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Hierarchy and Community at Home and Abroad

Evidence of a Common Structure of Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs in American Elites

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Although there is increasing evidence of a relationship between domestic and foreign policy attitudes among American elites, we have less of an idea about why these sets of attitudes cohere. The answer lies in a better understanding of what we mean when we talk about "left" and "right" or "liberal" and "conservative." Drawing on the literature on rights theory, partisan cleavages, and ideological continua, I posit the existence of two core values, hierarchy and community, that should manifest themselves both at home and abroad. I perform a principal components analysis on data capturing both the domestic and foreign policy attitudes of American elites. The results indicate an almost identical structure of attitudes in both domains, indicating that it is generally inappropriate to distinguish between the two. Using factor scores in a series of logistic regressions, I demonstrate that support for community is most important for predicting support for humanitarian military operations, while hierarchy and community both help determine positions on strategic missions.

Keywords: *American foreign policy; partisan cleavages; belief structure; elites*

Despite the old American adage that "politics stops at the water's edge," there is increasing empirical evidence that domestic and foreign policy attitudes among American political elites are strongly related (Lumsdaine 1996; Murray 1996). Holsti and Rosenau (1988; 1996) have demonstrated that those identified as liberals at home show greater levels of support for "cooperative internationalism," and stronger opposition to "militant internationalism." Murray, Cowden, and Russett (1999) confirmed these results, showing that both types of internationalism can be reduced largely to a

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single liberal-conservative dimension on which domestic policy variables also fall. E. H. Carr (1964) noted an association between the left and idealism more generally as far back as the interwar years. Yet we have less of an idea about why these sets of attitudes cohere. It makes intuitive sense that conservatives place great emphasis on achieving military superiority and show less interest in ending world hunger. But an intuition is not an explanation. The association suggests that both domestic and foreign policy attitudes are functionally interdependent, emerging from shared common values so as to form an ideology (Converse 1964). They are the manifestation of fundamental principles that structure political debate on both domestic and foreign policy.

The answer to what connects domestic and foreign policy might therefore lie in a more precise conceptualization of what it means to be liberal or conservative at both levels of analysis, a problem that others have raised (Conover and Feldman 1981). This prompts us to draw on the literature on party cleavages in advanced democracies as well as theories of liberalism and rights, areas of research that have developed heretofore in relative isolation from public opinion studies of American foreign policy. Building on this work, I argue that the two core values of political conflict are hierarchy and community. In terms of the former, the key question is to what extent an individual supports distinctions in political, economic, and social power. Hierarchy is opposed to two core values: equality and liberty. A hierarchical order privileges some over others. It is inegalitarian. And that lack of equality limits the freedom of those who do not have access to power, whether it is economic, cultural, social, or physical. It is antilibertarian. In contrast, the second core value, community, elicits positions on an individual's obligations to others. It captures how broadly an individual defines his or her identity rather than how others should be ranked in importance and status.

Using data from Holsti and Rosenau's (1999) survey of American foreign policy elites, I find that the underlying structures of domestic and foreign policy attitudes are virtually identical. In a principal components analysis, indicators of support for domestic hierarchy, whether expressed in terms of class, religion, race, state power, or gender, load in the same direction and on the same dimension as indicators of international hierarchy, such as support for military superiority and patriotism. Items measuring beliefs in a shared national community, such as concern for public health and environmental quality, load on the same dimension and in the same direction as items measuring beliefs in a broader international community, such as support for international aid and protecting human rights. Many constitutive principles of community are egalitarian, such as norms against discrimination, so that variables capturing those sentiments load on both dimensions. Only a third isolationist-internationalist continuum does not structure similarly across the domestic and foreign domains. It elicits general orientations about whether, as opposed to how, the United States should engage others in the world. In contrast to others who project their values indiscriminately across borders, isolationists draw a distinction between home and abroad. Isolationism has a moderate correlation with attachment to a domestic but not overseas community.

This framework helps explain conceptual puzzles in both domestic and foreign policy. In terms of the former, a focus on hierarchy helps resolve why social libertarians tend to be economic interventionists. For instance, fighting against the government sanction of prayer in school aims at preventing the imposition of a religious hierarchy, while redistributive taxation aims at reducing an economic one. In terms of foreign policy, the framework helps us understand the underlying values behind two dimensions that repeatedly emerge in the literature on foreign policy beliefs. Wittkopf (1990) and Holsti and Rosenau (1990) have shown the consistent existence of separate cooperative and militant internationalist dimensions, although it has not been clear what these continua are expressing.[1] What is a cooperative internationalist? Would it not just be the opposite of a militant internationalist? The latter is most likely what I call hierarchy, which does not just capture attitudes toward the importance of military force and anticommunism (the conclusion inferred from the variables that happened to load heavily on this dimension) but is rather a broader concept that has correlates at home as well. The domestic loadings help us demonstrate that the militant internationalism concept is better conceived as a belief that the United States is and should be superior to others in an international hierarchy of power. Similarly, cooperative internationalism is the international manifestation of what I call community, which also has a domestic expression.

Perhaps more important, individuals project their values from home abroad. My framework helps us understand ideological patterns of support for different types of military operations. I show that as support for hierarchy rises, so too does the level of endorsement of the use of force for strategic purposes, such as countering an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia (at a time when Saddam Hussein was still in power) or a North Korean invasion of its southern neighbor. This makes sense since these conflicts with adversaries pose threats to the material basis of American power and challenge its position in the international hierarchy of power. As support for community rises, individuals define their interests less in national terms, and support for strategic operations tends to decline. For humanitarian operations, community is the more powerful predictor. These types of military operations do not threaten American interests since they are fought on behalf of a third party and do not pose any costs to the United States or its position if it does not intervene. Isolationism has a consistent negative impact on support for the use of force, although the effect lessens for conflicts geographically close to home. It is a consistent tendency to avoid international entanglements regardless of the purpose.

This framework helps account for the flip-flopping pattern of support for some military operations and not others, obscured by the notion of consistently hawkish conservatives and dovish liberals or internationalist Democrats and isolationist Republicans (Legro 2000; Osgood 1953). Given that those who identify themselves on the left generally have higher scores on the community scale and lower scores on the hierarchy scale than those on the right, we expect conflicts over strategic issues to be framed between rightist hawks and leftist doves and debates over humanitarian

issues to be framed between leftist idealists and rightist skeptics. Just in the last thirty years, the right has vacillated between 1980s cold warriors, 1990s critics of peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and postmillennial antiterrorist crusaders. The left has opposed the right to some degree in all instances (Rathbun 2004). As Finnemore (2003) demonstrates in other contexts, the purpose of military intervention has changed over time. I find purpose is the key to understanding differences between left and right on the use of force.

In the sections that follow, I first review the efforts by those who study party competition, liberalism, and theories of rights to conceptualize left and right and develop a framework of core political values. I argue that equality and liberty are often improperly regarded either as consistently antagonistic or as independent. When understood as both antagonistic to hierarchy and supplemented by an additional dimension of community, the pattern of political cleavages in advanced democracies becomes clearer. While the discussion might seem abstract and unrelated to foreign policy, it is a necessary foundation for the next section. I analyze the existing research on American foreign policy attitudes so as to determine whether community and hierarchy might be useful for making sense of the pattern of data in these studies. In the third section, I choose indicators for all the key concepts at both the domestic and foreign policy levels. Using principal components analysis, I search for the existence of two dimensions that structure domestic and foreign policy similarly and possibly a separate isolationist dimension independent of domestic affairs. Using these factor loadings, I generate composite variables for hierarchy, community, and isolationism and use them to predict support for six hypothetical uses of force in a logistic regression. I conclude by reviewing some theoretical implications for research in international relations, public opinion, and present-day problems in American foreign policy.

Isolating the Core Values of Political Conflict

In discussing the core values of political conflict in democratic societies, it seems appropriate to begin with the three components of the French revolutionary cry of "liberty, equality, fraternity!" The first two occupy a privileged place in the literature on the meaning of left and right (Eatwell 1989; Rokeach 1973; Feldman 1988), while fraternity is often given short shrift. More than fifty years ago, Lipset (1954, 1153) wrote, "By 'left' we shall mean advocating social change in the direction of greater equality—political, economic, or social". This definition has maintained broad consensus over time (Gerring 1998; Putnam 1973). Parties of the left have historically been on the side pushing for equal treatment, beginning with struggles over the political equality represented by the franchise. The egalitarian left later made the transition from political to economic equality, advocating government intervention in the economy to create a more level material playing field (Marshall 1998). The

opposite of equality was hierarchy. Lipset (1954) writes, "By 'right,' we shall mean supporting a traditional, more or less hierarchical social order, and opposing change towards greater equality," (p. 1135). Alongside resistance to change, hierarchy has been the core concept of psychological studies of conservatism (Jost et al. 2003). The conflict between hierarchy and equality at its most fundamental level involves the exercise of power. The former principle distributes it widely; the latter concentrates it. This can include influence over others or over one's own destiny—what is called self-determination.

The issue has been complicated, however, by the status of liberty. Is it opposed to equality or the natural outgrowth of it? The former view was implicitly taken by work in American politics to model political conflict. Beginning with the pioneering work by Downs (1957), conceptualizations of left-right placement tended to situate parties along a single, material dimension of government intervention in the economy ranging from laissez-faire free market capitalism on the right to interventionism on the left, primarily to promote greater redistribution of wealth. This work implied that the right was best defined by its libertarianism, a tendency undoubtedly reinforced by the geopolitical context of cold war struggle that pitted a Western sphere of freedom against Soviet totalitarian egalitarianism (Rokeach 1973). Gerring (1998) defines liberty as the defining value of the American right since WWII, whereas equality guides the left.

This work, however, mistook interests for ideology. For the right, economic libertarianism might be a genuine ideological conviction. But given that interventionism generally has the aim of redistributing economic goods, it is just as likely that laissez-faire positions arise from a belief in (or at least an indifferent acceptance of) hierarchy. The outcome of capitalism unchecked by government involvement is often a hierarchy of privileged and unprivileged.[2] This would suggest that anti-interventionism is not libertarian and principled in origin but hierarchical and antiegalitarian.

The relationship between equality and liberty and the latter's proper home on the political spectrum is more easily understood if it is noted that liberty depends on equality, with the latter being the fundamental principle of liberal societies. This has been the conclusion reached by rights theorists such as Ronald Dworkin (1977, 272-3) and Jack Donnelly (2003, 43-44). Liberty does not exist without equality but rather depends on what they call "equal concern and respect," a broader concept embracing both values. To justify a denial of individual autonomy requires an appeal to inequality. Inegalitarian hierarchies of control restrict liberty. One cannot be free without being equal. This dependence can be seen in the role of both values in constituting democracy. Voting is the exercise of liberty, of making a choice and determining one's own fate. But this requires political equality so as to ensure access on the same terms to the ballot box. The same is true of most civil and political liberties. Issues such as freedom of expression or sexual preference enhance the freedom of nontraditional voices or groups in society but depend on the principle that all should be equally free to make their own choices.

It is when the exercise of free choice by individuals becomes threatening to the equal concern and respect due others that governments must intervene according to the left. If unchecked liberty has the effect of violating basic principles of equal concern and respect, it is necessary to act. Equal concern and respect require allowing for individual autonomy unless this results in a conception of "liberty as license" that ultimately threatens it (Dworkin 1977, 62; Donnelly 2003, 43). For this reason, while remaining laissez-faire on such issues as speech and morality, the left endorses limited government intervention to rectify inequalities that threaten individuals' abilities to determine their own fates because of such factors as racial discrimination or economic poverty. In these cases, the more fundamental concern of equality trumps liberties. However, in this liberal conception of equality, individuals remain the key focus of concern. Communist systems that sacrifice all liberties for the sake of equality and duty to the state are conceptually distinct and qualitatively different (Howard and Donnelly 1986). When states move away from a rights-based framework, even with the goal of more equal distribution of societal resources, they are no longer respecting their citizens.

This same conceptual distinction applies to the new set of issues put forward by the "postmaterial" or "new" left and right on "values" issues that differ from the materialist concerns of the distribution of resources among classes. Since the 1960s and 1970s, class divisions in advanced industrial democracies have been supplemented by new cleavages (Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984). Inglehart (1971, 1977) first noted the emergence of a new left interested in postmaterial issues such as increased freedom of individual expression, gender equality, and concern for the environment. Given the tremendous success of the postwar economies of Western Europe, he argued that the material concerns of individual well-being were largely satisfied, and voters and parties were free to address nonmaterial questions about values. Voters were moving down a hierarchy of needs. Inglehart (1971, 1977) described this "libertarian" left as forming a new pole of political conflict in opposition to both the old materialist left and right. Flanagan (1982) proposed instead that the new left was joined by a new right stressing its own values issues of limiting immigration and returning to law and order, defining a new sociocultural cleavage completely orthogonal to the old materialist dimension (Betz 1993; Kitschelt 1995).

Over time, however, it became clear that the new left and right did not develop independently from their older counterparts or compete along a fundamentally new dimension of politics. They merely added new issues to the hierarchy-equality cleavage, making a political issue of the status of groups whose role in society was not debated until recently (Kitschelt and Hellemans 1989; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987). Women's liberation, gay rights, and racial discrimination are simply the latest fronts in the battle over equal rights (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976). The new right also applied the value of hierarchy to new societal issues. Anti-immigration feeling drew distinctions between natives and immigrants. In the United States, the new tendency of the right draws much support from a religious critique of the egalitarian and

libertarian excesses of modern society—what is often known as "moral traditionalism" or the "Christian right." The new left was often called libertarian, the new right "authoritarian," but as argued above, the issue was primarily whether these groups were deserving of equal concern and respect (Kitschelt 1988). Equality and liberty are not opposed in these instances.

Understanding equality and liberty as commonly opposed to hierarchy and postmaterialism as just a new version of the hierarchy-equality divide helps explain why, while there is a minority of true libertarians in the United States opposed to government intrusion into almost all aspects of citizens' lives, individuals generally pick and choose where they want the state to intervene. In the United States, social conservatives tend to be economic conservatives opposed to market interference, while economic liberals tend to be social liberals (Holsti and Rosenau 1988). Kitschelt (1994) notes this same clustering in Europe as well. This is not inconsistent. The left's embrace of government intervention in the economy, for instance, through the imposition of progressive taxation or redistribution of wealth, is part and parcel with opposition to government sanctioning of religion in schools. In the former area, the left aims at reducing hierarchy by taking material resources from the rich and giving them to the poor; in the latter, at preventing its imposition by sanctioning either a dominant set of religious beliefs or creating a hierarchy between secularism and people of faith. As support for social conservatism rises, so do promarket sentiments (Kitschelt 1995).

Hierarchy concerns the standing of individuals vis-à-vis one another within a given society. It can be material or nonmaterial. Are some higher on a social, economic, or cultural ladder than others? It is implicated when a political issue involves taking a position on the relative standing and status of two groups, generally because this involves a redistributive tradeoff of some kind. Should the rich pay more in taxes to rebalance economic wealth? Should the often affluent children of white parents be bused to achieve school integration? Should humankind as a species sacrifice its material prosperity to save the natural environment? All of these imply a change in some kind of hierarchy.

Often lacking in a discussion of core democratic values, however, is fraternity, the feeling of general obligation to other citizens within society. Perhaps better described as "community," it is conceptually distinct from hierarchy. To use Tönnies's (2001) famous distinction, is the *gesellschaft* (society) a *gemeinschaft* (community)? Community does not necessarily require individuals to make a tradeoff or a decision about who benefits or is more powerful. It asks instead if the other is in some sense regarded as part of the self. Hierarchy is a vertical dimension, while community is horizontal. The former ranks; the latter encompasses. The notion of paternalism captures how hierarchy and community can mutually coexist. Those who favor a strong authoritative role for religion in society and politics can often demonstrate an intense interest in good works at home and abroad. Community manifests itself in support for the guarantee of what Shue (1996) has called "basic rights," those things that all

human beings should be entitled to. Feldman and Steenbergen (2001) have used the term “humanitarianism” for the same notion. Basic rights are those on which other rights depend. For instance, without the right to bodily integrity, manifested in freedom from torture or arbitrary detention, one cannot participate in the political process. Shue argues that this list is not restricted only to “negative” rights, traditional liberal political and civil liberties. It also includes “positive” rights such as basic health care and economic subsistence.

Many issues implicate both hierarchy and community, particularly those communitarian sentiments that when implemented, necessitate a reallocation of social resources and power. Many of the constitutive principles of community are egalitarian. Efforts at reducing discrimination fall into this category. Given its egalitarian profile, the left is generally more representative of community than the right. Support for remedying the gap between less privileged and those better off is an indication of concern for their basic well-being and an inclusion into a community, whether national or international. But to the extent that it demands a sacrifice and a shift in some kind of status, it calls on an individual’s position on hierarchy.

I therefore hypothesize that there are two primary dimensions in the domestic politics of modern democracies: hierarchy and community. The concepts seem to provide the umbrella necessary to accommodate the various notions of left and right that Inglehart and Huber (1995) find cross-nationally in an open-ended survey: authoritarianism versus democracy, traditional versus new culture, class conflict and xenophobia versus tolerance. These two dimensions are better markers of the left and right than the terms *liberal* and *conservative*. The latter term has become common parlance because the existing state of affairs the right seeks to protect is usually more hierarchical than the one they are arguing against (Jost et al. 2003, 343). Yet, the right can be radical as well, seeking to overturn established egalitarian and libertarian aspects of society. The question remains, however, whether there are foreign policy manifestations of these concepts.

Isolating the Core Values of Political Conflict over Foreign Policy

There appears to be a scholarly consensus that foreign policy beliefs are structured along two to three dimensions (depending on the statistical thresholds for significance that one imposes on the data). The most prevalent scheme has been that developed by Wittkopf (1990) and thoroughly probed by Holsti and Rosenau (1988, 1990, 1996) in a series of articles. Wittkopf (1990) identifies two dimensions: cooperative internationalism (CI) and militant internationalism (MI). Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis (1995) find very similar, likely identical, dimensions. The problem with the CI/MI scheme is the same that has been leveled at most efforts in this research area. As Holsti and Rosenau (1990) note, the CI and MI dimensions are completely inductively derived, creating

difficulties in specifying their meaning (p. 96). Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) complain that there are only "few examples of theory-guided research. While there is general consensus that foreign policy attitudes are somehow interrelated, few authors have paid much attention to the questions of why or how they are related" (p. 1102). Although their critique is leveled at studies of mass opinion, it applies equally to elites. It also applies to our understanding of the link between domestic and foreign attitudes.

MI is thought to have two major components: attitudes on the use of force and the threat of communism (Holsti and Rosenau 1990, 98). Conversely, CI involves attitudes toward détente and international cooperation (Holsti and Rosenau 1988, 255; Wittkopf 1990). According to the definitions implied by their labels, however, MI and CI would not be separate dimensions but would define the poles of a single continuum. The opposite of cooperation is after all conflict, and that is what militant means. Yet their research continually indicates at least two separate although related dimensions (Murray, Cowden, and Russett 1999). A more precise specification of just what these continua are capturing is necessary. What, if not cooperation and militarism, is the framework capturing? The previous discussion of community and hierarchy provide some help.

Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) argue in their study of mass foreign policy beliefs that anticommunism and militarism, concepts similar to MI, both spring from the more fundamental value of "ethnocentrism," the belief that the United States is superior to other countries. This is analogous to the hierarchy dimension in domestic politics described above. They explain, "If an individual truly believes that the United States is vastly superior to other countries in the world, this belief would certainly bolster the idea that the appropriate posture of the government should be the aggressive pursuit of our national interests (i.e., militarism). . . ." (p. 1108). It appears that MI might be a manifestation of a broader belief that the United States should sit atop the international hierarchy and should jealously guard its interests. This would explain both components of MI. As the primary threat to the global position of the United States, those concerned with hierarchy would naturally have placed a greater emphasis on containing communism and have had greater doubts about the Soviet Union's peaceful intentions. More generally, military power is the key element in establishing and preserving America's status in the world, so those emphasizing hierarchy should stress the importance of maintaining superior armed forces as well as the efficacy and even the morality of that strategy, even after the end of the cold war. Hierarchy is a broader concept than just the use of force, but military power should be the primary expression of that principle in international politics, given its anarchical nature.[3]

Regarding CI, Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis (1995) find the same dimension as Wittkopf (1990) and Holsti and Rosenau (1988; 1990; 1996) but more precisely identify its characteristics. They label this dimension "multilateralism," which they describe as an "identity" continuum that captures the inclusiveness of respondents' identity. More multilateral respondents favor the protection of human rights, strengthening the United Nations as the embodiment of a broader world society, and

combating world hunger. These associations suggest that CI is not the opposite of MI but rather a sense of obligation to the broader international community. This might be the foreign policy manifestation of the community dimension mentioned above. I use the term *community* instead of *multilateralism* only because the latter term might be confused for a process of decision making under international institutions (Ruggie 1992). Community is a broader concept evident in the belief that others should be helped and should participate in the management of international affairs. It is also a more generic term applying to both the domestic and foreign policy spheres. This conceptualization helps resolve what Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis (1995) consider anomalies. The authors are surprised that attitudes toward protecting weaker nations and bringing democracy to others do not fall under their security dimension, their analogue to MI. But since these questions were pitched generally rather than as part of the cold war struggle, these would logically fall under the dimension that captures obligations to the international family of nations and humankind.

Having attempted to specify more precisely the meaning of the hierarchy and community dimensions of foreign policy, it is still necessary to address the question of isolationism. The cleavage between isolationists and internationalists occupies the most prominent position in historical studies of ideological conflict over America's role in the world, at least up until the early 1950s (Legro 2000; Osgood 1953). Numerous studies of American foreign policy attitudes have hypothesized that in addition to a choice about how the United States relates to the world, evident in positions discussed above, is an equally important decision about whether to do so (Kegley and Wittkopf 1982). Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis (1995) list isolationism-internationalism as a third dimension in their analysis.

There are two theoretical possibilities. First, isolationism might be a by-product of attitudes on other dimensions—an effect rather than a cause. Wittkopf (1990) suggests this when he defines isolationism as a combination of opposition to both CI and MI. A lack of concern for others beyond United States shores because of a lack of communal feeling would have the effect of not engaging with others. Support for a less hierarchical international order in which force is not used to obtain goals might be confused with isolationism, since it would involve calls to bring American troops home. Or conversely, isolationism might be associated with an endorsement of hierarchy. "[T]o the degree that ethnocentrism fosters a self-centered or parochial view of the world, the tendency may be to draw inward into an isolationist shell rather than to push outward in the world," write Hurwitz and Peffley (1987, 1108). In any case, this conception of isolationism, as the de facto result of a choice rather than its motivating factor, might explain the strange bedfellows sometimes found in the isolationist and internationalist camps. McClosky (1967) complained already decades ago that "internationalist . . . has been employed to describe world federalists, pacifists, members of the Peace Corps, supporters of the United Nations, and even war hawks who favor unilateral military action to maintain American hegemony" (p. 55).

The second possibility, however, is that isolationism is a genuine ideological tendency. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) find a strong relationship between isolationism on one hand— measured by a general inclination to avoid engagement in international affairs—and ethnocentrism. But unlike most ethnocentrists, isolationists generally do not believe that warfare is a moral means of statecraft. Given that this works against the normal tendency, it suggests an autonomous group. Only if an individual consistently refuses to interact with the international environment in almost any way on the basis of a prior belief that such engagement yields no benefit can he of she be considered a true isolationist (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, 1108). There is no a priori theoretical reason to favor either conceptualization of isolationism. I will examine both possibilities.

Testing for a Common Structure of Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs

Expectations

The literature review above hypothesizes that domestic and foreign policy variables can both be traced to common antecedents, the core values of hierarchy and community. In the analysis that follows, I perform a principal components analysis to extract the latent variables. My expectation is that there will be at least two dimensions and possibly a third, depending on whether isolationism forms a distinct dimension. I use Holsti and Rosenau's (1996) dataset ($N = 2{,}515$), based on an elite mail survey with respondents randomly selected from *Who's Who in America*, as well as State Department officials, labor officials, foreign policy experts, military officers, and media leaders. It is by far the greatest and most extensive collection of questions on both domestic and foreign policy of all surveys, both at the mass and elite level. And many of its questions, although they seem repetitive, offer subtle changes in question wording so as to implicate different values, as will be seen.

I identify a battery of questions that measures attitudes toward domestic policies as well as a battery that measures attitudes toward foreign policies. They are more or less evenly balanced between the two. More crucial than the number of dimensions, which merely replicates previous studies, is how the indicators load. For each category, there are three types of variables: (1) those that are likely to elicit positions on hierarchy, (2) those that are likely to elicit positions on community, and (3) those that should draw on both. All variables are scaled (and in some cases rescaled) so that higher scores indicate what I might expect from the right side of the political spectrum: more hierarchy and a more restricted sense of community, both at home and abroad. This was confirmed by performing simple correlations for each variable with self-identification along a liberal-conservative continuum. Table 1 lists the variables, the question wording, and the response that receives the highest value. Except for two questions with

Table 1
Variables, Question Wording, and Core Values

Variable Name	Highest Value	Question Wording
Domestic Policy Battery		
Community		
Health	Too much	We are spending too much money, too little money, or about the right amount
Environmental Pollution	Not at all serious	Environmental problems such as air pollution and water contamination
Problems of Poor	Not at all serious	An inability to solve such domestic problems as the decay of cities, homelessness, unemployment, racial conflict, and crime
Social Security	Too much	We are spending too much money, too little money, or about the right amount
Hierarchy		
Privacy	Agree strongly	Requiring that applicants for marriage licenses, insurance policies, and some jobs be tested for AIDS
Decriminalization	Disagree strongly	Legalizing drugs such as cocaine to reduce drug-related crimes
School Prayer	Agree strongly	Permitting prayer in public schools
School Choice	Agree strongly	Providing tuition tax credits to parents who send children to private or parochial schools
Hierarchy and Community		
Equal Rights Amendment	Disagree strongly	Reviving the Equal Rights Amendment
School Busing	Disagree strongly	Busing children to achieve school integration
Redistribution	Disagree strongly	Redistributing income from the wealthy to the poor through taxation and subsidies
Environmental Regulation vs. Growth	Agree strongly	Relaxing environmental regulation to stimulate economic growth
Foreign Policy Battery		
Community		
Human Rights	Not at all important	Promoting and defending human rights in other countries
International Aid	Not at all important	Helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries
Protecting Weak	Not at all important	Protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression
UN Strength	Not at all important	Strengthening the United Nations

Hierarchy		
Military Superiority	Very important	Maintaining superior military power worldwide
Patriotism	Agree strongly	Declining patriotism at home undermines the effectiveness of United States' policies abroad
Preemption	Agree strongly	Rather than simply countering our opponent's thrusts, it is necessary to strike at the heart of an opponent's power
Domino	Agree strongly	There is considerable validity in the "domino theory" that when one national falls to aggressor nations, others nearby will soon follow a similar path
Hierarchy and Community		
UN Dues	Disagree strongly	American failure to meet its financial obligations to the UN unnecessarily undermines the UN's effectiveness
Development Gap	Not at all effective	How effective do you consider narrowing the gap between rich and poor nations as an approach to world peace?
Sovereignty	Disagree strongly	The time is ripe for the United States and other countries to cede some of their sovereignty to strengthen the powers of the UN and other international organizations
Aid vs. Inflation	Disagree strongly	The United States should give economic aid to poorer countries even if it means higher prices at home
Isolationism		
Scale Back	Agree strongly	America's conception of its leadership role in the world must be scaled down
Superpower Involvement	Disagree strongly	The United States is the world's only superpower and must thus become involved in any region when political stability is threatened
Burden Sharing	Agree strongly	Our allies are perfectly capable of defending themselves and they can afford it, thus allowing the United States to focus on internal rather than external threats to its well-being
Problems at Home	Agree strongly	We shouldn't think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own problems

three possible opinions, there were four possible responses for each question as well as the option of expressing no opinion. I treated the latter as missing data.

The domestic battery of the first category of variables captures attitudes toward hierarchy, whether exercised by church, state, or individuals, without implicating broader considerations of solidarity with a common community. They should all load with the same sign primarily on a hierarchy dimension. Perhaps most foundational for the concept of hierarchy is whether individuals enjoy a right of *Privacy* vis-à-vis the broader community. Is there any autonomy from the government or broader society? There is no ideal question, but the survey offers an adequate proxy: whether applicants for marriage licenses, insurance policies, and jobs should be subjected to AIDS testing. Tough law-and-order policies are often evidence of support of hierarchy. The question of *Decriminalization* of drug use should capture the same sentiment. Those more in favor of hierarchical control over personal freedom should greatly oppose this, while supporters of equal concern and respect are more likely to support it, since it does not threaten the more important concern of equality in society.

Supporters of equal concern and respect are not always libertarian, however, when a lack of regulation leads to pronounced inequality. I would argue that the issue of *School Prayer*, while framed in libertarian terms of "permitting" it in public schools, in fact measures opinions on whether the state can create a hierarchy of beliefs. The use of tuition tax credits to send children to private schools (*School Choice)* might stem from beliefs about freedom over education, but I expect that support is positively associated with hierarchy, since egalitarians fear it will foster the creation of an education hierarchy of parochial and private schools. It is of course possible that support for school choice and school prayer are all prolibertarian rather than prohierarchy indicators. This is for the data to judge.

The analogues of these questions in the foreign policy battery include numerous questions on the role of force and coercion, the most obvious manifestation of hierarchy in international politics. *Military Superiority* probes opinions about the importance of maintaining America's rank in the worldwide power hierarchy after the cold war. *Domino* indicates a belief that superiority must be maintained and aggressors met (although this could mean diplomatically, economically, or militarily), otherwise losses quickly spiral. Hierarchy holds threats at bay, the foreign policy analogue of tough sentencing. And support for *Preemption* implies that advantage must be seized or superiority might be lost. Beliefs in dominos, preemption, and preponderance of power are all associated empirically with hawkish foreign policies (Vasquez 1993; Jervis 1976; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Levy 1991). Given that I criticized the MI scheme for being too narrowly defined, I also include *Patriotism*, which measures pride in a country's achievements that might suggest a belief in its superiority.

Turning to the indicators of community, given that the domestic questions in the survey are often framed in terms of tradeoffs, there are very few questions that measure a general concern for the welfare of the community without requiring a rebalancing of hierarchical relations within society. Indeed, the latter occupies most of

domestic politics (Dworkin 1977). Much of Holsti and Rosenau's domestic battery explicitly mentions the cost to some privileged group of certain policies, or it is clearly implied by the issue, which should elicit hierarchical concerns. There are, however, domestic questions that simply ask respondents whether more attention should be paid to the environmental problems of air and water contamination (*Environmental Pollution*) as well as to problems such as unemployment, homelessness, racial conflict, and crime (*Problems of Poor*). These are prime candidates for the basic rights owed to every member of a community. No mention is made of the costs in doing so, so the questions do not prime political status. No change in hierarchy is implied. They should more closely zero in on responsibilities to the larger community. I also add *Social Security*, since it aims at providing a basic standard of living to ensure subsistence and does not involve the permanent redistribution of resources since all eventually benefit from their earlier contributions. Rather than using a question on support for Medicare and Medicaid, which of course requires tax funding and therefore implies wealth redistribution, I use a question on support for improving and protecting the nation's *Health*. I expect these variables to load predominantly on the community dimension.

There are more possibilities for community in the international battery. I include questions on support for *International Aid*, fostering *Human Rights*, and *Protecting Weak* nations against aggressors, all sentiments that should elicit belief in a broader international community that transcends the nation-state. All of these are foreign policy efforts at securing basic rights for others. Subsistence, participation in government, and physical security all fall in this category (Shue 1996). I also include a question on strengthening the United Nations (*UN Strength*), the most concrete manifestation of belief in an international community.

The final category of variables is likely to load on both dimensions. Most of them touch on basic sentiments of concern for the broader community but come with winners and losers. *Redistribution* aims at attitudes toward some basic degree of economic subsistence owed to all members of a community, yet requires a reallocation of resources. As mentioned above, discrimination issues tend to fall on this boundary. Support for the *Equal Rights Amendment* captures the fundamental communitarian principle of gender equality in modern democratic societies but implies a reduction in formerly male privileges. *School Busing* (although admittedly a dated question) aims at school integration in an effort at achieving racial equality but at the expense of inconvenience to white children who are forced to travel great distances to school. I also add a question on the tradeoff between economic growth and a clean environment (*Environmental Regulation vs. Growth*). While generic support of environmental protection (*Environmental Pollution*) should tap into community, a question posing a tradeoff between material wealth and regulation also elicits attitudes about the hierarchy between those who benefit from economic enterprise and those who suffer.

There are also foreign policy variables that should straddle both dimensions. Again, I selected many of them as pairings to variables in other batteries to provide

for better conceptual leverage. For instance, while generic support for international aid should tap solely into community, questions that suggest a cost at home for this aid, such as higher inflation (*Aid vs. Inflation)* or the narrowing of the gap between rich and poor nations (*Development Gap*), also draw on opinions about hierarchy. In contrast to *UN Strength,* which expresses generic support for the institution and community, I include a variable measuring support for limiting American sovereignty to make it a more effective body (*Sovereignty*), thereby threatening America's preeminent position. It should load on both dimensions. So too should *UN Dues*, which asks respondents whether U.S. failure to meet its financial obligations to the UN undermines its effectiveness. By posing a cost to the United States, it might bring out opinions of hierarchy.

Finally, I include a battery of questions that attempt to measure support for isolationism, defined as a general predisposition to avoid international obligations irrespective of their nature. Questions that ask whether the United States should become involved in every region in which political stability is under threat (*Superpower Involvement*) and whether its leadership role must be scaled back (*Scale Back)* are good indicators of categorical support or rejection for international engagement, since they do not specify the strategic situation or in what field leadership should be circumscribed. Other measures extract the balance the United States must strike between international and domestic obligations either directly (*Problems at Home)* or by gauging opinions on the weight that allies should pull for themselves (*Burden Sharing*). If isolationism is indeed a separate dimension that creates a dividing line between the United States and other countries, then we would not expect it to correlate significantly with any of the domestic policy variables or international policy variables. Isolationism as a concept would indicate a belief that the same values do not apply both at home and abroad. Alternatively, if it is only a by-product of other dimensions, we should expect these questions to display the opposite sign of those in the international hierarchy battery that indicate support for military superiority (*Military Superiority, Domino*, *and Preemption*) but the same sign as those that indicate superiority of the United States and its interests (*Patriotism*). They would also display the same sign as those indicating a more narrow and exclusive notion of international (but not domestic) community.

The Results

Table 2 presents the results of the principal components analysis. Given that community and hierarchy are related concepts, particularly because questions of equality and nondiscrimination are involved in both, it is likely that the dimensions are correlated, so I used an oblique rotation. The analysis includes all variables in the table, both domestic and foreign. I constrain the analysis to three factors, since no prior research has implied the existence of more, even in those that incorporated domestic variables. To show the visual impact of the findings, loadings of .30 or higher are

Table 2
Principal Components Analysis

	First	Second	Third
	Community	Hierarchy	Isolationism
Domestic Policy Battery	(negative)		
Community			
Health	.53	.08	–.20
Environmental Pollution	.62	–.06	–.15
Problems of Poor	.62	–.21	–.24
Social Security	.41	–.02	–.28
Hierarchy			
Privacy	–.05	.55	.01
Decriminalization	–.03	.36	–.14
Prayer in Schools	–.02	.68	.09
School Choice	.10	.50	.01
Hierarchy and Community			
Equal Rights Amendment	.44	.34	–.10
Busing	.23	.54	.10
Redistribution	.39	.44	–.01
Environmental Regulation vs. Growth	.39	.40	.02
Foreign Policy Battery			
Community			
Human Rights	.73	–.09	.23
International Aid	.68	–.01	.24
Protecting Weak	.49	–.24	.53
UN Strength	.67	.13	.11
Hierarchy			
Military Superiority	.15	.55	–.37
Patriotism	–.19	.68	.10
Domino	–.11	.66	–.02
Preemption	.06	.57	.01
Hierarchy and Community			
UN dues	.34	.41	.13
Development Gap	.67	.11	0
Sovereignty	.47	.29	–.12
Aid vs. Inflation	.33	.35	.35
Isolationism			
Scale Back	–.04	–.10	.67
Superpower Involvement	.24	–.05	.43
Burden Sharing	–.03	.09	.67
Problems at Home	.07	.27	.65
Eigenvalues	5.71	5.32	2.48
Percentage of variance	.20	.19	.09

Note: Table entries indicate factor loadings of a principle components analysis performed with STATA (STATACorp 2006). The author used an oblique rotation. N = 1,208.

shaded dark gray. Those at .20 or above are shaded light gray. The pattern is unmistakable.[4] In contrast to the null hypothesis, that there is no discernible relationship between domestic and foreign policy attitudes, and individuals apply different criteria to their considerations in each sphere, I find strong support for the hypotheses offered above. I focus first on the first two dimensions and then turn to the third. The first dimension appears to be a community dimension that explains 20 percent of the variance, the second a hierarchy dimension that accounts for 19 percent.

The loadings of the community variables, both domestic and foreign, are all above .40 on the first factor, and none approach this level on the hierarchy dimension. They all share the same sign as well. Given that the loadings are all positive and the variables are all coded so that higher values indicate a more restricted sense of community, the latent variable seems to indicate a more "exclusive" sense of national community. All of the variables in both domestic and foreign policy batteries expected to solely load on a hierarchy dimension do so at .50 or higher, except *Decriminalization*, which is still relatively high at .36. In addition, they all share the same sign. None of these approach any level of significance on the community dimension. Variables that are expected to tap into both dimensions generally do so. *Equal Rights Amendment* and *Redistribution* straddle both dimensions, although *Busing* falls a bit short on the community dimension (.23). The paired comparison succeeds in gaining conceptual leverage. I had hypothesized that indicating a cost to environmental protection would prime hierarchy, and it appears to do so. While *Environmental Pollution* loads only on community, *Environmental Regulation vs. Growth* straddles both dimensions, perhaps because it implies changes in existing hierarchies.

In the foreign policy battery, generic support for the UN (*UN Strength*) loads strongly on community and not on hierarchy, as expected. When a cost to UN membership is implied, whether in terms of *Sovereignty* or *UN Dues*, the hierarchy loadings are much higher, even while community is still important. The same pattern applies to questions on international aid. Generic support (*International Aid*) is only associated with community, but when this threatens increased inflation (*Aid vs. Inflation*), hierarchy becomes as important as well, since countries are being asked to trade off the interests of international equality against national interest. When international aid means a reduction in the gap between rich and poor (*Development Gap)*, hierarchy also emerges to a limited degree.

Overall, there is a great deal of symmetry between the domestic and foreign policy variables. It appears that domestic and foreign policy share a very similar if not identical structure, suggesting that both emerge from common core values. The fact that many of the variables invoke both dimensions, particularly those that touch on domestic and international equality issues, might provide an explanation for why CI and MI tend to go together, as noted by Murray, Cowden, and Russett (1999). These authors had suggested that they both are part of a dominant liberal-conservative continuum. Factor scores created from individual loadings on the two dimensions both correlate highly with liberal-conservative self-placement, measured in the dataset on

a seven-point scale. Hierarchy correlates at .70 and community (negative) at .61 with a left-right scale.

There is also significant indication of the existence of an independent isolationist continuum. The isolationist variables are associated with less support for military superiority and cosmopolitan identity. In Wittkopf's (1990) language, they have low scores of CI and MI. Isolationists are negatively inclined toward *Protecting Weak* and *Human Rights*, likely because they imply a belief in overseas entanglements. They do not like *International Aid*, especially when it threatens inflation. Isolationism is negatively related to beliefs that American military superiority should be maintained (*Military Superiority*). Isolationists want the United States to bring the troops home. However, much more significant is that all of the questions in the isolationist battery load strongly and positively on a third dimension accounting for 9 percent of the variance. Three of the four have loadings over .65. The strong loadings of the isolationist questions on a third dimension indicate that isolationism is an independent concept not reducible to scores on the other two dimensions, as the CI/MI framework originally suggested. Also interesting are the relatively high loadings of isolation on a number of the domestic battery of community variables. This is a surprising and unintended result but not difficult to conceptualize. Isolationists appear to care about the broader national community but not the international community. Unlike others, they do not apply the same values both at home and abroad. They do not, however, have strong feelings about hierarchy. This raises very interesting puzzles for future research.

Projecting Values Abroad: Core Values and Military Intervention

Expectations

Core values might structure political cleavages over foreign policy, but do they impact opinions on more concrete issues such as the use of force? Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999) find evidence at the mass level that foreign policy dispositions influence decisions about whether to intervene militarily, although the strategic situation must also be taken into account—what they call a "cognitive-interactionist" framework. I selected six hypothetical scenarios presented to respondents of the Holsti and Rosenau (1996) dataset. They were asked whether they would support the use of force if such a situation arose. Keeping in mind the Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999) findings, I distinguish conceptually between strategic uses of force aimed at protecting America's tangible and vital interests on one hand and humanitarian operations in areas where U.S. material interests are not at stake, something that other scholars have also done to gauge a different question, the level of aggregate public support for different types of military operations.[5] From the available scenarios, I chose a combination of those that are the most salient in foreign policy today (Iraq, North Korea), have empirical reference points

based on past experiences (Haiti, Rwanda), and that capture both clear-cut cases of dominant motive as well as more ambiguous ones (Israel, Mexico).

Strategic situations challenge both the national interests of the United States (the American national community) and its global power, prosperity, and status (in the international hierarchy). There is reason to expect that as support for community rises (i.e., respondents think of themselves not just as Americans but also as cosmopolitans), there will be less support for strategic military operations, since respondents do not identify themselves with the action being undertaken by the U.S. government to secure its own interests. Hierarchy arises in any case that threatens to pose costs to the United States, such as instability in areas close to the United States geographically or vital to its military and economic prosperity. Where there is a military challenge or situation that might do so, hierarchy should be associated with greater support for military action to prevent it. Even if these situations do not alter the hierarchy of international power, they still lead to reductions in American capabilities and prosperity and therefore its international position. Strategic issues also generally involve a more significant degree of force, which hierarchy supporters are more comfortable with.

Conversely, I hypothesize that support for community should lead to higher levels of endorsement of humanitarian operations since they are being pursued for purposes other than the national interest. Hierarchy might be negatively associated with humanitarian operations since they divert resources that threaten America's preeminent position in areas of more strategic significance. However, this concern is not likely to be pronounced, and community is likely to be a much more important factor. Since they are generally fought on behalf of a third party against a strategically insignificant oppressor, they do not implicate U.S. global superiority or affect the United States to any great degree. Inaction will not affect its international position.

Finally, isolationism should lead consistently to less support for intervention but lessen if the conflict is geographically close to home. If these hypotheses prove correct, we should have much more faith in the conceptual scheme advanced above.

I array the six operations from most strategic to most humanitarian to the degree possible, since the two are not necessarily negatively related. The most obvious case of the former is an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. An attack against a primary source of American oil is one of the clearest threats to America's vital interests, and the previous conflict against the Hussein regime likely primed Iraq as a leading challenger of America's global superiority. An invasion of South Korea by North Korea also endangers vital U.S. interests, since it threatens regional stability in an area where the United States has established influence but probably not to the extent of a Middle East war. The most clear-cut instance of a pure humanitarian operation is the deployment of American troops if renewed conflict in Rwanda threatened further acts of genocide. A civil war in Haiti would also be a humanitarian mission but would also have repercussions for more tangible U.S. interests in terms of preserving stability in a close-by neighbor and avoiding refugee influxes. A civil war does not invoke the

same degree of community impulse that genocide would, however. In the final two scenarios, strategic and humanitarian considerations are almost equally at stake. An Arab invasion of Israel would inflame a region vital to U.S. interests and challenge its leadership in the region but would not be as detrimental to U.S. material interests as an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. However, it would endanger Israel, the lone democracy in the Middle East and a part of America's value community. There are also mixed motives for intervention in a Mexican civil war, which could include fear of instability in a neighbor that could greatly tangibly affect the United States and lead to costs that would greatly concern supporters of hierarchy. Yet since it is a civil war, community should be an important factor in support.

Using the results from Table 2, I generated factor scales for *Hierarchy*, *Community*, and *Isolationism* using regression scoring. Given that the factor loadings on the community dimension were all positive and the variables were scored so that higher values indicated a more restricted sense of community, higher scores on the new community factor variable would indicate an exclusive conception of community. Therefore, I inverted the continuum by multiplying all values by negative one so that higher scores indicate a more expansive notion of community. I then included these three new variables in six logistic regressions along with other independent variables of gender, education, party identification, and occupation. Table 3 presents both logit coefficients and odds ratios. *Hierarchy*, *Community*, and *Isolationism* are all standardized variables with means of zero and standard deviations of one.

The Results

The results clearly support the hypotheses. Support for *Hierarchy* is particularly important for strategic operations, such as an invasion of Saudi Arabia or South Korea. The coefficients are positive as expected. A one-unit or standard deviation increase in *Hierarchy*, which has a range of about five units, makes the respondent one and a half times more likely to support retaliation against Iraqi provocation. There is not very much variation in the dependent variable in the case of an Iraqi invasion, since 86 percent of respondents support military action. Holding the continuous variables at their mean and the dichotomous variables at zero, the predicted probability of support is still 83 percent at the lowest levels of *Hierarchy.* However, this rises to almost 97 percent at the highest levels of the variable. A one-unit increase in *Hierarchy* is associated with a 28 percent increase in likelihood of supporting a war in Korea, less than for the more strategically significant Saudi Arabia but still powerful. *Hierarchy* has a very strong effect on support for intervention in a Mexican civil war, much more than an Arab invasion of Israel, likely because it has more imaginably tangible effects.

Positions on *Community* are particularly important for humanitarian operations, such as genocide in Rwanda or a Haitian civil war. A one-unit increase (in a range

Table 3
Effect of Ideology on Support for Intervention in Six Hypothetical Scenarios

	Iraqi Invasion of Saudi Arabia	North Korean Invasion of South	Arab Invasion of Israel	Mexican Civil War	Haitian Civil War	Genocide in Rwanda
Hierarchy	.42***	.25**	.11	.37***	.08	–.08
	(.13)	(.09)	(.09)	(.10)	(.11)	(.10)
	1.53	1.28	1.11	1.45	1.09	.92
Community	–.45***	–.10	.11	.34***	.65***	.97***
	(.13)	(.10)	(.09)	(.09)	(.11)	(.11)
	.64	.90	1.15	1.40	1.92	2.64
Isolationism	–.94***	–.87***	–.64***	–.25**	–.63***	–.55***
	(.11)	(.09)	(.08)	(.08)	(.10)	(.09)
	.39	.42	.53	.78	.53	.57
College	.90	–.03	–1.0**	–.33	–1.20**	–.50
degree	(.46)	(.38)	(.40)	(.35)	(.39)	(.42)
	2.45	.97	.37	.72	.30	.62
Graduate	.13	–.30	–1.10**	–.45	–1.11**	–.41
school	(.39)	(.34)	(.37)	(.32)	(.34)	(.38)
	1.14	.74	.33	.64	.33	.67
Gender	–1.33***	–.61**	.05	.08	–.17	.39
	(.25)	(.22)	(.23)	(.24)	(.28)	(.24)
	.26	.54	1.05	1.09	.84	1.48
Independent	–.92***	–.33	–.42*	–.58**	–.47	–.23
	(.27)	(.22)	(.20)	(.22)	(.24)	(.22)
	.40	.72	.66	.56	.63	.80
Republican	–.76*	–.21	–.33	–.31	–.55*	–.22
	(.34)	(.25)	(.23)	(.23)	(.27)	(.26)
	.47	.81	.72	.74	.57	.80
Diplomat	1.16	.67§	.08	.42	.09	–.10
	(.75)	(.40)	(.36)	(.33)	(.39)	(.40)
	3.17	1.95	1.09	1.53	1.10	.90
Military	1.60	1.76**	–.18	–.42	.33	–.44
official	(1.03)	(.61)	(.36)	(.34)	(.35)	(.42)
	5.0	5.82	.83	.66	1.38	.64
Public	.12	.50	–.27	–.28	–1.0§	–.66
official	(.53)	(.42)	(.33)	(.37)	(.55)	(.46)
(other)	1.03	1.65	.76	.75	.37	.52
Constant	2.77***	1.59***	2.35***	–.51***	–.30***	–.81***
Log-likelihood	–311.2	–475.2	–549.2	–494.8	–402.9	–425.0
Chi-square	197.9***	181.54***	90.6***	47.9***	123.12***	196.1***
Pseudo-R^2	.24	.16	.08	.05	.13	.19
N	1,075	1,005	1,020	929	973	940

Note: Table entries are logit coefficients with estimated standard errors in parentheses, followed by odds ratios. The dependent variable is coded 1 in favor of intervention and 0 against. Democrats are the excluded category for partisan identification. A high school degree is the excluded category for education. Gender is coded 0 for male, 1 for female.
***$p < .001$; **$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; §$p < .10$.

of approximately six units) in *Community* is associated with an increase of over two and a half times in the chances of supporting intervention to stop a renewed Rwandan genocide. For a Haitian civil war, respondents who move up a unit on the *Community* scale are almost twice as likely to support intervention. This is quite strong but less than the Rwandan case, as expected, given that the question of genocide creates an even greater sense of humanitarian need that communitarians should respond to. While only 23 percent of respondents would support military action in the case of genocide, *Community* still has a strong effect. The predicted probability of support for armed intervention in Rwanda for an individual at the cosmopolitan end of *Community* is 81 percent, declining to 3 percent at the more parochial end. This suggests that humanitarian operations, most likely because they might be regarded more as wars of choice, will be more ideologically contested.

Community is also significant for strategic operations. More cosmopolitan individuals are more opposed to intervention against Iraq than more parochial individuals. The effect is roughly the converse of *Hierarchy*. Those who embrace the narrowest sense of community have a 98 percent predicted probability of support for military action in this case, whereas for those who have the broadest identity, it falls to 85 percent. Even though there is a clear (and not particularly surprising) tendency among the respondents as a whole to support strategic military action and decline humanitarian operations,[6] there is nevertheless also a clear structure and direction to the pattern of political support, seen best in Figure 1. There is an observable and fairly steady decline in the odds ratios of *Hierarchy* toward one as operations become more humanitarian and less strategic. For Rwanda, it even goes below one, although the coefficient is not statistically significant. The effect of the variable dissipates as strategic considerations are less involved. *Hierarchy* as a value leads to support for strategic operations but is not relevant for humanitarian action. Conversely, there is a steady increase in the odds ratios of *Community* as humanitarian considerations become salient. Its effect dissipates toward the strategic end of the spectrum, but for Korea and Iraq, it falls below one. Community as a value detracts from support for self-interested action and bolsters more altruistic operations.

Turning to the remaining variables, isolationism has a consistently negative and highly statistically significant effect on support for intervention, although notably less for situations closer to home. Odds ratios are consistently less than one. Isolationists even largely favor inaction in Haiti and Mexico. Interestingly, the pattern of odds ratios shows that isolationists seem more opposed to strategic operations than humanitarian ones, although neither are particularly popular. A one-unit increase in isolationism is associated with a 61 percent increase in the probability of opposing a war against Iraq on behalf of Saudi Arabia but only a 43 percent increase of opposing an intervention in Rwanda. In the former, isolationism has a strong effect, much more than *Community* or even *Hierarchy*. The predicted probability of supporting a war against Iraq ranges from 38 percent at the extreme isolationist end of the continuum to 99 percent at the internationalist end.

Figure 1
Change in Odds of Supporting Military Intervention per Unit Increase of Three Values



Females show more support for humanitarian operations than men and less support for strategic operations, but only the former is statistically significant. Identification with the Democratic Party, having controlled for ideology, makes respondents more interventionist across the board in comparison to Independents and Republicans, although this only reaches statistically significant levels in a few instances. Of the occupational categories, being a diplomat, military official, or public official generally does not generate different opinions from those in the private sphere. The only exception is that military officers are much more interventionist in the Korean case, presumably because such an attack would be a de facto declaration of war on U.S. soldiers on the border. Military officers are almost six times as likely to favor intervention as civilians in that instance. The odds ratios for diplomats and military officials are pronouncedly high and positive in the instances of the strategic interventions, but the coefficients also have very high standard errors,

undermining much of the statistical significance. There is no sign of hierarchical military officials and communitarian diplomats, at least at the elite level. Education shows no consistent pattern. Higher levels of educational attainment push respondents toward anti-interventionism in both Haiti and Israel but nowhere else.

Theoretical Implications and Directions for Future Research

The findings of this article have significant implications for a number of diverse research traditions. First, if domestic and foreign policies are inspired by common core values, it makes little sense to study domestic and foreign policy in isolation. This article has shown how domestic variables provide conceptual leverage in ascertaining the meaning and structure of foreign policy attitudes. But the reverse could also be true for those studying comparative political behavior or party politics. For the field of international relations, a finding that elites on different ends of the political spectrum conceive of the national interest differently on the basis of ideology threatens the central realist assumption of a consistent hierarchy of goals that states defend (Krasner 1978). In this view, politics, particularly concerning the use of armed force, should stop at the water's edge. While scholars in the constructivist tradition have already pointed out the role of ideational variables in helping states define their interests, they have passed over this avenue of inquiry. Much of that work has neglected contestation at the level of domestic politics, focusing instead on the convergence of state behavior because of the powerful, homogenizing effects of international norms (Finnemore 1996). This can be remedied. While constructivists correctly pose the question of what the national interest is, the answer often depends on who gets to respond. Comparativists frequently demonstrate the role of ideology and the promises made by political parties during elections on policy choices later made in office, but international relations scholars have not done the same (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994).

A number of crucial questions remain unanswered. First, how broadly applicable are the findings? Would the framework work for mass beliefs? Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999) report numerous findings that my conceptual framework would shed theoretical light on and also suggest strong similarities beyond mass and elite belief systems. They found that while self-reported liberals and conservatives were both more inclined to support the use of military force when vital interests were threatened than when they were not, the increase in conservative support was much more striking. The right responds more to this situational cue. In all the instances of strategic military intervention, conservatives were consistently more supportive of armed action than liberals. But the pattern in nonstrategic scenarios, such as an invasion of Cambodia, was exactly the reverse, with strong liberals leading the interventionist charge. They also found that what they call increased "military assertiveness," which, given their indicators is very similar to my hierarchy dimension, is associated

with higher support for strategic uses of force but much less significant for humanitarian situations. These are all identical parallels to my findings at the elite level.

Second, how might the framework apply to the security issues of the post-9/11 era? Has the cleavage structure of American foreign policy decisively changed? The dataset could not have foreseen in 1996 many of the issues on today's newspaper front pages. Terrorism likely minimizes the ability to remain a true isolationist. It is a more direct threat to individual safety than even arguably the Soviet Union ever was. September 11 might have changed everything. But it might not have. Terrorism implicates hierarchy since it directly threatens the strategic interests and challenges the global leadership role of the United States. The rhetoric of the Bush administration suggests a firm belief in the concept. The phrases "with us or against us" and "fighting the enemy abroad so we do not have to face him here at home" both indicate a strong ranking of American interests over others. Its unilateralism and distaste for multilateral institutions grow most intense when it is implied that outside bodies might enjoy some say in American decisions, whether it is the UN Security Council or the International Criminal Court. The commitment to stay the course in Iraq lest America's adversaries be emboldened demonstrates a belief in domino rhetoric symptomatic of a stress on hierarchy. For those who stress America's rank in the world, demonstrating weakness or lack of resolve is truly dangerous to America's position. It is likely that, as was the case after the cold war (Holsti and Rosenau 1996; Murray 1996), elites simply apply old principles to new situations, creating new hierarchies and communities along the way.

Notes

1. Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis (1995) find a "multilateralist" and a "militarist" dimension. They are almost surely the same since the indicators largely overlap.

2. It should be noted, however, that capitalism is often regarded as the most egalitarian of all the forms of economic since it breaks up entrenched economic interests. However, even those who take this view argue that government intervention is necessary to remedy inevitable inequalities. See Dworkin (1985).

3. A brief word is necessary about my concept of hierarchy as it relates to a frequent understanding of the term in international relations theory as the opposite of anarchy. According to my usage, "hierarchy" is what results when anarchy is not tempered by notions of equality through either informal or formal restrictions on state power. They are not opposites as I use them. International law, norms, and organizations all reduce hierarchy to the degree that they limit the exercise of pure power. Hierarchy is not a managed order but rather the imposition by the strong.

4. The results are robust with similar results when using either maximum likelihood or principal factor estimation.

5. There is an important literature on the overall level of support for military operations based on their "principal policy objective." See Jentelson (1992); Jentelson and Britton (1998); Larson (1996); Eichenberg (2005). This is a different question from the one I am asking. Rather than asking whether humanitarian operations are generally more popular than strategic military actions in the aggregate, I am identifying which values are important for predicting individual support for particular types of operations, even while recognizing that we should expect different baselines, as confirmed again below.

6. Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999) find the same is true in the mass public.

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