



Steeped in International Affairs?: The Foreign Policy Views of the Tea Party¹

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The Tea Party is a powerful new force in American domestic politics, but little is known about its supporters' views on foreign affairs. New survey data indicates that supporters of the Tea Party exhibit attitudes on international relations consistent with the Jacksonian tradition in American political thought but not, as some have maintained, isolationist opinions of the Jeffersonian variety. Jacksonians are supporters of a strong defense and a large military presence abroad and are opposed to Wilsonian global idealism. The article operationalizes support for these three different foreign policy traditions by connecting them to previous findings on the structure of American foreign policy. The effect of Tea Party affiliation on foreign policy attitudes is severely weakened, however, once we control for political ideology, particularly economic conservatism. As is the case in domestic politics, Tea Party sympathizers seem to be somewhat ordinary conservatives, not a completely new breed. There is a direct parallel between their domestic attitudes and their foreign policy attitudes. Their lack of support for idealistic policies abroad, their most prominent set of attitudes, is part and parcel of a lack of social solidarity indicated in their more economically libertarian position at home.

The election of Barack Obama as President of the United States was thought by many at the time to herald a new era in governmental activism and the waning of free market ideology as a major force in American politics. Yet just two years later, the rise of the Tea Party and its anti-regulatory and small government agenda showed this conclusion to be premature, if not demonstrably false. On domestic issues such as raising the debt ceiling, newly elected members of Congress with links to the Tea Party have flexed their muscle and decisively influenced the debate and the outcome. The movement seems here to stay.

If we accept this premise, it raises the important question of what the Tea Party thinks about foreign policy. This issue has received only slight attention in the popular press and has certainly not been systematically analyzed by academics. There are strong reasons to believe that the Tea Party has no particular foreign policy views at all (O'Rourke 2010). First, the movement's primary focus is domestic spending issues. When asked whether there was a Tea Party line on foreign policy, Dick Armey, a former member of the House Republican leadership and now a prominent organizer for Tea Party affiliates, replied, "I don't think so." He then turned to a colleague and asked, "Do you see a common thread there?" (Shear 2010). Second, after an initial understanding of the Tea Party as populist independents rising up against entrenched elites and party interests, it is now generally understood that its sympathizers are overwhelmingly

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conservative Republicans (Williamson, Skocpol and Coggin 2011). Perhaps their foreign policy views are simply those typical of American conservatives today.

Third, those few observers of Tea Party foreign policy views see the movement as divided between those who back a traditional Republican internationalist and strong defense agenda and those who support a more isolationist course of international disengagement and military draw-down. These have been referred to, respectively, as the Palinite and Paulite wings of the party, after Sarah Palin on the one hand and Ron and Rand Paul on the other (Baker 2010; Rogin 2010; Shear 2010). The three figures are extremely popular within the movement and can be seen as symbolic leaders. The split between these two wings might make it impossible to speak of a consistent Tea Party foreign policy, but because the Tea Party cares too much about foreign policy, not too little. It might simply be too divided.

In the only sustained analysis of the question, the prominent foreign policy intellectual Walter Russell Mead situates this question in the broader traditions of foreign policy thinking in the United States. He argues that the Tea Party is an expression of a longstanding Jacksonian tradition in American politics and has the foreign policy views to match. Jacksonians are foreign policy hawks who endorse an expansive military presence abroad to protect the United States from foreign threats. They are hostile to multilateralist, Wilsonian initiatives to promote global security. The best assurance of peace lies in a strong national defense. Mead predicts that this strand of foreign policy thinking, the Palinite wing, is stronger in the Tea Party than the more isolationist, Jeffersonian tradition identified with the Paul family, which opposes expansive military policies as executive encroachments on liberty that create more conflicts than they solve (Mead 2011).

Is the Tea Party steeped in international affairs? What is its favorite brew? To date, surveys on the Tea Party have not included many questions on foreign policy attitudes. More importantly, there has been no systematic analysis of the broader foreign policy orientation, the general approach, of Tea Party supporters. Below I present data from a new You Gov/Polimetrix survey that asks respondents the extent to which they identify with the Tea Party as well as a large number of questions that have been used to decipher the structure of foreign policy opinion in the American body politic. I find support for Mead's hypothesis. High thermometer ratings for the Tea Party are positively associated with an index of "militant internationalism," negatively related to "cooperative internationalism," constructs used in the literature on the structure of American foreign policy beliefs. The combination captures the Jacksonian tradition. Tea Partiers, however, are not isolationist. If the Paul family speaks for the Jeffersonian tradition, it has few true believers alongside among Tea Party sympathizers.

However, the effect of Tea Party support is significantly weakened on foreign policy orientation once political ideology, both social and economic conservatism, is included in the analysis. Tea Partiers have the same ideological profile on foreign policy as average conservatives. Research and polls have shown that on domestic political issues, Tea Party supporters' attitudes are not really different from that of typical American conservatives (Williamson et al. 2011). The same is true in foreign policy as well.

The structure of Tea Party attitudes on foreign affairs also demonstrates a direct parallel to that of their domestic political attitudes. Economic conservatism has been found in other studies to be associated with lower cooperative internationalism, whereas social conservatism generally goes along with militant internationalism (Rathbun 2007). The Tea Party is more economically conservative than socially conservative, the former indicating a lack of concern for the welfare of others at home. On a parallel level, on issues of foreign policy those who identify with the Tea Party movement are more opposed to the notion of a global community than they are supportive of active political-military engagement. The Tea Party's opposition to global solidarity and multilateralism seems

to arise from the same ideological place as their resistance to providing economic assistance at home.

In the sections below, I first briefly elaborate on the Mead typology and how it might be operationalized for survey work by drawing links to the literature on the structure of American foreign policy opinions. In the data analysis, I measure cooperative internationalism, militant internationalism and isolationism using factor analyses, generating factor scores that allow us to assess the determinants of the foreign policy proclivities of survey respondents and the effect of feelings toward the Tea Party, controlling for political ideology and other demographic variables. I conclude with some thoughts about the implications of the findings for academic research on the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy and the potential effect of the Tea Party on foreign policy.

Mead's American Foreign Policy Traditions

In his landmark book, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World*, Walter Russell Mead (2002) identifies a number of traditions in American foreign policy thinking, highlights their core principles, and traces their influence historically on US relations with the rest of the world. Of most importance for an analysis of Tea Party views is the Jacksonian tradition. Jacksonians paint a grim picture of international relations. Mead writes, "Jacksonian society draws an important distinction between those who belong to the folk community and those who do not....Jacksonians are bound together in a social compact; outside that compact is chaos and darkness" (2002: 236). Americans are generally seen as morally superior to those outside, and the United States must be vigilant in protecting itself from threats abroad. Consequently they are supporters of the military and a robust defense. Mead writes, "Given the moral gap between the folk community and the rest of the world....Jacksonians believe that international life is and will remain both violent and anarchic. The United States must be vigilant, strongly armed" (Ibid: 246). This can lead to the aggressive use of military force. Jacksonians feel that "at times we must fight preemptive wars. There is absolutely nothing wrong with subverting foreign governments or assassinating foreign leaders whose bad intentions are clear" (Ibid). The best defense is a good offense.

Consistent with this threatening view of the world, Jacksonians adopt a foreign policy strategy akin to what international relations scholars call the "deterrence model" (Jervis 1976). The United States must demonstrate its resolve so as to build a reputation for toughness and prevent aggression by malevolent others. Mead writes, "Jacksonian opinion is sympathetic to the idea that our reputation, whether for fair dealing, cheating, toughness, or weakness, will shape the way others treat us.... You can deal with a bully only by standing up to him. Anything else is appeasement" (2002: 251). However, this is not purely a question of bargaining strategy. Jacksonians are also fierce defenders of American honor. Jacksonians demand that America's greatness be respected abroad. This also requires that the United States meet its moral obligations to others. "The honor code also requires that we live up to our commitments. We have obligations to those we have promised to protect" (Ibid).

Although Jacksonians do not relish the use of force, when it is used, they believe it must be decisive and overwhelming. Mead writes of the tradition: "The first rule of war is that wars must be fought with all available force... There is only one way to fight: You must hit them as hard as you can as fast as you can with as much as you can. Nothing else makes sense" (2002: 254). Jacksonians do believe in fighting fair unless others do not. "Honorable enemies fight a clean fight and are entitled to be opposed in the same way; dishonorable enemies fight dirty wars and in that case rules don't apply..."

Adversaries that observe the code will benefit from its protections; those that want a dirty fight will get one" (Ibid: 252). Opponents' lack of morality excuses America's response. "Since foreign evildoers have forced us into war, whatever casualties the other side suffers are self-evidently the fault of their own leaders rather than of the United States" (Ibid: 255).

The Jeffersonian tradition in American foreign policy shares some features with Jacksonianism, including a less than favorable view of outsiders and a general pessimism about the ability to transform international relations (Monten 2005). "Jeffersonians and Jacksonians would be happy if the rest of the world became more like the United States, though they don't find this likely. They resist, however, any thought of the United States becoming more like the rest of the world," writes Mead (2002:175). However, Jeffersonians believe that the best way to protect American interests is to remain aloof and separate from other countries. They are the true isolationists in American foreign policy. The Jeffersonian tradition is reflected in Washington's Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine, both which advised the United States to cordon off its neighborhood from others, particularly the European great powers (Legro 2005; Dueck 2006; Jackson 2006; Patrick 2009).

Jeffersonians oppose the aggressive pursuit of American interests abroad through military means because they are the guardians of freedom at home. They focus their attention on protecting American liberty against encroaching federal power. Jeffersonians see themselves as defenders of the ideals of the revolution that differentiate the United States from its former colonial occupiers. "Liberty is infinitely precious, and almost as infinitely fragile. They believe, perhaps more than anyone else, that democracy is the best possible form of government, but they constitute the only major American school that believes history is not necessarily on the side of the American experiment," writes Mead (2002: 183). One of the greatest threats to liberty is an extensive military presence abroad. Large standing armies and navies accumulate debts and necessitate concentrated power in a federal government that pursues secretive policies that are the very antithesis of open and transparent governance. Jeffersonians believe that the threats that Jacksonians see are not nearly as threatening as "things we may do to ourselves as we seek to defend ourselves against others, or even as we seek to advance our values abroad" (Ibid:184).

Jeffersonians and Jacksonians often form alliances against the advocates of another tradition in American foreign policy—Wilsonian idealism (Legro 2005; Dueck 2006; Jackson 2006; Patrick 2009). Wilsonians have an agenda of progressively transforming international affairs through some combination of the promotion of democracy, the construction of international organizations, and the development of humanitarianism and a cosmopolitan identity. They are more universalist than the more nationalistic Jacksonians and Jeffersonians. Wilsonianism has origins in the domestic progressive movements at the turn of the twentieth century (Ambrosius 1987; Knock 1992; Cooper 2001).

Jacksonians are deeply skeptical of these initiatives, as they share with Jeffersonians a narrower, more self-interested conception of the national interest. This is why they are often confused for isolationists (Nincic 1997; Lake 1999; Rathbun 2007). They are uninterested in, sometimes hostile to, incorporating moral values in American foreign policy. However, it should be kept in mind that these are qualitatively different belief systems about what international relations are and should be like. "Often Jeffersonians and Jacksonians will stand together in opposition to humanitarian interventions or interventions in support of Wilsonian...world-order initiatives. However, while Jeffersonians espouse a minimalist realism under which the United States seeks to define its interests as narrowly as possible and to defend those interests with an absolute minimum of force, Jacksonians approach foreign policy in a very different spirit, one in which honor,

concern for reputation, and faith in military institutions play a much greater role,” writes Mead (2002: 245). Unilateralism and hawkishness are substantially different from disengagement and withdrawal.

Linking Qualitative and Quantitative Research on Foreign Policy Orientation

Mead’s typology is qualitative and macro-historical in nature. How might we begin to test what he has to say about today’s Tea Party as latter-day Jacksonians at this moment in time? Ole Holsti (2004) offers a clue. Research on the structure of American foreign policy opinion has found that two major dimensions structure most of mass and elite attitudes on international affairs in the United States (Holsti and Rosenau 1988, 1990; Wittkopf 1990; Murray 1996; Murray and Cowden 1999; Rathbun 2007). Holsti, along with his coauthor Jim Rosenau, argues that particular combinations of these two attitude clusters, militant internationalism (MI) and cooperative internationalism (CI), allow for the construction of a fourfold typology (1988). Jacksonians, he suggests, are *hardliners* high in MI and low in CI. Wilsonians are *accommodationists* with the exact opposite ideological make-up. Isolationists oppose both types of internationalisms whereas internationalists support both (Holsti 2004: 55). The concepts of MI and CI were originally inductively derived through factor analyses of surveys of American respondents. However, subsequent analyses at both the mass and elite levels seem to have settled on similar interpretations of the latent values underlying the factors.

Militant internationalism captures positive respondent attitudes toward force and coercion. In other articles (Rathbun 2007), I call this “hierarchy,” Chittick, Billingsley and Travis (1995) “militarism” and Nincic and Ramos (2010) a “negative incentives-based means of policy.” Questions typically used to capture this latent variable evoke the discussion above. Militant internationalists believe that “rather than simply countering our opponent’s thrusts, it is necessary to strike at the heart of an opponent’s power.” An embrace of the importance of a strong reputation is evident in a belief that “there is considerable validity in the ‘domino theory’ that when one nation falls to aggressor nations, others nearby will soon follow a similar path” (Holsti and Rosenau 1988, 1990; Wittkopf 1990; Murray 1996; Murray and Cowden 1999; Rathbun 2007).

Cooperative internationalism indicates support for promoting the welfare of others abroad. In Rathbun (2007), I call it “community,” Chittick et al. (1995) “multilateralism,” and Nincic and Ramos an “other-regarding” foreign policy. Those with high scores on cooperative internationalism believe in promoting human rights, strengthening international institutions, giving international aid, and protecting the global environment (Holsti and Rosenau 1988, 1990; Wittkopf 1990; Murray 1996; Murray and Cowden 1999; Rathbun 2007). CI marks a sense of global identity and solidarity. Based on the discussion of Mead above, Holsti’s intuition seems correct. Jacksonians are militant internationalists who oppose cooperative internationalism; Wilsonians are cooperative internationalists who oppose militant internationalism.

Jeffersonians, in contrast to Jacksonians and Wilsonians, seek a more generic withdrawal from foreign affairs. While Holsti and Rosenau believe that isolationism is indicated by low scores on cooperative and militant internationalism, others have found a separate third dimension of isolationist thinking about international relations separate from militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism that seems to indicate isolationism (Chittick et al. 1995; Rathbun 2007). Isolationism is expressed in survey items like: “America’s conception of its leadership role in the world must be scaled down,” “Our allies are perfectly capable of defending themselves and they can afford it, thus allowing the United States to focus on internal rather than external threats to its well-being,” and

“We shouldn’t think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own problems.” All of these question load highly on the same dimension in factor analyses. If the third dimension appears in the factor analysis of survey data, scores on this dimension offer an additional and perhaps a better measure of isolationism than a particular combination of low CI and MI.

Hypotheses

We can evaluate Mead’s claim about the general foreign policy orientation of the Tea Party, as well as other hypotheses. We might consider three hypotheses that, albeit it for different reasons, are skeptical that there is any independent effect of Tea Party sympathy on foreign affairs.

H1: *The Tea Party is a primarily domestic phenomenon and its adherents will have no systematic views on foreign affairs.*

H2: *The Tea Party is split between Paulite and Palinite wings and therefore its supporters will have no coherent views on foreign affairs.*

H3: *The Tea Party is simply a collection of conservative Republicans. Sympathy with the Tea Party will have no independent effect on foreign policy views once we account for political ideology and partisan identification.*

Three more hypotheses would make specific predictions about the substance of Tea Party beliefs.

H4: *The Tea Party is a reflection of the Jeffersonian tradition in American politics and its sympathizers will be more isolationist. They will also have low scores on both militant and cooperative internationalism as well.*

H5: *The Tea Party is a reflection of the Jacksonian tradition in American politics and its sympathizers will demonstrate higher scores on militant internationalism and lower scores on cooperative internationalism.*

Data Analysis

Predictors of Tea Party Support

A new data set of 1,200 Americans collected by an Internet-based YouGov/Polimetrix survey in the second week of January 2011, designed in concert with the author, contains questions both on foreign policy orientation as well as Tea Party support. Survey respondents were asked to score the Tea Party on a scale from 0 to 100 with 0 representing very cold feelings toward the group and 100 very warm. I divide scores by 10 to allow for easier interpretation. The thermometer has a mean value of 4.7 for the sample, with a standard deviation of 3.4. Americans appear to be somewhat evenly split on the Tea Party and highly polarized.

Before I turn to foreign policy, however, I first explore the correlates of Tea Party support. Table 1 presents the results of an OLS regression with Tea Party sympathy as the dependent variable. As has been seen in previous work (Williamson et al. 2011), Model 1 shows that Tea Party sympathizers are more likely to be old than young. Whites sympathize with the Tea Party more than other races. Economic wealth is not statistically significant, except that those who prefer not to reveal their household income are more favorable to the Tea Party. Four-year college graduates and those who attended graduate school are less likely to support the movement. Education is negatively associated with Tea Party support.

For model 2, I also add dummy variables for party identification with independent being the excluded category. I also generate a scale for economic

TABLE 1. Predictors of Tea Party Sympathy

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>
Age	.04*** (.01)	.01 (.01)
Race	.84*** (.23)	.10 (.19)
Sex	.42* (.20)	.03 (.16)
Education		
Some college	.32 (.24)	.24 (.19)
College graduate	-.68* (.31)	-.27 (.22)
Graduate School	-1.59*** (.38)	-.34 (.28)
Household Income		
Prefer not to say	.94** (.33)	.06 (.26)
Middle	-.03 (.24)	-.31 (.19)
High	.44 (.31)	-.47* (.23)
<i>Party Affiliation</i>		
Democrat		-.75*** (.20)
Republican		.67*** (.21)
Economic Conservatism		1.42*** (.12)
Social Conservatism		.81*** (.12)
Constant	2.06	4.21
R^2	.08	.52
N	1075	982

Table entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; Independent is excluded category for partisan identification. Gender is dummy variable with male coded as "1". High school diploma and no high school are the excluded categories for education. Race is a dummy variable with whites coded as "1" and all other races as "0". Household income of \$0 to \$30,000 is the excluded category for income. Middle income is \$30,000 to \$80,000; high income is above \$80,000. Dependent variable is scaled from 0 to 10. Economic and social conservatism are standardized variables. Tea Party sympathy is based on a ten point scale.

conservatism on the basis of answers to five questions: whether government regulations protect society or unfairly hurt business, whether the government should do more to promote income equality, whether more resources should be devoted to welfare spending, whether healthcare is a right or a privilege, and whether business and individuals solve problems better than government. Questions' wordings are listed in the Appendix. Cronbach's alpha was .80, and principal components analysis yields only one factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1 accounting for 56% of the variance.

I also generate a score for *social conservatism* on the basis of six questions: support for the legalization of marijuana, the legalization of gay marriage, gun control, a belief in punishment to make offenders pay for the wrongs they have done, a belief that "new lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of society," and support for the statement that respondents want to "deport residents who are not in the US legally" rather than "allow residents who are not in the US legally

to remain in the country.” Cronbach’s alpha was .7, and only one factor emerged in a factor analysis using principal components, explaining 40% of the variance.

For both latent variables of political ideology, I generate factor scores. With this method, independent variables in the regression equation are the standardized observed values of the items in the estimated factors or components. These predictor variables are weighted by regression coefficients, which are obtained by multiplying the inverse of the observed variable correlation matrix by the matrix of factor loadings and the factor correlation matrix. This is a least squares regression and is a multivariate procedure that takes into account not only the correlation between the factors and between factors and observed variables (via item loadings), but also the correlation among observed variables, as well as the correlation among oblique factors. The factor scores are the dependent variables in the regression equation. Variables are standardized so they have a mean of 0 and a variance of 1 for use as independent variables.

Once party affiliation and ideology are accounted for, the effect of demographic variables is weakened. None besides income are statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level. High household income has a negative effect on Tea Party support compared to a lower socio-economic standing. As expected, given its origins in opposition to health-care reform, economic conservatism is highly associated with Tea Party support. Moving from the minimum score of economic conservatism found in the survey to the maximum is associated with an increase in just over 6 points on the 10-point Tea Party scale. And as has also been previously reported, Tea Partiers are also more socially conservative, although the effect is somewhat weaker than that of economic attitudes. Unsurprisingly Republicans identify more with the movement than independents, Democrats less. Party identification and ideology increase the fit of the model dramatically.

Factor Analysis of Foreign Policy Attitudes

The survey was designed partly by the author to include questions used to measure broader foreign policy orientations, which can then be used as dependent variables to capture the general foreign policy views of Tea Party supporters and detractors. So as to get a sense of the structure of foreign policy attitudes in the sample, Table 2 presents the results of a principal components analysis including a number of questions similar or identical to those used in previous studies to

TABLE 2. Three Dimensions of Foreign Policy Attitudes

<i>Foreign Policy Attitudes</i>	<i>MI</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>Isolationism</i>
Resolve	.70	-.06	.20
Prevent expansion	.82	.07	-.04
Striking at the heart	.71	-.03	.12
War is necessary evil	.83	.05	-.08
Torture	.27	-.37	-.03
United Nations	-.08	.74	.15
Global environment	.05	.74	-.10
Foreign Aid	.17	.62	-.37
Home focus	.18	-.14	.70
Mind own business	-.09	.01	.75
No permanent friends	.28	.10	.53
Secret diplomacy	.25	-.22	-.47
Eigenvalue	3.14	2.43	1.91
Proportion of Variance	.26	.20	.16

Table entries are factor loadings derived from a principle components analysis retaining all factors with an eigenvalue > 1 and using oblique, promax rotation. N = 986.

capture the three factors discussed above. The analysis generates three factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. Given both prior findings in the foreign policy opinion literature (Murray and Cowden 1999; Rathbun 2007) and what we know of Mead's foreign policy typology, I used an oblique rotation that allows the factors to be correlated with one another.

The first dimension is the militant internationalism factor, marked by strong loadings of items measuring support for *striking at the heart* of an opponent's power, and *preventing expansion* by aggressive powers. Both of these questions have been used by other others to tap into MI (Murray and Cowden 1999; Rathbun 2007). Those who score on that dimension also think that "the United States must demonstrate its *resolve* so that others do not take advantage of it," part of the "deterrence model" of thinking in foreign affairs. Militant internationalists in general are comfortable using force, even if they are not enthusiastic. They believe that that "going to war is unfortunate but sometimes the only solution to international problems" (*war is necessary evil*).

The second dimension is that of cooperative internationalism. In Rathbun (2007), I use questions on the global environment, foreign aid and the United Nations as measures of this latent variable and all load highly on the second factor in this sample as well. Cooperative internationalists are willing to "expand the power of the *United Nations*, even if the US might have less influence in international affairs" and "protect the *global environment* even if that hurts US economic growth." Cooperative internationalists stress cosmopolitan solidarity. CI seems to indicate more of a value-driven American foreign policy. For instance, those who score high on this construct reject the notion that captured terrorists deserve to be tortured.

The factor analysis does in fact reveal the presence of a third, isolationist dimension, anchored by high loadings on the two questions capturing generic opposition to international engagement—"the US should *mind its own business* internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own" and "we should not think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems and building up our strength and prosperity here at home" (*home focus*). The longstanding Jeffersonian belief that the United States should avoid foreign entanglements is evident in the high loading of the statement that "nations have *no permanent friends*, only permanent interests." Perhaps the best marker of Jeffersonianism in foreign affairs, the notion that foreign policy should be open and transparent, is highly associated with this factor as well. A forced choice question reveals that isolationists reject the notion that "when it comes to diplomacy, the US government sometimes needs to keep secrets from its citizens," instead siding with the sentiment that "the American public has the right to know everything the US government does" (*secret diplomacy*). Jeffersonians are historically strong critics of the concentration of foreign policy decision-making authority in the executive branch and advocates for congressional oversight (Mead 2002; Monten 2005; Patrick 2009).

Effect of Tea Party Support on Foreign Policy Attitudes

Using the results in Table 2, I generate factor scores using regression scoring for CI, MI, and isolationism for use as dependent variables in a series of OLS regression models. Each is again standardized with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Tables 3, 4, and 5 gauge the effect of Tea Party sympathy on the three different foreign policy constructs of isolationism, MI, and CI, respectively. The analyses use robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity although a Cook Weisberg tests confirms that the variance is

constant. All the analyses below are weighted so that the survey approximates a national probability sample, although attaching such weights barely affects the results.¹

Table 3 gauges the effect of Tea Party sympathy on isolationism or Jeffersonianism. Model 1 shows that supporters of the movement are no more isolationist than those who are not. Model 2 shows that once we control for militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism, the coefficient even becomes weakly negative. And this effect and its statistical significance increases when we take into account party affiliation and political ideology. The substantive effect remains small. Moving from one end of the Tea Party scale to the other is associated with only a .50 decrease in isolationism, which has a range of about 6 units. Nevertheless, in terms of foreign policy, the Tea Party is definitively not a Jeffersonian phenomenon, at least at the level of the mass public. In fact, Tea Partiers oppose isolationism. We can reject hypothesis #4. Isolationism is negatively related to CI, but not statistically significantly related to MI. This gives us an indication that it is best to use the factor score based on the third dimension found in the factor analysis than to use a combination of low scores on CI and MI to measure the concept.

Table 4 shows the effect of Tea Party support on militant internationalism, Table 5 on cooperative internationalism. Model 1 in the first (second) indicates that warm feelings toward the movement lead to higher (lower) scores on MI (CI). Tea Party supporters have Jacksonian tendencies, even after we control for the covariation among the different constructs in model 2 of each table. We find support for Mead's hypothesis #5 and as a consequence can reject hypotheses #1 and #2 about the incoherence of Tea Partiers foreign policy views. This provides more evidence that Tea Party supporters are generally Jacksonian rather than Jeffersonian.

The standardization of the coefficients allows something of a direct comparison of the relative effects of Tea Party support on CI and MI. Looking at model 2 in both Table 4 and Table 5, we see that those who identify with the movement appear to be more anti-cooperative than they are pro-militant. They are more opposed to cosmopolitan solidarity than they are supportive of vigorous and assertive American foreign policy. The CI variable is also more robust to the inclusion of MI in the model than vice versa.

The effect of Tea Party support, however, on MI and CI is significantly weakened when we control for domestic political ideology as evident in model 3 in Tables 4 and 5. Placing measures of social and economic conservatism in the model performs two functions. First, it allows us to assess whether Tea Party identification, in and of itself, has an effect on foreign policy attitudes. Second, it provides a way to further assess the viability of using CI, MI and isolationism to capture Jacksonianism, Jeffersonianism and Wilsonianism. Jacksonians are social conservatives. Mead describes them as populist defenders of the American "folk community" at home, a sentiment which typically has a racial and nativist element. They stress traditional values. They believe in "loyalty to family, raising children 'right', sexual decency (usually identified with heterosexual

¹ YouGov uses sample matching techniques to draw "representative" samples from non-randomly selected pools of respondents in online access panels, which consist of internet users who were recruited via banner ads, purchased email lists, and other devices. The sample matching technique begins by drawing a stratified national sample from a target population (in this case, the 2006 American Community Survey). Rather than contacting these individuals directly, which would be prohibitively expensive, YouGov utilizes matching techniques to construct a comparable sample from its existing internet panel. Members of the matched sample are then contacted and invited to participate in the survey. After selection, the sample is weighted to match the target population on a series of demographic factors. Although the matched sample has been drawn from a non-randomly selected pool of opt-in respondents, it can in some respects be treated as if it was a random sample. These matched samples resemble the broader public on a number of socio-demographic variables; however, since respondents self-select into the original panel they may differ from the broader public on unmeasured variables like political interest and awareness.

TABLE 3. Effect of Tea Party Support on Jeffersonian Isolationism

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
Tea Party thermometer	.01 (.01)	-.02† (.01)	-.05** (.02)
Militant internationalism		.05 (.05)	-.03 (.05)
Cooperative internationalism		-.16*** (.04)	-.08† (.05)
Economic conservatism			.07 (.06)
Social conservatism			.32*** (.05)
Party affiliation			
Democrat			.05 (.09)
Republican			-.19* (.09)
Age	.01** (.002)	.005† (.002)	.002 (.003)
Race	-.05 (.08)	-.07 (.08)	-.03 (.08)
Sex	-.02 (.07)	-.06 (.07)	-.06 (.07)
Education			
Some college	-.10 (.08)	-.11 (.08)	-.03 (.09)
College graduate	-.23* (.10)	-.24* (.10)	-.14 (.10)
Graduate School	-.26* (.13)	-.22† (.12)	-.08 (.12)
Household Income			
Prefer not to say	.13 (.12)	.10 (.12)	.13 (.12)
Middle	.05 (.08)	.04 (.08)	.02 (.08)
High	.05 (.10)	.01 (.10)	.004 (.11)
Constant	-.25	.02	.16
R^2	.02	.05	.10
N	882	882	822

Table entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; † $p < .10$. Independent is excluded category for partisan identification. Gender is dummy variable with male coded as "1". High school diploma and no high school are the excluded categories for education. Race is a dummy variable with whites coded as "1" and all other races as "0". Household income of \$0 to \$30,000 is the excluded category for income. Middle income is \$30,000 to \$80,000; high income is above \$80,000. Dependent variable is scaled from 0 to 10. Economic and social conservatism are standardized variables. Tea Party sympathy is based on a ten point scale.

monogamy)... Corporal punishment is customary and common," writes Mead (2002: 234). Wilsonian idealism abroad had its roots in progressivism at home. Wilsonians should be economically liberal.

The effect of Tea Party support on MI and CI is indeed weakened by the inclusion of social conservatism and economic conservatism. MI is somewhat more robust than CI but the effect of Tea Party support on militant internationalism is nevertheless substantively and somewhat statistically weak ($p < .05$). Controlling for domestic political variables, moving from the coldest to the warmest feeling toward the Tea Party is associated with only an increase of .30

TABLE 4. Effect of Tea Party Support on Militant Internationalism

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
Tea Party thermometer	.11*** (.01)	.06*** (.01)	.03* (.01)
Isolationism		.03 (.03)	-.02 (.03)
Cooperative internationalism		-.34*** (.04)	-.24*** (.05)
Economic conservatism			-.04 (.06)
Social conservatism			.35*** (.05)
Party affiliation			
Democrat			.13† (.08)
Republican			.19** (.07)
Age	.01*** (.002)	.01* (.002)	.002 (.002)
Race	-.04 (.07)	-.08 (.07)	-.04 (.07)
Sex	.21*** (.06)	.15* (.06)	.16** (.06)
Education			
Some college	.02 (.08)	.01 (.07)	.06 (.07)
College graduate	-.04 (.09)	-.05 (.09)	.04 (.09)
Graduate School	-.22* (.10)	-.15 (.09)	-.02 (.10)
Income			
Prefer not to say	-.05 (.09)	-.11 (.09)	-.11 (.09)
Middle	.06 (.08)	.03 (.07)	-.002 (.07)
High	.20* (.09)	.12 (.09)	.07 (.09)
Constant	-.99	-.51	-.37
R^2	.21	.29	.36
N	882	882	822

Table entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; † $p < .10$. Independent is excluded category for partisan identification. Gender is dummy variable with male coded as "1". High school diploma and no high school are the excluded categories for education. Race is a dummy variable with whites coded as "1" and all other races as "0". Household income of \$0 to \$30,000 is the excluded category for income. Middle income is \$30,000 to \$80,000; high income is above \$80,000. Dependent variable is scaled from 0 to 10. Economic and social conservatism are standardized variables. Tea Party sympathy is based on a ten-point scale.

units on MI, which is roughly a six-unit scale. It is even smaller for CI, which has a similar scale. There is therefore a good deal of support for hypothesis #3. Just as previous research has raised questions that the Tea Party is anything qualitatively different than a conservative mass movement with typically rightist domestic views, the same appears to be true in terms of its adherents' foreign policy attitudes.

Given the particular combination of Tea Party attitudes—low in CI, high in MI, neutral to negative on isolationism—the lack of robustness of the Tea Party thermometer variable is unsurprising given that hawkishness and resistance to

TABLE 5. Effect Of Tea Party Support on Cooperative Internationalism

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
Tea Party thermometer	-.14*** (.01)	-.11*** (.01)	-.02 (.01)
Isolationism		-.10*** (.03)	-.04† (.02)
Militant internationalism		-.28*** (.03)	-.17*** (.03)
Economic conservatism			-.37*** (.04)
Social conservatism			-.18*** (.04)
Party affiliation			
Democrat			.15* (.06)
Republican			-.03 (.06)
Age	-.01*** (.002)	-.01*** (.001)	-.01*** (.001)
Race	-.12† (.06)	-.13* (.06)	-.08 (.06)
Sex	-.18** (.06)	-.13* (.05)	-.07 (.05)
Education			
Some college	-.05 (.07)	-.06 (.07)	-.06 (.06)
College graduate	-.05 (.09)	-.09 (.08)	-.13† (.07)
Graduate School	.21* (.10)	.12 (.09)	.03 (.09)
Income			
Prefer not to say	-.16† (.09)	-.16† (.09)	-.10 (.08)
Middle	-.08 (.07)	-.06 (.06)	-.03 (.06)
High	-.22* (.09)	-.16† (.08)	-.02 (.08)
Constant	1.40	1.09	.50
R^2	.33	.41	.54
<i>N</i>	882	882	822

Table entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; † $p < .10$. Independent is excluded category for partisan identification. Gender is dummy variable with male coded as "1". High school diploma and no high school are the excluded categories for education. Race is a dummy variable with whites coded as "1" and all other races as "0". Household income of \$0 to \$30,000 is the excluded category for income. Middle income is \$30,000 to \$80,000; high income is above \$80,000. Dependent variable is scaled from 0 to 10. Economic and social conservatism are standardized variables. Tea Party sympathy is based on a ten-point scale.

globalism marks conservative foreign policy thinking at this particular historical juncture, as indicated by other studies (Holsti and Rosenau 1988; Murray and Cowden 1999; Rathbun 2007; Nincic and Ramos 2010), and Tea Partiers are conservative and largely Republican in party affiliation.

This allows us to explore the question—why do Tea Party sympathizers believe what they do, a somewhat different question than what they believe. In Rathbun (2007), I argue that economic liberalism and CI go together as both tap into a degree of concern for the welfare of others, one that applies both home and abroad. MI and social conservatism are driven by a desire for strong authority at

the domestic and international level, respectively. Holsti and Rosenau (1988) reveal similar associations using the same data, and Nincic and Ramos (2010) offer a similar, perhaps identical, interpretation.

These results suggest that my model also seems to explain attitudes at the mass level. MI seems to emerge from the same ideological place as social conservatism, as the latter variable is substantively and statistically significant in Model 4. Economic progressivism is very predictive of CI in Model 5; the effect of social libertarianism is also statistically significant but somewhat weaker.

As both economic and social conservatives, it is natural that the Tea Party exhibits the same tendencies of being higher in MI and lower in CI. My framework also helps explain why the latter is more salient than the former. At home, the Tea Party is marked more by its economic conservatism than its social concerns, even though the latter are still important. This indicates less concern with the welfare of others. They appear to draw conclusions about foreign affairs consistent with this domestic ideological stance. They oppose for instance foreign aid spending or global multilateralism for the greater international social good in the same way they resist domestic regulation to benefit American society at large. Tea Party supporters have militant internationalist attitudes to go with their social conservatism, but just as the latter is somewhat less important to them, so is the former. Their domestic and foreign policy attitudes exhibit a similar structure.

Conclusion

The findings have both important theoretical and empirical implications. In terms of the former, this paper reveals that we can use central constructs from the foreign policy belief literature to connect quantitative work on public opinion with historical insights into American foreign policy. These two literatures almost always move parallel to one another, but the findings above might allow us to build a bridge. To the extent that scholars attempting to fix the meanings of the central cleavages consistently found in research on American attitudes, they have generally looked to identify the abstract values that explain the patterns of correlations of specific issue attitudes (Chittick et al. 1995; Rathbun 2007). This paper suggests a different, although compatible, track of grounding our explorations in US foreign policy tradition and the history of American foreign relations.

In terms of the latter, the high scores of militant internationalism and low scores of CI among those who identify strongly with the Tea Party indicate that the Palin wing is predominant in the party. Had the Paulite views been more prevalent, it would signal a more fundamental reorientation of Republican foreign policy in a qualitatively different direction. John McCain, who among others has raised concerns about a Republican slide into isolationism, can rest easy (Gewen 2010). The movement's effect instead will be a quantitative shift further toward the right toward greater militant internationalism and lower cooperative internationalism. The Tea Party may or may not be necessarily well steeped in international affairs, but we have a sense of their brew.

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Appendix**Question wordings**

Foreign Policy Questions	
Foreign aid	Federal spending on foreign aid (decreased a lot to increased a lot, 5-pt scale)
Global environment	Protect US economic growth even if that hurts the global environment—Protect the global environment even if that hurts US economic growth (forced choice from 1 to 6)
Home focus	We should not think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems and building up our strength and prosperity at home (strongly disagree to strongly agree, 7-pt scale)
Mind own business	The United States should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own (strongly disagree to strongly agree, 7-pt scale)
No permanent friends	Nations have no permanent friends, only permanent interests (strongly disagree to strongly agree, 7-pt scale)
Prevent expansion	The United States should take all steps including the use of force to prevent aggression by an expansionist power (strongly disagree to strongly agree, 7-pt scale)
Resolve	The United States must demonstrate its resolve so that others do not take advantage of it (strongly disagree to strongly agree, 7-pt scale)
Secret diplomacy	When it comes to diplomacy, the American public has the right to know everything the US government does—When it comes to diplomacy the US government sometimes needs to keep secrets from its citizens (forced choice from 1 to 6)
Striking at the heart	Rather than simply countering our opponents' thrusts, it is necessary to strike at the heart of an opponent's power (strongly disagree to strongly agree, 7-pt scale)
Torture	Captured terrorists deserve to be tortured because they want to kill Americans (strongly disagree to strongly agree, 7-pt scale)
United Nations	Reduce the power of the United Nations so that the United States might have more influence in international affairs—Expand the power for the United Nations, even if the United States might have less influence in international affairs (forced choice from 1 to 6)
War is necessary evil	Going to war is unfortunate but sometimes the only solution to international problems (strongly disagree to strongly agree, 7-pt scale)
Social Conservatism	
Deportation	Allow residents who are not in the United States legally to remain in the country—Deport residents who are not in the United States legally (forced choice from 1 to 6)
Gay marriage	Recognize marriage only as a union between a man and a woman—Recognize marriage between gay and lesbian couples (forced choice from 1 to 6)
Gun control	Americans should be free to own any type of gun they want—The government needs to tightly regulate possession of certain types of guns, such as assault rifles (forced choice from 1 to 6)
Legalization	Keep marijuana illegal, as it is today—Legalize marijuana (forced choice from 1 to 6)
New lifestyles	New lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society (strongly disagree to strongly agree, 7-pt scale)
Retributiveness	The purpose of punishment should be to make offenders pay for the wrongs that they have done (strongly disagree to strongly agree, 7-pt scale)

(continued)

Appendix (*continued*)

Economic Conservatism	
Business/individual over government	Businesses and individuals can solve problems better than government can (strongly disagree to strongly agree, 7-pt scale)
Government regulation	Government regulation unfairly hurts businesses—Government regulations protect society (strongly disagree to strongly agree, 7-pt scale)
Healthcare	Healthcare should be a privilege for those who can pay for it—Healthcare is a right and should be provided to all citizens regardless of their ability to pay (forced choice from 1 to 6)
Income equality	The government should get out of the business of trying to promote income equality—The government should do more to reduce income inequality (forced choice from 1 to 6)
Welfare	Federal spending on people on welfare (decreased a lot to increased a lot, 5-pt scale)
