The ‘Magnificent Fraud’: Trust, International Cooperation, and the Hidden Domestic Politics of American Multilateralism after World War II

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This article seeks to overturn the conventional wisdom that World War II forced a decisive, bipartisan break in American grand strategy. As they had after World War I, American political elites debated the relative merits of unilateralism and multilateralism. Assessments of the relative costs and benefits of a cooperative and multilateral solution to American security depended on judgments about the likelihood of opportunism by America’s partners. Democrats were more trusting than Republicans, expecting cooperation where the latter anticipated defection. This led to different preferences for the creation and design of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty. Drawing on theories of “social orientation” and political ideology, I explain why the left is more trusting than the right. Rationalist accounts of the creation and design of the UN and NATO overstate the case for ideological convergence and therefore the importance of structure because they largely ignore behind-the-scene bipartisan consultations that allowed for a compromise prior to the votes on the respective treaties. My social psychological theory of international cooperation demonstrates that multilateralism is a dispositional trait, not a simple functional response to some objective security situation.

One of the great truisms in the study of international relations is that World War II forced a decisive and bipartisan break in American foreign policy (Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007; Busby and Monten 2008). After 1945, the United States embarked upon a new internationalist path of engagement that broke with its previous grand strategy of political–military isolation, ushering in a new age of peace and prosperity. This new course was most evident in its new enthusiasm toward international organizations. Whereas the United States declined to enter the League of Nations after World War I, it joined the United Nations and a few short years later signed and ratified the North Atlantic Treaty. Structuralists argue that the changing nature of military technology, the United States’ unprecedented power, the scope of its interests, and the growing threat of the

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Soviet Union combined to compel this change (Leffler 1979; Lake 1999). Ideational scholars argue that the lessons and experiences of the war itself, shared across the political spectrum, finally vanquished isolationism and unilateralism, particularly in the Republican Party where these tendencies were strongest (Legro 2005). In both accounts, however, the post-World War II era was marked by a new consensus on American foreign policy manifest in the overwhelming bipartisan support in the Senate for these agreements. This contrasted sharply with the polarizing partisan politics that marked the debate over the League of Nations Covenant.

I seek to overturn this conventional wisdom in important ways. World War II was a significant break, but in its aftermath American political elites again vigorously debated the wisdom of cooperation with other nations in the framework of international security institutions. Even in the early post-World War II era, the most bipartisan period in American foreign policy in the twentieth century, the programmatic divisions between the parties were not significantly different than they were after World War I. There was agreement that the United States could not stay aloof from international political and military issues, but Democrats and Republicans again differed over the relative merits of multilateralism and unilateralism, that is, whether security was best served by combining resources with others or going it alone. These two different positions were reflected in the contrasting positions of the political parties as to how to design the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty, for which there was an even more compelling security logic. Democrats were more ideologically inclined toward cooperative solutions to collective problems than Republicans.

The post-World War II period was different than the post-World War I period not in terms of substance, but rather in terms of process. The Democratic administration, having learned from the mistakes of Woodrow Wilson in 1919, solicited Republican input behind the scenes during the negotiation of these two treaties and bridged differences before the two documents were publicly debated. Given the need for two-thirds majority support in the Senate, any solution to the dilemma of postwar engagement had to reflect a compromise between the mainstream tendencies in both parties. The overwhelming support for these two instruments in the Senate gives the appearance of an agreement on substance based on a compelling strategic rationale or a new ideological consensus. In fact, it was actually the result of a carefully constructed deal. As Dean Acheson later admitted, “Bipartisanship was a magnificent fraud,” although a useful one. “It’s a great myth that ought to be fostered.” The former Secretary of State cautioned in an interview: “Don’t bring too damn much scholarship to bear on it. You’ll prove it out of existence if you’re not careful.”2 I am disregarding his admonishment.

Scholars have noted the importance of multilateralism and unilateralism in defining and differentiating the policy preferences of American parties but have not uncovered the micro-logic underneath these positions (Ruggie 1997; Lake 1999; Legro 2005; Busby and Monten 2008). As this was a matter of national security, Democrats and Republicans did not have different material stakes in the outcome like they might have had on issues of trade or finance. I argue that Democratic multilateralism and Republican unilateralism are the products of fundamentally different levels of concern about opportunism. Multilateral solutions to common problems promise potentially greater gains of cooperation. However, cooperative agreements come with the risk of entrapment and free-riding. Unilateralism protects against both of these potential costs, but with the opportunity cost of foregone gains.

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How might we explain variation in concerns about opportunism, given that both parties responded to the same structural cues of the strategic environment? To answer this question, I draw on social psychology, where we find evidence that even when placed in identical situations, individuals show markedly different inclinations to cooperate. Individuals have different “social orientations” (McClintock 1972). The variation in cooperative behavior is explained by their different expectations about how others will behave. In the context of cooperation, concern about opportunism and defection is the manifestation of distrust, while an expectation of cooperation and reciprocity reflects trust. This particular kind of trust is a trait of individuals, not the product of a structural situation. Differences in social orientation are a function of variation in “generalized trust,” the belief that others are generally trustworthy (Uslaner 2002). Individuals have different dispositions to trust. Social psychological experiments show that placed in the same strategic settings, generalized trusters, known as a “cooperators,” tend to frame potentially mixed-motive situations in terms of an assurance game, while “competitors” perceive these situations as a prisoner’s dilemma.3

These insights allow for the development of a social psychological theory of international cooperation and institutional design. In foreign affairs, cooperators are likely to be dispositionally more multilateralist than competitors. Social psychology puts the “ism” in multilateralism. Rationalists also argue that multilateralism is a more optimal design for cooperation in assurance situations than in prisoner’s dilemmas (Martin 1992). However, they cannot explain different levels of trust in and different framings of the same situation because trust in rationalist accounts is structural rather than dispositional in nature. Drawing on work in political psychology, which shows that political ideology is largely a function of generalized trust, I argue that partisan differences on the dangers of opportunism reflect the different social orientations of Democrats and Republicans. This means that the left is more ideologically disposed toward multilateral solutions than the right because of its more trusting nature.

In the cases that follow, I demonstrate that Democrats, assuming the trustworthiness of their partners, framed the strategic situation after World War II less in terms of a prisoner’s dilemma and more in terms of an assurance game, as they believed that cooperation would be reciprocated. Less concerned about entrapment, Democrats were willing to endorse stronger and more binding security commitments under both the UN and NATO. The Roosevelt administration preferred a United Nations without a great power veto. The Truman administration was willing to provide a guarantee of European security before the Europeans could effectively contribute to the alliance because it expected future reciprocity.

Republicans, in contrast, largely framed the same structural situation as a prisoner’s dilemma game in which other countries would take advantage of American cooperation. They therefore preferred unilateralism in which the United States would retain full discretion over its foreign policy. The right did not want to make security commitments in advance and insisted on a veto in the United Nations. More conservative members of the Republican Party preferred a unilateral declaration of American intent to the North Atlantic alliance, but even moderate Republicans wanted the Europeans to first demonstrate their commitment to continental defense before the conclusion of any pact, so as to prevent free-riding, and to weaken the security guarantee so as to lessen the possibility of entrapment. In short, Republicans had “trust issues” in a way that Democrats did not.

3 By “framing,” social psychologists mean something different than sociologists. Framing is how individuals understand a situation, not a strategic process by which they try to bring others around to their point of view.
The final form of these organizations was a product of behind-the-scenes negotiations before these treaties ever reached the Senate floor. Where this partisan pattern did not hold it was because party and ideology were not completely aligned in the postwar period. Ideologically conservative Democrats often aligned with Republicans and liberal Republicans with Democrats, another factor that gave the false appearance of an ideological consensus.

Structural Accounts of Security Cooperation and Postwar American Multilateralism

Decisions about whether to pursue security cooperatively or unilaterally involve weighing the gains of collaboration against the potential costs of opportunism. This is true of both alliances and global collective security arrangements such as the United Nations. The advantage of multilateralism is the recruitment of partners for increased protection. Larger organizations mobilize more collective force and theoretically have a greater likelihood of prevailing in armed conflict and of deterring it in the first place. However, cooperation is not without risks, as articulated nicely by Snyder (1984) and subsequently refined by Lake (1999).

First, states can become ensnared in conflicts that do not serve their interests. Security guarantees might lead to moral hazard, leading smaller states to take overly provocative acts with the expectation that others will bail them out. This is the problem of “entrapment.” Second, collective security commitments might encourage free-riding on the defense contributions of others. Third, states might not meet their commitments, “abandoning” others in their time of need.

Rationalists argue that structural factors are most important in determining how states evaluate these tradeoffs. Weaker states and those with more proximate adversaries are more concerned about abandonment. Stronger states, or those that are geographically isolated, have more viable independent options and are more concerned with entrapment. The protection of geography, of course, disappears if the nature of military technology makes the world smaller (Snyder 1984; Kydd 2005).

Rationalists argue that when states have an overriding stake in providing the public good of security, when they form a “privileged group,” they will choose to cooperate despite the costs of opportunism. Hegemons are said to have such an interest in security cooperation given the extensive scope of their interests in regional or global security and their overwhelming power and resources (Keohane 1984; Snidal 1985). Hegemons, who are willing to tolerate free-riding, can fight alone even if abandoned, and it is virtually impossible to entrap them in conflicts given the great reach of their interests.

Based on this logic, Lake (1999) concludes that whereas the structural imperatives and the gains from cooperation were ambiguous after World War I, the benefits of security cooperation became obvious for the United States after World War II. Developments in military technology were particularly important as changes in the nature of warfare exposed the United States to conflagrations in Europe but also allowed it to realize the joint gains of military cooperation through a division of labor that yielded positive externalities. The costs and likelihood of opportunism, Lake argues, had declined because of the asymmetries in power between the Old and New Worlds. Entrapment was less worrisome after World War II because the American security perimeter had expanded and abandonment was unlikely on the part of the more vulnerable Europeans. Free-riding was not an overriding concern, as the United States was willing to provide the bulk of the public good (Lake 1999: chapter 5).

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4 Cooperation might not be the right term of course, as there is very little reciprocity in these instances.
Therefore, whereas the United States refused the League of Nations’ collective security commitment in Article X, it made a security commitment to Western European defense in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article V. The power of structure was evident in that it created a bipartisan consensus on America’s new internationalist path, which contrasted with the polarizing partisan politics of the League debate (Lake 1999: chapters 4–5). Lake does not address the case of the United Nations, but a similar logic would apply to that case. The United States had global interests and the power and interest to pursue them.

In the case studies below, I find no evidence of this overwhelming interest in global or even European security on the part of the United States. American willingness to engage internationally was predicated on an expectation of reciprocity on the part of others. Even if a large state does not form a privileged group, it might nevertheless choose to cooperate if it believes that the likelihood of opportunism is low, that is that others will reciprocate rather than defect when it cooperates. This choice suggests trust, a belief that one’s interests will not be harmed when one’s fate is placed in the hands of others (Larson 1997:19; Sztompka 1999; Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna 2004:25; Hardin 2006:29; Hoffman 2006:17). In the context of cooperation, trust is the belief that others have assurance game rather than prisoner’s dilemmas preferences (Kydd 2005: 4–6). The belief that others will act opportunistically indicates a lack of trust.

Kydd (2005) applies such an argument to security cooperation in Europe after World War II, although he utilizes a particular conception of trust that Uslaner (2002) calls “strategic.” In this rationalist understanding, actors trust when they have information that leads them to expect that specific others’ interests “encapsulate” their own (Hardin 2006). This is generally the incentive to build or sustain a long-term, mutually beneficial relationship. There might be a short-term incentive to defect, but this is overcome by the potential long-term gains of creating partnerships. In international relations, whether interests encapsulate one another depends on structural features such as the distribution of power and material interests. This is a highly structural account of trust. It has nothing to do with the attributes or the character of the individuals cooperating, and it implies that those in the same structural circumstances with the same information will make similar choices. Where the objective situation is one of assurance, individuals will cooperate.

The strategic trust account of postwar American multilateralism provides a more accurate description of the considerations of administration officials after World War II than the hegemonic account. Reciprocity and opportunism were key concerns. However, the empirical case studies below show that decision makers in the same structural position subjectively framed the security situation. Republicans expected more opportunism than Democrats. There was no objective understanding of the security environment. This fact is generally missed because these alternative framings are evident only behind the scenes, in private consultations between the Democratic administration and Republicans in the Senate. Only non-structural factors or attributes of the players, what social psychologists call dispositional factors, can explain such variation in framing within a particular incentive structure.

**Putting the “Ism” Into Multilateralism: A Social Psychological Theory of International Cooperation and Institutional Design**

What makes some individuals dispositionally less worried about opportunism and more inclined toward cooperation than others? Individuals have different propensities to trust, a common concept in the social psychological literature that Uslaner (2002) calls “generalized” trust (Rotter 1980:1; Sztompka 1999; Messick and Kramer 2001:91; Cook and Cooper 2003:213; Tyler and Degoey 2004:332; Mercer 2005:95). Generalized trusters are more inclined to believe that others
are trustworthy, while less trusting individuals are more fearful by nature. They have trust issues.\(^5\)

Generalized trust describes an inclination independent of information about the specific context (Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994:138). Sztompka (1999:70) writes, “Trustfulness may incline people to grant trust, and suspiciousness to withhold trust, quite independently of any estimate of trustworthiness. The origins of trustfulness or suspiciousness are not epistemological. They have nothing to do with knowledge about the partners of future engagements.” A general inclination to trust cannot rest on information about the interests of others, as we cannot collect data on everyone. While the etymology of strategic trust is “A trusts B to do X,” the etymology of generalized trust is “A trusts” or “A is trusting” (Uslaner 2002:4).\(^6\) This is not to say that particular information about potential partners’ trustworthiness is not relevant, only that it is not the only factor weighed in decisions. Strategic trust does not exhaust the varieties of trust, either theoretically or empirically.

Generalized trust has been found by social psychologists to improve cooperation in “social dilemmas” familiar to international relations scholars, such as public goods or commons situations. In these mixed-motive environments, individuals must balance their desire for short-term egoistic gains against long-term collective welfare losses that affect them negatively. Overwhelming evidence indicates that, faced with the same incentives, individuals are more likely to contribute to a public good or restrain from consumption of the commons if they believe before the experiment that others will do so as well. Only dispositions to trust can have this effect (Tyszka and Grzelak 1976; Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee 1977; Alcock and Mansell 1977; Marwell and Ames 1979; Dawes 1980; Rotter 1980; Messick and Brewer 1983; Yamagishi and Sato 1986; Brann and Foddy 1987; Yamagishi and Cook 1993; Parks 1994).

Differences in dispositions to trust are at the heart of different “social orientations” (Deutsch 1960a; Messick and McClintock 1968; McClintock 1972). To explain variation in cooperation levels, researchers have documented the existence of different types of players. Most important for the purposes of this paper are competitors and cooperators. Competitors and cooperators have different views of the world that lead them to transform the objective decision matrices given by researchers into “effective” decision matrices (Kelley and Stahelski 1970; Kelley and Thibaut 1978; McClintock and Liebrand 1988; Parks 1994).\(^7\) They frame the same environment differently.

Competitors see a dangerous environment populated by other competitors. As a consequence, they convert repeated games with an assurance incentive matrix into an effective prisoner’s dilemma, constantly defecting even against a strategy of 100% cooperation. In repeated prisoner’s dilemmas, expecting defection, competitors consistently defect against all strategies, including tit-for-tat, leaving potential gains on the table (Kuhlman and Marshello 1975; Kuhlman and Wimberley 1976; McClintock and Liebrand 1988).

In contrast, more trusting cooperators transform a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game into an assurance game on the basis of their more optimistic assumptions about the behavior of others. This change in framing leads cooperators to begin games with cooperation, rather than waiting for a cooperative gesture, as they expect their moves will be reciprocated. However, cooperators are

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\(^5\) This is not to make a value judgment. More fearful individuals are better suited as leaders in genuinely dangerous environments.

\(^6\) “Generalized trust” is different than what Uslaner (2002) calls “particularized trust,” a belief that a specific other or group is inherently trustworthy in character. This is the type of trust (or better stated, distrust) used implicitly by Larson (1997) in her discussion of US–Soviet relations.

\(^7\) The labels are unfortunate as they imply tautology, that we know cooperators by the fact that they cooperate. However, differences between the types are based on different beliefs about others.
not altruistic. Studies consistently show that those with a cooperative and trusting social orientation will stop cooperating if faced with a partner who consistently defects (Kelley and Stahelski 1970; Kuhlman and Marshello 1975; Kuhlman and Wimberley 1976; Rotter 1980; McClintock and Liebrand 1988). Cooperators’ preferences are predicated on reciprocity.

Social psychological studies on cooperation lead us away from a focus on the structure of the game toward the traits of individuals. Kuhlman and Marshello conclude on the basis of their famous experiment: “The most important point to be made in the present paper is that the effective structure of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game... varies from one person to the next, and a good deal of this variation may be understood in terms of the motivational orientations being considered here” (1975:930). McClintock and Liebrand (1988) find that that game structure itself had no significant independent effect on the likelihood of the total population of subjects to cooperate or defect. For instance, the overall level of cooperation of participants in an assurance game was not statistically significantly higher than that in a prisoner’s dilemma, even though the game structure would predict that cooperation would be easier. Only the effect of social orientation was statistically significant.

The Kuhlman and Marshello study in particular and the social orientation program in general had an enormous impact on research on cooperation. According to McClintock and Liebrand (1988:396), “Kuhlman and Marshello demonstrated that what appeared as irrational choice behaviors in a Prisoner’s Dilemma were in fact rational” given individuals’ different beliefs about others. In her review of the literature, Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom (2003:39) writes, “The really big puzzle in the social sciences is why cooperation levels vary so much” among individuals in the same structural circumstances. I argue that generalized trust provides an answer and apply the insights of this literature to international cooperation and institution building.

The literature on social orientations and cooperation yields clear implications that allow us to construct a social psychological theory of international cooperation. Generalized trusters with a cooperative social orientation should be more inclined toward multilateralism than non-trusters with a competitive social orientation. First, generalized trust lowers concerns about opportunism, making cooperators more likely to cooperate than to pursue security alone. Generalized trust promotes what Ruggie (1992) calls “quantitative” multilateralism. Second, cooperators define situations in assurance terms and should be more inclined to initiate cooperation without fear of free-riding. Competitors, on the other hand, are less likely to cooperate for fear of defection and more likely to insist on a prior demonstration of good faith before considering cooperation.

Third, generalized trusters should also be more willing to make more of a commitment to “qualitative” multilateralism. Ruggie defines this as “an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of ‘generalized’ principles of conduct—that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence” (1992:51). In terms of security institutions, genuine qualitative multilateralism comes in the form of a binding collective guarantee in which the parties agree in advance to come to the aid of others if they are attacked, without knowing when, where, or whether an attack will occur. Qualitative multilateralism comes with a price, as it limits state discretion in the future.8 Its more binding

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8 Unless the actual control of policy is taken away from states, these are only paper commitments, of course. Non-compliance is always possible and of course in every agreement there are scenarios in which every state would not meet any obligation. Nevertheless, non-compliance is, ceteris paribus, more costly and therefore less likely given the very fact that its states have made the commitment.
nature increases the likelihood of entrapment. However, multilateralism has the advantage of having a greater deterrent effect. More trusting cooperators are more inclined to resolve the tradeoff in favor of qualitative multilateralism. Less trusting competitors should insist on unilateralism or its institutional equivalent, such as a dilution of a security guarantee or a veto that limits the potential for entrapment by leaving states master of their own fate.

This is a dramatic departure from the prevailing wisdom of rational institutionalism, which works with the assumption that international organizations are functional responses to the objectively evident collective action problem that states face (Stein 1982; Keohane 1984). Martin (1992) notes, for example, that multilateralism is inappropriate in prisoner’s dilemma situations but optimal for assurance games. However, rationalists cannot explain why individuals in the same situation will define their environment differently and be led toward different institutional preferences. The social psychological argument leads us to think of multilateralism as a dispositional trait of generalized trusters, an inclination to trust others that allows those with a cooperative social orientation to seek out better opportunities through cooperation. It puts the “ism” in multilateralism. By contrast, competitors are unilateralist by disposition.9

This does not mean that generalized trusters are non-instrumental actors building international organizations for the sake of building them. Institutions are tools for achieving mutual gains. Rather trusters have a dispositional tendency to believe that the risks of opportunism are lower, making their subjective strategic calculus different than others in the same structural circumstances. Generalized trust is only one of many variables that might influence cooperation, and the differences between competitors and cooperators are best thought of in relative terms. No one is completely trusting, and even the most trusting individuals will not cooperate if the costs of defection are high enough.

### Political Ideology, Domestic Politics, and Generalized Trust

To control for structure while assessing the role played by dispositions to trust, I focus on domestic political differences among cooperators and competitors over international cooperation and institutional design. Rationalists cannot explain, by their own admission, domestic variation in preferences on institutional solutions among decision makers in these instances. Lake calls this “something of a mystery” that lies “outside the current theory” (1999:74–76). It is necessary to measure generalized trust independently of the behavior it prescribes. Dispositions to trust and social orientation are first evident in how individuals frame a situation. Cooperators are more likely to see cooperation in assurance terms, competitors in prisoner’s dilemma terms.

The political psychology literature offers particular expectations about who is likely to be more trusting, and by extension more multilateral in their preferences. There is an overwhelming consensus on the part of those who study the structure of political belief systems that a general sense of threat is central for explaining the adoption of rightist political views. Generalized trust, and its absence, is ideological. Duckitt (2001) argues that the right has a “motivational goal” of security, driven by a belief that the world is a dangerous place in which others are intent on harm. Feldman (2003) claims that rightist ideology is a reflection of a pessimistic view of human nature, which is consistent with a long-standing observation about the nature of the right (Deutsch 1960b; Tomkins and Izard 1965; Conover and Feldman 1981). Duckitt (2001) and Feldman

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9 I should nevertheless stress that the argument applies to institution building. It does not necessarily imply that Democrats will always be the most willing to use multilateral institutions, such as seeking UN Security Council authorization for military force, although they might be.
(2003) are both capturing the same core aspect of rightist thinking—that others cannot be trusted. Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway (2003) call this the “existential motive,” a common denominator that they find in a remarkable effort to synthesize the findings of hundreds of studies on the psychological correlates of political ideology with 88 different samples from a multitude of countries.

The age-old solution to fears about human nature is the creation of strong political institutions to coerce, punish, and protect. This explains the stronger support of the right for more authoritarian policies in the areas of civil liberties and criminal justice. Those with less trust or faith in people as a whole advocate more restrictions in terms of political expression and political participation. Strong law-and-order policies are necessary to deter and punish crimes and keep the citizenry in check. The right also stresses the importance of traditional moral values to discipline otherwise unruly and socially destabilizing behavior. The left, in contrast, takes more libertarian positions on these issues. Liberal support for strong state institutions is generally to harness the power of the state to pursue its agenda of helping the weak and disadvantaged through economic redistribution, rather than protect its citizens from untrustworthy individuals (Inglehart 1977; Dworkin 1978, 1985; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Kitschelt 1988a,b, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Duckitt 2001; Duckitt and Fisher 2003; Duckitt and Sibley 2009; Janoff-Bulman 2009a,b; Jugert and Duckitt 2009; Van Leeuwen and Park 2009).10

On the basis of these findings, we can hypothesize that we will see significant differences in the propensity to cooperate on the part of liberals and conservatives. The left will be more quantitatively and qualitatively multilateral than the right when creating international security institutions, as they will frame the issues differently.11 I use political party affiliation as a proxy for ideology, although the latter is the real manifestation of generalized trust. Where party does not align with ideology, as was often the case in postwar American politics, we should expect something less than party unity, as liberal Republicans side with mainstream Democrats and conservative Democrats with mainstream Republicans. Such ideological coalitions across party lines help rebut the potential claim that much of this process was partisan and electoral in nature, rather than substantive and principled.

The United Nations

The standard historical account of postwar American foreign policy is that World War II brought home the lesson that a unilateral foreign policy was no longer an option in an interdependent world (Ruggie 1997; Legro 2005; Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007). However, after World War II, the two parties fell back roughly on the same preferences for international cooperation and organization as they had after World War I. Although it is generally missed in accounts of the UN’s creation, early plans for the postwar organization on the part of the Democratic Roosevelt administration were somewhat radical in their multilateralism. The first blueprint, the “Draft Constitution of International Organization” produced by the State Department in July 1943, provided for a security guarantee even more binding than the Covenant of the League of Nations, which had caused great

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10 One might expect that the natural response to a more pessimistic outlook in foreign affairs would be to endorse some sort of system of international governance. However, significant efforts at supranational organization presuppose some notion of trust as they involve placing one’s fate in others’ hands even more than multilateralism.

11 Other types of multilateral institutions, such as those dealing with trade and finance, do not necessarily require trust, as exchange does not occur sequentially. And they have domestic distributional consequences in a way not true of security organizations, which might lead to partisan differences but along very different lines that do not involve trust.
domestic political consternation a quarter of a century before. If a situation led to a “breach, or imminently threatened breach, of the peace between nations,” an Executive Council would request the parties to restore the position before the onset of conflict. States failing to comply were “presumed to intend a violation of the peace of nations.” The Council was then to “apply all the measures necessary to restore or maintain the peace.” All the key clauses specified not that the Council “could” undertake these actions, but that they “shall” (Russell 1958:229–233, 472–485; Hoopes and Brinkley 1997:68–69). This binding security guarantee created a significant risk for entrapment.

This initial Democratic preference for multilateralism is often passed over because analysts focus on Roosevelt’s preference for a four-power alliance to maintain international security after the war. State Department planners in the Democratic administration indeed utilized Roosevelt’s “four policemen” concept, but situated it in a qualitatively multilateral arrangement (Russell 1958:209; Hilderbrand 1990:15). According to the Draft Constitution, the great powers would enjoy veto power in peaceful settlement matters, but not in enforcement of breaches to the peace. In these latter instances, decisions would require a two-thirds majority vote of the Council, including only three-fourths of the permanent members of the Executive Council. This increased the risk of opportunism considerably. On the most important issues, great powers like the United States would not have the power to veto the use of their own armed forces, and they could be ordered into an operation by an affirmative vote of eight of eleven members of the Council (Russell 1958: 472–475). Democratic planners recognized the potential dangers of entrapment but believed that these more general multilateral commitments were necessary to ensure the success of the organization (Russell 1958: 243; Hilderbrand 1990:9, 26).

These were the same type of provisions that had prompted the Republicans to wage a fierce battle to limit any derogation of American sovereignty during the League of Nations fight in 1919. At that time Republicans, under the leadership of majority leader and head of the Foreign Relations Committee, Henry Cabot Lodge, demanded a reservation to the treaty declining any legal or moral obligation to come to the aid of others in case of aggression under Article X unless the United States decided otherwise. This was designed to prevent entrapment (Ambrosius 1987: chapter 7; Knock 1992: chapter 14; Cooper 2001: chapters 6–7). Republicans universally grounded their objections in a pessimistic understanding of human nature in keeping with their competitive social orientation. They believed that others could not be trusted to not act opportunistically (Stone 1970:10–11, 144; Ambrosius 1987:48; Cooper 2001:40; Patrick 2009:17).

The Republican position after World War II was virtually identical. World War II had dealt almost a deadly blow to Republican isolationism, the belief that the United States could avoid participation in great power politics. However, isolationism was a minority view even after World War I, and the real political question in 1919 was whether unilateralist Republicans and multilateralist Democrats could come to a consensus on American grand strategy (Stone 1970; Ruggie 1997). Even Legro, who claims that the post-World War II period was marked by a new cultural consensus on international engagement, notes that this was a coalition of two distinct types of “internationalists” (2005:70).

In September 1943, the Republicans laid down a marker of their expectations for the form of a postwar organization at a conference of party leaders at Mackinac Island. No one was more important in this meeting than Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan. The Republican Senate Steering Committee claimed

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12 This became the UN Security Council.
13 See the following references in the Congressional Record (hereafter CR): CR 65 (2): 2368; CR 65 (3): 60.
that his "views respond more completely to the composite judgment and conscience of Republicans in this international field than do those of any other Senators" (Campbell 1973:148). Although a non-interventionist before World War II, Vandenberg, believed that Pearl Harbor showed that continued American engagement in world affairs was unavoidable and crucial for maintaining peace after the war. However, the difference between his party and what he called "New Deal foreign policy" was that the Republicans would ensure "that we shall remain a totally sovereign country" (Vandenberg 1952:55–57). Vandenberg noted privately that sovereignty, what I have been calling the retention of unilateralism, was of great importance to "conservative portions of the party" (Campbell 1973:20). The party completely marginalized those few among them pushing for more dramatic plans based on pooling sovereignty, who were not coincidentally the most liberal in the party in terms of their domestic positions (Divine 1967:62–63, 70, 78, 106; Campbell 1973:20; Hoopes and Brinkley 1997:62, 161; Schlesinger 2003:63; Patrick 2009:63).

On the basis of Vandenberg's drafts, the Republican conference at Mackinac endorsed a resolution in favor of "responsible participation by the United States in a postwar cooperation organization among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and to attain permanent peace with organized justice in a free world." This same formula was necessary to gain bipartisan support for the Connally Resolution in 1943, which expressed generic Senate support for American participation in a postwar security organization, but was a watered-down version of more ambitious resolutions stressing the need for some sort of United Nations military force. Republican preferences for the design of a postwar organization were substantially different from those of Democrats. It was only at the insistence of the liberal Warren Austin that the plank even mentioned an organization. Vandenberg's preference was only to endorse international "cooperation" (Hull 1948:1261; Vandenberg 1952:43–44, 61–62; Russell 1958:93–94, 124–126; Hoopes and Brinkley 1997:65–67).

The administration had not yet given active consideration to the likely reaction of Republicans. Just as conservatives began to make their views known, the Democratic administration began to rethink the lack of a great power (and therefore American) veto on enforcement action by the United Nations as well as the nature of the security guarantee. A new plan in December 1943 stripped any security guarantee, including only the negative obligations "to refrain from use of force or threat to use force in its relations with other states" and "to settle all disputes with other states by pacific means" (Russell 1958:576–581). Members would not be required to act against aggression, thereby eliminating the entrapment problem.

With domestic politics in mind, the administration also inserted a great power veto. Hull recounted,

As for our own country, we recalled the insistent demand made in Woodrow Wilson's period for veto privileges in the League of Nations. Bitter opposition had been raised to the United States' entry into the League on the basis of erroneous assumptions that, if we became a member of the League, the Covenant allowed an agency of the League to give orders to our military forces in preserving peace. The biggest stumbling block that sent the Wilson movement in support of the League to utter destruction in 1920 was the argument over this point and no other political controversy during our time has been accompanied by more deep-seated antagonisms. (Hull 1948:1622–1623)

Roosevelt also concluded that Council action should require unanimity of all major powers, citing the same domestic political reasons. He was concerned that
the United States could otherwise be called upon to furnish armed forces without its consent, which Congress (always shorthand for Republicans) would never permit (Hilderbrand 1990:36). It is possible that this was his personal preference as well, but the historical record does not establish this firmly. However, in any case the Republican preference for unilateralism was a central concern.

By late April 1944, the nature of the postwar security organization was largely set, laid out in a paper entitled the “Possible Plan for a General International Organization” (Russell 1958:592–591). The administration shared it with the “Committee of Eight,” a bipartisan group of Senators convened by the administration to avoid the 1919 experience and build congressional support prior to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of the Big Three (Hull 1948:1622–1623; Notter 1949:195–196; Russell 1958:273–275; Campbell 1973:3, 17). Roosevelt and Hull were haunted by the specter of the League and determined to take into account conservative objections before the treaty reached the Senate (Notter 1949:195–196; Vandenberg 1952:95–96; Campbell 1973:3, 6, 17).

Hull was careful to point out features that would appeal to Republicans concerned about opportunism, particularly the veto. He explained to the Senators: “The veto power is in the document primarily on account of the United States… Without it the United States would not have anywhere near the popular support for the postwar organization as with it in, any more so perhaps than in 1920.” Hull himself hinted privately that he was not necessarily pleased with the fact: “We might as well recognize that this is about the best that can be done as a beginning” (1948:1662).

Hull’s pitch was perfect. In his diary, Vandenberg claimed that the most “striking thing about it is that it is so conservative from a nationalist standpoint.” By “conservative,” Vandenberg seems to have meant that it protected against opportunism, particularly entrapment, by preserving America’s unilateral freedom of action. He wrote in his diary, “To [Hull’s] credit, he recognizes that the United States will never permit itself to be ordered into war against its own consent… I am deeply impressed (and surprised) to find Hull so carefully guarding our American veto in his scheme of things … All in all … I think his preliminary scheme is excellent” (Vandenberg 1952:95–98). Therefore, differences between the two parties were settled before the issue of postwar organization became public, giving the appearance of bipartisan consensus.

With these provisions, the passage of the United Nations Charter was assured. Democratic Senator William Fulbright confessed in the opening of the debate: “I find myself somewhat suspicious of the unanimity with which the charter is apparently received by this body. Practically no measure of real importance has been accepted with such docility by the opposition.” He attributed this “unexpected approval in certain quarters of the Charter may have been induced by the assurance which some proponents have made that we sacrifice none of our American sovereignty” (US Congressional Record 79(1): 7963). Senator Fulbright was correct. The Charter passed by a vote of 89–2.

Nevertheless, ideological differences were still in evidence. Roll-call analysis yields little, given the prearranged compromise. However, a comprehensive review of the rhetoric of the debate reveals that Republicans, and almost only Republicans, stressed that the retention of unilateral discretion in foreign affairs was a virtue that allowed them to support the treaty.15 Republicans were consistently more pessimistic in their basic beliefs about international affairs and the trustworthiness of others.16 Democrats, and almost only Democrats, lamented the hindrance that might be posed by the great power veto and the lack of

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significant qualitative multilateralism. They were also much more sanguine about the potential for cooperation.\textsuperscript{17}

The only exceptions to these clear partisan differences were, as the argument would expect, liberal Republicans such as Hawkes, Austin, Smith, Bridges, and Wiley, whose concerns about the veto and general optimism about international cooperation contrasted sharply with others in their party.\textsuperscript{18} Quantitative data shows that these Republican outliers were the most ideologically liberal in their party, voting more often with the Roosevelt and Truman administrations than many Democrats.\textsuperscript{19} Where ideology did not overlap with party, ideology trumped simple partisan identification. The lack of a one-to-one relationship between party identification and ideology helped further the illusion of an ideological convergence between the parties on matters of foreign policy by somewhat obscuring the pronounced tendencies of multilateral liberals and unilateral conservatives.

The North Atlantic Treaty

The discussions leading up to the North Atlantic Treaty were structurally compelled to a large degree. States do not create alliances for the sake of it. The Czech crisis, the Berlin blockade, Soviet pressure on Norway, and fears that Italy and France would elect communist governments all gave the period of 1948 a crisis feel and undermined the first preference of the administration, a somewhat self-sufficient Europe not tightly allied to the United States (Weber 1992). As Lake points out, however, the systemic imperative of the Soviet threat did not dictate a unique, multilateral, and cooperative solution (1999:128–129). Nevertheless, Lake’s alternative account is structural as well. He claims that the positive externalities of a division of labor made possible by the nature of military technology led the United States toward cooperation. The risks of opportunism were not pronounced given the asymmetric distribution of power and the alignment of North Atlantic interests.

I claim instead that the North Atlantic Treaty was one way of dealing with the threat, but a cooperative one that reflected Democrats’ trust of their European partners. The idea of a pact was initially floated by British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, who suggested an arrangement to “create confidence and energy on the one side and inspire respect and caution on the other.” Bevin feared that without American assurance, there would be “piecemeal collapse of one Western bastion after another” (Foreign Relations of the United States 1948:15; Henderson 1983:4–6; Achilles 1992:11–12; Miscamble 1992:115).\textsuperscript{20} “Potential victims” needed to “feel sufficiently reassured to refuse to embark on a fatal policy of appeasement” (FRUS 1948:15; Kaplan 2007:30).

The Democratic administration framed the problem in similar terms, as a reassurance game in which American cooperation would be reciprocated. In a memorandum to Secretary of State George C. Marshall, John Hickerson, Director of the State Department’s Office of European Affairs, diagnosed the problem as an underestimation of American resolve not only by the Soviets, but also the Europeans, “to the point of losing their will to resist.” Hickerson stressed that European “willingness to fight for liberty is closely related to the strength of the help available” and argued that “concrete evidence of American determination...would go far to reduce both dangers” (FRUS 1948:40–42). Administration

\textsuperscript{17} CR79 (1): 7963, 7968, 8067, 8072, 8084, 8106, 8177, 8130, 8142.
\textsuperscript{18} CR 79 (1): 7965, 8001, 8036, 8039; 8060ff, 8165.
\textsuperscript{19} Data can be found at http://www.voteview.com/DWNL.htm. An explanation of how the scores are calculated can be found in Poole and Rosenthal (2007).
\textsuperscript{20} Foreign Relations of the United States will hereafter be FRUS.
officials expected that the Europeans would cooperate “provided they are assured of military support by the United States” (FRUS 1948:85–86). This is the framing that indicates a cooperative social orientation.

The basis of the very first American position paper for top-secret discussions with the United Kingdom and Canada on a potential alliance demonstrated the Democrats’ more trusting disposition. Assembled by the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department and called PPS/27, it accepted as an “assumption” that the Europeans would cooperate if given assurance of support by the United States (FRUS 1948:62; Henderson 1983:17; Miscamble 1992:123; Kaplan 2007:68). This trusting disposition led naturally to the first suggestion of what would become the heart of the North Atlantic Treaty, a qualitatively multilateral commitment that an attack on one would be an attack on all, to be justified legally under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (FRUS 1948:61–64; Miscamble 1992:123). This formula became the basis of a planning document called the “Pentagon Paper.” The United States even indicated, as a gesture of assurance, its willingness to guarantee the security of interested parties before the conclusion of such a pact (FRUS 1948:71–72).

This was not, however, an American hegemon willing to tolerate free-riding. The Truman administration expected the Europeans to eventually reciprocate in the common struggle against the Soviet Union. Even Hickerson, the biggest cheerleader for the alliance, stressed that the Europeans must themselves pool resources and resist “by every means at their disposal...any threat to the independence of any member whether from within or without” (FRUS 1948:40). While planning documents stress that an American commitment would increase European confidence, this “should be predicated upon resolute action by them.” The United States expected “reciprocal support” (FRUS 1948:62). The Americans promised assistance in case of attack “provided they defend themselves with every resource at their command” (FRUS 1948:63).

On this basis, Kydd concludes that this was an objective assurance game in which mutual cooperation was the equilibrium strategy given the structural nature of the strategic situation (2005:165–168). However, this is belied by the fact that there was considerable opposition to the North Atlantic Treaty on the part of those in the same structural position. A sizeable group of Senators, predominantly conservatives, initially opposed the alliance based on a belief that the Europeans were not trustworthy, most prominently Replication Senator Robert Taft of Ohio. This conservative group also believed that the United States needed a strategy for deterring a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. However, they argued that the Europeans would take advantage of American trust, entrapping the United States in conflicts not in its interest, free-riding on American defense commitments, and even abandoning it in its time of need. Taft feared that a binding treaty would induce moral hazard and lead to entrapment. Such an instrument required action “without any examination of the reasons for the aggression which may have occurred” (Taft 1951:88–89). The United States could not judge whether a country “had given cause for the attack” (Taft 1997:82–83).

Republican Senator William Jenner accused the Europeans of “gorging themselves at the expense of the American taxpayer while continuing the exploitation of their own people” (Taft 1997:9561). Conservatives framed the same situation as prisoner’s dilemma in which the Europeans would defect if the Americans cooperated.

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21 For other references to entrapment, see comments in CR 81(1): 9639 by Donnell and Malone; CR 81(1): 9648, 9889.

Taft and his allies instead backed a unilateral alternative protecting against entrapment, a “Monroe Doctrine for Europe.” The United States would declare its interest in the security of Western Europe, much as it had done for the Western Hemisphere, thereby warning Russia not to contemplate any armed action in the Western sphere of influence. By focusing on air power, it would also obviate the need for significant American spending on conventional forces, which the Republicans believed would lead to European free-riding (Taft 1951:19–20, 1997:59–63, 87–91; Doenecke 1979; Snyder 1991; Lake 1999).

Lake cannot account for why these Taft Republicans differed in their assessment of the likelihood of opportunism, which was the core ideological difference, as they agreed on the nature and significance of the Soviet threat and the implications of the changes in military technology for military strategy. However, Lake (1999:131, 170) argues that the Taft Republicans were largely insignificant because structural features of the environment made the wisdom of the cooperative path clear to a vast majority. Only the Taft minority did not grasp this.

However, this misses the fact that concerns about opportunism were shared by almost all Republicans, both in the “isolationist” Taftite and the more moderate and “internationalist” Vandenberg wings of the party. Recognizing this, the administration proceeded extremely cautiously so as to cultivate enough Vandenberg Republicans to cement the treaty. Key aide Theodore Achilles recalled that “memories of what the Senate had done to the League Covenant haunted us.” Democratic policymakers laid down two ground rules: involvement of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and full bipartisan consensus given the fact that 1948 was an election year (Achilles 1992:14; Kaplan 2007:31). Because Lake (1999) does not devote any real attention to the domestic political consultations proceeding alongside the transatlantic negotiations, he overstates the degree of consensus on the cooperative solution and understates differences concerning the potential for opportunism. This leads him to incorrectly conclude that there was an ideological agreement on the merits of multilateralism owing to the power of structure.

Deputy Secretary of State Robert Lovett briefed Vandenberg on the administration’s early conversations with Europeans in a series of meetings. As Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Senator had the power to block any treaty. Unlike in his early consultations on the United Nations, Vandenberg was not pleased with the drafts. Just like Taft, he worried about free-riding and entrapment. He expected the “majority of the countries to take one or two lines of action, either to fold their hands and let Uncle Sam carry them, or secondly, and in his opinion of equal and perhaps greater danger, to let them get a sense of false security which might result in their taking so firm an attitude as to become provocative and give the impression of having a chip on their soldier” (FRUS 1948:82). When Republican John Foster Dulles was brought into the conversations, there was “unanimous agreement that the United States should not be in the position of taking any engagement for assistance of any sort which would be automatically brought into being by the act of someone else” (FRUS 1948:107). The two Republicans predicted that the proposals would not garner the two-thirds necessary for Senate approval (FRUS 1948:82). Other Republicans and conservative Democrats had similar concerns when consulted in closed hearings (US Senate 1973:8, 20).

In the face of this opposition, the Democratic administration applied the brakes. After the consultations with Vandenberg and Dulles, administration officials dramatically revised the Pentagon Paper, producing NSC 9/2, which stripped any consideration of a security guarantee. NSC 9/2 sought a coordinated military supply plan and only a commitment to military talks in case

23 Truman Library, Oral History Project.
of aggression, as Vandenberg and Dulles had suggested (FRUS 1948:116–119). This document is sometimes incorrectly taken as evidence for a continuing structural divide between more vulnerable Europeans and more geographically insulated Americans, when in fact it was a function of domestic politics (Weber 1992:647–649). American officials promised the Europeans that their long-term goals were not in question, but that more conservative Senators did not agree. Lovett explained to them the “terrible difficulties in Congress” and how convincing even Senate internationalists like Vandenberg was the “most difficult challenge” (Miscamble 1992:127; Baylis 1993:98; Kaplan 2007:69). Hickerson reminded the Europeans that bipartisanship was “essential in an election year with Democratic administration, a Republican Congress, and the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, a potential candidate for the Presidency.”

Vandenberg suggested an alternative, a resolution passed by the Senate endorsing a much weaker arrangement. Whereas the administration’s proposal presumed that the United States would act first on the assumption of European reciprocity, the Republican Senators reversed the order. Owing to their prisoner’s dilemma framing of the situation, they held that Europeans must, in Dulles’ words, first demonstrate “continuous and visible evidence of maximum efforts to take care of themselves” (FRUS 1948:106). The Senate would proclaim to take particular notice of countries that showed their determination to resist aggression and would be prepared to consider, but not promise in advance, “association, on the basis of mutual aid and self-help with such Regional Arrangements as affect its national security” (FRUS 1948:101). In private Foreign Relations committee hearings, Vandenberg emphasized that the United States would only consider association if the Europeans “can succeed in proving to us that [they] means business in connection with it” (US Senate 1973:29). Other Republicans insisted on “evidence” of self-help and mutual aid; otherwise, the United States “shouldn’t have anything to do with them” (US Senate 1973:20). The final resolution incorporating this formula passed 64 to 4 in June 1948.

The Vandenberg Resolution is often incorrectly taken as an indication of a bipartisan commitment to a multilateral alliance. The administration somewhat disingenuously used it as such, but it was in reality a dilution of a plan for a much more binding commitment to European security. Shortly after its passage, the Truman administration convened multilateral transatlantic negotiations. A multinational working group reached consensus on the “Washington Paper,” which recommended a treaty with “unmistakably clear provisions binding parties to come to each other’s defense” that would “hearten the peoples” of Western Europe and deter the Soviet Union (FRUS 1948:242–243). Democrats were less concerned about entrapment and free-riding and more concerned with assurance.

That any administrative hesitation was political in nature is indicated by the speed and energy with which they acted following the surprise victory of Truman over the Republican candidate, Governor Thomas Dewey, along with the Democratic takeover of the Senate in November 1948. Given the need for two-thirds Senate support, the treaty text would still have to be bipartisan, but with the danger of making the pact into an electoral issue removed, Democrats could make their own views clearer. This was immediately evident in negotiations over the language of the security guarantee. Before the elections, the United States

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24 Truman Library, Oral History Project.
25 Truman Library, Oral History Project.
favored the more non-committal obligation to “undertake to assist in meeting the attack” without any specific mention of military force (Baylis 1993:94–95; Kaplan 2007:123). The draft treaty concluded in December 1948 instead contained the pledge “to assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith such military or other action, individually and in concert with the other parties, as may be necessary to restore and assure the security of the North Atlantic area” (FRUS 1948:334–337; Henderson 1983:70; Achilles 1992:22; Baylis 1993:108; Kaplan 2007:188).

This went too far for Vandenberg and the conservative Democrat Thomas Connally, now chairman of the Foreign Relations committee. In private both were concerned, stressing that it implied that the United States was “rushing into some kind of automatic commitment” (FRUS 1949:74; Acheson 1969; Reid 1977:153; Kaplan 2007:197). They insisted that it must be made clear that there was “no obligation, moral or otherwise, to go to war” in case of armed aggression (FRUS 1949). Connally was particularly concerned about entrapment, raising the possibility publicly of “letting European nations declare war and letting us fight” (Henderson 1983:90). “We cannot be Sir Galahads, and every time we hear a gun fired plunge into war and take sides without knowing what we are doing and without knowing the issues involved,” he said (Henderson 1983:91; Kaplan 2007:201). Vandenberg wanted it “made plain” that individual countries would determine for themselves what action they might take, so as to remove the automaticity and restore unilateral discretion in the treaty (FRUS 1949:109). Connally and Vandenberg jointly suggested replacing a pledge to take action “as may be necessary” with the phrase “as it may deem necessary,” “it” being each individual member (FRUS 1949:108–110). Truman and Acheson had to concede this restoration of some unilateralism, eventually incorporated into the security guarantee of the treaty, as otherwise they would endanger ratification.

Because the administration tended to court Republican and conservative Democratic objections during the negotiation process, ratification was largely uncontroversial. As Achilles would later note of changes to Article V, “Vandenberg’s and Connally’s insistence on those … phrases paid off handsomely” (Achilles 1992:31). Vandenberg’s formula of “self-help and mutual aid” was inserted word-for-word into Article III to guard against free-riding. As a result, the North Atlantic Treaty passed overwhelmingly 82–13.

How Generalizable Is Generalized Trust?

The case studies mentioned earlier demonstrate that generalized trust was a key ingredient in the American commitment to multilateralism and is what differentiated advocates of significant international cooperation from those more skeptical of collaboration. However, is it possible to say more generally when generalized trust is more likely to matter, and how it interacts with other factors?

It is likely that generalized trust, as it is a core element of a particular ideological view of the world, will divide actors at home when structural cues from the environment are more ambiguous because there is a plausible case for both unilateral and multilateral options. When the environment provides overwhelming incentives, we should expect more of a domestic consensus.

Dispositional trust is not inconsistent with the idea that certain structural situations induce less cooperative behavior on the part of all. As the potential costs of defection rise, all are less likely to cooperate, regardless of their level of trust. Trust affects assessments about the likelihood of defection, not the cost. The level of vulnerability is a function of the structural circumstances. Support for

26 Connally was one of the most conservative Democratic senators, among the most conservative quartile the party as measured by NOMINATE scores.
strong security guarantees, for instance, often reflects a higher degree of insecurity vis-à-vis a potential adversary. For this reason, Europeans wanted a very tight alliance after World War II. They preferred qualitative multilateralism because of the potential costs of abandonment, which would have been the case regardless of the level of trust. The structure of the game is one of many important factors in explaining behavior in social dilemmas. Rationalism is not wrong, but incomplete (Tyler 2001:287; Ostrom 2003:45; Kramer et al. 2004:284).

However, these thoughts about when generalized trust is most likely to matter make the case studies that much more telling. Even in two instances in which structural forces are argued to have been compelling, there was significant domestic debate about multilateralism. And in the case of NATO, even though the United States was much less vulnerable, the more trusting Democratic administration was willing to make the more binding multilateral commitment of the kind that the Europeans desired. Structure was weak enough that Democratic preferences were generally closer to those of its international partners than its domestic interlocutors. And had the Republicans been in office, NATO might not have materialized, or it could have looked very different. Dulles and Vandenberg favored only a standardization of equipment and pooling of military supplies when initially consulted on the pact (FRUS 1948:104–108).

This discussion points toward the importance of integrating social psychological insights into studies of international cooperation, something which has been relatively rare. International relations scholars have drawn on psychology to explain systematic errors in decision making or human inclinations to define themselves in terms of in- and out-groups (Jervis 1976; Mercer 1995). But who better than psychologists to help us with our trust issues?

References


