conservation Area. This type of area is the most restrictive of the three types: “it is unlawful to injure, damage, take or possess any specified living, geological or cultural marine resources for certain commercial, recreational, or a combination of commercial and recreational purposes” (“Definitions”). These areas are also known colloquially as “no take areas.” While these areas can be established for any of the same reasons as a State Marine Reserve, they are usually established to protect particularly important living or geological resources.
Unfortunately it is often difficult to enforce strict adherence to the established rules for a few reasons. Sometimes recreational boaters are not even aware that an MPA exists in the area, or, if they do know an MPA exists, they may be unaware of the rules governing the type of MPA established. Furthermore, even if the boater is aware that an MPA exists and knows what types of regulations are in effect, effective enforcement mechanisms such as the coast guard or police boats may be out of reach. From our experience talking with the residents of our USC Wrigley Institute on Catalina Island we learned the “no take” area at Big Fisherman Cove gets frequent intruders in the form of recreational fisherman. Although residents attempt to warn or chase off the fishermen the island’s single police boat is often too far away to provide effective enforcement.
To date outside of evaluating the problems associated with the enforcement of existing MPA boundaries the primary focus of study has been on understanding the ecological impact of designating an area as a marine reserve. While the intent behind MPAs has traditionally been the conservation of a species or particular type of habitat, scientists are increasingly considering incorporating social science perspectives into both the design and implementation of marine reserves. For example, ecosystem managers are working to include stakeholders in the process of designing and placing MPAs in order to better assess the consequences of MPAs on both fishing yields and profits. By taking into account socioeconomic factors and the impact of MPAs on the local community scientists are hoping to better “account for and balance the multitude of human uses and more effectively address the cumulative impacts affecting the overall health of an ecosystem”(Gaines et al).
The Commission for Environmental Cooperation recently (December 2012) published two new guides in the hopes of aiding intergovernmental cooperation in establishing Marine Protected Areas: “Scientific Guidelines for Designing Resilient Marine Protected Area Networks in a Changing Climate” and a “Guide for Planners and Managers to Design Resilient Marine Protected Area Networks in a Changing Climate.” The CEC recognizes that marine resources do not obey national boundaries, including this map, appropriately without borders, in its recent publication.
The aforementioned publications differ in their target audiences: the former is geared towards scientists collecting data for MPAs while the latter is focused more on informing public leaders of how to organize the creation of MPAs. The “Guide for Planners and Managers” suggests four main guidelines should be observed when creating MPAs, mandating the protection of “Species and Habitats with Crucial Ecosystem Roles or Those of Special Conservation Concern,” with effort to protect the “Full Range of Biodiversity Present in the Target Biogeographic Area,” as well as protecting “Potential Carbon Sinks” and the “Ecological Linkages and Connectivity Pathways” necessary for species to migrate from differing habitats.
One of the ways ecosystem managers have sought to reconcile conservation goals with social and economic interests is through the establishment of marine reserve networks. Marine reserve networks not only allow for habitat connectivity, but also allow for ecosystem managers to increase the benefits of a series of smaller reserves “without excluding human uses over large areas”(Gaines et al.). While the establishment of marine reserve networks has only occurred recently, the benefits of marine reserve networks established by both scientific and socioeconomic information has already been documented in the Channel Islands National Marine Sanctuary by Hamilton et al. In this paper Hamilton et al. documents that marine reserve network has resulted in an increase in both density and biomass of the target fish species.
Another, albeit larger, example of a marine reserve network is the California State Marine Reserve established from the Marine Life Protection Act. The Marine Life Protection Act (MLPA) was a law passed by the state of California in 1999 with the expressed intent of improving both the design and management of marine protected areas in California State waters through the use of the best available science. Some of the major goals of the MLPA initiative included protecting the natural diversity and abundance of marine life, improving recreational, educational, and study opportunities, protect marine natural heritage, and ensure MPAs have clearly defined objectives. Overall the project spanned the 1,100 miles of the California coast and focused on five regions: the North Coast, North Central Coast, Central Coast, South Coast, and San Francisco Bay.
This extensive undertaking that began in 2007 and was completed in 2012 includes 124 MPAs and 15 complete closure areas. In the Southern California region the MPAs created by the MLPA project account for 354 square miles ( ~15% of total area) and include biodiversity hotspots such as the kelp beds off of La Jolla, Lover’s Cove on Catalina Island, and Naples Reef. Of the 50 marine reserves in the south coast region 37 were implemented as a result of the passage of the MLPA.
CEC. 2012. Guide for Planners and Managers to Design Resilient Marine Protected Area Networks in a Changing Climate. Montreal, Canada. Commission for Environmental Cooperation. 42 pp.
“Definitions and Acronymns.” DFG.CA.gov. California Department of Fish and Wildlife, 21 Jan. 2010. Web. 21 Feb. 2013.
Gaines, Steven D., Lester, Sarah E., Grorud-Colvert, Kirsten, Costello, Christopher, and Pollnac, Richard. “Evolving Science of marine reserves: New developments and emerging research frontiers.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 107.43 (2010).18251-18255.
Hamilton, Scott L., Caselle, Jennifer E., Malone, Dan P. and Carr, Mark H. “Incorporating biogeography into evaluations of the Channel Islands marine reserve network.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 107 (2010). 18272-18277.
Regions & MPAs. California Marine Protected Areas Educational Resources.Web. http://www.californiampas.org/pages/regions.html. Feb. 21 2013.
In the early 1890s, the city of Los Angeles was just beginning to recover from an economic depression. The city was looking for something to boost its economy after this downturn, and the answer seemed to lie within a resource that had been discovered and used on a smaller scale for generations: oil. Exploiting this oil, some argued, would boost both the economy as well as industries by providing inexpensive energy. Edward Doheny and other American businessmen quickly took advantage of this new opportunity. By the end of the 1890s, there were over five hundred oil wells in a relatively small area of downtown.
While the oil industry seemed to provide the economic boost the city had been looking for, it also had numerous drawbacks. The sudden boom in this industry led to the building of countless oil derricks, which had a significant impact on the city. These large and noisy structures took over whole neighborhoods, and aside from the impact of the structures themselves, the oil pumping leaked oil and natural gas; some Los Angeles residents felt that the oil industry was destroying the city. The building of oil derricks continued, and as this was still relatively new and primitive technology, it was unregulated. Oil would often leak and pour out onto streets, into gutters, and through residential areas. These issues caused a call for regulation, but as the oil industry was so new and profitable, officials were initially hesitant to take any action. Regulations gained support in the early 1900s, but official measures were largely unsuccessful, and the oil industry continued to thrive.
By the 1920s, the state of California began to look to the Pacific Coast as a rich new source of oil. This area offered significantly large oil fields, which were estimated to be more than 5 billion barrels. Accordingly, increased pressure grew to exploit these reserves, but this was a complex issue; recreation, tourism, and beachfront homeowners would be significantly impacted if California proceeded with coastal oil development. As a result, a battle ensued between the government who wanted to drill in coastal areas, and coastal cities who wanted to preserve their beaches. Numerous protests and lawsuits ensued until the California court ruled in favor of the government’s right to prospect all non-public coastal land. Coastal drilling proceeded, but the battle was far from over. Throughout the 1920s and beyond, there was continued controversy about whether or not southern California’s coastal oil should be exploited, particularly in Santa Barbara.
After a catastrophic oil spill from Platform A off of the coast of Santa Barbara in 1969, leasing of offshore tracts was stopped due to the high visibility of the incident and the strong public opinion against offshore drilling. Because of the ban on leasing in state and federal waters, and the fact that California is not thought of as a highly productive oil region, many people do not realize the extent of California’s oil production today.
In spite of the aforementioned drilling bans, drilling continues on pre-existing sites that had already attained leases. The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, or BOEM, reports that, as of 2009, there are twenty-three oil and gas platforms off of the California coast that have produced a cumulative 1.24 billion barrels of oil.
Even more surprising are the figures for onshore oil fields in California. According to a 2004 study done by the California Department of Conservation, there are 208 active oil fields producing nearly 270 million barrels in 2004 alone, or a cumulative 27 billion barrels. And this production is not likely to stop any time soon, with fifty-one of California’s oil fields estimated to have a total of 100 million barrels of cumulative discoverable oil, the largest of which, Midway-Sunset, still has just shy of 11 thousand producing wells.
When thinking about the likelihood of Los Angelinos allowing another situation like the early twentieth century to occur in order to capitalize on a large cache of oil, the answer seems clear. Current day Californians pride ourselves on being some of the most environmentally conscious and forward thinking in the nation. We look back on the days when oil fields intruded along our sandy shores and tell ourselves confidently that we would never let this happen.
However, there is a subtler and possibly more troubling trend that threatens our environment now. Hydraulic fracturing may not be happening on beaches up and down the coast, but it is happening in California. The Inglewood Oil Field has undergone a reported twenty-three hydraulic fracturing operations since 2003, according to its owner. Many sources, including the academy award-winning documentary Gasland, chronicle disconcerting connections between ‘fracking’ and human health. With all the uncertainty that surrounds hydraulic fracturing and its side effects on the water table and the concerning lack of regulation, it seems that Californians should know what they are getting into before future generations look back with disbelief as we do now on Southern California in the early 1900’s.
This post was written by Lindsey Estes, a senior pursuing a B.A. in Environmental Studies with a minor in Political Science, and Kyle Ferree, a senior pursuing a B.S. in Environmental Studies.
Sarah S. Elkind
“Oil in the City: The Fall and Rise of Oil Drilling in Los Angeles”
Daniel Johnson & Paul Sabin
Land of Sunshine: An Environmental History of Metropolitan Los Angeles
2004 Oil and Gas Statistics