Planning, Power, and Possibilities: How UNIDAD is Shaping Equitable Development in South Central L.A.

By Manuel Pastor, Vanessa Carter, Alejandro Sanchez-Lopez, and Robert Chlala

USC Program for Environmental and Regional Equity (PERE)
Acknowledgements

In writing this report a few years out from the events it retells, we were drawn back into the smart, earnest, and inspiring work of United Neighborhoods in Defense Against Displacement (UNIDAD). Its work has been and will continue to be marked by collaboration towards a common goal – a more equitable future for Los Angeles. This report carries on the collaborative spirit of the coalition and, as such, we can only begin by acknowledging the many people who made it possible.

First, to the UNIDAD coalition members themselves who granted us access to their world. In particular to the always patient Joe Donlin (Associate Director/Director of Equitable Development at Strategic Actions for a Just Economy (SAJE)) who helped to situate the research, connect us with interviewees, and review the findings, as well as to other UNIDAD members who provided comments on earlier drafts: Sandra McNeill (T.R.U.S.T. South LA), Cynthia Strathmann (SAJE), Benjamin Torres (Community Development Technology Center), Gabriela Garcia (SAJE), Nancy Halpern Ibrahim (Esperanza Community Housing), and Rabeya Sen (Esperanza). And for the use of their photos in the report, we thank Gabriela Garcia (again) and Jon Truong (SAJE).

Thanks to all of our interviewees for the time and insight they provided us. Listed at the end, they represent many different viewpoints and institutions spanning from the University of Southern California to the Los Angeles City Council to G.H. Palmer Associates. Their thoughtful responses to often tough questions guided our analysis, and we trust their voices are reflected here in the nuanced story we try to tell. We also had the opportunity to hear from – and be funded by – The California Endowment. And thanks to the James Irvine Foundation for their support.

Finally, our gratitude to the team at the USC Program for Environmental and Regional Equity (PERE). To Gladys Malibiran, our communications specialist, who made this report presentable and will ensure that it gets out into the world. To Jennifer Ito and Rhonda Ortiz, our project managers, for helping us keep our priorities straight at the start and for making sure our commas and periods ended up in the right places at the end. And thanks to our USC doctoral students Adam Liszkiewicz (Cinematic Arts) and Kristie Valdez-Guillen (American Studies and Ethnicity) and Master of Public Policy student Heddy Nam for their able research assistance and tireless fact-checking.

— Manuel Pastor, Vanessa Carter, Alejandro Sanchez-Lopez, and Robert Chlala

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Executive Summary

Private redevelopment is in full tilt in downtown Los Angeles – and cities across the nation. But with what is often welcome progress also comes unequal gains and potential problems of displacement. In two community organizing victories, United Neighbors in Defense Against Displacement (UNIDAD) has proven that community organizations and private developers can forge a shared future using tools like Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs; legal agreements on new development projects).

Planning, Power, and Possibilities tells the story behind two such CBAs – one with developer G.H. Palmer Associates in 2011 and a second (which was technically a “Development Agreement”) with the University of Southern California (USC) in 2012 – and notes how they include concrete benefits such as a new health clinic, living wage jobs, and $20 million for affordable housing, among other things. We put those agreements in a broader context, showing how histories matter, movements matter, and models matter for achieving mutually beneficial wins and building inclusive, healthy, and vibrant cities.

For more than two decades, UNIDAD has brought together community organizations that represent low-income, immigrant, and Black communities in South Central Los Angeles to work towards health, economic, and racial justice. Collaboration among member organizations dates back to the 1990s, when the Coalition for a Responsible USC formed to improve the labor conditions for USC service workers, the majority of whom lived locally.

Renamed the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice (FCCEJ), it later worked with others to secure the first comprehensive CBA in the country at what is now the Staples Center and L.A. Live in downtown L.A.

So in 2006, when USC launched its Master Plan process and G.H. Palmer Associates bought land just east of USC to build the luxury Lorenzo Housing Development, relationships were in place, and moving to action did not take long. What this shows is that histories matter: It is critical to understand the history of a particular place and critical for the groups that seek to enhance community voice to have developed long-term relationships – and trust – with one another and local residents.

UNIDAD’s success in affecting equitable development stems from its movement-building approach. Social movements are sustained groupings that develop a frame or narrative based on shared values, that maintain a link with a real and broad base in the community, and that build for a long-term transformation in systems of power. To build an authentic base, UNIDAD organizations’ membership is made up of local residents, many of whom were trained in The People’s Planning School for these very campaigns.

In coalition, these community planners from relatively-small, membership-based organizations were able scale up from the neighborhood to the city level and become recognized participants in the conversation on urban redevelopment and community health. This was particularly significant because CBAs have traditionally been secured with an important labor partner; here the main drivers were smaller community-based organizations,
making this an important and unique case and worthy of study by groups in other areas where labor is either not strong or not always closely aligned with community groups.

UNIDAD also refined and echoed a unified message throughout the campaigns, one that centered on how development without displacement was both possible and critical to community health. Tone was key as well: Even when negotiations were tense, UNIDAD stuck with a narrative that could serve as the foundation of a long-term partnership – that its goal was a “win-win-win” for the developer, university, residents, and the City. And to make sure the message was taken seriously (and revealing adeptness with government), UNIDAD also built trust with the City Council, nurturing ties with then-Councilmember Jan Perry and meeting regularly with then-Councilmember Ed Reyes. These capacities, broader than community development strategies, are part and parcel to movement building.

Research was also an important part of the model. Knowing the issues was critical in creating leverage – from understanding zoning conditions in the case of the Lorenzo, to benchmarking USC’s proposals against affordable housing allotments in other university redevelopment plans, to developing studies – including a Health Impact Assessment – that placed community concerns in the broader context of community well-being. As a result of all this organizing, messaging, and research, the USC Master Plan now includes significant affordable housing allotments and the Lorenzo provides space for a health center – and both developments are already leading to new, living-wage employment opportunities for local residents.

UNIDAD’s victories have created an innovative model for urban redevelopment. With the long and often underfunded work of implementation ahead, many questions remain for the USC Master Plan agreement, including guaranteeing community input in housing fund decisions as well as tracking local hiring and the like. Still, UNIDAD has already shown how organizing for community benefits can tilt the balance of power to make way for equitable development and community health. The coalition looks forward to using more pro-active strategies in the future, like shaping Community Plans.

UNIDAD has proven that a broader set of stakeholders can determine the future of a city, highlighted how investment can happen without displacement, and demonstrated what equitable growth looks like and will require. Already, UNIDAD’s lessons are informing UC Berkeley’s expansion into Richmond, and in March 2015, the coalition secured a new CBA at the Grand Metropolitan in L.A. What is at stake now is not any particular agreement or even any particular neighborhood but whether tools like CBAs can be combined with movement-building strategies to help us establish the types of communities most of us actually want – ones that are diverse, healthy, and responsive. The UNIDAD story helps to point the way forward for urban America.
Introduction

On December 12, 2012, United Neighbors in Defense Against Displacement Coalition (UNIDAD) and the University of Southern California (USC) issued a joint press release celebrating USC’s new Master Plan and its landmark inclusion of community benefits.¹ The agreement included $20 million for affordable housing, a commitment to 30 percent local and 10 percent disadvantaged hiring for the project, and – along with other community programs – an Economic Development Coordinating Council (North-Hager, Donlin, and Andro 2012).

This community victory was achieved over the course of about two years in which UNIDAD demonstrated an effective combination of community organizing, policy research, and just plain persistence. It also built on lessons learned and coalitions forged during a similar effort in 2011 to secure community benefits as part of the Lorenzo Housing Development by G.H. Palmer Associates. And both are part of a larger body of work that shows the ability of community organizations to shape urban development in Los Angeles and beyond.

Indeed, these milestones in a new model of equitable development are part of a broader story in cities across the nation as developers discover that lower-income neighborhoods are ripe for investment. In response, community members and organizations are asking who gets to determine the future, how to have investment without displacement, and what inclusive growth should really look like. In historic South Central Los Angeles, wins on both the Lorenzo Housing Development and the University of Southern California Master Plan reflect a fundamental sense that a new future is possible: one of just growth.

Equitable growth – what we call “just growth” – is more than a nice sentiment, it is an economic reality. For example, the Cleveland Federal Reserve Bank – not usually identified as a social justice ally – conducted an analysis of nearly 120 U.S. metropolitan areas and found that “racial inclusion and income equality are contributing factors to economic growth” (Eberts, Erickcek, and Kleinhenz 2006:iii). More research has since substantiated this finding and found that “knowledge communities” are a key ingredient in just growth (Benner and Pastor 2012). Knowledge communities are a place where diverse stakeholders can come together to develop a shared understanding of their region as a way to move forward together.

¹ USC refers to this project as a “Master Plan” and the City refers to it as a “Specific Plan.” For consistency, we use “Master Plan” throughout this report.
Part and parcel to building knowledge communities is a realistic approach to power. Bringing together stakeholders with varying levels of power takes work and a hard-nosed assessment. Developers and universities simply hold greater sway than community-based organizations and low-income residents in Los Angeles and elsewhere. But power can be built such that development does not automatically spell displacement. Coalitions, like UNIDAD, have tools by which to amplify their voice and affirm residents as stakeholders. These tools include building a base of community residents, nurturing relationships with local politicians and business representatives, and harnessing strategic research.

As part of a power-building effort, the story of UNIDAD cannot be told outside of the rich history of social-movement organizing in Los Angeles. Social movements are sustained groupings that develop a frame or narrative based on shared values that maintain a link with a real and broad base in the community, and that build for a long-term transformation in systems of power (Pastor and Ortiz 2009). Since the 1992 civil unrest, movement-building organizations in the L.A. region have been gaining in strength and sophistication, and the organizations that are part of UNIDAD are integral to this history (Pastor and Prichard 2012). Together, they have sustained the impulse towards equity and helped reshape the region.

In this report, we detail UNIDAD’s work to realize community benefits agreements in two separate instances— one with G.H. Palmer Associates and the other with the University of Southern California (USC) – and offer insights into new and effective models of community-shaped growth.2 We conducted this research over the course of several years, interviewing members of the UNIDAD coalition, USC, G.H. Palmer Associates, and elected and appointed officials from the City of Los Angeles in an effort to understand the story from multiple perspectives (see appendices for the list of interviewees). We supplemented our interviews with a review of the literature on community benefit agreements and on community-university relations, verified facts by checking policy documents, and conducted a scan of media coverage of both development projects.

From our research, we lift up three over-arching lessons: Movements matter, models matter, and histories matter for building a city and an America based on values of growth, equity, and inclusion. Movements are key because they help to build community voice to influence the development process, shifting power in such a way that investment without displacement is possible. Of course, we only get there if we have the right tools and policies, and so models matter, particularly because the sort of

2 The USC Master Plan negotiations actually resulted in what is called a “Development Agreement” which was signed with the City of Los Angeles and makes legally binding the community benefits for which UNIDAD worked. For rhetorical ease, we refer to it as a CBA in this report.
development pressures and political challenges that the UNIDAD coalition faced are likely to be part of the future of South Central and other urban areas as cities continue to stage a remarkable resurgence in terms of attracting capital and investments. Finally, histories matter – and we use the plural because it is critical to understand the history of a particular place and also critical for the groups that seek to enhance community voice to have developed long-term relationships – and thus trust – with one another to be effective.

To make these broad points, we start with three very brief histories: that of South Central L.A., of community benefits agreements, and of campus-community relationships during development. We then take a look at the specific histories of the relationship between USC and its community, starting as far back as 1966 and the Hoover Redevelopment Project. We then walk forward to understand how UNIDAD’s movement has grown alongside USC, from its original iteration as the Coalition for a Responsible USC, to the development of USC’s Galen Center, and up to the start of the current USC Master Plan and UNIDAD’s concerns about residential displacement.

We take a deeper look at the Lorenzo Housing Development campaign, as it was critical to success at USC as well as being chronologically in the midst of the USC Master Plan process. The Lorenzo campaign was an opportunity for the coalition to solidify, to hone its message, and to return to USC with a win in-hand and a higher profile. This win was also particularly important to morale as the developer had a reputation for being resistant to equitable development in the region but, in this case, ultimately engaged in a collaborative process in order to move the development into the construction phase. It also offers a new model of negotiating a Community Benefits Agreement (CBA), with the agreement reached solely between two private entities (UNIDAD and G.H. Palmer Associates), without city involvement.

Turning back to USC, we highlight the challenges to that campaign: the politics of representation, the politics of institutions, and the politics of urban governance. But we then explain how UNIDAD confronted these challenges not just with the tools of equitable development, but with the multifaceted capacities of social movements. In so doing, UNIDAD was able to navigate city politics, use research to raise the bar on affordable housing, and leverage the media to carry the coalition’s message, among other things (see Table 1). We close by suggesting lessons for shaping equitable development, noting that social movements that build power and enhance community voice are not a sidebar, but key to achieving better planning and new possibilities for urban redevelopment.
A Brief History

South Central Los Angeles

The area historically known as South Central, now often called “South Los Angeles,” encompasses 28 neighborhoods and over 51 square miles (Los Angeles Times 2015). While it is frequently conflated in the public imagination as a single neighborhood, it is actually composed of multiple neighborhoods, often with very different demographics, housing stock, and commercial corridors (see Map 1). Nonetheless, the entire area has a shared history of both struggle and resilience.

The long-time heart of the community was “Historic South Central,” an area running south from downtown L.A. along Central Avenue (and through what is called South Park). From the 1940s to 1960s, this area and its immediate environs constituted an anchor for L.A.’s African-American community. It was home to the largest Black-owned insurance company in the Western U.S. (Golden State Mutual Life Insurance Company), numerous Black-owned larger businesses (e.g., the Dunbar Hotel, originally opened as the Hotel Somerville), and numerous community organizations including the local chapters of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Urban League (Sides 2006).
As the community grew and racially restrictive covenants fell, Blacks gained a toehold in other parts of South Central. But geographic expansion was not accompanied by an increase in economic opportunity or a shift in racially-biased policing. The 1965 Watts civil unrest resulted from a police stop, but many analysts saw the real triggers as unemployment and economic distress. Both the uprising and subsequent reportage brought the challenges of South Central residents into the national consciousness. It marked the beginning of the era in which the neighborhood became synonymous with struggle – and also triggered a period of white flight that opened up housing opportunities in the western areas of South Central.

In the years following the Watts unrest, Black community organizations – like the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the Black Panthers (Felker-Kantor 2013; Pulido 2006) – actively challenged discriminatory housing practices, school segregation, and other civil and economic injustices. In the late 1980s, new groups like the Community Coalition for Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment (now named Community Coalition) emerged to find community-driven solutions to the crack-cocaine epidemic, in ways focused on root causes of poverty and violence as opposed to more punitive approaches (Community Coalition 2015; Sonenshein 1996).

In 1992, another uprising took place that initially started in South Central, once again rooted in issues of racism, police brutality, and limited economic opportunities. Unlike in 1965, the 1992 civil unrest was not confined to South Central but occurred in many low-income neighborhoods throughout the city and county. It sparked much more than the fires reported in the national media; it also triggered a new kind of grassroots organizing for social change.

This new organizing was connected in part to a revitalizing labor movement (Milkmam 2006), but it also stemmed from long histories of Black, Chicano, and Asian political mobilizations (Pulido 2006). As these streams of change began to coalesce into cross-cutting regional social movements, community organizers and regionalist scholars increasingly articulated that the solutions to the problems of South Central were not confined to the dynamics occurring solely within these neighborhoods (e.g., Clark and Christopherson 2009; Orfield 1997; Orfield and Luce Jr. 2010; Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka 2009). Rather, change would require new strategies, broader coalitions, and innovative tools to gain influence beyond the confines of the neighborhood.

Other dynamics driving the changing economic and political landscape included continued immigration, especially from Central America and Mexico, as well as new flows of capital from the Pacific Rim. In the single decade from 1980 to 1990, the population of South Central went from being 23 percent to 45 percent Latino – and is now 63 percent – as many Central American refugees fleeing civil wars began moving into the area.³ South Central is now becoming a more permanent home for immigrants and their U.S.-born children. Yet high housing costs and the lack of good jobs remain an ongoing struggle for new immigrants and long-time African-American residents alike (Kun and Pulido 2013).

³ USC PERE analysis of data from U.S. Census Bureau, Geolytics, Inc., and 2008-2012 American Community Survey (Ruggles et al. 2010).
Given the historic disinvestment and ongoing economic distress in South Central, the focus of grassroots organizing campaigns has been on quality affordable housing, higher wages, and other housing and economic measures. But an additional chapter in the history of South Central that is, in part, due to its proximity to L.A.’s booming downtown has been a developer-led revival of the area – something that seemed a distant possibility in the smoldering fires of the 1992 uprising.

Grassroots organizations have responded to these development pressures by trying to articulate an equitable economic future conceived and forged by the communities most impacted. The UNIDAD coalition works throughout the community but has been particularly active in the northern portion of South Central which is closest to the current flurry of downtown redevelopment. Community Coalition and Strategic Concepts in Organizing and Policy Education (SCOPE) organize further south. Neighborhoods like Watts that have mature African-American-led civic organizations are now also nurturing Latino leadership. Many of these organizations have a membership base rooted in a specific neighborhood and work together around issues that affect all of South Central.

How will these community forces for equity and market pressures for economic growth come together? Will new investors engage residents in creating healthy and economically vibrant communities? Bringing together community, religious, and service organizations, UNIDAD is making a bold statement: Investment without displacement is possible; equitable development is doable.

Community Benefits Agreements

A **community benefits agreement** (CBA) is an accepted tool for equitable growth. A CBA is a legal agreement through which communities can negotiate the terms of a development project. It opens up a vital process for democratic input and influence over investments (Musil 2012; Salkin and Lavine 2008). Los Angeles has been ground zero for the development and implementation of CBAs: The first CBA was the 1998 Hollywood and Highland agreement.

The Hollywood and Highland CBA resulted from community groups forming coalitions and setting down a clear legal contract with developers Legacy Partners and Gatehouse Hollywood over their obligations to the impacted community. Spearheaded by the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE), the CBA secured 70 percent local hire with half of that at a living wage (The Public Law Center 2011). Additional concerns over union neutrality (i.e., not standing in the way of workers choosing their own representation for collective bargaining), increased traffic, noise, and pollution were also negotiated prior to groundbreaking. Creating a model for community influence in the process,
Hollywood and Highland showed what a group of dedicated community and labor organizers could accomplish when facing some of the biggest developers in the country (Pastor et al. 2009).

Shortly thereafter, in 2001, the Los Angeles Sports and Entertainment District CBA, often referred to as the “Staples CBA”, was negotiated for a massive sports and entertainment facility to be built around the Staples Center in downtown Los Angeles. Prior to this CBA, the developer (AEG) had verbally promised living wage and union neutrality benefits to the labor and community coalition in the construction of the Staples Center. These benefits were then rescinded when the developer obtained its land variances from the City (Salkin and Lavine 2008). Community concerns about displacement, noise, and traffic were also largely ignored (Ho 2007).

AEG’s circumvention proved to be both legal foul play and bad business. As the project expanded to include a 27-acre site now known as “L.A. Live,” community coalitions re-strategized under the banner of the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice (FCCEJ) (Ho 2007). Evolving from the Coalition for a Responsible USC and expanding from a primary focus on development at USC, FCCEJ members became concerned with L.A. Live and other plans to transform the northern part of historic South Central into a “sports and entertainment corridor,” especially given the impact they were already seeing with the Staples Center (Saito 2012).

FCCEJ used its strength in numbers and leveraged the project’s dependence on land variances and city subsidies to negotiate a substantive CBA. The agreement – which was initially focused on labor relations – included at least $1 million for public parks and recreation, living wage and local hiring requirements, resident parking set-asides, and job training programs (Salkin and Lavine 2008). Considered the first “full-fledged” CBA, the L.A. Live/Staples Center agreement also included a monitoring body and was integrated into AEG’s development agreement with the City. FCCEJ continues to do this work for equitable development, now under the banner of UNIDAD.

CBAs have proved to be a tool for democratizing development projects in marginalized communities (Pastor et al. 2009; Salkin and Lavine 2008). Key to their adoption: CBAs have benefits for developers, too (Been 2010). Taking active steps to incorporate community concerns strengthens a developer’s relations not only with the community but also with local government. For example, at Hollywood and Highland, participating in the CBA helped the developer secure $90 million in subsidies from the City (The Public Law Center 2011). CBAs can even help keep a project out of contentious court proceedings (Been 2010). One of our interviewees noted that major developers in Los Angeles now have a model for how to move their project forward smoothly – that is, engage in a collaborative CBA process. And, indeed, in our interviews with UNIDAD members, they are ultimately looking for partnership with USC and others investing in the development of their community.
### Table 1. Comparison of Lorenzo and USC Master Plan Community Benefits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Lorenzo Apartments⁴</th>
<th>USC Master Plan⁵</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries</td>
<td>Adams Blvd to 23rd St., between Flower St. and Grand Ave., Los Angeles, 90007</td>
<td>Jefferson Blvd. between Hoover St. and McClintock Ave., Los Angeles, 90007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developers</td>
<td>G.H. Palmer Associates</td>
<td>University of Southern California</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Development characteristics | ▪ 9.4 acres  
▪ 1.6 million square feet (sf) total  
▪ 919 multi-family residential units  
▪ 140,650 sf for recreational (private/residential) amenities  
▪ 34,000 sf of retail  
▪ 7,500 sf for a community-serving medical center | ▪ 200 acres  
▪ 5 million square feet (sf) total  
▪ 2.26 million sf housing (5,400 student beds, 250 faculty housing units)  
▪ 202,000 sf retail, 40,000 sf grocery  
▪ 80,000 sf community educational facility  
▪ 12.33 acres open space, including student/private common spaces with 20,000 sf fitness space |
| Build out        | 2011-2013            | 2015-2017        |
| Total project cost | $250 million         | $650 million costs for USC Village; at least $5 billion economic impact expected |
| Benefits Stipulated (Partial Listing) | ▪ $1.05 million contribution to new Community Benefits Fund for affordable housing in historic South Central  
▪ 7,500 sf community health clinic operating rent-free for 20 years  
▪ $160k for community health outreach services  
▪ $2.1 million contribution to clinic for initial operating expenses, medical equipment and community outreach | ▪ $20 million investment in city-managed affordable housing fund  
▪ 4,038 net new student beds built on campus  
▪ 25,000 sf full-service grocery that accepts WIC, EBT  
▪ 800 sf community room  
▪ $20 million to upgrade roads and streetscapes around USC Village |

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⁵ USC Master Plan CBA:  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefits Stipulated (Partial Listing)</th>
<th>Benefits Stipulated (Partial Listing)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ For development project: 30% local hire, 10% local at-risk residents, both paid at living wage</td>
<td>▪ Donations to local parks ($350k), local school activities ($25k annually), park programming ($10k annually), transit-oriented planning ($500k)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ $200k for jobs training and referral</td>
<td>▪ Storefront Transit Mobility Hub for public transport access/use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Permanent jobs: 40% hours local hire, 60% paid living wage</td>
<td>▪ Legal assistance clinic for affordable housing based in law school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ $300k for creating small business revolving loan fund</td>
<td>▪ $300k investment in a pilot Jobs Training program, managed by a new Economic Development Coordinating Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ 10% of retail space designated for local small businesses, with discounted rent</td>
<td>▪ 30% of permanent jobs for local residents; 10% for local disadvantaged residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ $200k contribution for community to engage in transit-oriented development strategies</td>
<td>▪ New jobs: 50% unionized/pay a living wage, 30% local hires, 10% disadvantaged workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ 5 percent (approx. 46) apartments set-aside for Very Low-Income housing (as required by the Los Angeles Density Bonus Agreement)</td>
<td>▪ 15% local procurement goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ $140k for CBA compliance monitoring</td>
<td>▪ 25% minority business enterprises (MBEs) hired during construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ $17.5K in relocation assistance funding per qualified University Village tenants</td>
<td>▪ Small Business Empowerment Services to 40 Local Small Businesses and all University Village tenants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A CBA – and its variants, like a Developer’s Agreement, as in the case of USC – can be powerful legal tools, but not without limitations. Establishing partnerships between developers and the community can be tough, but government can help by providing grants, enforcing exactions, offering legal resources, and incentivizing developers’ participation through subsidies and grants (Salkin and Lavine 2008). While legally binding, when an agreement is privately negotiated between the developers and the coalition, enforceability can be tricky, which is a topic discussed in Naved Sheikh’s “Community Benefits Agreements: Can Private Contracts Replace Public Responsibility?” (2008). Without government involvement, the onus of enforcement is on the community coalition that fought for and won the agreement. However, such coalitions often have limited funding, time, and legal expertise (Baxamusa 2008; Been 2010). Establishing a third-party moderator (usually an elected official) can facilitate communication between groups, establish a referee for negotiations and enforcement, and grant greater legitimacy to the agreement (Baxamusa 2008).

One key feature of the earliest CBAs, including the landmark agreements at Hollywood and Highland and the L.A. Live/Staples Center, was the role of organized labor (and/or labor-affiliated institutions such as LAANE). Labor brings institutional power and resources that frequently gives extra leverage in obtaining CBAs. But in the case of the USC Master Plan campaign, labor did not play a role in the negotiations we highlight, partly because key labor interests had already been incorporated into USC’s early development plans. This presented a particular challenge in contrast with past history: Given that past agreements had been secured with the resources and power of labor, it was not clear if community groups could do it alone. This is part of what makes these cases so important to understand for other urban areas where labor is either weak or does not have the positive relationships with community groups that characterize the L.A. scene: The campaigns in this case study illustrate that it is possible to secure a CBA even without the City’s involvement (in the case of the Lorenzo) and additional community benefits even after the labor deal had been made (in the case of USC) – both innovations in the development of CBAs. This is not to say that a “labor-free” CBA is preferred, but rather that community coalitions like UNIDAD can have the capacity to secure community benefits.

**Campus and Community Connections**

University expansions are a unique case of urban development. While universities are usually long-time members of the community, not all have established connections with the community nor care to: some build fences while others intentionally work to build bridges through community programming, for example. They are simultaneously autonomous institutions, but as non-profits they are also mission-driven. When there is conflict with the community at the start of development projects, universities may face increased potential for litigation, detrimental public relations, and even the loss of federal funding (Cisneros 1995; Harkavy 1997; Maurrasse 2001; Rodin 2007). As such, they have good reason to consider community relations when embarking on development projects (e.g., Wigintton 2013).
One example of how things can go wrong comes from Columbia University’s approach to expanding into West Harlem. In 2007, Columbia set out to build with private funds an 18-acre campus extension, half of which it had already purchased and the remaining half it planned to acquire through private sales and eminent domain. The university neglected to account for the significant impact the project would have on the surrounding community—an oversight that would lead to significant community contestation and legal setbacks.

Although Columbia did not need public subsidies, the university did need government support to use eminent domain and to gain project approval at all levels (Fisher, Zients, and Donnelly 2015). This would become invaluable and increasingly unlikely as community unrest grew. While the conflict was ultimately resolved through community-led CBA negotiations, Columbia’s failure to include the surrounding community led to extra legal, financial, and political costs—just a few of the detrimental impacts of unilateral university growth (Foster and Glick 2007).

The University of Pennsylvania’s (Penn) process provides a contrast to Columbia’s. In response to the 1994 murder of a Penn student, President Judith Rodin decided that “for Penn to flourish academically, our neighborhood had to flourish as well” (Rodin 2001). Guided by this principle, Penn spearheaded the West Philadelphia Initiatives (WPI), a policy for ensuring mutual benefits for the university and community alike. In both its planning and implementation phases, the university sought community input from the outset of this redevelopment project (Buchanan, 2010; Rodin 2007). The university gained vital community support which allowed it to access federal subsidies and avoid costly litigation processes (Buchanan 2010; Rodin 2001, 2007).

The community around Penn was able to secure resources for the struggling local economy. Among these were partnership programs, which provided mortgage subsidies, retail space, and investments in public education (Rodin 2007). Penn serves as an exemplary case study of the power of long-standing commitment to mutual growth: increased economic vitality, safety, and community support for future development. Investing in Philadelphia’s future was an investment in Penn’s future and a socially responsible model for university growth.

"USC has grown to where it is today because it is intrinsically a part of the city, and deeply rooted in the neighborhoods of South Los Angeles and Eastern Los Angeles. As an education and research institution, it is in our DNA to improve the health, well-being, and prosperity of the communities in which we live. We believe it is our obligation to strengthen local resources with stakeholder involvement, and continue to help develop a sustainable and strong foundation for all our neighbors.”

—Craig Keys, Associate Senior Vice President, Civic Engagement, USC
The View from South Central

The University of Southern California’s plans to expand dramatically have brought many of the questions raised by campus-community relationships to the fore. USC is located just south of downtown Los Angeles along the Figueroa Corridor, which is a major thoroughfare that stretches between downtown and historic South Central. In the early 2000s, new private and public investment was going into projects along the Figueroa Corridor. New projects included the Expo Line metro light rail and luxury housing, both of which spurred the potential for massive displacement (Liu 2012). At the same time, the Figueroa Corridor was the site of dynamic community activism. The aforementioned FCCEJ coalition (now UNIDAD) set a precedent for how development could be more equitable when it secured the L.A. Live/Staples Center CBA.

USC and the Figueroa Corridor are the tip of the iceberg when it comes to a changing South Central – both geographically and in terms of market-driven redevelopment. The larger South Central region, which spans from USC to Watts, had been discounted by the media and some policymakers as a pariah, rife with gangs, violence, and poverty for decades. Following the 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest, planners, officials, and some community groups worked to re-brand the region as “South Los Angeles” to cast off its prior image and to push for investment in a slew of new services and public amenities meant to deal with long-term inequalities and disinvestment (Dreir 2003; Pastor and Prichard 2012).

Of course, name changes alone cannot do the redevelopment trick. Many community organizations are pressuring for a return to the moniker “South Central” to hold onto the history and identity of the area. This connection to the past is particularly important since the region is undergoing tremendous change with a growing Latino population and African-American out-migration to the suburbs and exurbs of greater Los Angeles (Kun and Pulido 2013). USC’s own campus development – aided by the City’s decades-long Hoover redevelopment project – resulted in the displacement of African-American residents and businesses (CRA/LA 1965, Ramos 2000, Truong 2012).

In the northernmost neighborhoods of South Central, including Historic South Central, University Park, and Exposition Park, USC is the “800-pound gorilla,” according to one interviewee, when it comes to reshaping and rebranding this part of the city. In 1966, the City’s Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA/LA) designated the region adjacent to USC as the Hoover/Hoover Expansion Redevelopment Project, where any tax increases from new projects were to fund new affordable housing and community facilities. The “Hoover Redevelopment Project” was meant to stop USC from leaving historic South Central by “retaining and developing additional affordable housing, improving community facilities within University Park, and promoting economic development opportunities” (CRA/LA n.d.). One of the CRA’s first moves was to facilitate the 1961 USC Master Plan which expanded the campus from 95 to 150 acres – a move that was criticized at the time as targeting the removal of Black residents and businesses (USC UP Campus Master Planning
n.d., Ramos 2000). Since 1966, the CRA, as part of its mission for the Hoover Redevelopment Plan to “create a campus surrounded on all sides by an appropriate environment,” has facilitated USC’s growth which has included demolishing properties to build shopping centers (the University Village and, recently, University Gateway), a hotel, and office properties – all the while directing public resources to maintain roads and grow public transportation in the area and build some affordable and senior housing (CRA/LA n.d., 1965).

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⁶ While CBAs are usually private agreements between multiple parties, the Lorenzo CBA was unique in that it was reached without any government involvement during the negotiation process.
More recently, the CRA used the threat of eminent domain to remove existing housing and commercial properties so USC could build what became a massive sports complex through a lengthy process spanning from 1989 to 2006. In 1989, USC originally announced a 4.6 acre retail, office, and hotel project, which was meant to create 2,700 jobs and $1.6 million in tax increment financing and was strongly backed by the CRA (Stewart 2003). But the project did not go as planned (in part due to the 1990s economic downturn) and the land assembled, 30 percent of which was sold by the CRA to USC, was utilized as a parking lot until 2003 (Stewart 2003; Stremfel 1990).

That year, the University announced the land would instead house a new large-scale sports facility, the Galen Center, which would bring significantly fewer jobs and no new small businesses but would offer use of the facility for graduations and other community events (Lapriore 2003; Stewart 2003). FCCEJ actively contested the decision, noting the CRA broke from its mission by putting the Galen Center under a tax-exempt status. In doing so, the property would not generate additional property tax revenues to finance further community-based development. Supported by student organizations, such as the Student Coalition Against Labor Exploitation (SCALE), in community hearings and actions, FCCEJ made clear that the move also failed to address the growing crises of housing affordability and availability plaguing working families in the area due to rising, often illegal evictions and the use of housing stock as *de facto* dorms by landlords and housing corporations (Stewart 2003).

Ultimately, USC did not agree to a CBA for the Galen Center with FCCEJ, and in the years that followed, pressures on housing stock continued to push working families and other low-income residents further south and also reduced the number of rent-stabilized housing units (Amaro 2015).

The relationship between USC and the surrounding community is complicated. While redevelopment has not always gone well, take a walk through South Central on any given day and you will be sure to find USC t-shirts and flags supporting the football team. The university has invested in multiple afterschool and educational programs in local elementary, junior, and high schools to help neighborhood residents gain the preparation needed to attend the college. Of course, one interviewee raised an important question to residents supporting USC because of the benefits they receive: “What will happen when residents are displaced? How will they access USC’s programs if they can no longer live in the area?”

Many residents also work at USC, which is the largest private employer in L.A. (Grant 2006). Community organizations and labor groups have also pressed USC to be a good neighbor. In fact, FCCEJ itself emerged out of a labor dispute at USC. In 1997, Strategic Actions for a Just Economy (SAJE), the Hotel and Restaurant Employees union (HERE), and about two dozen other groups – including local religious organizations – associated themselves with the FCCEJ (SAJE Community Outreach 2003). The CRA used the threat of eminent domain to remove existing housing and commercial properties so USC could build what became a massive sports complex through a lengthy process spanning from 1989 to 2006. In 1989, USC originally announced a 4.6 acre retail, office, and hotel project, which was meant to create 2,700 jobs and $1.6 million in tax increment financing and was strongly backed by the CRA (Stewart 2003). But the project did not go as planned (in part due to the 1990s economic downturn) and the land assembled, 30 percent of which was sold by the CRA to USC, was utilized as a parking lot until 2003 (Stewart 2003; Stremfel 1990).

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organizations and student groups such as SCALE – came together under the Coalition for a Responsible USC to advocate for food service workers, many of whom lived in the surrounding area (Haas 2011). Workers had not had a contract for over five years, and the university had begun to move janitors to lower-paying subcontractors, with other service workers slated to follow (Rohrlich 1998; Wilton and Cranford 2002). The campaign focused on asking USC to fulfill its promise to act as a “good neighbor” to South Central. It was ultimately successful in maintaining workers’ benefits, such as free tuition to USC for their children and ensuring job security (Rohlrich 1998). All this was happening just as the plans for L.A. Live and the Figueroa Corridor were developing (Wilton and Cranford 2002), plans that would bring the coalition to broaden its scope (Saito 2012).

Whether it was USC or AEG or USC again, and whether under the banner of Coalition for a Responsible USC, FCCEJ or UNIDAD, this sustaining and dynamic coalition has remained centered on the belief that USC, developers, business owners, workers, and residents alike can partner in economic growth – and that development does not have to spell displacement.

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It Takes a Village

When USC began its Master Plan process in 2006, it did so in the context of a complex relationship with the community and a rapidly changing Figueroa Corridor region, and at a time when Los Angeles was one of the hottest real estate markets in the country. With affordable housing scarce and development pressures on the rise, it was not hard to predict that tensions might result.

The most major transformation outlined in the Plan is the complete rebuilding of the University Village, across from the main campus. The Village was formerly home to small businesses and to one of the few local grocery supermarkets in the area. With the exception of Trader Joe’s, the exact establishments to replace these businesses are not yet determined, but many anticipate higher-end corporate franchises. The planned mixed-use facility will also include consumer retail, academic buildings, and housing, all of which seem to serve mainly the USC community, based on renderings and branding.9

University officials we interviewed view this redevelopment as USC making a catalytic investment in historic South Central by being the ‘first mover’ into a difficult market. Many saw an opportunity to help advance the university alongside the community, including providing better grocery and food amenities and creating a “public square” for community and USC student and staff interaction. As USC’s Master Plan became public knowledge, FCCEJ came forward under a new name – United Neighbors in Defense Against Displacement.

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9 USC University Park Campus Master Planning. https://upcmasterplan.usc.edu/
Coalition, or UNIDAD – indicating the coalition members’ broader vision of development without displacement and their interest in improving neighborly relationships with USC and other developers in South Central.¹⁰

USC did make important overtures to the community. In its initial unveiling of the Master Plan, USC concentrated its bargaining with city-wide labor and economic justice groups and focused on gaining the early support of labor leaders.¹¹ UNIDAD, however, lifted up displacement and the lack of housing as the multi-million dollar elephant in the room, one which USC had begun to acknowledge during its development of the Galen Center. USC originally offered $2 million for neighborhood housing as part of its Master Plan (Saillant 2012), a modest sum relative to the need and in comparison to expansion projects by other urban universities. Part of USC’s rationale was that the University Village was slated to house more than 2,500 students and was not tearing down any existing private residences (the latter argument – that the development was not on existing residential land – was also used in the Lorenzo project). Thus, it anticipated that the project would relieve pressures from student renters on the local housing market.

This was an argument that fell short for the members of the UNIDAD coalition. The 2007 “University Park Housing Study” commissioned by USC after FCCEJ’s Galen Center campaign found that “one of the significant concerns of the community was the dramatic impact on the supply and pricing of housing due to the demand by students for rental housing in the community.” Researchers substantiated UNIDAD’s demands, finding that the university needed to build more student housing simply to meet its own goals as well as to meet a conservative estimate of undergraduate demand (Hyerstay, Russell, and Gutierrez 2007). Part of the reason: USC is increasingly a residential university.

UNIDAD had to demonstrate that investment would cause the displacement of existing low-income renters and the need for more net new student beds than those for which the university was originally planning. USC’s catalytic investment was intended to make the area more appealing and, so, would drive up real estate values. While the commitment to building student beds on campus was important, this was viewed as unlikely to meet the full demand, particularly as improved amenities attracted not only more students but others seeking the proximity to the university and downtown. UNIDAD remained concerned that low-income renters would be priced out of housing for several reasons. Analysis suggested that many local and proximate units that were affordable because they were part of federal programs, like Section 8, were likely to lose their designation as their terms or affordability covenants expired. There was also concern that

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¹⁰ Additional UNIDAD member organizations include Blazers Youth Services; Coalition for Responsible Community Development; CD Tech; Esperanza Community Housing; Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.; Playa Vista Job Opportunities and Business Services; Strategic Action for a Just Economy (SAJE); St. Agnes Church; St. Mark Church; St. Francis Center; St. John’s Well Child & Family Center, Inc.; T.R.U.S.T. South LA; United University Church; and Vermont Village Community Development Corporation. UNIDAD’s legal partners for the Lorenzo campaign was Public Counsel and the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles (LAFLA) and for the USC campaign was LAFLA, only. Note also that similar as to its prior iteration as FCCEJ, UNIDAD’s membership is not fixed. See UNIDAD’s Facebook page at: https://www.facebook.com/UNIDADLA

¹¹ The eventual Master Plan brought with it more residential than commercial development which, according to PV Jobs, results in more unionized construction jobs.
rent-stabilized units would revert to market value as long-time tenants were forced to move out.

Many UNIDAD leaders had experience in dealing with USC. Some served on USC community relations committees. Others had been involved in the Galen Center development project. The coalition itself had originally formed out of a labor struggle at USC. But for some at USC, particularly those in the real estate department, the coalition seemed to emerge somewhat from left field. Some questioned UNIDAD’s legitimacy in speaking for the community, in particular for historic South Central’s Black community, as its membership was seen as representing primarily Latino and immigrant constituents. Viewed from an economic perspective, the coalition had little ground to stand on: USC was dedicating massive funds to develop an area that badly needed new services and amenities, and community groups could not do the same. Moreover, USC saw itself as a strong partner in the community and as an institution that was already listening to community concerns. To address the very real issues of displacement, UNIDAD would have to change the balance of power.

**Interlude: G.H. Palmer Associates and the First Fully-Private CBA**

Just as UNIDAD and USC were coming face-to-face over the Master Plan, in December 2010 G.H. Palmer Associates’ latest development plans came online. G.H. Palmer Associates was starting a multi-million dollar residential and retail complex on the 9-acre site of the Orthopedic Hospital that was being sold. While the land was zoned for medical or educational uses, G.H. Palmer Associates proposed to create the Lorenzo, a private, luxury housing complex, with a range of amenities meant to entice USC students. The units would not generally be affordable to local residents, who were already struggling not just with housing costs but also important health disparities and environmental injustices (Physicians for Social Responsibility-LA 2009).

In fact, a health lens was already part of the culture of organizing in the region. This was due in part to the effort of groups like Esperanza Community Housing, which had a strong community health promotion program as a major focus of its work — indeed, Esperanza’s health work and location across from the former Orthopedic Hospital was catalytic to UNIDAD’s Lorenzo campaign. Creating further momentum for place-based health initiatives was (and is) The California Endowment’s (TCE) Building Healthy Communities (BHC) initiative which fosters cross-organizational collaboration.

Though the link between health and the built environment had been established (e.g., LACDPH 2015), TCE’s recognition that more equitable development could be a way to address inadequacies in the built environment led them to offer important support to UNIDAD and other social justice organizations in South Central. TCE facilitated UNIDAD’s work in several ways. First, it provided grants to support the growth of organizing efforts and to enhance coalition infrastructure. Regularly convening the BHC grantees was one part of that effort which helped solidify the common narrative for social justice and community health in South Central and created strong cross-organizational ties.
Second, TCE collaborated to deepen the health equity lens. Esperanza Community Housing anchored this part of UNIDAD’s work and TCE helped bolster it. One manifestation of this was the Health Impact Assessment of the USC Master Plan with Human Impact Partners that helped to bridge the gap between UNIDAD’s asks and USC’s proposal (Lucky and Heller 2012). Health improvement became one of the rubrics for organizing and promoting a more equitable approach to development. Third, TCE supported strategic communications that helped to affect a true shift in the narrative. UNIDAD had the resources to work on its framing and messaging and secure media advocacy that was key to, in particular, the USC campaign (see “Finding the Right Frame and Moving the Message,” p. 28).

Taking on G.H. Palmer Associates about the proposed development was not a decision to be taken lightly. G.H. Palmer Associates was already known for challenging the City of Los Angeles and community organizations over opposition to its projects – and winning. For example, in 2007, G.H. Palmer Associates sued the City to circumvent an inclusionary zoning ordinance that mandated developers of new buildings either to include a percentage of units for low-income residents or to provide funds for the City to build affordable housing elsewhere. The lawsuit proved precedent-setting as it forced City Councilmembers to exclude rental units from Los Angeles’ Mixed Income Housing Ordinance and hampered efforts to create affordable housing (Court of Appeal of the State of California 2009).

Though the Lorenzo project had been navigating the City permitting process as far back as 2007, it did not come in the public eye until 2010. In December of that year, organizers, activists, leaders, and community members gathered at the Los Angeles Convention Center to attend the Second Annual South Los Angeles Health and Human Rights Conference. Following the conference, hundreds of participants descended on the future site of the Lorenzo housing development, chanting “Save the Q!” The slogan referred to a ‘Q condition,’ a site-specific zoning designation which restricted land use to education or health services. At the Planning Commission meeting the following month, UNIDAD leaders and community members with “Save the Q!” stickers filled the room and spoke to the zoning issues and the health impacts of the project. The commissioners decided to postpone the decision on the project.

In the process of trying to break ground on this project, G.H. Palmer Associates realized that it could not rely on a purely adversarial process. It knew about the Staples Center CBA and came to the determination that moving a development project in the City of Los Angeles would require crafting a CBA. To that end, according to our interviewees, G.H. Palmer Associates switched legal representation to a firm more accustomed to such an approach, Latham & Watkins, LLP. UNIDAD also received
key legal support from the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles (LAFLA), a resource facilitated by TCE funding, which ensured its collective voices were heard in negotiations. As representatives from UNIDAD and G.H. Palmer Associates grappled with negotiations, over time, tension gave way to a working relationship. In interviews, members from both groups echoed that establishing communication through the respective legal teams was essential in getting the CBA to move forward.

When the City Planning Commission approved the Lorenzo in early 2011, UNIDAD and Palmer Associates had negotiated a groundbreaking, fully-private CBA with $9.5 million in community benefits. The CBA stipulated a 7,500 square foot community health clinic in the Lorenzo that would operate rent-free for its first 20 years; targeted living wage jobs during the development process for local and at-risk populations and also that 60 percent of permanent jobs would be living wage and 40 percent of the hours for local hires; fostered community engagement in the lease-up of the five percent of units set aside for low-income tenants that was required by the city; devoted 10 percent of retail space to community-serving businesses at a discounted rent; established a small business revolving loan fund; and provided support for local job training and health promotion programs, among other benefits (see Table 1) (McDonnell 2011). The Lorenzo began its housing operation in June of 2013 and the Rev. Warner Traynham Health Center opened its doors to the community in March of 2015. In some ways enshrining the knowledge that movements and history matter, the facility includes photographic installations commemorating UNIDAD’s community struggle to realize the Health Center.

At first glance, UNIDAD’s victory seemed like a classic David-versus-Goliath battle, with a relatively small community coalition – without major labor allies – taking on a developer that had successfully sued the City of Los Angeles, threatening to make inclusionary zoning illegal. But as seasoned veterans of community efforts to reshape development for equity, UNIDAD’s leaders knew what was possible. The organizations that comprised UNIDAD had deep roots in historic South Central, and it was the coalescing of a social movement around health, displacement, and equity that allowed UNIDAD to mount an effective public campaign and turn out supporters to events. Additionally, while the relationship between UNIDAD and G.H. Palmer Associates was not easy, the personal relationships forged between representatives of each group allowed for negotiations to finally flourish, according to our interviewees. It was, in part, because of the success of this work that UNIDAD was seen in higher regard during the USC Master Plan negotiations.

12 In June of 2015, the California Supreme court ruled that inclusionary zoning was legal with for-sale projects, opening the possibility of overturning the Palmer decision in terms of rental units as well (Dolan 2015).
The Challenges of Change

When UNIDAD turned full focus back to USC, the coalition had earned remarkable visibility, support, and momentum. The coalition had an organized voice, a clear set of demands, a desire to represent largely-unheard community voices, and a track record of building power. But UNIDAD and USC were still a good distance from each other. Early negotiations among USC and UNIDAD were not moving forward, especially when it came to questions of housing. Mainstream media was not particularly attuned to the issues either. UNIDAD was facing three sets of political challenges – those of representation, institutions, and urban governance.

The politics of representation

A big point of contention was about who represented the community. According to some USC staff, UNIDAD did not have a strong connection to the neighborhood’s long-time Black residents, and instead almost entirely reflected the area’s Latino and immigrant population. Whether true or not, this is a common question in the CBA process: Who should be negotiating the CBA (Wolf-Powers 2010)? It is also a consistent problem activists face when talking about displacement: Who is the authentic community? When surveying community members in outreach meetings and visits, USC’s staff reported that displacement was not the most pressing concern; instead, it was jobs. To this end, USC did work early on to negotiate with key regional labor and economic justice bodies, thinking that this addressed both real concerns and likely sources of contention.

UNIDAD took a broader, more historical, and regional view. While the coalition was unified around housing, internally the members had different asks and goals. The USC Plan brought to surface many long-simmering issues of inequality in a rapidly-changing South Central. Although it was a challenge, the coalition had to prioritize establishing a unified front, managing frustration with the process, and establishing concise demands. UNIDAD represented a diversity of interests, from health and wellness groups to religious organizations to economic justice organizations, and coalition members each brought a unique contribution to the group in how they envisioned the neighborhood moving forward.

The politics of institutions

Despite having a single public Master Plan, not all of USC’s constituents were on the same page. Separate departments within the institution held divergent approaches to the Master Plan and expansion processes, and had to answer to different stakeholders, such as Trustees (i.e. investors and donors), students, faculty, and staff. Not everyone got what they wanted in the final plan. In addition, one interviewee relayed that USC was organizing the local community and had been doing that for four years, leveraging its contacts from the many different neighborhood programs and initiatives USC runs (for some of those programs, see Wigintton 2013).
The real estate team’s primary goal was to ensure a financial return on investment in redeveloping parts of the neighborhood. However, this focus on traditional real estate practices would put some at USC at odds with community organizations and residents – many of whom felt that they had been working hard in their own right to improve the neighborhood and so had just as much of a vested interest in the project outcomes.

Navigating the internal politics of USC also proved a challenge for UNIDAD: Who would be the best partners in this endeavor? How could it prove that the local community was an asset to the university’s investments? These remain ongoing questions as UNIDAD members now sit on an Economic Development Coordinating Council as part of the Master Plan implementation.

The politics of urban governance

UNIDAD also had to work to get the City to partner in shaping the USC Master Plan. Councilmember Bernard Parks, who represented the area of historic South Central surrounding USC, was initially an opponent of UNIDAD’s efforts, saying that his district had borne a disproportionate share of affordable housing for the City. UNIDAD needed to find others to work with who at least understood, if not shared, its perspective. Mercedes Marquez, the (now former) deputy mayor who headed the City of L.A.’s Housing Department, was such a person. As we will see, Marquez and Councilmember Ed Reyes directed various city departments to conduct their own research on other universities and their community programs (something UNIDAD had done as well), and the City’s reports were critical in corroborating UNIDAD’s own work and winning over other City elected and appointed officials to the idea that more was possible.

Other matters were making it too easy for the City to overlook community challenges to the USC Master Plan. At that time, a labor and economic justice group-led CBA was being negotiated around the potential NFL stadium in downtown, called Farmers Field, a multi-billion dollar development (Roth and Andro 2012).13 Downtown was also abuzz with negotiations over the occupancy tax for hoteliers and other aspects of the rapidly-changing downtown landscape (Martín 2010). Getting – and staying – on the public policy screen was a challenge.

Strategies for Success

“If it weren’t for UNIDAD, the City’s focused work with USC may not have happened,” said one Los Angeles leader we interviewed. UNIDAD worked tirelessly to make the case that the USC Master Plan required attention because of the serious ramifications for the future of Historic South Central in particular and South Los Angeles in general. When preliminary conversations between USC and UNIDAD stalled – then halted altogether – and local government seemed ambivalent, how did UNIDAD manage to get everyone to the negotiating table again and to help one of the region’s largest and oldest institutions develop a more equitable plan?

13 In March 2013, Farmers Field and the NFL stadium near downtown was put on hold after personnel changes at AEG (Farmer 2013).
Listening to our interviewees, we found that UNIDAD approached shaping development through a social-movement lens. As noted above, social movements are not episodic coalitions; rather they are rooted in shared values and narratives, work to create a real and broad base in the community, and are aimed at long-term transformation in systems of economic and political power (Pastor and Ortiz 2009). But as visionary as all that sounds, movements also only work when they are pragmatic and can deliver real on-the-ground change, partly because that builds community confidence to keep moving forward.

Delivering on the promise of change requires some very specific skills. In what follows, we name five key approaches that UNIDAD employed to secure not one but two victories. We suggest that it was not a one-off that UNIDAD won major benefits from private developers (without benefiting from strong labor allies standing by its side as was the case in the L.A. Live development) but rather it grew from more than a decade of organizing to shape redevelopment in the heart of Los Angeles. Movement strategies and tactics, honed through years of experience, were at the center of all its work – including its legal negotiations and process. In fact, as UNIDAD interviewees also pointed out, the legal support they received from the public interest organization Public Counsel, who represented the coalition in the USC Master Plan campaign, was invaluable precisely because the legal team recognized UNIDAD’s identity as a social movement and made space for a truly community-driven process. As such, the UNIDAD story has lessons around skill-building for other groups that want to secure a more equitable future in our nation’s urban areas.

Scaling Up and Strengthening Coalition

UNIDAD gave the opportunity for many smaller organizations – each of which had a stake in the future of the neighborhood – to build their power in coalition and develop a common narrative. This allowed them to “scale up” beyond their immediate neighborhood to the level of city – and even regional – influence and to present their vision for the future of the region.

As several interviewees explained, coalition members had different goals, interests, and tactics, so they created a common platform centered on three issues: housing, jobs, and small business development. These foci emerged directly out of UNIDAD’s consultation with community members and member organizations. Early on in its campaign (as it did with the Lorenzo CBA), UNIDAD engaged in a community prioritization process to ensure that its proposals to the developers best addressed the range of coalition members – and that whatever community benefits emerged, they would be tailored to meet the diverse needs of the local community. It crafted a strategy that could assess what was being lost in the construction – including locally-owned restaurants and a grocery store in a food desert – present options for moving forward, and provide residents a practical way to engage in USC’s redevelopment plan. They did door-to-door (or office-to-office) organizing, protested publicly, and had media appearances, among other actions.
The genuine connections undergirding the coalition could be seen in the ways in which member organizations supported each other and brought specific strengths to the table. For example, many congregations supported UNIDAD’s work because UNIDAD made a special effort to include faith-based groups. At one point, a group of local pastors of predominantly Black churches circulated a letter sharing the need for community input on the USC Master Plan. Not only did this help counter perceptions that UNIDAD represented solely Latino interests, but it also brought morality to bear on the economic and political decisions (UNIDAD 2012).

UNIDAD also kept its ties to broader South Central movement-building and community-based organizations by participating in the TCE Building Healthy Communities (BHC) network. The South Los Angeles BHC’s Land Use Working Group was a key forum to gain input on the USC campaign and shape strategy, and the Working Group’s reports to the broader South Los Angeles BHC proved a critical channel to link its campaign to a broader set of allies.

### Developing Leaders and Lifting Up Community Expertise

To better equip residents to engage around community development issues, UNIDAD member Strategic Action for a Just Economy (SAJE) drew from its experience in running the People’s Planning School to train residents. UNIDAD began with an authentic base of community residents – many of whom were members of organizations or connected to UNIDAD member institutions in other ways. Established in 2007 and activated around key campaigns, the School taught community members the basics of the planning process and the decision-making processes of city officials, developers, and institutions like USC.

As the School was developing leaders, it also created the space for community members to share their concerns and to develop their voice in a way that could shift power dynamics. Participants were trained in storytelling and empowered to articulate their stories at public forums and across social media platforms. This training mattered not only for the present campaign but for ongoing work to create an equitable Los Angeles. The School was part of building a base of leader-experts with a grassroots vision of equitable community development.

### Finding the Right Frame and Moving the Message

UNIDAD members refined a message that could move the discussion forward and could best encapsulate the perspectives of multiple coalition members while keeping the conversation open with USC. The message was developed through numerous workshops, facilitated dialogues, and consistent and repeated interactions among members. In addition, The California Endowment...
supported the communications efforts by hiring Fenton Communications to help shape key messaging, particularly around who would be impacted and how. The Master Plan would take several years, and nothing was immediately being bulldozed (and housing was not slated to be physically destroyed). This allowed the coalition to take a slightly longer-term approach and to lay out potential ramifications of the plan as well as the benefits of working with the coalition to make the Master Plan more equitable.

Media coverage of the conflict over the development became more frequent, so UNIDAD had to be strategic. Early in the campaign, UNIDAD was often cast as a small band of extortionists resisting USC’s high hopes for improving historic South Central – or as a “likely-to-lose” group in a pitched and perhaps pyrrhic battle with the University. This narrative made UNIDAD’s efforts toward a partnership with USC all the more difficult. Many UNIDAD members had experience with the limits of this oppositional frame from the FCCEJ days, and thus worked hard to craft a unified message that could change the narrative.

UNIDAD members emphasized that their campaign was not about blocking the development, rather it was about ensuring that the university considered broader community needs. The key phrase: responsible development. UNIDAD stayed focused on jobs, housing, and small business development, areas where gains would benefit both the campus and the community residents. The other key word was partnership. UNIDAD re-iterated the ways in which securing community benefits would allow a future-oriented partnership to develop between USC and local community. This message gained traction with local mainstream news outlets, especially as the City was closer to approving the plan and discussions grew tense. As the negotiations were settling, UNIDAD kept a positive frame, calling the agreement a “win-win-win” for the university, local residents, and the City – and the building block of a long-term partnership. Indeed, USC was hailed for its “good neighbor” policies by media outlets.

**Negotiating Politics and Making Policy**

UNIDAD used its expertise in the mechanisms of governance and government to guide its work. This meant long, tough dialogues with City officials and an eye towards the long-term. UNIDAD knew the importance of the Planning and Land Use Management (PLUM) Committee and used research and community presence to persuade its members to hold off on approving the plan until a more equitable plan was developed. UNIDAD met on a regular basis with City Councilmember Ed Reyes, the head of PLUM. UNIDAD members visited his office and invited him to community forums. While Councilmember Reyes and the coalition did not always see eye to eye, they built a stronger relationship. This resulted in him being receptive to UNIDAD during the later-stage PLUM hearings. When PLUM ultimately

14 See for example, Sandy Banks’ (2012) *Los Angeles Times* article, “Some USC neighbors foresee a threat, not improvement.”
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/18/local/la-me-banks-usc-20120918
approved the USC Master Plan in December 2012, UNIDAD had succeeded in delaying hearings for over a year to make sure the final plan encompassed community-suggested housing, employment, and small business provisions.

In the midst of the negotiations, other sands were shifting in City Hall. In November of 2011, tensions between Councilmembers Jan Perry, Bernard Parks, and Herb Wesson came to a head, and Councilmember Perry resigned from her position as President Pro Tempore (Zahniser 2011a, 2011b). Wesson was elected as the new City Council President weeks later – with Perry and Parks absent from the vote. Over the next few months, redistricting changed the boundaries that Parks and Perry represented which changed their involvement with the USC Master Plan work. Parks ceded Baldwin Hills and other historically black neighborhoods to Wesson. USC’s main campus transferred to Perry, who in turn saw nearly all of the downtown portion of her district relinquished to Councilmember Jose Huizar, ending her years of careful work to connect downtown economic development with historic South Central.

UNIDAD’s efforts were given a boost from all this: Parks originally opposed additional affordable housing in his district but was no longer a major barrier. At the same time, Perry threw her weight behind establishing a formal city process for USC and UNIDAD to negotiate a mutually beneficial agreement. Although she had a prior history with FCCEJ, she did not become deeply involved in negotiations between USC and UNIDAD until redistricting.

This was a lucky break for UNIDAD which helped to move the campaign forward.

**Resarching the Realities**

As mentioned before, UNIDAD did its own research on university-community development, which laid the foundation for negotiations, particularly around housing. Prior studies, including those done for the Galen Center campaign (Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice 2003), one by Enterprise Partners (Hyerstay et al. 2007) and a more recent study completed by Healthy City (Healthy City 2009), showed the stress that the lack of student housing was putting on rents and availability for local residents. Building on this, the PLUM Committee commissioned a study on effects of the Master Plan on neighborhood housing, including on Section 8, and other existing residents (Campbell and Monterrosa 2012).

The resulting Los Angeles Housing Department (LAHD) report was critical for the City process, validating UNIDAD research and moving City officials. Many interviewees cited the study’s release as an important turning point. According to some interviewees, the report alerted Mayor Villaraigosa to the gravity of the situation and brought him to press for more significant housing allocations. Overall, the report brought the many parties around a common set of data and projections that helped the negotiations to move forward.
Getting to Win-Win-Win; Getting to Partnership

When the first City-run Planning Department outreach meetings were held in February and March of 2012, the USC plan did not reflect UNIDAD’s concerns. In the months that followed, UNIDAD’s members went to work to increase awareness around the Master Plan and garner visibility for the campaign. In May 2012, after a 9-hour hearing, the City Planning Commission approved the Master Plan 6-2 but required USC to increase its affordable housing contribution to $8 million, up from the original $2 million (Guidry 2012).

While this was progress, it fell short of what UNIDAD wanted. Fortunately, for the coalition, the process slowed and politics shifted. In August 2012, the Master Plan was heard in PLUM Committee for the first time. The decision was put on hold until further studies on the impact of USC’s plan and on other universities’ development plans were produced. Meanwhile, after the June 2012 redistricting, City Councilmembers Parks and (especially) Perry came out squarely in support of UNIDAD’s biggest ask: a $20 million affordable housing guarantee from USC. The narrative surrounding UNIDAD’s efforts also began to shift. With every public demonstration held by UNIDAD, the group gained visibility and honed its message. During this time, media proved far more amenable to representing the negotiations not as a tense battle, but in a way that showed UNIDAD as hoping to enhance—not derail—USC’s vision for community development.

By December 2012, USC’s Master Plan was unanimously approved by the City Council. It featured a significant 40 percent set aside for local hiring, as well as what once seemed impossible: greater commitments by USC to build student housing and a $20 million fund to build affordable housing in the area (Troop 2012). Prior, UNIDAD and USC made a private settlement which solidified the terms included in the agreement with the City.

Much had changed between USC and UNIDAD over the course of several years. One could easily say both parties (or at least some of the individual member organizations or departments) seemed pitted against each other at the start. By the end of 2012, both parties were moving forward together. Partnership was the word of the day, but maybe more importantly, it yielded a plan that advanced equitable development in the northern part of South Central and the region. City officials facing a wave of downtown construction now had another precedent for what shared success could look like.

Over two decades of work by grassroots community groups was proving that historic South Central was no longer a place known solely for urban disinvestment and decline, but a place to look to for a more inclusive vision of people, place, and prosperity.
Lessons for Shaping Equitable Development

Investment without displacement of low-income residents is not inevitable – but it requires a variety of tools. A CBA is one such tool that can be wielded even when the resources and power are stacked against a coalition that some observers called “the patron saints of lost causes.” UNIDAD developed its agreement in the absence of significant labor allies (who usually bring more resources and influence to campaign coalitions) and in the face of two powerful, private developers. We consider this of note for other community coalitions that might not have their labor counterparts on board with a particular campaign or when they feel as though they are going against a giant. Much of this, we think, has to do with UNIDAD functioning within a long-term, social movement-building frame.

In fact, UNIDAD has already pivoted to another campaign. In March of 2015, UNIDAD (again with legal support from Public Counsel) signed a new fully-private CBA with developer Norman Isaac covering the new Grand Metropolitan high-rise near the Lorenzo and USC (McNary 2015). Of the 160 planned units, the project will include 24, or five percent of all units, for those extremely low and very low income residents who make less than 30 percent of the area median income, which sets a new precedent. The project has a 40 percent local hiring goal for construction jobs, will hire 100 percent of its maintenance staff locally, and will have case management services for local homeless as well as a small business incubator space (McNary 2015; Public Counsel 2015).

As innovative as CBAs are, they are not without their limitations. Indeed, UNIDAD interviewees called CBAs reactive and prefer using resources to build vision and advance forward-looking plans for their neighborhood. While the Lorenzo and USC agreements may have been necessary and certainly built power among the coalition member organizations, they were time-intensive, required deep compromises, and will require ongoing monitoring.

Implementation is one of the biggest challenges. Many questions remain for the USC Master Plan agreement: Who will ensure that the affordable housing money actually serves the communities being affected? How will the community continue to have input into these processes? How will local hiring and business needs be guaranteed?

Unless communities keep watch and work to ensure accountability, agreements with developers will not necessarily hold up. For example, AEG attempted to back out of its labor promises during Staples Center’s construction in 1999 (Ho 2007; Salkin and Lavine 2008). But as the L.A. Live/Staples Center situation also proved, when the community steps in again and devotes (often expensive) resources to help shepherd implementation, the CBA can prove an important contribution to regional equity (Beach 2008; Salkin and Lavine 2008). Unfortunately, monitoring implementation is not only time-intensive, it is rarely funded – even though it is where the real benefits of the agreement lie.

“We can be in a constructive phase now.”
— Sandra McNeill, Executive Director, T.R.U.S.T. South LA, in the wake of the campaign
For this reason, with the Lorenzo CBA, UNIDAD built in significant implementation funding, which was an innovation at the time.

CBAs can indeed tilt the balance of power between communities and private developers, but they may not always be the most appropriate tool or lead to the most desired change. At times, different planning and policy tools will work for different fights. In the G.H. Palmer Associates negotiations, much work happened between the lawyers. In the USC case, traditionally effective tools—like California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) litigation—were not the primary instruments UNIDAD used to confront USC. But research on the housing effects produced by the L.A. Housing Department did prove vital.

UNIDAD is looking towards other more proactive tools. Shaping community land use plans is vital for making equitable development more widespread. In particular, it has been part of the update processes for the South and Southeast L.A. Community Plans, which contain zoning powers derived from Community Plan Implementation Overlay zones (CPIOs) and will set the rules for what can be built on the land for decades to come. Though the updates for both plans were slated for release, the City has pushed back the timeline for all community plans in the wake of litigation against the Hollywood Community Plan (Zahniser 2014). Additionally, some community leaders have concerns that the sort of development incentivized by the South and Southeast L.A. plans in their current drafts may cause displacement of existing residents. UNIDAD is also following the money. Los Angeles County is heavily investing in transportation. Measure R puts $40 billion into transportation build-out over the next 30 years, and the way that plays out will have huge impacts on communities. In response, a coalition that includes many UNIDAD member organizations—the Alliance for Community Transit-Los Angeles (ACT-LA)—has developed a citywide Transit-Oriented Development policy that would prevent displacement, increase access to jobs, preserve community assets and culture, promote health and green neighborhoods, and ensure deep civic engagement.

Policymaking at broader geographies is a particularly important tool. While UNIDAD is in the midst of work in South Central, citywide and regional policies can prevent the repeated and hard work of negotiating individual CBAs and let the coalition turn to other ways to make their communities’ vision for just growth a reality. These hard-won lessons can also be exported to other places. UNIDAD has built expertise in shaping development towards equity, in engaging powerful and private institutions, and in staying rooted in place. As such, when UC Berkeley started its expansion into Richmond, CA—a city with a number of parallels to historic South Central—UNIDAD members provided technical assistance to partners working in the Richmond community.

The University of California expansion into Richmond, CA, has been a relatively smoother process than the USC Master Plan, in part because it is much smaller. While USC’s University Village will build over 5 million square

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15 One of the advantages of the place-based funding from The California Endowment was that it supported not only the coalition members but also supported the lawyers necessary to negotiate the CBAs. TCE took a broader view of their role as a funder, becoming a facilitator of neighborhood empowerment and community health.

16 http://www.allianceforcommunitytransit.org/campaigns
feet of new floor area, the Richmond expansion’s first phase is only set to be between 300,000 and 400,000 square feet (Li 2015). Part of this is the charge of a public university and the role of its Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society in working with affected community groups, part of this is the deep social movement infrastructure in the Bay Area, and part is the technical assistance provided by the UNIDAD coalition (with funding from TCE for the Richmond BHC area). Campus-community inequalities in resources, power, and capacity are being kept at the center of the process (see “UNIDAD’s Expertise Expanded” box for details).

As development pushes outwards from downtown Los Angeles, these many tools for equitable development will continue to be used and honed. One such possibility at-hand: USC is expanding its Health Sciences Campus in east Los Angeles, also through a Master Planning process.17 The major community benefit to date is the $1 million gift to the Los Angeles Parks Foundation (Lara 2015). With the uptick in regional redevelopment, the more community coalitions can influence City planning policy, the less they will have to pivot from CBA to CBA.

17 Health Sciences Campus Master Plan website: http://hscmasterplan.usc.edu/
UNIDAD’s Expertise Expanded: 
The UC Berkeley Expansion’s Community-Engagement Process

UC Berkeley’s Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society is leading the community-engagement portion of their campus expansion project. The Haas Institute is collaborating with the Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment (ACCE), Contra Costa Interfaith Supporting Community Organization (CCISCO), and Safe Return Project, not to mention receiving technical assistance from UNIDAD. In 2013, it held multiple workshops, door-to-door conversations, and other meetings to collect residents’ analysis of the impacts and opportunities of the planned “Global Campus at Richmond Bay.” Organizers brought community ideas and data to UC Berkeley, and the UC Berkeley Chancellor and Director of the Lawrence Berkeley Nuclear Laboratory (a partner in the expansion) signed a Joint Statement of Commitment in three meetings. That CBA includes educational partnership and programs, local hiring programs, workforce training opportunities, minority and women small business set-asides, a permanent community grant-making program, and a broader working group for long-term community partnership.

The Haas Institute and community partners’ findings and additional research have also been released in a report Anchor Richmond (Moore et al. 2015). It details how the new campus could help improve workforce opportunities, businesses and community wealth, housing, youth and education, environmental health, community investment, and community engagement. This report brings to light the housing needs in Richmond, where most residents are renters and low-income residents facing one of the most expensive regional rental markets in the U.S. Researchers propose several strategies to dampen displacement (like a Community Land Trust), as well as offer indicators to trace the impact of the campus. The UC Berkeley experience builds on the lessons of UNIDAD’s more than one decade of work with USC.

Source: “Anchor Richmond: Community Opportunity & Anchor Strategies for the Berkeley Global Campus at Richmond Bay” (Moore, Barhoum, and Alvarez Franco 2015).
Conclusion

While UNIDAD has deep capacity in shaping development to be equitable, its vision is much broader. CBAs, community plans, zoning policies, and the like are part of getting to a more democratic practice of community building. UNIDAD is building power to create a seat at the table so that all stakeholders in development are present. As much as USC has tangible interests in investments in historic South Central, so does UNIDAD. Both want a more vibrant community – but UNIDAD has to build power to be heard.

Increasing the diversity of stakeholders involved in development is better for the region. This makes intuitive sense – regions are more likely to grow together if there is a shared analysis, and people believe that others have their back.

But research is also demonstrating the importance of community conversations in generating sustained and inclusive growth (Benner and Pastor 2015). The trick is that these conversations cannot just occur between friends but also between those who may have different immediate interests yet in the long-run share a single common destiny.

This was certainly the case for the university and its surrounding community and even the case with the G.H. Palmer Associates development where the viability of Lorenzo as a place where students felt welcome and safe depended on a community that could also embrace the project.

There is a misleading sense that conflict about development is the opposite of collaboration: As we see in both these cases, what really happened is that tough issues were raised, realities were recognized by both sides, and in the long-run, better development resulted.

Thus we return to our three central lessons in planning for a better future. First, movements matter. In order for the community to be effectively represented, someone needed to engage the grassroots, forge a narrative, and act with strategy. UNIDAD became a key vehicle for doing this – and while the coalition members brought a variety of skills, their main goal and effect was simply to rebalance power in such a way that residents being threatened by displacement could effectively voice and have policymakers act on their concerns.

Second, models matter. Fortunately, the vehicle of a community benefits agreement was available – although the striking thing is that these were CBAs like few others (there was no public subsidy to leverage and the main needs of labor had already been addressed). As a result, UNIDAD had to borrow from other experiences and adapt tools to fit the circumstances, including strategies to build broad coalitions and develop leaders, conduct and publicize research, and understand the inside and outside games enough to balance power-building with ally cultivation, and tough stances with a willingness to negotiate. Now UNIDAD is paying it forward by providing expertise to others tackling similar challenges in other locales.
Third, histories matter. On the one hand, the histories of the organizations working together in the past was key to being able to build trust and unity. But also important was understanding the history of disinvestment in South Central and the resulting concerns about being left out of development when it finally occurred; understanding the history of G.H. Palmer Associates and why a CBA would be a novel thing for them; and finally understanding that while USC was a major force for displacement in the area, it was also an institution with community programs that had built support. So any strategy had to be nuanced in a way that would lead to partnership later on when the negotiations ended and the implementation began. Histories can be sustained and remembered through historicizing by and for the community. For example, the Rev. Warner Traynham Health Center includes an installation detailing the history of the Lorenzo campaign so as to give permanency to the movement. These development partnerships have allowed for the community to imprint its assets, resources, and culture onto the built environment.

And while all these dimensions that matter have been discussed in this report, there are a final two that also deserve mention.

First, health matters. With the support of TCE, UNIDAD developed and led with a framework that stressed the link between community health and adequate housing, decent employment, and affordable food as well as to direct services like health clinics – and that civic engagement can both help to achieve these goals and improve the confidence, efficacy and well-being of neighborhood residents. This is a view of health that extends far beyond hospitals and medical insurance – important at they are – to the conditions that make for vibrant communities.

Second, the future matters. One reason to conduct organizing and negotiations in a powerful but principled way is that developers, communities, and universities will all still be around when the dust is settled and life goes on. One reason for all sides to adopt a more inclusive vision of development is that our very sustainability as a society depends on whether we can learn to find the sweet spots where equity and growth come together.

The secrets to getting that balance right will be found in the conflicts and collaborations occurring in our urban areas. Demographic and economic dynamics are leading to a rebirth of central cities, even as American income inequality hits historic peaks. Movement organizations, civic leaders, forward-looking businesses, and non-profits need to understand these trends and work together to bend their arc in a way that will help us to establish the types of communities most of us actually want – ones that are diverse, vibrant, and responsive to their residents. The UNIDAD story highlights new possibilities for equitable development and helps to point the way forward for an urban America still very much grappling with our common future.
List of Interviewees

*Titles reflect interviewee’s roles in relationship to the UNIDAD campaigns.*

*=Previous position at time of interview.*

Mike Ector, Program Manager, Coordinator Services Program, PV Jobs  
Sandra McNeill, Executive Director, T.R.U.S.T. South LA

Larry Frank, Deputy Mayor, City of Los Angeles*  
Jan Perry, Councilmember, City Council, City of Los Angeles*

David Galaviz, Executive Director, Local Government Relations, USC  
Ed Reyes, Councilmember, City Council, City of Los Angeles*

Paulina Gonzalez, Executive Director, SAJE*  
Thomas Sayles, Senior Vice President, University Relations, USC

Nancy Halpern Ibrahim, Executive Director, Esperanza Community Housing  
Greg Smith, Vice President of Development, G.H. Palmer Associates*

Craig Keys, Associate Senior Vice President, Civic Engagement, USC  
Benjamin Torres, President & CEO, Community Development Technology Center (CDTech), Los Angeles Trade Technical College (LATTC)

Mercedes Márquez, General Manager of the Housing + Community Investment Department and Deputy Mayor for Housing, City of Los Angeles*  
Jeff Wiginton, PhD Candidate, Sol Price School of Public Policy, USC*


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