COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH: DECISION-MAKING IN CRISES: THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF FOREIGN POLICY GROUPS

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- Appendices 1-4: Complete Coding Criteria for Variables to be added to the ICB Data Set
- Appendix 5: Coding of Selected Variables for Iran Hostage Crisis (ICB Crisis #309)
APPENDIX 1: Questions Used to Code Variables Related to the Primary Decision Unit

Variables to be coded:

1. *The Nature of the Ultimate Decision Unit (Predominant Leader, Single Group, or Multiple Autonomous Actors)*: coded based on questions 1-14

2. *Permeability of Decision Unit (Self-contained or Open to External Influence)*: coded based on questions 15 and 16 if decision unit is single group or multiple autonomous actors; if the decision unit is predominant leader, coded based on whether the head of state’s LTA conceptual complexity score (see Appendix 2) is below the median score for heads of state (self-contained unit) or above the median score (externally influenceable unit).

Questions to be used:

1) Begin by identifying an immediate substantive problem that the regime has recognized. (For the ICB cases, this would be the foreign policy crisis in question).

2) Is there in the regime’s leadership a single individual with the power/authority to commit (or withhold) the regime’s resources in the affected issue area regardless of opposition by others?
   If YES, go to Q3; if NO, skip to Q8

3) Has the leader manifested in the past a general, active interest in as well as involvement with foreign and defense issues?
   If NO, go to Q4; if YES, skip to Q6

4) Is the immediate foreign policy problem one perceived by the regime leadership to be critical for the well-being of the regime or society or does it entail high-level diplomacy and protocol?
   If NO, go to Q5; if YES, skip to Q6

5) Does the immediate problem concern a matter known to be of personal interest to the leader?
   If YES, go to Q6; if NO, skip to Q8

6) Does the leader, after setting the general policy direction for coping with the problem, evidence regular, active participation in the decision process?
   If YES, go to Q7; if NO, skip to Q8

7) Does the leader include selected others as part of the decision process throughout the examination of the problem and give them a “veto” over any decision?
   If NO, the **DECISION UNIT IS PREDOMINANT LEADER**; if YES, go to Q8
8) Does the problem as defined fall within the domain of an issue area for which there is only one known dominant policy group?
   If NO, go to Q9; if YES, skip to Q12

9) When a foreign or defense problem is perceived to be critical for the well-being of the regime or society, is there one group that can exercise final authority to commit or withhold the regime’s resources in coping with the problem?
   If NO, skip to Q11; if YES, go to Q10

10) Is the current problem perceived to be critical?
    If YES, skip to Q12; if NO, go to Q11

11) Are the policy groups likely to be involved with the immediate problem arrayed in a hierarchical manner in relation to one another such that somewhere in the chain of command one group can make an authoritative decision to commit or withhold the regime’s resources?
    If YES, go to Q12; if NO, skip to Q14

12) Is everyone within the regime whose support is essential to commit or withhold the regime’s resources for coping with the immediate problem a member of the same policy group, such that a group decision cannot readily be altered by outside opposition?
    If YES, go to Q13; if NO, skip to Q14

13) Is the issue area of which the immediate problem is a part one in which the regime is dependent upon the approval of an external (foreign) entity?
    If NO, the DECISION UNIT IS SINGLE GROUP; if Yes, the DECISION UNIT IS MULTIPLE AUTONOMOUS ACTORS

14) Are there two or more separate actors (groups, organizations) who do not combine into a single decision unit and none of the actors can by itself (i.e., without the concurrence of one or more others) commit or withhold the regime’s resources in coping with the immediate problem?
    If Yes, the DECISION UNIT IS MULTIPLE AUTONOMOUS ACTORS; If No, go to Q13.

15) If the decision unit is a single group, is the group able to achieve prompt consensus on the best course of action, or is there considerable disagreement about how to proceed?

16) If the decision unit is multiple autonomous actors, do these actors interact in a competitive, adversarial way do they exhibit little or no conflict?
APPENDIX 2: Questions Used to Code Variables Related to Structure of Advisory Group

Variables to be coded:

1. *Structure of advisory system (formalist, collegial, or competitive)*: coded based on questions 1-9

Questions to be used:

(1) Who are the main foreign policy advisers to the leader? Please indicate their names and positions.

(2) Is there a clear chain of command among these advisers, or, are they pretty much on an equal footing?

(3) Among all the main foreign policy advisers, is there someone clearly the dominant and the most influential one? If yes, please indicate his/her name and position.

(4) Were there clear divisions of opinions/preferences among the advisers? If so, please describe the nature of the division and indicate the names of the advisers that represent each side.

(5) If the answer to question (4) above is Yes, then were these differences often expressed/debated in public (e.g., during meetings with the leader) or kept in private? If the answer to question (4) above is No, then skip this question.

(6) Does the leader often seek advice from only one or two close advisers or equally from all the advisors?

(7) Was the leader aware of the different opinions/preferences among the advisers?

(8) How would you characterize the advisory process?
   a. All the advisors work equally as a team and strive for building consensus
   b. There was a clear hierarchy where one advisor is the most powerful and dominates the advisory system
   c. All the advisers work as a team but the emphasis is on advocating respective position and debate.
   d. None of the above (if this option is chosen, please describe below how you would characterize the advisory process)
   e. Don’t know

(9) How would you characterize the leader’s relations with the advisers?
   a. The leader often seeks information from one or two key advisers.
   b. The leader often seeks information from all the advisers in a group meeting setting.
   c. The leader often seeks information from all the advisers but one or a few at a time.
d. None of the above ((if this option is chosen, please describe below how you would characterize the relationship between the leader and the advisers.)
e. Don’t know.
APPENDIX 3: Questions Used to Code Variables Related to Small Group Dynamics

Variables to be coded:

Symptoms of Groupthink (Coded as Absent/Minimal, Moderate, Strong, except for Variable 5)
1. Overestimation of Group Power: coded based on questions 1 and 2
2. Overestimation of Group Morality: coded based on question 3
3. Closed-mindedness: coded based on questions 4 and 5
4. Pressures Toward Uniformity: coded based on questions 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10
5. Overall Severity of Groupthink: coded by adding scores from variables 1-4, with
   Absent/Minimal = 0, Moderate = 1, and Strong = 2 (scores for variables 1 and 2 are each
   multiplied by .5 before adding them to the scores for variables 3 and 4).

“Rational” versus “Defective” Decision-Making (Coded as Absent/Minimal, Moderate, Strong,
except for Variable 8)
1. Complete Survey of Alternatives: coded based on question 11
2. Complete Survey of Objectives: coded based on question 12
3. Complete Survey of Risks of Preferred Choice: coded based on question 13
4. Reappraisal of Initially Rejected Options: coded based on question 14
5. High Quality Information Search: coded based on question 15
6. Bias in Information Processing: coded based on question 16
7. Existence of Contingency Plans: coded based on question 17
8. Overall Rationality of Decision-Making: coded by adding scores from variables 1-7, with
   Absent/Minimal = 0, Moderate = 1, and Strong = 2 (variable 6 is reverse-coded)

Observed Causes of Groupthink (Coded as Absent/Minimal, Moderate, Strong)
1. Group Cohesion: coded based on questions 18, 19, and 20
2. Impartial Leadership: coded based on questions 21, 22, and 23
3. Tradition of Impartial Leadership: coded based on question 24
4. Procedural Norms: coded based on question 25
5. Clear Procedures: coded based on question 26
6. Insulation of Group: will be coded based on questions 27 and 28

Absence/Presence of New Group Syndrome (Coded as Absent/Minimal, Moderate, Strong)
1. Group Stage: coded based on questions 29 and 30
2. Group Norming: coded based on question 30

Group Role (Coded as Absent/Minimal, Moderate, Strong)
1. Group as Think Tank: coded based on questions 31 and 32
2. Group as Command Center: coded based on questions 33 and 34
3. Group as Arena: coded based on question 35
4. Group as Sorter: coded based on question 36
5. Group as Ideologue: coded based on question 37
6. Group as Smokescreen: coded based on question 38
Questions to be used:

1) Do most or all of the group members share a sense of invulnerability—that the group can achieve whatever it wishes and avoid negative outcomes?

Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

2) Does the group appear to be overly optimistic about its plans succeeding given the objective situation it faces?

Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

3) Do group members appear to have an unquestioned belief in the group’s inherent morality—that the group’s plans are moral and raise no ethical concerns?

Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

4) When faced with warnings or other information that might lead group members to reconsider their assumptions before recommitting themselves to past policy decisions, do group members collectively rationalize, minimize, or seek to explain away these unpleasant facts?

Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

5) Do group members have stereotyped views of enemy leaders as too evil to warrant genuine attempts to negotiate, or as too weak and stupid to counter whatever attempts are made to defeat their purposes?

Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

6) Does the group reach an apparent consensus relatively quickly on the appropriate course of action?

Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

7) Do some group members harbor doubts about the group’s preferred policy approach that they do not raise in front of the full group?

Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

8) Do individual group members believe that despite their own private doubts the rest of the group members are in full agreement?

Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence
9) If any group member expresses strong arguments against any of the group’s stereotypes, illusions, or commitments, does the group apply direct pressure to this dissenter, making clear that this type of dissent is contrary to what is expected of all loyal members?

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<th>Clearly Yes</th>
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10) Do some members of the group take it upon themselves to protect the group from information that casts doubt on the effectiveness or morality of the group’s preferred policy (e.g., by taking dissenters aside and telling them to keep their dissenting views quiet, or by otherwise keeping this unpleasant information from the group)?

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<th>Clearly Yes</th>
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11) Do the key decision-makers conduct a complete survey of policy alternatives?

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12) Do the key decision-makers clearly identify their objectives?

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13) Do the key decision-makers examine the risks of the preferred policy choice?

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14) Do the key decision-makers reappraise options that they initially rejected?

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15) Do the key decision-makers conduct a comprehensive search for information about the situation and the likely effectiveness of various options before deciding on a course of action?

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16) Do the key decision-makers selectively notice and/or give greater weight to pieces of data that support the preferred policy course and ignore or discount information that casts doubt on the preferred policy?

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17) Do the key decision-makers work out contingency plans in case the preferred policy does not work as planned?

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18) Do group members appear to really like each other and get along well?
Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

19) Do group members have a sense of solidarity or common purpose?
Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

20) Do group members appear to have positive feelings about attending group meetings and carrying out the routine tasks of the group?
Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

21) Does the leader use his or her power or prestige to influence the members of the group to approve of the policy alternative he or she prefers?
Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

22) Does the leader encourage the group members to engage in open inquiry and critical evaluation of options?
Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

23) Does the leader make his or her preferences known to the group regarding the best course of action early in the decision-making process?
Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

24) Is there an identifiable tradition or norm in this group (in place prior to this decision-making episode) that dictates the leader will remain impartial about the best course of action until the group has had a chance to consider a range of alternatives?
Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

25) Is there an identifiable tradition or norm in this group (in place prior to this decision-making episode) that establishes methodical procedures for coming to a decision?
Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

26) Do the group members self-consciously decide on a set of procedures by which a decision will be reached before launching into the decision-making process?
Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

27) Is the group insulated from the opinions of outside experts and critical evaluation from others within the government?
28) Does the group seek expert opinions from sources beyond the group itself?

Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

29) Is the group at a relatively early stage of development?

Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

30) Is the group showing signs of undergoing a process of norming, that is, reaching agreement on how it will operate?

Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

31) Does the group arrive at a common representation of events?

Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

32) Do the group members share information available to them with their colleagues?

Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

33) Is the group able to effectively coordinate and control foreign policy actions taken on its behalf?

Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

34) Is someone (identify them) in control over the group?

Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

35) Do any of the following – divergent perceptions, mixed motives and bureau-political role playing – affect the group’s deliberation process and outcomes?

Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

36) Is the agenda for the group sorted out in a rational way?

Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence

37) Are members of the group expected to project and maintain dominant beliefs and values?

Clearly Yes  Somewhat  Clearly No  Insufficient Evidence
38) Does the group appear to be the real decision-making body or could it be a smokescreen for legitimation of a decision already made?
### APPENDIX 4: Questions Used to Code Variables Related to Bureaucratic Politics

Variables to be coded:

1. *Fragmented Power*: coded based on question 1  
2. *Multiple Actors/Different Interests*: coded based on question 2  
3. *Politically-Generated Outcomes*: coded based on question 3

Questions to be used:

1) Is power fragmented on an agency basis?

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2) Do multiple actors express varying interests?

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3) Are outcomes politically generated?

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APPENDIX 5: Coding of Selected Variables for Iran Hostage Crisis (ICB Crisis #309)

THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF FOREIGN POLICY GROUPS

1) Primary Decision Unit

3. The Nature of the Ultimate Decision Unit:
   a. Predominant Leader
   b. Single Group
   c. Multiple Autonomous Actors

4. Permeability of Decision Unit:
   a. Self-Contained
   b. Open to External Influence

2) Structure of Advisory Group
   a. Formalistic
   b. Collegial
   c. Competitive

3) Small Group Dynamics

Symptoms of Groupthink
6. Overestimation of Group Power:
   a. Absent/Minimal
   b. Moderate
   c. Strong

7. Overestimation of Group Morality:
   a. Absent/Minimal
   b. Moderate
   c. Strong

8. Closed-mindedness:
   a. Absent/Minimal
   b. Moderate
   c. Strong

9. Pressures Toward Uniformity:
   a. Absent/Minimal
   b. Moderate
   c. Strong

10. Overall Severity of Groupthink (on scale from 0 to 6): 3.5
“Rational” versus “Defective” Decision-Making

9. Complete Survey of Alternatives:
   a. Absent/Minimal
   b. Moderate
   c. Strong

10. Complete Survey of Objectives:
    a. Absent/Minimal
    b. Moderate
    c. Strong

11. Complete Survey of Risks of Preferred Choice:
    a. Absent/Minimal
    b. Moderate
    c. Strong

12. Reappraisal of Initially Rejected Options:
    a. Absent/Minimal
    b. Moderate
    c. Strong

13. High Quality Information Search:
    a. Absent/Minimal
    b. Moderate
    c. Strong

14. Bias in Information Processing:
    a. Absent/Minimal
    b. Moderate
    c. Strong

15. Existence of Contingency Plans:
    a. Absent/Minimal
    b. Moderate
    c. Strong

16. Overall Rationality of Decision-Making (on scale from 0 to 14): 10

Observed Causes of Groupthink

7. Group Cohesion:
   a. Absent/Minimal
   b. Moderate
   c. Strong

8. Impartial Leadership:
a. Absent/Minimal
b. Moderate
c. Strong

9. Tradition of Impartial Leadership:
   a. Absent/Minimal
   b. Moderate
   c. Strong

10. Procedural Norms:
    a. Absent/Minimal
    b. Moderate
    c. Strong

11. Clear Procedures:
    a. Absent/Minimal
    b. Moderate
    c. Strong

12. Insulation of Group:
    a. Absent/Minimal
    b. Moderate
    c. Strong